GOSWAMI, C. J.:- This appli­cation under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against an order of remand passed by the learned Assistant District Judge No. 1, Gauhati, while deciding an appeal against the decree earlier passed by the learned Munsiff. 2. It is necessary to refer to the vagary of the litigation in this matter over a title suit filed as early as on 6th November, 1957 centering round a dispute with regard to six lessas of land with a thatched cowsh­ed in Gauhati town. The learned Mun­siff dismissed the suit on 5th June 1959. An appeal (T. A. 40/59) was filed before the Additional District Judge who set aside the decree of the trial Court on 7th June, 1960 and re­manded the suit for disposal. The learned Munsiff this time decreed the suit on 5th December, 1961. An ap­peal (T. A. 15/62) was heard by the learned Subordinate Judge, who set aside the decree and remanded the suit on 1st September, 1964 for the second time for disposal in accord­ance with law by appointing a fresh survey commission for surveying of dag No. 2506 (measuring 4 Kathas 12 lessas) to ascertain if the suit land formed part of that dag and directed that further evidence could be adduced by the parties on matters relating to the Survey Commissioner's report. The learned Munsiff heard the suit and this time decreed on 30th Janu­ary, 1969. An appeal (T. A. 45/69) was taken to the learned Assistant District Judge who, on 12th May, 1970, set aside the decree of the learn­ed Munsiff and third time remanded the suit "for disposal in accordance with law after careful consideration of all the issues before him by allow­ing the parties to adduce further evi­dence if they so desire." It is against this last remand order that this civil revision is directed. 3. The plaintiff's case briefly is that he has been in occupation as Mourasi tenant of Janardan Temple land measuring about 4 K. 10 L. in dag No. 1228 (Old) renumbered as dag No. 2506 (new) measuring 4K. 12L and that the defendant came to occupy with the plaintiff's permission six less­as out of this land and erected a thatched cowshed therein. The suit was brought when he refused to va­cate, after notice. The defendant denies the plaintiff's claim. 12L and that the defendant came to occupy with the plaintiff's permission six less­as out of this land and erected a thatched cowshed therein. The suit was brought when he refused to va­cate, after notice. The defendant denies the plaintiff's claim. He states that he was in occupation of the land in suit independently under Janardan temple and not with permission of the plaintiff. 4. The learned Additional Dis­trict Judge, while remanding the suit, held as under: "After taking the entire facts and circumstances into consideration, I hold that the defendant occupied the land in suit under the plaintiff and he has been in permissive possession of the same. As I have already indicat­ed, the defendant does not claim any land of dag No. 2506. The defendant's case is that the suit land does not fall within the plaintiff's dag." The learned Judge further observed: "The learned Munsiff will appoint an Amin to measure the area of Dag No. 2506 belonging to the plaintiff and to ascertain whether the land in suit forms a part of Dag No. 2506. The plaintiff will be entitled to decree on the basis of the Amin's finding. The other points should be decided on evi­dence on record, as the issues were al­ready framed and the parties led evi­dence on those issues." 5. Before we deal with the points, it is necessary to consider what was intended by the learned Addi­tional District Judge in remanding the suit for the first time. It is true that the learned Judge stated in his order that the other points should be decided on evidence on record as the issues were already fram­ed and the parties led evidence on those issues. We are of opinion that this obser­vation would not entitle the learned Mun­siff to interfere with any findings of fact arrived at by the learned Additional Dis­trict Judge. As noted earlier, the learned Judge held that the defendant occupied the land in suit under the plaintiff and he has been in permissive possession of the same. He also held that the defendant did not claim any land of Dag No. 2506 and his whole case was that the suit land did not fall within the plaintiff's dag. As noted earlier, the learned Judge held that the defendant occupied the land in suit under the plaintiff and he has been in permissive possession of the same. He also held that the defendant did not claim any land of Dag No. 2506 and his whole case was that the suit land did not fall within the plaintiff's dag. The learned Assistant District Judge later right­ly held that the only issue remained to be decided was whether the suit land formed part of Dag No. 2506 of the plaintiff, and he rightly remanded the suit directing the learned Munsiff to appoint a fresh Survey Commission for survey of Dag No. 2506 to ascertain if the suit land forms part of that dag. The learned Munsiff therefore was required only to consider whether the report of the third and last survey was correct or not and he accepted the report after considering the evidence given by the Commissioner, who was cross-examined by the defendant at length. On the Survey Commissioner's report and his evidence, the learned Munsiff held that the plaintiff was entitled to get possession of five lessas of land lying on the contiguous west of the dag which was found in the defendant's possession. The suit was accordingly de­creed with respect to five lessas of land instead of six lessas claimed by the plain­tiff. 6. The learned Assistant District Judge completely misconceived the scope of the dispute that survived for adjudication in the suit after the previous two appellate courts had passed the orders in the two earlier appeals, namely T. A. 40/59 and T. A. 15/62. 