JUDGMENT Jagmohan Lal, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arises out of proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The dispute related to two plot nos. 155 and 163 which had been recorded in the basic year in the names of Laxmi Kant and Sri Kant opposite parties 5 and 6 who are daughter's sons of one Srimati Lachminia, but in the remarks column these plots were recorded to be in possession of Deo Chand petitioner no. 1 and at the time of partal he was found to be in possession. An objection under Section 9 (2) of the Consolidation Act was filed by Deo Chand alleging that by virtue of his remaining in adverse possession for more than the prescribed statutory period he had acquired sirdari rights in both these plots under Section 210 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Another objection was filed by his wife Srimati Kailasha petitioner no. 2 with respect to a part of plot no. 163 with the allegation that this part of plot no. 163 which was a Zamindari grove had been purchased by her from Srimati Lachminia, the previous owner of it, by means of a registered sale deed dated 14-10-1939 and since then she was in possession of this property. On the other hand the contention of Laxmi Kant and Sri Kant was that both these plots belonged to their maternal grand mother Srimati Lachminia as a zamindar before the abolition of the zamindari. After the abolition of the zamindari she became bhumidhar of these plots and on the death of Srimati Lachminia these opposite parties inherited them and since then they were in possession thereof. According to them the entry regarding Deo Chand's possession against these plots was wrong and fictitious. They wanted that this entry may be expunged. 2. The Consolidation Officer rejected the claim of the petitioners and upheld the contention of the opposite parties 5 and 6. He accordingly ordered that the name of Deo Chand who was recorded as occupant of these plots shall be expunged from the records. On an appeal filed by the petitioners the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) found under his judgment, dated 5-8-1967 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition) that Deo Chand had been in possession of plot no. He accordingly ordered that the name of Deo Chand who was recorded as occupant of these plots shall be expunged from the records. On an appeal filed by the petitioners the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) found under his judgment, dated 5-8-1967 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition) that Deo Chand had been in possession of plot no. 163 at the time of abolition of the zamindari and as such he acquired rights of an asami in this land under Section 21 (d) of the zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. He could not, however, acquire adivasi/sirdari rights in it because the land was the grove of an intermediary and the intermediary acquired bhumidhari rights therein after the abolition of the zamindari. With respect to the claim of Srimati Kailasha petitioner he was of the view that since the sale deed in her favour executed by Srimati Lachminia had not been duly proved she could not claim any title in this plot under the sale deed. He accordingly dismissed the appeal of Srimati Kailasha while the appeal of Deo Chand was decreed with respect of plot no. 163 against which his name was ordered to be entered as asami under clause 7. But his appeal with respect to plot no. 155 was dismissed. The petitioners then went in revision before the Deputy Director who agreed with the findings recorded by the appellate authority and dismissed the revision on 27-3-1968 (vide annexure 6). The petitioners have now come before this Court by filing this writ petition. The writ was contested by the opposite parties 5 and 6 who filed a counter-affidavit. 3. I heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) as well as the Deputy Director committed a manifest error of law by relying on the provisions of Sec. 90-A of the Evidence Act as amended in its application to this State for rejecting the sale deed dated 14-10-1939 executed by the predecessor of the opposite parties 5 and 6 in favour of the petitioner no. 2 which document had been filed by the petitioners in original and was more than 20 years old as such the genuineness of this document could be presumed under Section 90 of the Evidence Act without any formal evidence to prove its execution. 2 which document had been filed by the petitioners in original and was more than 20 years old as such the genuineness of this document could be presumed under Section 90 of the Evidence Act without any formal evidence to prove its execution. It is pointed out that the presumption available under Section 90 is independently of the presumption available under Sec. 90-A and that presumption is not subject to the condition laid down in Sub-Sec. (2) of the latter Section. Sec. 90-A provides for presumption of genuineness without formal proof of its execution in respect of a registered document or a duly certified copy thereof or any certified copy of a document which is part of the record of court of justice and is produced from any custody which the court in a particular case considers proper. This presumption is, however, subject to the condition that it shall not be made in respect of any document which is a basis of the suit or of a defence or is relied upon in a plaint or written statement. In this case we are concerned only with a registered document which was filed in original. The presumption available under Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 90-A governs every registered document even though it is not more than 20 years old. If, however, the registered document is more than 20 years old an independent presumption in respect of its genuineness is available under Section 90 which is not subject to a condition similar to the one contained in Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 90-A. 4. It is difficult to accept the contention that so far as registered document are concerned they are all governed by Sec. 90-A including Sub-Sec. (2) thereof whether they are more or less than 20 years old. If this contention is accepted it would make the provisions of Section 90 redundant and superfluous so far as registered documents are concerned. It is one of the rules of interpretation that if the two provisions of a statute are capable of more than one interpretation they should be construed harmoniously so as not to render one or the other provision superfluous or nugatory. It is one of the rules of interpretation that if the two provisions of a statute are capable of more than one interpretation they should be construed harmoniously so as not to render one or the other provision superfluous or nugatory. In my opinion the presumption under Section 90 so far as it relates to registered documents applies only to the documents which are more than 20 years old and this presumption is not subject to a condition similar to the one contained in Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 90-A. On the other hand the presumption available under Sub-Sec. (1) of S. 90-A applies to registered document or copies thereof which are not more than 20 years old and that is subject to the condition laid down in Sub-Sec.