CHANDRASHEKHAR, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner was an applicant for allotment of a site in Rajamahal vilas Extention, Bangalore. The City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as the Trust Board), did not allot him any site theiein. Respondents 2 to 16 who had also applied for sites therein, were allotted sites therein. In this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has prayed for a declaration that such allotment ot sites to respondents 2 to 16, is illegal and void He has also prayed for declaring Rules 4 and 15 of the City of Bangalore Improvement (Allotment of Sites) Rules, 1964 (framed under the provisions of the City of bangalore Improvement Act, 1945), as ultra vires. He has further prayed for a mandamus directing the Trust Board to reconsider and distribute the sites in accordance with low and justice. ( 2 ) AT the outset certain undisputed facts may be stated. The Trust board formed an extension called " Raiamahal Vilas Extension" as an improvement scheme under the provisions of the City of Bangalore Improvement act, 1945, (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). By its notification dated 11-11-1970 (Ext. A) it announced that 66 sites in that extension were available for allotment and called for applications for those sites from the general public. As many as 1202 applications were received from edible applicants 61 sites were allotted to P5 persons among those applicants. Some ot those sites were allotted to persons in purported exchange of sites which had been allotted to them earlier in the same extension or other extensions or lav-outs. The petitioner had applied on four earlier occasions for allotment ot a site to him. But he was not allotted a site. Many of these 65 allotters succeeded in their very first attempt in securing allotment of sites. ( 3 ) WE shall now briefly set out the material averments in the petitioner's affidavit and the traversal thereof in the counter-affidavit sworn to by the chairman of the Trust Board (hereinafter referred to as the Chairman ). The petitioner has ellaged that the proceedings of the Trust Board renting to allotment of sites noticed in Ext A, were manifestly arbitrary and opposed to the mandatory pensions of the Rules. The petitioner has ellaged that the proceedings of the Trust Board renting to allotment of sites noticed in Ext A, were manifestly arbitrary and opposed to the mandatory pensions of the Rules. This averment has been denied by the Chairman the petitioner has alleged that Site No. 141 which was his first choice, was allotted to respondent-2 who was not a resident of Bangalore and was not qualified for allotment of any site and that he brought to bear on the Trust Board powerful political influence The Chairman has denied that the allotment of a site to respondent-2 was due to any political influence and has also averred that respondent 2 had stated in his application that he was ordinarily resident of Bangalore. ( 4 ) THE pelitioner has alleged that respondent-3 to whom Site No. 135a has been allotted, was unmarried and was a trainee in a factory and was living with his father who owned a house in Bangalore. The Chairman has pleaded that the fact that respondent-3 was unmarried or that his father owned a house, did not render him ineligible for allotment of a site. The petitioner has alleged that respondent-4 was a member of the mysore Legislative Assembly from Sorab Constituency, Shimonaj District, and was ordinarily and permanently resident of that District, and not a resident of Bangalore, that he had applied for the first time for a site and that it was obvious that his position had influenced the allotment of a site to him. The petitioner has also pleaded that such allotment to respondent-4, was opposed to Rules 9 and 10. The Chairman has denied that the fact of this respondent being a member of the Legislative assembly had influenced the allotment of the site to him. The Chairman has also pleaded that the fact that responden1-4 was such member, did not disqualify him for allotment of a site if he was otherwise eligible. The Chairman has averred that respondent-4 had stated in his application for allotment that he was ordinarily residing in Bangalore during the time of the Mysore Legislative Assembly. The Chairman has also pleaded that under sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 the Trust Board has competence to relax the condition regarding residence. The Chairman has averred that respondent-4 had stated in his application for allotment that he was ordinarily residing in Bangalore during the time of the Mysore Legislative Assembly. The Chairman has also pleaded that under sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 the Trust Board has competence to relax the condition regarding residence. ( 5 ) THE petitioner has alleged that grant of Site No 139b to respondent-5 who is Vice-Chancellor of the University of Agricultural Science, was in excess of the reservation of sites under clauses (i) and fii) of Rule 10 (2 ). The Chairman has pleaded that reservation of sites indicated in rule 10 (2), is not an inflexible one according to the terms of that Rule. In reply to the petitioner's averment that a site was allotted to respondent-15, a member of the Legislative Council and resident on Chintamani, in preference to permanent residents of Bangalore like the petitioner, the Chairman has averred that respondent-15 had staled in his application that he was mostly a resident of Bangalore. ( 6 ) LIKEWISE, in reply to the petitioner's averment that a site was allotted to respondent-16, a member of the Legislative Council, and resident of Melur, in preference to permanent residents of Bangalore, the Chairman has averred that respondent-16 had stated in his application that he was ordinarily a resident of Bangalore, and that the period of such residence was 12 years. ( 7 ) THE petitioner has averred that respondents 6 to 10 who had been allotted earlier sites elsewhere, have been allotted again sites notified under Ext. A, that they were highly placed and influential persons like ministers, Government Officers and their relatives, that the procedure of allotting sites in exchange of sites which had been allotted earlier was not warranted by the provisions of the Act and the Rules, and thai according preference to them, was arbitrary and illegal and had vitiated the entire allotment. The Chairman has pleaded that under Sec. 29 of the improvement Act, and the proviso to Rule 9 (2), it was within the power of the Trust Board to allot sites in exchange, that the Trust Board acted in its discretion in doing so and that it could not be said that such allotment in exchange was not justifiable. The Chairman has pleaded that under Sec. 29 of the improvement Act, and the proviso to Rule 9 (2), it was within the power of the Trust Board to allot sites in exchange, that the Trust Board acted in its discretion in doing so and that it could not be said that such allotment in exchange was not justifiable. The Chairman has also stated that respondents 7, 8 and 10 had not taken possession of the sites which had been previously allotted to them. ( 8 ) IN reply to the petitioner's averment that the parents of respondent 12 owned a site and a house in bangalore, the Chairman has stated that there was no information before the Trust Board that any member of respondent-12's family owned any site or house in Bangalore. The petitioner has alleged that allotment of a site to respondent-13 whose father owned a site, was illegal and opposed to rules. The chairman has averred that respondent-13 had stated in his application that his father owned a small house allotted to him by the Trust Board in the year 1955 and that he (respondent-13) would live independently. The chairman has pleaded that respondent-13 was a Doctor of Medicine and was not considered as a dependent on his father. ( 9 ) IN reply to the petitioner's averment that respondent-14 was disqualified for applying for a site as his family owned a house in Jayanagar, the Chairman has averred that respondent-14 had stated in his application that neither he nor any member of his lamily owned any house nor had been allotted a site or house by the Trust Board and that the Trust Board had no information that he or his family owned a house in Jayanayar. ( 10 ) THE petitioner has averred that it was patent that the entire allotment of sites, smacked of arbitrariness and unfairness and was opposed to rules, was illegal, and was vitiated by capricious consideration. This averment has been denied by the Chairman, and he has also pleaded that the petitioner was not an applicant for allotment of any of the sites allotted to several of respondents 2 to 16 and that, hence he could not be regarded as being interested in, nor concerned with, such allotment of sites. This averment has been denied by the Chairman, and he has also pleaded that the petitioner was not an applicant for allotment of any of the sites allotted to several of respondents 2 to 16 and that, hence he could not be regarded as being interested in, nor concerned with, such allotment of sites. In reply to the petitioner's plea that denial of a site to him was discriminatory and opposed to Art. 14 of the Constitution, the Chairman has stated that the petitioner's application was duly considered, first by the allotment Committee and then by the Trust Board, in accordance with rules, treating him as one nf the eligible applicants, that there were several other eligible applicants for sites, that it was for the Trust Board to allot a site to any one of such applicants for allotment, that there was no hostile discrimination by the Trust Board and that the petitioner's complaint of infringement of Art. 14 of the Constitution, was baseless. The Chairman finally has pleaded that 24 allottees have paid the full prices for the sites allotted to them, that 16 allotees had been put in possession of sites allotted to them, and that any unsettletment nt of the whole list of allotment, would cause serious dislocation to the Trust Board and hardship to many. ( 11 ) ALMOST towards the close of the arguments of the learned Advocate general who appeared for the Trust Board, an application was made seeking permission to file an additional affidavit on behalf of the Trust board. Mr. V. Krishnamurthy, learned Counsel for the petitioner, opposed the application on the ground that the additional affidavit was sought to be produced at a very belated stage and that it was intended to cover up the deficiencies in tho case of the Trust Board as they became apparent during the course of the hearin of arguments. However, by our order dated 16-4-1971, we permitted the Trust Board to file the additional affidavit as important and complicated questions arise for determination in this petition. However, by our order dated 16-4-1971, we permitted the Trust Board to file the additional affidavit as important and complicated questions arise for determination in this petition. ( 12 ) IN his additional affidavit, the Chairman has stated, inter alia, that in selecting applicants and making recommendations for allotment, the allotment Committee acted in accordance with the Rules and having due regard to Rules 9 and 10 and that in the opinion of the Allotment Committee and the Trust Board, the persons to whom allotment of sites had been made, were more deserving for allotment than the petitioner. The chairman has also stated that a tabular statement had been prepared of all the eligible applicants with material particulars relating to them, that such statement had been placed before the Trust Board along with the recommendations of the Allotment Committee and that after due consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances and the principles or eligibility and selection laid down in Rules 9 and 10, the Allotment committee and the Trust Board took the impugned decision. ( 13 ) IN the additional affidavit, the following statement as to the several categories of applicants and the numbers of sites allotted to such categories, has been set out: no. of Sites allotted : 65 . No. of sites reserved as per R. 10 (2) No. of sites allotted 1. State Government Servants 10 13 2. Central Government Servants 10 10 3. Industrial Concerns 3 2 4. Scheduled Castes/tribes 7 7 5. General Public 32 29 6. Defence 3 4 . 