7. This is a simple suit in which the plaintiff wants recovery of six lessas of land where the defendant is having a cowshed with his permission. The ques­tion of title to the land does not arise. If the plaintiff establishes permissive occupa­tion of the defendant, he is entitled to a decree for eviction. The learned Addi­tional District Judge found as a fact that the defendant was in permissive occupation of the land under the plaintiff. Since, however, as the defendant has asserted that the land in suit is not included in the dag which is mentioned by the plaintiff, it became necessary to survey the land in Order to find out whether the plaintiff's case that the land in suit forms part of dag 2506 is correct or not. Since, however, as the defendant has asserted that the land in suit is not included in the dag which is mentioned by the plaintiff, it became necessary to survey the land in Order to find out whether the plaintiff's case that the land in suit forms part of dag 2506 is correct or not. That has been achieved by appointment of a Survey Com­missioner who stood the test of cross-exa­mination and his report was accepted by the court. In view of the short contro­versy that survived after the learned Addi­tional District Judge had determined the most important question about permissive occupation of the defendant, the learned Munsiff could not have gone beyond the ambit of the enquiry indicated in the ear­lier two appellate judgments which he was bound to follow. Indeed, those two judg­ments were never questioned by any of the parties in a higher court. The learned Assistant District Judge therefore acted illegally and with material irregularity in not deciding the appeal as it was and in remanding the suit in the way he has done. He has, therefore, failed to exercise his jurisdiction in not disposing of the appeal in accordance with law. We are, there­fore, constrained to set aside the judgment and order of the learned Assistant District Judge. 8. Since we have exercised our jurisdiction under Section 115, C.P.C. in this case to interfere with the order, what would be the order which we should pass? Should we remand the matter again to the first appellate court and for the forth time in the history of this litigation? Should we continue the problematic uncertainty of this litigation resultant as it seems to be of the orders of as many as six courts over six lessas of land with a tiny cowshed which may, after nearly 14 years of its challenging existence under the protection of the law, perhaps, give in to nature's fury if not yet to a decree of court? The justice of the case requires that we take the burden ourselves to examine the entire records and make the final order on the merits, just and appropriate, in the circum­stances of the case. Once we hold, which we do, that Section 115, C.P.C. is attract­ed, there is no bar in law to pass such order as the High Court thinks fit including final disposal of the suit. 9. Once we hold, which we do, that Section 115, C.P.C. is attract­ed, there is no bar in law to pass such order as the High Court thinks fit including final disposal of the suit. 9. We have found that there is a finding of fact by the learned Additional District Judge in appeal that the defendant was in permissive occupation of the land under the plaintiff and the finding is based on the evidence of the plaintiff, corrobo­rated by P.Ws. 2 and 3. The defendant's case of an independent right directly under the temple was found by the learned Judge to be false. On the above finding as to the permissive occupation of the land, the defendant is estopped from denying the title of the plaintiff. The second part of Section 116, Evidence Act, is clearly appli­cable to the defendant. That part of the section provides: "......no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof shall be per­mitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given". The rule of estoppel between landlord and tenant is also extended under Section 116, Evidence Act, in terms to licensee and, for the matter of that, to a person in permis­sive occupation of immovable property. The present suit, as framed, is therefore clearly maintainable in law. 10. We may observe that a court should decline to frame an issue as to main­tainability of a suit in absence of specific averment in the written statement as to how and in what circumstances the same is not maintainable in law. A mere vague recital in the written statement, without anything more, cannot be the basis for raising such an issue. Issues are framed for a right decision of the case with an object to pinpoint the real and substantial points of difference between the parties specifically and unambiguously emerging out of the pleadings. Vague issues, sug­gested in a mechanical way, should not be framed to keep the door open for astute casuistry as a suit proceeds at different levels leading inevitably to the law's delay. The court has to own its own responsibility in framing issues. 11. Vague issues, sug­gested in a mechanical way, should not be framed to keep the door open for astute casuistry as a suit proceeds at different levels leading inevitably to the law's delay. The court has to own its own responsibility in framing issues. 11. No question of notice tinder Section 106, Transfer of Property Act arises in view of the finding of the learned Judge, although one requisite under that section had been served on the defendant, who did not even deny this fact. 12. The report (Ext. 3) of the Sur­vey Commissioner (C.W. 1), his field book (Ext. 4) of local investigation read with his evidence given in the case leave no room for doubt in our mind that the sur­vey and measurements were properly and faithfully done and only five lessas out of the land in dag No. 2506 which the plaintiff has been admittedly holding under the tem­ple was in occupation of the defendant, as shown in the sketch maps, Ext. 5 (1) and 5 (2), the portion being marked 'A' in both. Hence, we unhesitatingly come to the con­clusion, in agreement with that of the trial Court, that the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for khas possession of five lessas of land mentioned above. 13. We, therefore, allow the appli­cation, set aside the judgment and order of the learned Assistant District Judge (Shri G. Hussain) and restore the decree of the learned Munsiff (Shri P. C. Saikia). In the special circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. D.M.Sen, J.:- 14. I agree. Application allowed.