(2) of this section that it will not apply to those documents which are the basis of the suit or defence or are relied upon in the plaint or written statement. 5. A registered document filed from proper custody whose genuineness has remained unchallenged for more than twenty years is entitled to some respect simply on account of its age even if that happens to be the basis of the suit or is relied upon by the plaintiff in his plaint. No hardship is likely to be caused if the court starts with an initial presumption if in favour of its genuineness and throws the burden on the other party who challenges its clue execution to lead evidence in support of his challenge. But in the case of a recent document which is the basis of the suit or defence or relied upon by a party in his plaint or written statement it will not be just to start with this presumption and shift the burden on the other party to prove want of due execution. So a restriction was imposed in respect of such documents in Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 90-A. 6. Even assuming that Sec. 90-A is all comprehensive so as to cover even those cases which fall under Section 90, the condition laid down in Sub-Sec. (2) has to be applied to only those documents which are the basis of the suit or of a defence. In the present case the basis of the claim preferred by the petitioner no. 2 was the plot no. 163 of which she asserted herself to be the bhumidhar. In the present case the basis of the claim preferred by the petitioner no. 2 was the plot no. 163 of which she asserted herself to be the bhumidhar. In proof of her claim she relied on her possession over the land in dispute as well as the transfer of ownership made to her by the previous owner Srimati Lachaminia under the sale deed dated 14-10-39. On these facts the sale deed cannot be said to be the basis of the suit but only a piece of the evidence in support of the claim set up by the petitioner no. 2. If a suit is filed to enforce a registered mortgage-deed or to recover possession of the property conveyed under a sale deed and in the alternative for recovery of the price from the vendor, the suit can be said to be based on the mortgage-deed or the sale deed as the case may be. In such a case it is for the plaintiff to prove the due execution of the document which is the basis of his suit and by relying on the presumption under Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 90-A he cannot be permitted to throw the burden on the other side. If the document is not the basis of the suit but is simply relied upon as a piece of evidence it is permissible to presume its genuineness under Section 90 if it is more than twenty years old and under Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 90-A if it is a registered document or a duly certified copy thereof and is less than twenty years old. The sale deed dated 14-10-39 was a registered document and it was more than twenty years old. So its genuineness could be presumed under any of these two provisions even in the absence of any formal proof. The consolidation authorities were not justified in putting out sale deed from consideration by applying a wrong provision of law. 7. The learned counsel for the opposite parties contended that the presumption available under Section 90 or 90-A is a discretionary presumption and if the consolidation authorities did not think it proper to draw such a presumption, it cannot be a matter of challenge in a petition under Article 226. 7. The learned counsel for the opposite parties contended that the presumption available under Section 90 or 90-A is a discretionary presumption and if the consolidation authorities did not think it proper to draw such a presumption, it cannot be a matter of challenge in a petition under Article 226. It is true that the courts have a discretion to make such a presumption under these provisions but that discretion has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. They commit a legal error if they not only arbitrarily refuse to exercise this discretion but also invoke wrong provisions of law in support of the stand taken by them. In this case the sale deed, if it had not been excluded from evidence on a mis-application of law, would have gone to the root of the matter whether or not the opposite party no. 2 had acquired a title to that part of plot no. 163 which had been conveyed to her under this sale deed. The learned counsel for the petitioner also pointed out that on the basis of this sale deed mutation had also been effected in favour of the petitioner no. 2 in the khewat and though the petitioner had filed a copy of that khewat it has not been taken into consideration by the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) or the Deputy Director. This is alleged to be an another error in the judgments of these authorities which vitiates their findings that the petitioner no. 2 is not the owner of the land in dispute. To this extent the challenge of the petitioners to the orders of the Assistant Settlement Officer and the Deputy Director appears well founded. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that in respect of plot no. 155 also the findings of these authorities suffer from a legal error in so far as they did not place reliance on the entries in the remarks column of the khasra wherein Deo Chand petitioner no. 1 was recorded as occupant of plot no. 155. Against this plot, as stated earlier, the opposite parties 5 and 6 were recorded as tenure-holders in column no. 1 while the petitioner no. 1 was simply recorded as an occupant. Both the parties adduced evidence to prove their possession over this plot. 1 was recorded as occupant of plot no. 155. Against this plot, as stated earlier, the opposite parties 5 and 6 were recorded as tenure-holders in column no. 1 while the petitioner no. 1 was simply recorded as an occupant. Both the parties adduced evidence to prove their possession over this plot. While appraising that evidence the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the Deputy Director did not attach much value to the entries in favour of the petitioner no. 1 in the remarks column of the Khasra on the ground that these entries had not been made in compliance with the provisions of Para A-102-C of the Land Records Manual and they choose to rely on other evidence in coming to the finding of fact that the opposite parties 5 and 6 were in possession of this land. Under these circumstances this finding of fact recorded by these consolidation authorities cannot be challenged in this writ petition. 9. The writ is partly allowed and the last order of the Deputy Director dated 27-3-1968 is quashed so far as it relates to plot no. 163. The Deputy Director is directed to re-hear the revision filed by the petitioners with regard to this plot after taking into consideration the registered sale deed dated 14-10-39 as well as other evidence that had been produced by the parties and then to decide the dispute between the parties relating to this plot. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.