65 65 lastly, the Chairman has pleaded in the additional affidavit that according to the Trust Board's understanding of the requirement of Rule 10 (2), reservation therein indicated, was only by way of broad outline and that adherence strictly to the percentages therein was not mandatory. Most of the respondents-allottees have also filed counter-affidavits traversing the averments in the petitioner's affidavit. We do not consider it necessary to set out the contents of those counter-affidavits, becauss the allotment of sites to these respondents should stand or fall on the strength of the defence put forward by the Trust Board. Almost towards the conclusion of the hearing of the petition. Mr. Krishnamurthy stated that the petitioner would not press the petition as against respondent-14. However, vespondent-14 had also filed his counter-affidavit and Mr. S. K. Venkataranga Iyengar appeared for him and addressed arguments. Almost towards the conclusion of the hearing of the petition. Mr. Krishnamurthy stated that the petitioner would not press the petition as against respondent-14. However, vespondent-14 had also filed his counter-affidavit and Mr. S. K. Venkataranga Iyengar appeared for him and addressed arguments. ( 14 ) BEFORE dealing with the contentions of the parties, it is useful to set out the material provisions of the Improvement Act and the City of Bangalore improvement (Allotment of Sites) Rules, 1964. The Improvement Act was enacted to make provision for the improvement and future expansion of the City of Bangalore and for the appointment of a Board of Trustees with special powers to carry out the aforesaid purposes. Sec. 3 of the Act provides, inter alia, that the duty oi carrying out the provisions of the Act shail, subject to such condition and limitations contained in the Act bo vested in a Board to be called "the Trustees for the Improvement of the City of Bangalore'' and that such Board shall be a body corporate and have perpetual succession and shall sue and be sued. S. 4 of the Act provides for the constitution of the Board. The Chairman of the Board and 6 Trustees are to be appointed by the Government, and remaining 4 Trustees are to be elected by the Councillors of the corporation ot the City of Bangalore amongst themselves. S. 14 of the Act, inter alia, empowers the Board to undertake improvement or expansion or both in the areas in and around Bangalore City ss. 16 to 18 provide for compulsory acquisition of lands for the improvement schemes of the Trust Board. S. 21 empowers the Government to entrust to the Trust Board and its Chairman any of the powers and functions of the Corporation of the city of Bangalore and of its Commissioner respectively subject to any restrictions or modification, in any area to which the Improvement Act applies. S. 29 deals with the power of the Board to acquire, hold and dispose of property. Sub-sec. (1) of that section provides, inter alia, that the board shall, for the purpose of the Act, have power to acquire and hold movable and immovable property whether within or outside the city. Sub-sec. S. 29 deals with the power of the Board to acquire, hold and dispose of property. Sub-sec. (1) of that section provides, inter alia, that the board shall, for the purpose of the Act, have power to acquire and hold movable and immovable property whether within or outside the city. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 29 provides, inter alia, that subject to such restrictions, conditions and limitations as may be prescribed by rules made by the Government, the Board shall have power to lease, sell or otherwise transfer any movable or immovable property which belongs to it. S. 42 empowers the Government to make rules The material part of that Section, reads:"42. Power of the Government to make rules.-The Government may make rules from time to time not inconsistent with this act; (a) * * * * (aa) regulating the allotment or sale by auction of sites by the board; (ah) specifying the conditions, restrictions and limitations subject to which the Board may sell, lease or otherwise transfer movable or immovable property. "s. 43 empowers the Board to make, with the previous approval of the government, bye-laws for carrying out the purpose of the Act; but the government is empowered to cancel any bye-law made and published under this Section. ( 15 ) IN exercise of the power under S. 43 of the Act, the Trust Board had with the previous approval of the Government and by its notification dt. 8-1-1954, made bye-laws regulating allotment and sale of sites. In supersession of those bye-laws, the Government in exercise of the powers conferred by S 42 of the Act, made rules called, the City of bangalore Improvement (Allotment of Sites) Rules, 1964 (hereinafter called the Rules), which came into force on 1-5-1964. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 states that these Rules shall apply in respect of allotment of sites other than such classes of sites as may be notified by the Government by general orders from time to time. Rule 2 contains definitions of certain terms used in the Rules. Clause (c) of that Rule reads: "' Family in relation to a person' means such person, and it married, the wife or husband, as the case may be, and the dependent children, grand-children, parents, sisters and biothers, of such person. Rule 2 contains definitions of certain terms used in the Rules. Clause (c) of that Rule reads: "' Family in relation to a person' means such person, and it married, the wife or husband, as the case may be, and the dependent children, grand-children, parents, sisters and biothers, of such person. ' sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 provides that whenever the Trust Board has formed an extension or lay-out in pursuance of any scheme, the Trust board may, subject to the general or special orders of the Government, offer any 01 all sites in such extension or lay-out, for allotment to persons eligible for allotment of sites under the Rules. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 provides for due publicity to be given in respect of the sites for allotment specifying the location of sites, their numbers, the amount payable as earnest money, the last date for submission of applications and such other particulars as may be considered necessary. ( 16 ) RULE 4 provides that the Trust Board may, with the previous sanction of the Government, reserve sites in any area for allotment to any specified class of persons and that such class may consist of employees in any office or establishment in the City of Bangalore. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 piovides that where sites are reserved under sub-rule (1), the procedure to be followed for allotment shall be determined by the Board subject to the orders of the Government. ( 17 ) RULE 7 provides, inter aha, that an application for allotment of sites shall be in Form-I (annexed to the Rules) and shall be accompanied by the receipt challan or draft evidencing the deposit of the earnest money under Rule 8, and that every applicant shall make an application for a specified plot and indicate two other plots as his next preference. Rule 8 provides, inter aim. that every applicant should deposit as earnest money an amount equal to 12 per rent of the value of the site applied for or where the value of the sites in respect of which he has indicated his next preference is more than the value of the site applied for, such percentage of the higher value. Rule 9 deals with eligibility i'or allotment. Rule 9 deals with eligibility i'or allotment. Two conditions of such eligibility are: (i) an applicant must be ordinarily resident in the area under the jurisdiction of the Trust Board; and (ii) he or any member of his family should not own or should not have been allotted a site or a house by the Trust Board or any other authority within such area. ( 18 ) THE proviso to the first condition empowers the Trust Board to relax it in the case of persons who bonafide intend to reside in such area. The proviso to the second condition empowers the Trust Board to relax it in case where the house owned is found to be inadequate having regard to the size of the family of the person applying for allotment of a site. Rule 10 sets out the principles in making selection of applicants for allotment. That rule reads:"10. Principles for Selection of applicants for allotment of sites. (1) The Board shall consider the case of each applicant on its merits and shall have regard to the following principles in making selection and fixing the priority for allotment; (1) applicants whose lands or houses have been acquired by the board provided they are otherwise qualified for allotment; (ii) the status of the applicant, that is, whether he is married or single and has dependent children; (iii) the income of the applicant and his capacity to purchase a site and build a house thereon for his residence; (iv) the number of years the applicant has been waiting for allotment of a site and the fact that he did not secure a site earlier though he is eligible and had applied for a site. (2) In order to ensure that there is an equitable distribution of sites among the different classes of persons, sites may be reserved and allotted as far as possible as indicated hereunder: (i) fifteen per cent of the available sites may be reserved and allotted to the State Government servants; (ii) fifteen per cent of the available sites may be reserved and allotted to Centra] Government servants, servants of local authorities and Corporations owned or controlled by the Central Government and State Government; (iii) five per cent of the available sites may be reserved and allotted to employees cf industrial concerns; (iv) ten per cent of the available sites may be reserved and allotted to persons belonging to the Schedule Castes and Scheduled Tribes; (v) fifty-five per cent of the available sites may be reserved and allotted to the general public. (3) To ensure that several classes are fairly represented among the general public, as far as possible, persons belonging to the following categories may be considered for allotment: i. Doctors (men and women), ii. College Lecturers (men and women), iii. Lawyers, iv. Engineers, iv. Journalists, vi Bank Employees, vii. Staff of Commercial Establishments, viii. Social Workers and ix. Others. " ( 19 ) RULE 11 provides that the Board shall constitute a Committee called the "allotment Committee" consisting of three members of the Trust board including the Chairman for considering applications and making recommendations to the Board. Rule 12 provides that the Trust Board shall consider recommendations of the Allotment Committee and after such further enquiry as it deems fit, make allotments. Rule 13 provides that the Trust Board may allot to an applicant the site applied for by him or the site in respect of which he has indicated preference or any other site. Rule 14 empowers the Trust Board to revoke any proposal to dispose of any site under the Rules, if in its opinion, the area covered by such site has to be reserved for any purpose, for the use of the inhabitants of the extension concerned. Rule 15 reads:"15. Decision of Board-The Board shall have the right to reject the allotment of all or any of the sites applied for by an applicant without assigning any reasons. Rule 15 reads:"15. Decision of Board-The Board shall have the right to reject the allotment of all or any of the sites applied for by an applicant without assigning any reasons. In case where there are more than one applicant for a site, and if all the applicants satisfy the conditions for allotment, the Board shall have the right to allot the site tc any one of the applicants without issuing any reasons. The decision of the Board shall be final and binding on every applicant. "as stated earlier, the petitioner has asked us to declare Rules 4 and 15 as ultra vires. Mr. Krihnamurthy contended that Rule 4 confers on the trust Board unguided power resulting in arbitrariness and unfairness. ( 20 ) THE learned Advocate General contended that it is unnecessary for the purpose of this petition, to go into the validity of Rule 4 because not reservation under that Rule had been made by the Trust Board in regard to 66 sites, the allotment of which has been impugned in this petition. Rule 