JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS second appeal arises out of a suit between the landlord and tenant for ejectment of the appellant. There is no dispute that the defendant-appellant is a tenant of an open piece of land which was purchased by the plaintiffs-respondents in May 1962. It was let out to the defendant-appellant at Rs. 40/-per month on 10th July 1962. In October 1963 the rent was increased to Rs. 45/ -. On 6th January 1964 a notice Ex. D. 1 was served on the defendant for vacating the land. The landlord got sanction of the municipality for constructing a building upon this land with a plan sanctioned on 7th May 1964. Thereafter rent was increased to Rs. 100/- and a fresh notice for termination of tenancy, dated 16th September 1965, was sent to the defendant which was refused by him on 22nd September 1965. By this notice the tenancy was terminated with effect from 6th November 1965. The suit was decreed by both the Courts below. The only point argued in this Court on behalf of the defendant-appellant is that the required condition under section 12 (1) (n) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act has not been satisfied in this case and the Courts below were wrong in coming to that conclusion. ( 2. ) CLAUSE (n) of section 12 (1) is as follows:- "in the case of an accommodation which is open land, that the landlord requires it for constructing a house on it " The contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the term requires is a strong term and a mere desire of the landlord is not sufficient to satisfy the provision of law. In this case, according to him, a mere desire has been expressed and nothing more has been proved. Both the Courts below found that the plaintiffs had a desire to make a construction over the land and they have accordingly decreed the suit. Both the Courts have, however, held that it is not necessary for the landlord to prove that he had the means to make the construction and although evidence was led by the plaintiffs on this point, the lower appellate Court did not consider it necessary to give a finding thereon. ( 3. Both the Courts have, however, held that it is not necessary for the landlord to prove that he had the means to make the construction and although evidence was led by the plaintiffs on this point, the lower appellate Court did not consider it necessary to give a finding thereon. ( 3. ) THE points urged by learned counsel for the appellant were- (1) that the plan sanctioned by the municipality in 1964 lapsed after a a year and it was not renewed before the filing of the suit; (2) that the rent was increased in October 1964 and yet a notice of ejectment was again given on 16th September 1965; and (3) that the Courts below were wrong in coming to the conclusion that the requirements of law were satisfied without giving a decision on the point whether the landlord had the means to make the construction. ( 4. ) IN order to interpret the force of the word requires it is not merely necessary to look to the normal meaning of the word in English language but also to see the context in which it has been used. In section 12 there are other provisions which depend upon the need of the landlord. For instance, clause (e) requires that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord, in clause (f) the provision is that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord and in clause (h) again the provision is that the accommodation is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of building. But in clause (n), which is relevant to this case, the Legislature merely provides that the landlord requires it. It is further important to note that sub-section (5)of section 12 makes it quite clear that the landlord will not be entitled to eject under clause (e) before the expiry of two months from the date of the order ; for ejectment under clause (f) further conditions are laid down by sub-section (6) ; and for ejectment under clause (h) conditions are again provided under sub section (7) ; but with regard to clause (n) there is no further provision restricting the right of the landlord to get possession. From this context it appears that the Legislature used the word requires in the simple sense of wishes or wants. From this context it appears that the Legislature used the word requires in the simple sense of wishes or wants. The reason appears to be to encourage new constructions for increasing residential accommodation. Restriction to the normal right of the owner to eject a tenant should not be read into the word except on clear expression of legislative intent. ( 5. ) THIS clause (n) came up for consideration before another learned single Judge of this Court in Saffar Sandow v. Laxman (Second Appeal No. 261 of 1968, decided on the 7th December 1968. ). While dealing with the argument regarding scope of clause (n) the learned Judge compared it with the other parts of section 12 and approved of the earlier decision in the following passage: "in the decision reported in S. Bootasingh v. Jamnaprasad (1963 MPLJ Notes of Cases, Note No. 134) it was held that the requirement of this clause would be satisfied if the landlord merely says that be wants to build a house on the open land. " ( 6. ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant drew my attention to certain decisions under some Control Acts in other states where the word required used in the context of those Acts was interpreted, but I do not think it necessary to go into those cases because the provisions of the M. P. Act are very different. I, with respect, agree with the learned Single Judge who decided Laxmans case (supra), that it is enough to satisfy the Court that the landlord wanted to construct over the land. This, of course, does not mean that the defendant cannot show that the landlord had no real desire and only wanted to get the land vacated for some other purpose on that pretext. The burden of proving this fact would be upon the defendant tenant. ( 7. ) TO come to the facts, in the present case the argument that the sanction of the municipality has lapsed is not of much force, for it is now only a formal matter to get it extended as soon as the landlord gets possession over the land. It would be useless to get it extended unless he gets possession. ( 8. ) AS to the enhancement of rent to Rs. It would be useless to get it extended unless he gets possession. ( 8. ) AS to the enhancement of rent to Rs. 100/- on 7th October 1964, the statement of the plaintiff is that the defendant only wanted a few months time to vacate the land and as the plaintiff was not agreeing to it, the defendant induced him to give him a short time by payment of higher rent of Rs. 100/-and in these circumstances he had agreed to allow the defendant to continue only for a short time. This statement was accepted by the Courts below and therefore it does not help the defendant. ( 9. ) WITH regard to the ability to make the constructions the plaintiff has stated that he has the means and he has even stated those means in his cross-examination. The defendant has merely showed his ignorance in his statement by saying that he is unable to say whether the landlord has the means or not. In these circumstances, even though it were necessary for the Courts to find out whether the landlord has the means or not, the evidence clearly is in favour of the plaintiff. But it cannot be laid down as a matter of law that the existence of means with the plaintiff is an essential element which the plaintiff must prove in every case. It all depends on an over all picture of the case whether the Court accepts the plaintiffs case that he wants to build over the land or the defendants case that the expression of desire to build is a fraud on the law. It is a finding of fact based on evidence in each case. ( 10. ) BOTH the Courts below having come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs required the land for making constructions, no interference is called for in second appeal. This appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.