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1971 DIGILAW 140 (KER)

KRISHNAN UDAYAN v. STATE OF KERALA

1971-06-24

E.K.MOIDU, P.NARAYANA PILLAI

body1971
Judgment :- 1. For the murder of his wife, Sosamma, the appellant was convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Mavelikara under S.302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. 2. The occurrence took place at or about 6 p. m. on 3 81970. The appellant and Sosamma belonged to the same village, Mulakuzha. They belonged to different communities. While the appellant was an Ezhava, Sosamma was a Christian. They loved each other and wanted to marry but their relations would not agree. Sosamma eloped with the appellant about three months before the occurrence. It was to Quilon that they went. There they got married and a registered document was executed to evidence it. When they had lived there happily only for about 20 days as husband and wife pw. 1, mother of Sosamma, came and during the absence of the appellant took Sosamma from there to her house in Mulakuzha. Thereafter pw.1 filed a suit against the appellant before the Chengannur Munsiff's court for declaration that the marriage of Sosamma with the appellant was invalid. The appellant came to know about it. 3. On the date of occurrence Sosamma took bath in a stream near her house along with pw. 2, a servant girl in a neighbouring house. Thereafter when she was doing her hair the appellant suddenly appeared there. He came near her and requested her to come with him. She flatly turned it down and asked him to mind his business and go away from there. Then saying that if she did not come with him one of them had to die he stabbed her on the chest with a knife and ran away. She and pw. 2 cried aloud. Neighbours and pw.1 came. After getting the injury on Sosamma bandaged she was removed to the Chengannur Government Hospital where she died at 7.30 p. m. that day. 4. pw.1 lodged the first information, Ext. P1, before the Chengannur Police Station. On the basis of it a case was taken up against the appellant and he was arrested the next day. According to the appellant he had nothing to do with the occurrence. 5. It is not disputed by appellant's counsel and is sufficiently proved in this case that Sosamma died as a result of the injury inflicted on her by the appellant at the time of occurrence. According to the appellant he had nothing to do with the occurrence. 5. It is not disputed by appellant's counsel and is sufficiently proved in this case that Sosamma died as a result of the injury inflicted on her by the appellant at the time of occurrence. Besides the evidence of the occurrence witnesses, pws. 2,4 and 5, of whom pws. 4 and 5 are neighbours, there is also the statement made by Sosamma to pw.1 when she came to the scene soon after the occurrence on hearing cries from there that it was the appellant who inflicted the injury found on her and the evidence of pws. 6 and 7, also neighbours, who saw the appellant going away from the scene with a penknife after the incident. There was absolutely no reason for these witnesses to falsely implicate the appellant. The injury cut the liver and the left superior epigastric artery. I am satisfied that it was the appellant who caused Sosamma's death. 6. This brings me to the question as to what exactly is the offence that the appellant has committed. His act is prima facie murder unless it is established that it comes under one or the other of the exceptions mentioned in S.300 of the IPC. Here the question is whether it comes under the first exception which deals with acts done when "deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation'. The atrocity of the offence would be mitigated if the act was done under the influence of a feeling which temporarily took away from the offender control over his actions. Several of man's misdeeds are committed on the spur of the moment. In reacting to situations he is easily swayed by emotions, which rob him of his faculty of reason, though momentarily. A person who has some control over emotions and passions would not easily be provoked by distasteful acts of others. Self-restraint, patience, forgiveness, tolerance and similar traits are the marks of distinction of a noble man. Even to his foe he would be considerate. Though Duryodhana was all out to wipe the Pandavas and adopted heineous methods Dharmaputrar of the Mahabharatha was never angry with him. On the other hand he knew that Hatred, jealousy, rudeness and other bad qualities were innate in bad men and so instead of being provoked by them he overlooked those failings. Though Duryodhana was all out to wipe the Pandavas and adopted heineous methods Dharmaputrar of the Mahabharatha was never angry with him. On the other hand he knew that Hatred, jealousy, rudeness and other bad qualities were innate in bad men and so instead of being provoked by them he overlooked those failings. At the same time there are persons unusually excitable or hasty or hypersensitive or hot-tempered or pugnacious who would easily get provoked even by trivial acts of others. When Dussasana started removing Panchali's dress it was different reactions that it produced on Dharmaputrar and his brothers who were then there. A man's provocation and self-control are solely dependant upon the extent of mastery he has gained over his emotions and passions. Noble men and hypersensitive and hot-tempered men are exceptions to the ordinary run of men. Law does not expect everyone to act like a Dharmaputrar. At the same time it does not expect him to be hypersensitive or hot-tempered also. It takes into account only the average man an ordinary reasonable man. He has the ordinary good and bad qualities. Anger is a passion to which even good men are subject and mere human fraility is not punished with ferocity. The usual test to ascertain whether a person acted under grave and sudden provocation is to see whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances have lost self-control. An average reasonable man of one class or society may differ entirely from that of another. What is