4 empowers the Trust Board to reserve (with the sanction of the government) sites in any area for allotment to any specified class of persons like employees in any office or establishment in Bangalore City. As none of these 66 sites were reserved for being allotted to any specified class of persons, it is unnecessary for the purpose of this petition, to go into the validity of Rule 4. Mr. Krishna Murthy assailed Rule 15 on the ground that the power conferred on the Trust Board to reject the allotment of all or any of the sites applied for, without assigning any reason for such decision, must be regarded as unguided and arbitrary power and that likewise, the power to select any one of the several eligible applicants for a site, without assigning any reason for such selection, must also be regarded as an unguided and arbitrary power. Rule 15 consists of the following three parts: (i) The Trust Board shall have the right to reject the allotment of all or any of the sites applied for by an applicant without assigning any reasons; (ii) Where there arc more than one applicant for a site and all of them satisfy the conditions for allotment, the Trust Board shall have the light to allot the site to any one of such applicants without assigning any reason; and (iii) The decision of the Trust Board in regard to the allotment of sites, shall be final and binding on everyone. ( 21 ) WE think there is nothing unreasonable in empowering the Trust Board to reject the allotment of any site applied for by an applicant. That the trust Board need not assign any reason for its decision in rejecting an application, does not necessarily mean that the power to so reject, is arbitrary or capricious Likewise, when there are more than one applicant eligible for allotment of a site, obviously the Trust Board has to allot that site to only one of them. The power to so allot that site to any one of them, cannot be said to be, per se. arbitrary. That the Trust Board need not assign any reason for so allotting a site to any one among several applicants, does not necessarily mean that the power to make such allotment, is arbitrary or capricious. The power to so allot that site to any one of them, cannot be said to be, per se. arbitrary. That the Trust Board need not assign any reason for so allotting a site to any one among several applicants, does not necessarily mean that the power to make such allotment, is arbitrary or capricious. ( 22 ) THE view we have taken receives support from the observations in the majority judgment of the Supreme Court m Krishna Chand v. Commissioner of Police, AIR 1967 SC 705, 710, Wanchoo, J (as he then was), who delivered the majority judgment, said that because there is no provision in the calcutta Polie Act that Commissioner should give reasons for refusal of a licence for a eating house and to communicate the same to the person applying for the licence, it cannot be held that the licensing provision is unreasonable and unconstitutional His Lordship added that it such a person thinks that he fulfilled all the conditions for grant of a licence and that the Commissioner acted unreasonably m rejecting his application, he can apply to the High Court under Art. 226 and compel the Commissioner to disclose before the Court the reasons for refusal and that if those reasons are extraneous and are not germane to the licensing provision, the High Court will compel the Commissioner to act within the scope of the licensing provision. ( 23 ) THE finality given to the decision of the Trust Board for rejecting the allotment of sites or allotting a site to any one among many applicants cannot also be construed as giving arbitrary power to the Trust board. Such finality merely means tint such decision cannot be re-opened or re-ronsidered either suo motu or at the instance of any person and that no appeeal or revision is provided from such decision. Such finality cannot be understood as barring judicial review under Art. 226 of the constitution, or such decision of the Trust Board Indeed, no statute of parliament or the State Legislature nor any rule made thereunder, can abridge the power conferred on the High Court under Art 226 of the constitution. ( 24 ) HENCE, we reject the contention of Mr Krishna Murthy that Rule 15 is ultra vires and invalid on the ground of arbitrariness or conferment of unguided power on the Trust Board. ( 24 ) HENCE, we reject the contention of Mr Krishna Murthy that Rule 15 is ultra vires and invalid on the ground of arbitrariness or conferment of unguided power on the Trust Board. Mr Krishna Murthy next soughy to challenge sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 on the ground that the classification of applicants for sites into several categories and reservation of different percentages of sites to those categories, are not based on any intelligible criteria having reasonable relation to the object of the Rules i. e. , selection of applicants for allotment of sites He argued that there is not reason why the State Govrnment servants and the Central Government servants should be regarded as separate classes apart from the rest of the ppplioants and why certain percentage of sitts should bo reserved for them the learned Advocate General raised an objection that neither in the petition nor in the petitioner's affidavit has the validity of sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 been assailed and that Mr Krishna Murthy should not be permitted to urge this contention for the first time in his arguments. We think the objection of the learned Advocate General, is sound. In the absence of a plea in the petition or ]n the petitioner's affidavit, the State and the Trust Board had no opportunity to place materials in support of the validity of that sub-rule. Hence. we cannot permit Mr Krishna murthy to challenge the validity of sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 at this late stage. In the absence of a plea in the petition or ]n the petitioner's affidavit, the State and the Trust Board had no opportunity to place materials in support of the validity of that sub-rule. Hence. we cannot permit Mr Krishna murthy to challenge the validity of sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 at this late stage. ( 25 ) THE principal ground on which Mr Krishna Murthy assailed the allotment of sites to respondents 2 to 16, was that the selection of applicants for allotment, of sites, was not based on any principles, that the principles for selection of applicants as stated in sub-ruled (1) of Rule 10, were ignored and that the selection of respondents 2 to 16, was arbitrary, discriminatory and violativ of Art. 14 of the Constitution Elaborating this contention, Mr Krishna Murthy submitted that under clause (iv) of rule 10 (1), one of the principles to which the Trust Board should have regard in selecting applicants, is the number of times an applicant had unsuccessfully applied for a site or the number of years during which he has been unsuccessfully making applications for such allotment, that the petitioner who had applied for a site for the fifth time, should have been preferred to the allottees-respondents most of whom had applied for sites for the first time Mr Krishna Murthy complained that ignoring the better claims of the petitioner (on the ground of his earlier unsuccessful attempts to get a site), amounted to hostile discrimination against him. Mr Krishna Murthy added that even the counter-affidavit of the chairman did not disclose that the section of applicants was made in accordance with the principles laid down in sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 or by the application of any rational criteria. ( 26 ) DEVELOPING his above contention, Mr. Krishna Murthy argued that the power of the Trust Board to select applicants for allotment of sites, is a quasi-judicial power and that the proceedings of the Trust Board relating to such allotment, were violative of principles of natural justice. In support of this contention, Mr. Krishna Murthy relied on the following observations of Hegde, J. who spoke for the Court in Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 , 154:"the dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. In support of this contention, Mr. Krishna Murthy relied on the following observations of Hegde, J. who spoke for the Court in Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 , 154:"the dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look no the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the organ of the State under our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate The concept of rule of law would lose its validity if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. In recenl years the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi-judicial power. " ( 27 ) ON the other hand, the learned Advocate General contended that the power of selection of applicants lor allotment of sites, is purely an administrative one and that by no stretch of imagination such power can be regarded as quasi-judicial. The learned Advocate General relied on the following statement of law in Halsbury's Laws of England, simonds Edition (Third Edition), Vol. 11, page 56:"moreover an administrative body, whose decision is actuated in whole or in part by questions of policy, may be under a duty to act judicially in the course of arriving at that decision. The learned Advocate General relied on the following statement of law in Halsbury's Laws of England, simonds Edition (Third Edition), Vol. 11, page 56:"moreover an administrative body, whose decision is actuated in whole or in part by questions of policy, may be under a duty to act judicially in the course of arriving at that decision. Thus, if in order to arrive at the decision, the body concerned had to consider proposals and objections and consider evidence, if at some stage of the proceedings leading up to the decision there was something in the nature of a lis before it, then in the course of such consideration and at that stage the body would be under a duty to act judicially. If on the other hand, an administrative body in arriving at its decision has before it at no stage any form of lis and throughout has to consider the question from the point of view of policy and expediency, it cannot be said that it is under a duty at any time to act judicially. " ( 28 ) FROM the aforesaid statement of law, it is clear that one of the essential requisites of a quasi-judicial power, is the existence of a lis before the authority which has to decide. In the selection of applicants for allotment of sites, it is difficult to say that there is any form ox lis between the rival applicants or between an applicant and the Trust Board. The Trust Beard has merely to consider such rival applications having regard to the principles set out in Rule 10 and any other relevant principles or policy. As there is no lis at any stage of the selection of applicants for allotment of sites, the power of the Trust Board in making such selection, cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as quasi-judicial. Though the dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power, is thin and is being gradually obliterated, the distinction between the two, is real and cannot be ignored. ( 29 ) IF the selection of applicants for allotment of sites, is not a quasi-judicial power, then there is no question of violation of principles of natural justice. Though the dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power, is thin and is being gradually obliterated, the distinction between the two, is real and cannot be ignored. ( 29 ) IF the selection of applicants for allotment of sites, is not a quasi-judicial power, then there is no question of violation of principles of natural justice. However, as observed by S. R. Das, C. J. , in his majority judgment in Radeshyam v. State of M. P. , AIR 1959 SC 107 , 110, to say that an action is an administrative action, is not to say that the authority taking such action has not to observe ordinary rules of fair play. ( 30 ) THE learned Advocate General contended that once it is held that the selection of applicants for allotment of sites, is not a quasi-judicial power, the power to make selection should be regarded as purely a discretionary power and that Courts cannot interfere with the exercise of such discretion by the Trust Board unless the same is shown to be mala fide. In support of this contention, the learned Advocate General sought to derive support from the following observations of Bose, J. , who spoke for the Court in State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, AIR 1955 SC 41 , 46 while considering an order of the Government requisitioning certain premises under S. 6 (4) (a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948:"a wide discretion must be left to Government to carry out the policy of tile Act. If the number of vacancies is small and the number of the homeless large, it is evident that there must be some picking and choosing. So long as this is done on broad lines of principle and reasonably, the Courts cannot interfere simply because other methods are also possible, for in the end Government must be left to determine which of many possible schemes is the best. " ( 31 ) THE aforesaid observations of Bost J. , do not in our opinion, support the proposition of the learned Advocate General that Courts cannot interfere with an exercise of discretion in Ihe absence of mala fides. All that his Lordship said there was, that the Courts cannot interfere with exercise of discretion by the Government so long as such exercise of discretion is done on broad lines of principles and reasonably. All that his Lordship said there was, that the Courts cannot interfere with exercise of discretion by the Government so long as such exercise of discretion is done on broad lines of principles and reasonably. These observations cannot be understood as laying down, that even where the exercise of discretion is not done on broad lines of principles and reasonably, the courts cannot interfere with exercise of such discretion. ( 32 ) THE learned Advocate-General next relied on the following observations of Lord Green, M. R. , who spoke for the Court of Appeal in carlatona Ltd. v. Commissioner of Works, (1943 )2 All. ER. 560, 564:"it has been decided as clearly as anything can be decided that where a regulation of this kind commits to an executive authority the decision of what is necessary or expedient and that authority makes the decision, it is not competent to the courts to investigate the grounds or the reasonableness of the decision in the absence of an allegation of bad faith. If it were not so it would mean that the courts would be made responsible for carrying on the executive Government of this country on these important matters. Parliament, which authorises this regulation, commits to the executive the discretion to decide and with that discretion if bona fide exercised no court can interfere. All that the court can do is to see that the power which it is claimed to exercise is one which falls within the four corners of the powers given by the legislature and to see that those powers are exercised in good faith. Apart from that, the courts have no power at all to inquire into the reasonableness, the policy, the sense, or any other aspect of the transaction. " ( 33 ) IN the above case, the exercise of power was under Regulation 51 (1) of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, which read: 51 (1) A competent authority, if it appears to that authority to be necessary or expedient so to do in the interests of the public safety, the defence of the realm or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of any land, and may give such directions as appear to the competent authority to be necessary or expedient in connection with the taking of possession of that land. ( 34 ) FROM the words "if it appears to that authority" occurring in that regulation, it is clear that the exercise of power thereunder, was dependant on the subjectibe satisfaction of the authority. As we shall presently point out, the selection of appelants for allotment of sites, is not left to the subjectiive satisfaction of the Trust Board Hence, the above decision is of no assistance to the learned Advocate-General on the other hand, in Jaisinghani v Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1427 , the Supreme court has explained that in a system governed by rule of law (upon which our whole constitutional system is based), discretion when conferred upon the executive authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits, that such decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules, that in general, such decisions should be predictable, that the citizen should know where he is, that if a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and that such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. ( 35 ) IN Satwant Singh v Assistant Passport Officer, AIR 1967 SC 1836 , it was claimed on behalf of the State that the State had unfettered discretion to issue or not to issue a passport to a person. Repelling that contention, Subba Rao, cj. , who spoke for the Court, said thus at page 1845:"but in the present cose the executive claims a right to issue a passport at its discretion; that is to say, it can at its discretion prevent a person from leaving India on foreign travel. Whether the right to travel is part of personal liberty or not within the meaning of Art. 21 of the Constitution, such an arbitrary prevention of a person from travelling abroad will certainly affect him prejudicially while in the case of enacted law one knows where he stands, in the case of unchannelled arbitrary discretion, discrimination is writ large on the face of it Such discretion patently violates the doctrine of equality, for the difference in the treatment of persons rests solely on the arbitrary selection of the executive. . We, therefore, hold that the order refusing to issue the passport to the petitioner offends art. 14 of the Constitution. . We, therefore, hold that the order refusing to issue the passport to the petitioner offends art. 14 of the Constitution. "from the above two decisions of the Supreme Court, it is clear that it is not permissible to confer on any administrative authority absolute and unfettered discretion nor can such authority claim that in exercise of such discretion it csr. tal e a decision without following any rule or principle. Moreover, the power conferred on the Trust Board to select applicants for allotment of sites, is not an absolute and unfettered power. Such power is regulated by the Rules which prescribe the procedure and principles for such selection when the conferment on the Trust Board, of the power to select applicants for allotment of sites, is regulated by the Rules, there is no reason why the exercise of such power, should not be subjected to judicial review in order to see that the Trust Board exercises such power in conformity with those Rules and that such selection is guided by the principles laid down in Rule 10 and not made arbitrarily Even if the Trust board is not strictly bound by those principles, the Court can examine whether the Trust Board has based its decision on any other principles and whether those principles are relevant for the purpose of making such selection. ( 36 ) FURTHER, when a person complains that in exercise of the power conferred on an administrative authority, there has been hostile discrimination against him, it is the duly of the Court to examine whether there has been violation of equality of treatment guaranteed by Art. 14 of the constitution. We are not unmindful oi the limitations on the judicial review of the decisions of administrative authorities on whom discretion has been conferred by statute. In a petition under Art 226, the High Court is not constituted as a Court of appeal over the decision of such authority. As stated by Venkaterama Aiyer, J. . who spoke for the Bench in C. S. S. Motor Service v Madras State, AIR 1953 Mad. 279 , 292, it is not the province of the Court to go into the question of the coirectness, fairness or soundness of the decision of such authority. As stated by Venkaterama Aiyer, J. . who spoke for the Bench in C. S. S. Motor Service v Madras State, AIR 1953 Mad. 279 , 292, it is not the province of the Court to go into the question of the coirectness, fairness or soundness of the decision of such authority. It is for such authority to decide on questions of policy as to which among the several competing principles would serve best the interest of the public. The jurisdiction of the High Court is limited to examining whether such administrative authority has exercised the power conferred on it. in conformity with the rules regulating exercise of such power, whether the decision of that authority is arbitrary or based on any principle or rule which is relevant for the purpose of such decision and whether such decision has infringed any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part-Ill oi the Constitution. ( 37 ) THUS, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned Advocate-General that in the absence of mala tides, the decision of the Trust Board is not subject to judicial review and that even if there is violation of any of the rules regulating such decis;on, the High Court cannot interfere with such decision. It was next contended by the learned Advocate-General that the selection of applicants for allotment of sites, is a matter for subjective determination by the Trust Board and that such subjective determination is not justiciable. ( 38 ) THE learned Advocate-General referred to the following observations of the Supreme Court in Suahu Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1966 SC 91 , 94:"the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is a condition of the making of the order, and it that condition is shown to exist, the Courts have no power to enquire into the sufficiency ol materials on which the order is made or the propriety or expediency of making the order. It is the satisfaction of the prescribed authority which is determinative of the validity. That, however, does not exclude the courts' power to investigate into the compliance with the procedural safeguards imposed by the statute, or into the existence of prescribed conditions precedent to the exercise of power, or into a plea that the order was made mala fide or for a collateral purpose. That, however, is not judicial review of the order. That, however, does not exclude the courts' power to investigate into the compliance with the procedural safeguards imposed by the statute, or into the existence of prescribed conditions precedent to the exercise of power, or into a plea that the order was made mala fide or for a collateral purpose. That, however, is not judicial review of the order. "but, the above observations can have application to the present case, only if the selection of applicants for allotment oi sites, is left to the subjective determination of the Trust Board. The expressions like "if the authority is satisfied" and "where is appears to the authority", which are usually found in a statutory provision conferring power to decide on the basis of subjective satisfaction, are not found in Rule 10. The principles set out in sub-rule (1) ci Rule 10, namely, applicants being displaced persons whose lands or houses have been acquired by the Trust Board, the status of the applicant, the income of the applicant, his capacity to purchase site and to build a house thereon, the number of years he has been waiting for allotment, the fact that ho did not secure a site earlier, are all objective criteria. When Rule 10 provides that in selecting applicants, the Trust Board shall have regard to such objective criteria, the selection of applicants cannot be said to be left to the subjective satisfaction of the trust Board. In that view, it becomes unnecessary to consider several other decisions cited by the learned Advocate-General as to limitations on judicial review when the decision of an administrative authority is based upon its subjective satisfaction. ( 39 ) IT was also contended by the learned Advocate-General that the allotment of sites, is a matter of contract between the Trust Board and the persons to whom sites are allotted, that the Trust Board has as much freedom as any other person to enter into a contract for sale or lease or sites with whomsoever it desires and that no person has any right to claim that the Trust Board should enter into a contract with him to sell a site. The learned Advocate-General adverted to the fact that after