provocation for an average man of one society may not be so for such a person of another society. A lurking suspicion about the conduct of his wife would have different reactions on different individuals. There are persons who have on discovery of illicit intimacy by their wives peacefully given them in marriage to those with whom they were on such intimacy. On the other hand there are those who have murdered their wives on such discovery. The law has no foot rule by which to measure reasonable conduct of an. average man. The important point to observe is that in this field judges have not been inventing or submitting to some arbitrary rule. The truth is that while fully aware of the literal meaning of the critical words "deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation" they have not been insensitive to implications. average man. The important point to observe is that in this field judges have not been inventing or submitting to some arbitrary rule. The truth is that while fully aware of the literal meaning of the critical words "deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation" they have not been insensitive to implications. As to what is reasonable conduct of an average man and what would constitute grave and sudden provocation depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In K. M. Nanavati v. State AIR 1962 SC 605 the Supreme Court said: "No abstract standard of reasonableness can be laid down. What a reasonable roan will do in certain circumstances depends upon the customs, manners, way of life, traditional values etc,; in short, the cultural, social and emotional background of the society to which an accused belongs. In our vast country there are social groups ranging from the lowest to the highest state of civilization. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any standard with precision; it is for the court to decide in each case, having regard to the relevant circumstances." 7. It is practically a rule of English Law that "mere words and gestures cannot, except in circumstances of most extreme and exceptional character"'be sufficient to constitute grave and sudden provocation. But there is no such rule in our country. Mental injury is sometimes more severe than physical injury. A good example of that occurred in Madhavan v. State of Kerala 1966 KLT.112 There after an alrecation between the husband and wife the latter swore that she would not go and live with the former, pulled their child which was with him towards her and after breaking her thali chain threw it at his face. He killed her by cutting her with the chopper in his hand. It was held by a Division Bench of this Court that Exception I of S.300 applied to the case. 8. During the temporary absence of self-control it would be meaningless to expect the person who has lost self-control to act like a reasonable man and modulate the attack. To put the idea differently it is unreasonable to expect him to act like a reasonable man after he has lost self-control. But the ferocity of his act during the temporary absence of self-control has a bearing on the question of punishment. 9. To put the idea differently it is unreasonable to expect him to act like a reasonable man after he has lost self-control. But the ferocity of his act during the temporary absence of self-control has a bearing on the question of punishment. 9. Having said that much, one turns to the instant case. The appellant and Sosamma belonged to different communities. There was the risk of social ostracism involved in their intercommunal marriage. They took that risk because of the intensity of the love that each had for the other. While the appellant was only 20 Sosamma was only 17. They lived happily at Quilon. That was only for about 20 days. It was thereafter that pw.1 during the appellant's absence took Sosamma to her house at Mulakuzha. After coming to Mulakuzha pw.1 instituted a suit against the appellant for getting the marriage declared invalid. In spite of these acts on the part of pw,1 the appellant was under the impression that he had only to call Sosamma for her to accompany him. He availed of the opportunity when Sosamma was away from her mother to invite her to come with him. After coming near her in endearing terms he made the invitation. But to his surprise she retorted that he should mind his business and asked him to go away from the place. This played on his mind and completely put him out. It was then that saying that if that was the position only one of them could live, he stabbed her but only once and ran away. I am satisfied that it was when the appellant was deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation that he stabbed Sosamma. Hence his conviction and sentence under S.302 of the Indian Penal Code are set aside, he is instead convicted under S.304 Part I of the IPC., and taking all the circumstances into consideration sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and this appeal allowed to that extent. Moidu, J: I agree. In the background of the incident and the circumstances existed at the time of the occurrence I feel that the appellant lost self-control and committed the act of violence against his own wife upon the provocation given by her. It is not proved that the appellant went in search of a knife but he carried the knife for his avocation. In the background of the incident and the circumstances existed at the time of the occurrence I feel that the appellant lost self-control and committed the act of violence against his own wife upon the provocation given by her. It is not proved that the appellant went in search of a knife but he carried the knife for his avocation. He stabbed only once but it was under grave and sudden provocation which disabled him from exercising any rational control over his action. There are substantial grounds, therefore, in the circumstances of the case to believe that Exception I to S.300 of the IPC. applies to this case. In the nature of the case conviction under S.304 Part I is proper and the sentence of seven years' rigorous imprisonment will meet the ends of justice.