a site is allotted to an applicant, the Trust Board enters into a lease-cum-sale agreement with the allottee in Form No. II (appended to the Rules) or executes a deed of sale in favour of the allottee in the same manner as in a transaction between a private vendor and a vendee. The learned government Advocate who appeared for the State (Respondent-17) also adopted the same line of arguments. ( 40 ) SUPPORT for the above contention was sought to be derived from the following observations of the Supreme Court in K. Achyuthan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1959 SC 490 , 492:"it is perfectly open to the Government, even as it is to a private party, to choose a person to their liking, to fulfil contracts which they wish to be performed When one person is chosen rather than another, the aggrieved party cannot claim protection of Art. 14, because the choice of the person to fulfil a particular contract must be left to the Government. Similarly, a contract which is held from the Government stands on no different footing from a contract held from a private party. " ( 41 ) IN Achyathan's case, the petitioner held contracts for supply of milk to Government hospitals and the controversy related to cancellation of one such contract. Supply of milk to hospitals was not regulated by any statute apart from the general law of contract. But, allotment and sale of sites by the Trust Board, are regulated by the provisions of the Improvement act and the Rules, and are not purely a matter of contract between the Trust Board and the allottee or the purchaser. Where the allotment or sale of sites is by a public authority, namely, the Trust Board, acting under the provisions of a statute or the rules made thereunder, a person who feels aggrieved by any action of the Trust Board in regard to such allotment or sale, can challenge such action in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Where the allotment or sale of sites is by a public authority, namely, the Trust Board, acting under the provisions of a statute or the rules made thereunder, a person who feels aggrieved by any action of the Trust Board in regard to such allotment or sale, can challenge such action in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. A similar view was expressed by the Supreme Court in K. N. Guruswamy v. State of Mysore, AIR 1954 SC 592 while dealing with disposal of the privilege to vend liquor which was governed by the Mysore Excise act That view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Divisional Forest officer, South Kheri v. Rama Sanehi Singh, (1970) 1 SCWR 194. There, at an auction held by a Forest Officer, the respondent had purchased the right to cut and remove timber for a certain period in a certain area. The Divisional forest Officer cancelled a portion of that contract. That order was challenged by the respondent before the High Court which quashed that order. Before the Supreme Court, it was contended that since the dispute arose out of the terms of a contract and the Divisional Forest Officer had, under those terms authority to modify any action taken by a subordinate forest authority, the remedy of the respondent was to institute an action in the civil Court and that the writ petition was not maintainable. Repelling that contention, this is what Shah J. (as he then was), who spoke for the court, said at page 197:"but in the present case the order is passed by a public authority modifying the order or proceeding of a subordinate forest authority. By that order he has deprived the respondent of a valuable right. We are unable to hold that merely because the source of the right which the respondent claims was initially in a contract, for obtaining relief against any arbitrary and unawful action on the part of a public authority he must resort to a suit and not to a petition by way of a writ. In view of the judgment of this Court in K. N. Guruswamy's case (1955) 1 S. C. R. 305 there can be no doubt that the petition was maintainable, even if the right to relief arose out of an alleged breach of contract, where the action challenged was of a public authority invested with statutory powers. In view of the judgment of this Court in K. N. Guruswamy's case (1955) 1 S. C. R. 305 there can be no doubt that the petition was maintainable, even if the right to relief arose out of an alleged breach of contract, where the action challenged was of a public authority invested with statutory powers. " ( 42 ) IN the light of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, we have no hesitation in rejecting the contention of the learned Advocate-General that the allotment or sale of sites by the Trust Board is purely a matter of contract and no writ petition can be filed challenging such allotment or sale. Another contention in the nature of a preliminary objection raised by the learned Advocate General was that the petitioner had no locus standi to maintain this petition. The learned Advocate Genera] adverted to the pronouncement or the Supreme Court in several decisions to the effect that a petitioner who seeks to file a petition under Art. 226 of the constitution, should ordinarily be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject matter ot the petition. The learned Advocate General argued that the sites in question were the property of the Trust Board, that the petitioner had absolutely no right or interest in them, nor had he any right to claim that the Trust Board should allot or sell any site to him. ( 43 ) IT is true that no person has any vested right or interest in a site in an extension or lay-out formed by the Trust Board, until such site is alloted or sold to him. But Rule 10 (1) imposes an obligation on the trust Board to consider the applications for allotment of sites, in the manner provided in thai sub-rule, i. e. . on the merits of the applications and after havinp, regard to the principles set out in that sub-rule. Corresponding to that obligation on the Trust Board, there is a right in every member of the public who applies for a site, to require the Trust Board to consider his application in that manner, i e. , as provided in R. 10 (1 ). Corresponding to that obligation on the Trust Board, there is a right in every member of the public who applies for a site, to require the Trust Board to consider his application in that manner, i e. , as provided in R. 10 (1 ). Moreover, the Trust Board is a statutory public authority performing manv of the functions which a municipal authority performs in a local area Under S. 21 of the Impingement Act the Trust Board is empowered to exercise powers and functions of the Corporation of the City of bangalore within its (the Trust Board's) territorial jurisdiction Hence, the Trust Board should be regarded as a local authority which is included in the definition of the word State in Art 12 of the Constitution At any rate, the Trust Board which is a public authority exercising statutory tpowers, comes within the ambit of the expression 'other authorities' occuring in Art. 12 Under Act 14 of the Constitution the Trust Board (which comes within the definition of the word 'state') shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws hence every person has a right to equality of treatment by the Trusst board and if such right is infriged it is opon to him to approach the high Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution to enforce such right as the petitioner who had applied for allotment of a site, complained that he has been discriminated against and that he has been denied equality of treatment by the Trust Board he could approach this Court under art. 226. Hence we reject the contention of the learned Advocate General that the petitioner had no locus standi to maintain the petition another cognate contain on advanced by the learned Ad\ocate General and the leaned Government Advocate, was that allotment of sites by the Trust Board was m he nature of a concession granted by the trust Board to the allottees and that no person can claim equality of treatment in grant of a concession. In support of this contention the learned Government Advocate relied on the decision of the Supreme court in K. V. Rajalakshmian Setty v. State of Mysore, AIR 1967 SC 993 . There, the demand of the appellant and 41 other officials was that they should receive benefits which others promoted before and after them, had received. In support of this contention the learned Government Advocate relied on the decision of the Supreme court in K. V. Rajalakshmian Setty v. State of Mysore, AIR 1967 SC 993 . There, the demand of the appellant and 41 other officials was that they should receive benefits which others promoted before and after them, had received. In rejeting such claim the Supreme Court observed at Page 996:"no doubt some concession had been shown to the first hatch ot 41 persons and the batches of persons who had come in after the batch of 63 persons also received some concision, but after all these were concessions and not something which they could claim as of right The State of Mysore might have shown some indulgence to this batch of 63 persons hut we cannot issue a writ of mandamus commanding it to do so There was no service rule which the State had transgressed nor has the State evolved any principle to be followed in respect of persons who were promoted to the rank of Assistant engineers from surveyors. " ( 44 ) THE learned Government Advocate also relied on the decision in sheila Kapur v. Chief Commissioner, Delhi, AIR 1968 Delhi 146. There, the appellant's husband's land had been compulsorily acquired. His prayer for allotment of an alternative land was rejected by the authorities. The appellant complete and that in case of spseveral persons whose lands had been acquired the authorities had allotted them alternative lands and that denial of alternative land to her husband was discriminatory. Rejecting that contention, this is what a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court said at page 149:"as no legal right vested in the appellant to get alternative plots, the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution would not be attracted, even if the Government adopted a policy of pick and chocse and allotted alternative plots to some owners, as concession, and refused to allot plots to the appellants. Of course, the Government is expected to act in consonance with the principle of fair play even while extending concessions to citizens and treat them as far as possible, on equal basis But it is a question of propriety and not of any legal obligation. Of course, the Government is expected to act in consonance with the principle of fair play even while extending concessions to citizens and treat them as far as possible, on equal basis But it is a question of propriety and not of any legal obligation. Any discrimination, in the matter of extending concessions, which the Government is not under any legal obligation to do, cannot per se attract the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution. " ( 45 ) WE are unable to accept the contention that allotment of sites, is in the nature of a concession. Carrying out improvement schemes including forming new layouts and extensions and allotting sites therein, are statutory functions and duties of the Tiust Board under the provisions of the Improvement Act and the Rules. As stated earlier, corresponding to such obligation imposed on the Trust Board, the petitioner who had applied for a site, has a right to require the Trust Board to select the applicants in accordance with the provisions of the Rules. ( 46 ) IN Rajalakshmaiah's case (13 ). the Supreme Court pointed out that there was no service rule which the State had transgressed. Likewise, in Sheila Kapur's case (14), allotment of alternative land was not a matter governed by any statutory rules But, selection of applicants for allotment of sites, is governed by statutory rules. Hence, the aforesaid two decisions are distinguishable and have no application to the present case. Some of learned Counsel for respondents-allottees submitted that it is for the person who complains that he has been discriminated against, to furnish particulars of persons similarly circumstanced to between whom and him discrimination is alleged, and to show how there has been hostile discrimination. It was said that the petitioner had not furnished such particulars, that his allegations of discrimination were vague and that in such state of pleadings, the Court was not called upon to go into the complaint of discrimination and of violation of Art. 14. Reference was made to the following observations of the Supreme Court in Probhudas v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 1044 , 1047:"it cannot be too stronglv emphasized that to make out a case of denial of the equal protection of the laws under Art. 14 of the Constitution, a plea of differential treatment is by itself not sufficient. Reference was made to the following observations of the Supreme Court in Probhudas v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 1044 , 1047:"it cannot be too stronglv emphasized that to make out a case of denial of the equal protection of the laws under Art. 14 of the Constitution, a plea of differential treatment is by itself not sufficient. An applicant pleading that Art. 14 has been violated must make out that not only he had been treated differently from others but he has been so treated from persons similarly circumstanced without any reasonable basis, and such differential treatment is unjustifiably made. " ( 47 ) THE petitioner has alleged in his affidavit that he was also an eligible applicant like respondents-allottees, that this was his fifth attempt to get a site, and that several respondents-allotteer who had applied for the first time, had been allotted sites He has also alleged that selection of applicants for allotment of sites, was done arbitrarily and not on any rational basis We think these allegations made by the petitioner contain sufficient particulars of the alleged discrimination Hence, we are unable to accept the contention that his allegations in this regard are vague or lack sufficient particulars it was also contended by some of learned Counsel for respondents-allottees that as the petitioner was an applicant for Site No 141, he could only assail the allotment of that site to respondent-2, that he could not challenge the allotment of other sites and that at any rate he could not challenge the allotment of sites other than Site No. 141 and Sites NOs. 135a and 357 (for which he had indicated in his application his second and third preferences respectively) Support for this contention was sought to be derived from the following observations of this Court in KR. D. Karanth v. City Improvement Trust Board, 1962 Mys. L. J. 313, 315, 316:"the mere circumstance that the Board dealt with several applications at a Board meeting cannot enable any individual applicant to challenge the decisior of the Board except in regard to the sits that be applied for. It is. D. Karanth v. City Improvement Trust Board, 1962 Mys. L. J. 313, 315, 316:"the mere circumstance that the Board dealt with several applications at a Board meeting cannot enable any individual applicant to challenge the decisior of the Board except in regard to the sits that be applied for. It is. however, urged on behalf of the petitioner that even independently of the fact of their applying for a particular site or sites, they are interested as citizens in seeing that a statutory body like the Board, which is entrusted with public property and funds, discharges its duties within the ambit of its powers and that therefore they are entitled to challenge the allotments not only of particular sites which they applied for but of all the sites dealt with under the resolution in question We cannot accept this contention It is well established that in a matter of this character the interest of the petitioner must be his individual interest and the relief sought for by him must be confined to such interest. " ( 48 ) THERE, the allotment of sites was governed by the Bye-laws approved by the Government in its notification dated 8-1-1954. Bye-law 3 of those bye-laws provided, inter alia, that an application should be for a specified site and that if a person desires to apply for more than one site, a separate application should be made for each site. In those Bye-laws there was no provision for an applicant expressing his preference for two other sites besides the particular site applied for Nor was there in those bye-laws any provision corresponding to Rule 13 which provides that the trust Board may allot to an applicant the site applied for, or the site in respect, of which preference has been indicated by him or any other site. As the scheme of making applications and allotment of sites under those bye-laws, is materially different from that under the present Rules (which superseded the Bye-laws), the above observations in K. R. D. Karanth's case (16), have no application to the present case. ( 49 ) TO many of the respondents-allottees the Trust Board has allotted sites different from what they had applied for or had mentioned as their next preferences. ( 49 ) TO many of the respondents-allottees the Trust Board has allotted sites different from what they had applied for or had mentioned as their next preferences. If the petitioner was selected for allotment of a site, it was permissible for the Trust Board to allot him any site, and not necessarily one of sites Nos. 141, 135 and 357 Hence the petitioner has, in our opinion, sufficient interest to challenge the allotment of sites to respondents 2 to 16. ( 50 ) THE view we have taken receives support from a very recent unreported decision of this Court. In Writ Petition No. 630 of 1971, WP. 630/71 the petitioner had prayed for issue of a direction to the Trust Board to permit inspection of certain records thereof. He had applied lor allotment ot a site in the same extension, i. e. , Raj Mahal Vilas Extension; but he was not allotted a site. There, one of the questions that aiose was whether his right of inspection was confined only to the resolution of the Trust board relating to the allotment of the three sites mentioned in his application or whether he was entitled to inspect resolutions relating to allotments ot other sites also in that extension. Upholding the claim of the petitioner to inspect resolutions relating to allotment of all the sites in that extension, this is what Narayana Pai, CJ. , who spoke for the Bench, said in para 24 of the order:"but if we closely scrutinise the matter, an application is not for allotment of any particular site. Any one of the sites in the layout may be allotted to an applicant. The fact that the petitioner is permitted to express his preference in respect of certain sites does not mean that his application must be regarded as an application limited to a particular site. Indeed, Rule 13 of the Allotment Rules says that the site appied for or site in respect of which preference is indicated by the applicant or any other site may be allotted to him. " ( 51 ) SOME of learned Counsel fur respondents-allottees contended that it it is held that the petitioner could have been allotted any one site mentioned in Ext. " ( 51 ) SOME of learned Counsel fur respondents-allottees contended that it it is held that the petitioner could have been allotted any one site mentioned in Ext. A, then it follows that he should have challenged the allotment of all the 65 sites in that extension after impleading as respondents all those 65 allottees and that it was not open to him to pick and choose some only of such allottees and challenge only the allotments in their favour. It was urged that the petition should be dismissed in limine as the petitioner has not impleaded all those allottees. ( 52 ) THE above objection to the petition, is not without force. But the petitioner has alleged in his affidavit that the Trust Board had not publicly notified the list of allottees, that he had applied to the Trust Board for grant of a copy of the list of allottees and that the Trust Board did not comply with his request He has produced a copy of his letter dated 27-1-1971 addressed to the Trust Board in this regard. . The writ petition was filed on 11-2-1971. No doubt, it has been stated in the counter-affidavit of the Chairman that the list of allottees was put up on the notice board of the Trust Board and that even before the Trust Board could reply to his letter, the petitioner had rushed to the Court. ( 53 ) ASSUMING that the petitioner could have seen and did see, the list of allottees of sites, on the notice board, it was not easy for him to ascertain the addresses and other particulars of those allottees to implead all of them. He cannot be said to have rushed to the Court when he did not receive a reply from the Trust Board even two weeks after he requested for such information. It has not even been suggested that he had any ulterior motive in not impleading as respondents the rest of the allottees or that there was any collusion between him and them. It has not even been suggested that he had any ulterior motive in not impleading as respondents the rest of the allottees or that there was any collusion between him and them. If the petitioner's contentions should succeed, there is no impediment to set aside the allotment of sites to respondents 2 to 16 direct the Trust Board to allot those sites afresh, in these circumstances we do not consider it reasonable to reject the petition on the sole ground that all the 65 allotees, have not been impeaded as responaents in this petition. ( 54 ) WE shall now deal with the petitioners contention that the selection of applicants by the Trust Board for allotment of sites. , was arbitrary. opposed to the mandatory provisions of the Rules and was discriminatory. In the counter-affidavit of the Chairman of the Trust Board, it has been pleaded that reservation of sites for several categories of applicants as provided in sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 is not inflexible The learned advocate General also contended that the use of the word 'may' in that sub-rule clearly shows that the reservation mentioned in that sub-rule is only recommendatory and not mandatory As the Trust Board itself has not claimed that in making selection of applicants for allotment or sites, it (the Trust Board) followed the reservation provided in that sub-rule it is not necessary for the purpose of this petition to go into the question whether the reservation of sites for several categories of applicants as provided in that sub-rule, is only recommendatory or mandatory the learned Advocate-General urged that clauses (1) to (iv)in sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 do not lay down am order of priority of the claim of applicants and that that sub-rule does not provide that if a person answers all or any of the principles specified in clauses (i) to (iv), he should necessarily be selected or even preferred for allotment of sites It was also urged by the learned Advocate General that the words "shall have regard to" occurring in that sub-rule mpai no more than that the Trust board shall bear in mind those principles ard that those words cannot be construed as imposing an obligation or the Trust Board to strictly base its selection on these principles. The learned Advocate General ma'ntained that at any rate, no person can challenge the decision of the trust Board on the ground that it did not have regard to those principles in support of this contention the learned Advocate General relied on the following observations if Viscount Simon, L. C. who spoke for the Judicial committee ot the Privy Council in Ryots of Garabandha v Zamindar of Parlakimedi, AIR 1943 PC 164, 180 while approving the view taken by the majonty of the collective Board of Revenue. "the View taken by the majority of the Collective Board of revenue in making the order dated 10th October 19386, which is now co,plained of, is that the requirement to 'have regard to' the provisions in question has no more definite or technical meaning than that of ordinary suage and only requires that these provisions must be taken into consideration In their view the prime duty of the revenue Officer under Chapter 11 is to to a fair and equitable rent, and though he must be guided by the principles underlving such provisions as are contained in Chap 3, he is not strictly bound by such provisions. " ( 55 ) THE above observations of the Privy Council, were quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Mysore State Electricity Board v Bangolore woolen Cottonand Silk, Mills Ltd. , AIR 1963 SC 1128 . Dealing with the expression having regard to the nature and geographical position of the supply and the purpose for which it is required ", the Supreme Court said that that expression does not contemplate thai a consumer of electricity can raise a dispute as against the Electricity Board on the looting that the board did not pay due regard to the nature and geographical position ot the supply and for the purpose for which it was required. ( 56 ) IN view of the aforesaid decisions, we think the learned Advocate general is right in his submission thai ihe words " have regard to'' in sub-rule (1) of Rule 10, must be interpreted to mean that the principles specified in clauses (i) to (iv) of that sub-rule must be taken info consideration by the Trust Board and that though the Trust Board must be guided by those principles, it (the Trust Board) is not strictly bound by such principles and that an allottee cannot raise a dispute against the trust Board on ihe ground that it (the Trust Board) did not pay due regard to those principles. ( 57 ) EVEN so, the question that has yet to be answered by the Trust Board, is on what principles or by the application of which criteria, it selected applicants ior allotment of sites. Neither in the counter-affidavit nor in the additional affidavit sworn to by the Chairman of the Trust Board has it been stated on what principles or by the application of which criteria such selection of applicants had been made. The learned Advocate general referred to the avernents in the additional affidavit of ihe Chairman to the effect that a tabulated statement of all the eligible applicants with material particulars relating to them, had been placed before the allotment Committee and before the Trust Board and that after giving due consideration to all the relevant facts and circumstances and the principles of eligibility and selection laid down in Rules 9 and 10, the allotment Committee and the Trust Board made the impugned selection of applicants. ( 58 ) THE mere fact that a tabulated statement containing the material particulars of all the eligible applicants, was before the Allotment Committee and the Trust Board, would not be sufficient to draw an inference that the selection of applicants for allotment of sites had been made on the basis of any intelligible principles or criteria. ( 58 ) THE mere fact that a tabulated statement containing the material particulars of all the eligible applicants, was before the Allotment Committee and the Trust Board, would not be sufficient to draw an inference that the selection of applicants for allotment of sites had been made on the basis of any intelligible principles or criteria. Even the further assertion of the Chairman that in making such selection the Allotment Committee and the Trust Board gave due consideration to all relevant facts and circumstances and the principles of eligibility and selection laid down in rules 9 and 10, would not be sufficient to show that such selection was made on the basis of the principles specified in clauses (i) to (iv) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 or any other principles or by the application of any criteria and that the principles or criteria so employed were relevant for the purpose of such selection. Even after perusing carefully the contents of the counter-affidavit and the additional affidavit sworn to by the Chairman and listening to the arguments of the learned Advocate General we are not satisfied that the impugned selection of applicants was made by the application of any principles or criteria. However, the learned Advocate General said that where the number of sites available for allotment is small and where there are a very large number of applicants for those sites, it is impossible to lay down any hard and fast rules or principles or criteria for selection of applicants for allotment and that such selection must necessarily be left to the discretion of the Trust Board there is considerable force in the contention of the learned Advocate general that it is neither possible nor practicable to apply rigidly any set of rules or principles of criteria for making such selection of applicants for allotment of sites. It at least the Trust Board had followed broad and general principles oi criteria for making such selection, we would not interfere with the discretion of the Trust Board as to which among the several competing principles or criteria should prevail in making the selection. It at least the Trust Board had followed broad and general principles oi criteria for making such selection, we would not interfere with the discretion of the Trust Board as to which among the several competing principles or criteria should prevail in making the selection. But we are unable to agree with the contention of the learned advocate General that it is neither possible nor practicable to lay down even broad and general principles for such selection of applicants and that it should be lelt to the discretion of the Trust Board to make the selection without the application of any uniform rules, principles or criteria. As Lord Mansfield stated in the case of John Wilkes, (1770) 4 Bur. 2528, 2539, discretion means sound discretion governed by rules, nor by humour, it must not be arbitrary, vague or fanciful As stated by Doglas, J. , in United states v. Wunderlieh, (1951) 342 U. S. 98, where discretion is absolute, man has always suffered. ( 59 ) WHERE the number of applications is very large, it is possible that even after the application of any set of rules, principles, criteria, or classifications, the number of applicants who have equal claims, is in excess of the number of sites available for allotment. In such a situation the selection among such applicants by drawing lots,, would appear to us to be fairer than leaving the selection to the unguided discretion of the Trust board. The mathematical probability in the system of drawing lots, will, at least, give equal chances to all applicants and will eliminate the possibility of favouritism, we may point out that in the Bye-laws regulating allotment of sites (which have been superseded by the Rules), Bye-laws provided for drawing lots. Hov/ever, it is not necessary for us to express any final opinion on this aspect because it is not for the Courts to decide questions of policy and principles for such selection of applicants. However, the learned Advocate General alluded to the observations of the Supreme Court in Pannalal Bingraj v. Union of India, AIR. 1957 SC. Hov/ever, it is not necessary for us to express any final opinion on this aspect because it is not for the Courts to decide questions of policy and principles for such selection of applicants. However, the learned Advocate General alluded to the observations of the Supreme Court in Pannalal Bingraj v. Union of India, AIR. 1957 SC. 307, 408 to the effect that where the power to transfer a rase from one Income Tax Officer to another, is vested not in a minor official but in top-ranking authorities like the Commissioner of Income Tax and the Central Board of Revenue, abuse of power cannot easily be assumed, that there is presumption that public officials will discharge their duties honestly and fairly and that such power, though discretionary, is not necessarily discriminatory. In C. Lingam v. Government of India, AIR. 1971 SC. 474 the Supreme Court observed that the officers authorised to exercise certain powers under the Essential commodities Act, were the District Collector and the Deputy Commissioner for Civil Supplies who are expected to discharge their duties in a responsible and reasonable manner. The learned Advocate General highlighted the fact that the Chairman and 6 members of the Trust Board are appointed by the Government and 4 members are selected by the members of Corporation of the City of Bangalore. He said that such a responsible body can be trusted to exercise reasonably and fairly the discretion vested in it. ( 60 ) IN Pannalal Bingaraj's case (22), the Supreme Court added that the presumption that high authorities exercise the power conferred on them honestly and fairly, cannot be stretched too far and cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reason for subjecting individuals to hostile and discriminatory treatment and that there may be cases where improper execution of power will result in injustice to people. When the petitioner has come forward with a specific complaint that the Trust Board has exercised its power to select applicants, in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner, the initial presumption of fairness and reasonableness, will not take the matter far. The Trust Board has to show that it has exercised that power reasonably i. e. , on the basis of reasonable principles or criteria and not arbitrarily. The Trust Board has to show that it has exercised that power reasonably i. e. , on the basis of reasonable principles or criteria and not arbitrarily. ( 61 ) IT is not sufficient for the Trust Board merely to assert that in its opinion the persons to whom sites have been allotted, are more deserving than the petitioner. The Trust Board should demonstrate on what objective standards or criteria it came to that conclusion In particular, the trust Board has to show by the application of which principles, criteria or standards, respondents-allottees, many of whom had applied for sites for the first time, were considered to have better claims than the petitioner who had applied for the fifth time But, the Trust Board has failed to do so. As it has not shown that the selection of respondents 2 to 15 made by it, was by the application of the principles stated in clauses (i) to (iv) of sub-ruled) of Rule 10 or any other principles, criteria or objective standards, we cannot but hold that such selection of applicants and allotment of sites to them, were arbitrary Such exercise of power violator, the doctrine of equality and is clearly unsustainable. However, Mr. N. Venkatachala, learned Counsel for respondent-5, submitted that it was evident from the additional affidavit produced by the Chairman of the Trust Board that 10 sites were allotted to the class of persons specified in clause (ii) of Rule 10 (2), (namely, Central Government servants servants of local authorities and Corporations owned and controlled by the Central Government and the State Government), that the number of sites so allotted to that class did not exceed 15 per cent (the percentage reserved to that class under Rule 10) of the total number of sites and that the petitioner who did not belong to that class, could not challenge the allotment of a site to respondent-5 (Vice-Chancellor of agricultural University) who belonged to that class. ( 62 ) IN the additional affidavit, it has been merely stated that 10 sites were allotted to the said class of persons But it is not the case of the Trust board that it made reservation of sites for different classes of persons as provided in sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 and that it considered applications of applicants belonging to that class, only for those 10 sites and selected 10 applicants in that class on the basis of any principles or criteria. Apart from the question whether the Vice-Chancellor of the Agricultural university can be regarded as a servant of that University, the site allotted to respondent-5 cannot be regarded as a site reserved for the said class of applicants and that the petitioner was not eligible to be allotted that Site. Hence, we see no reason to treat the case of respondent-5 differently from those of other respondents-allottees. We shall now examine the validity of allotment of sites to respondents 6. 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 purporting to be by way of exchange, i. e. in exchange for sites which had been allotted to them earlier. The learned Advocate General looked into the records of the Trust board and gave the following particulars of the earlier allotments of sites to respondents 6 to 11:" (i) Respondent-6 had been allotted a site earlier. Though he had paid the full price thereof, no agreement had been executed by him and the Trust Board in respect of that site; nor had possession certificate been issued to him by the Trust Board in respect of it. (ii) Respondent-7 had been allotted a site earlier. He had paid the full price thereof; an agreement had been executed by him and the Trust board in respect of that site and that agreement was registered in the sub-Registry. But no possession certificate had been issued to him by the Trust Board in respect of that site. (iii) Respondent-8 had been allotted a site earlier. He had paid the full price thereof and executed an agreement in respect of it. But that agreement had not yet been got registered in the Sub-Registry. Nor had the possession certificate been issued to him by the Trust Board in respect of that site. (iv) Respondent-9 had been allotted a site earlier. He had paid the full price thereof. He had paid the full price thereof and executed an agreement in respect of it. But that agreement had not yet been got registered in the Sub-Registry. Nor had the possession certificate been issued to him by the Trust Board in respect of that site. (iv) Respondent-9 had been allotted a site earlier. He had paid the full price thereof. An agreement in respect of it had been executed by him and the Trust Board and got registered in the Sub-Registry. The possession certificate had also been issued to him by the Trust Board in respect of that site. (v) Respondent-10 had been allotted a site earlier. He had neither paid the price thereof nor executed an agreement in respect of it. (vi) Respondent-11 bad been allotted a site earlier. He had paid the full price thereof. An agreement had been executed by him and the Trust board in respect thereof and got registered in the Sub-Registry. The possession certificate had been issued to him by the Trust Board in respect of that site. Subsequently he returned that possession certificate to the Trust Board. " ( 63 ) MR. KRISHNAMURTHY contended that it was not competent for the Trust board to pave any site in exchange for a site which had been alloted earlier. On the other hand, the learned Advocate General urged that under s. 29 of the Improvement Act. it is competent for the Trust Board to exchange sites with persons to whom sites had been allotted earlier. The relevant part of sub-sec. (2) of S. 29 of the Improvement Act, reads:" (2) Subject to such restrictions, conditions and limitations as may be prescribed by rules made by the Government, the Board shall have power to lease sell or otherwise transfer any movable or immovable property which belongs to it,. . . . . "the word 'transfer' in the above sub-section, is, in our opinion, wide enough to include exchange. In tho Transfer of Property Act, 1882, exchange is one of the species of transfer of property. No rules have been made by the Government under the Improvement Act placing any restriction, on exchange of immovable property bv the Trust Board. Hence we think the learned Advocate General is right in contending that it is competent for the Trust Board to exchange sites with persons to whom sites had been allotted earlier. Mr. No rules have been made by the Government under the Improvement Act placing any restriction, on exchange of immovable property bv the Trust Board. Hence we think the learned Advocate General is right in contending that it is competent for the Trust Board to exchange sites with persons to whom sites had been allotted earlier. Mr. Krishnamurthy next contended that a person to whom the Trust board has allotted a site is not eligible for applying for a site again, even if it be by way of exchange. Mr. Krishnamurthy relied on sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 which provides, inter alia, that no person who or any member of whose family owns or has been allotted a site or a house by the Board, shall be eligible for allotment. ( 64 ) WE think sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 should not be construed literally but should be construed reasonably. The intention of that sub-rule appears to be to put an embargo on any person securing allotment of more than one site from the Trust Board, except in the circumstances mentioned in the proviso to that sub-rule. Where a person asks for allotment of a site in exchange ior the bite which had been allotted to him earlier, he does not thereby attempt to secure more than one site. The site he asks for is in lieu of the site which had been allotted to him earlier. Hence, sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 does not, in our opinion, either disqualify a person from applying for, or disable the Trust Board from giving him, another site in exchange. Mr. Krishna Murthy argued that respondents 6 to 11 also should be regarded as allottees of sites like the rest of respondents-allottees because they (respondents 6 to 11) had applied for allotment of sites in Form-I appended to the Rules and that the allotment of sites to them suffers from the same infirmity as the allotment of sites to the rest of the respondent -allottees. ( 65 ) IT is not disputed that respondents 6 to 11 had applied in Form-I for sites notified for allotment under Ext. A In fact when some of them requested for exchange of sites, the Trust Board had asked them to apply in Form-I for the sites they wanted to be allotted in exchange. ( 65 ) IT is not disputed that respondents 6 to 11 had applied in Form-I for sites notified for allotment under Ext. A In fact when some of them requested for exchange of sites, the Trust Board had asked them to apply in Form-I for the sites they wanted to be allotted in exchange. If these respondents are treated as fresh applicants for sites like the remaining respondents-allottees, there can be no doubt that the selection of respondents 6 to 11 and allotment of sites to them, are unsustainable for the reasons already stated. But it was contended lor respondents 6 to 11 that though they had applied for sites in Form-I, the impugned allotment of sites to them was, in substance, exchange of sites and not fresh allotment of sites and that such exchange of sites should be treated separately from allotment of sites for the first time to other respondents-allottees. Exchange has been denned thus in S. 118 of the Transfer of Prooperty act, 1882: "118. When two persons mutually transfer ownership of one thing for the ownership of another, neither thing or both things being money only, the transaction is called an 'exchange'. " ( 66 ) IN order to constitute an exchange of sites between the Trust Board and any person to whom a site had been allotted earlier, such person must have become the owner of such site (allotted earlier ). In other words, the title in the site allotted to him earlier, must have passed to him and he should transfer back the ownership of such site to the Trust Board in return for the Trust Board transferring to him the ownership of another site. From the particulars furnished by the learned Advocate General about the earlier allotment of sites to respondents 6 to 11, it is been that only in the cases of respondents 7, 9 and 11 the tale in the respective sites allotted to them earlier, had passed to them as they had paid the full prices ot such sites, agreements in Form-II in respect of such sites had been executed by them and the Trust Board, and such agreements had been got registered in the Sub-Register. But the title in the sue allotted earlier to respondent-6, had not passed to him though he had paid the full price thereof, because the agreement relating to that site had neither been executed by him and the Trust Board nor had been got registered in the sub-Registry in the case of respondent-8 also the title of the site allot cod to him earlier had not passed to him though he had paid the fall the price thereof and the agreement m iespect of that site had been got executed by him and the Trust Board, because that agreement had not been registered in the Rub-Registry and the possession certificate had also not been issued to him Respondent 10 had neither paid the price of the site allotted to him earlier nor was any agreement in respect of such site executed by him and the Trust Board Hence, the title in such site had not passed to him between the Trust Board and each of respondents 6, 8 and 10, there was no exchange of ownership of sites because the title in the site allottee to him earlier had not yet passed to him under a registered instrument and he had not become the owner of such site In the cases of respondents 7, 9 and 11 who had acquired ownership of sites alloited to them earlier, there was no legal impediment for exchange of those sites for sites which remained with the Trust Board. ( 67 ) THE Trust Board has not explained in the counteraffidavt or additional affidavit or even during the course of the hearing of the petition, what procedure was adopted by it for calling for applications from per sons to whom sites had been allotted earlier but who desired to obtain alternative sites in excharge, and how the Trust Board dealt with requests of such persons for exchange of sites During the last twenty years the trust Board has formed many lay-outs and and extensions and allotted a large number of sites to individuals Among such allottees, it is very likely that there are many desirous to get alrenative sites in exchange, presumably because they think that the dimensions or the situation or both of such alternative sites aie more suitable than those of the sites already allotted to them Unless the Trust Beard makes known to such persons its readiness to exchange sites in appropriate cases, gives them an opportunity to apply for exchange of sites and considers and decides such application on any intelligible basis, there willl be arbitrariness and discrimination in allotting sites in exchange as it has not been shown by the Trust Board that the allotment of sites by way of exchange, was done ifter affording equal opportunity to persons desirous of getting such exchange of sites and by following any principles or criteria for permitting such exchange, we cannot uphold the allotment of sites bv way of exchange c\en m the case of respondents 7 9 and 11. ( 68 ) LASTLY, it was pleaded that some of the respondents-allottces had paid the full prices of the sites allotted to them that a few of them had even obtained possession of such sites, that they would be put to hardship it the allotment of sites in their favour should be set aside and that there would be serious dislocation to the Trust Board also. The petitioner filed this petition within a few weeks after the impugned allotment ot sites. On 15-2-1971 this Court made an interim order restraining the Trust Board from delivering possession of sites allotted and the respondents-allottees from putting up any construction on those sites. In the circumstances, neither the Trust Board nor the respondents-allottees can complain of any serious hardship if the impugned allotment should be set aside. On 15-2-1971 this Court made an interim order restraining the Trust Board from delivering possession of sites allotted and the respondents-allottees from putting up any construction on those sites. In the circumstances, neither the Trust Board nor the respondents-allottees can complain of any serious hardship if the impugned allotment should be set aside. Even if some inconvenience should be caused to respondents-allottees, or the Trust Board by setting aside such allotment, such inconvenience is inevitable in maintaining the rule of law. As stated earlier, almost towards the close of the hearing of the petition, mr. Krishna Murthy said that the petitioner would not press the petition as against respondent-14 But Mr. Krishna Murthy gave no reason for this change in the attitude of the petitioner towards respondent-14. The allotment of a site to respondent-14 suffers from the same arbitrariness as the allotment of sites to other respondents-allottees and we are not able to see any distinguishing feature about the allotment ot a site to him. At this late stage, we cannot permit the petitioner to withdraw the petition as against respondent-14 since such a course would bring about a discrimination as between respondent-14 and the rest of the respondents-allottees. ( 69 ) IN the result, we quash the allotment by the Trust Board to respondents 2 to 16, of the sites mentioned in the notification of the Trust Board dated 11-11-1970 (Ext. A ). It will be open to the Trust Board to allot those sites afresh according to law. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .