JUDGMENT : B.K. Patra, J. - This is an appeal against a reversing judgment of the Subordinate Judge, Jaipur in a suit by the Plaintiff for cancellation of a sale deed and for confirmation, or, in the alternative, recovery of possession of the disputed property from Defendant No. 1. 2. Shorn of details the facts are these: The Plaintiff had a Bajyapti Madhyaswatwadhikari interest in the disputed property. He Executed a sole deed Ext. A dated 20.8.1957 in respect of this property in favour of Defendant No. 1 for Rs. 200/-. Plaintiff?s case is that although he Executed the Kabala it was a nominal one and had not been Acted upon and that he did not deliver possession to Defendant No. 1. He therefore, brought the suit in the year 1960 for cancellation of the sale deed and for confirmation of his possession therein, or, in the alternative for recovery of possession of the same. Defendant No. 1 who aloe contested the suit contended that the sale deed is genuine, that consideration had been paid thereunder by him to the Plaintiff and that possession had been delivered to him. 3. The, trial Court found that the Kabala is genuine and for, consideration and that possession of the property had been delivered to Defendant No. 1., He, therefore, dismissed the suit by his judgment dated 29th June, 1965. Shortly thereafter the Plaintiff filed an appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Meanwhile the sub-proprietary interest, in respect of which the Plaintiff had executed the Kabala Ext. A, vested in the State Government under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This vesting took place in March, 1963 at a time when the suit was pending is in the trial Court. The Plaintiff made an application before the Collector u/s 8.A of the Act obviously claiming that he was the intermediary was in khas possession of the disputed Lands and praying that the disputed Lands should be settled with him on fair and equitable rent. On 30-11-1964, the Collector passed the order Ext. 7 settling the disputed lands with the Plaintiff. It is seen from the order that no objections had been filed contesting the claim which the Plaintiff had made before the Collector. On 30-11-1964, the Collector passed the order Ext. 7 settling the disputed lands with the Plaintiff. It is seen from the order that no objections had been filed contesting the claim which the Plaintiff had made before the Collector. The fact of such settlement with the Plaintiff was, however, not brought to the notice of the trial Court which by then was in (sic) of the case and the trial Court passed a decree dismissing the Plaintiff?s suit. During the pendency of the appeal in the lower appellate Court, the Plaintiff filed on 21.7-1966 an application under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC to accept Ext. 7 as an additional evidence in the case. This prayer was allowed on 29.7.1966 and additional evidence was received on 24-8-1966. The learned Subordinate Judge held on evidence that the Plaintiff bad duly Executed the sale deed Ext. A and had also received consideration thereunder but had not parted with possession. Taking into consideration the events that took place subsequent to the institution of the suit, namely, the vesting of the disputed property in the State and The settlement of the disputed lands with the Plaintiff as evidenced by Ext. 7, he held that: As the sub-proprietary interest transferred under Ext. A has vested in the State Government during the pendency of the suit and by some means or other, Plaintiff got his name recorded as a tenant on the footing of Ext. 7 before the Collector under the states Abolition Act and Defendant No. 1 did not apply within the time stipulated by law, Plaintiff?s new status as a tenant has to be declared, and his possession as such tenant is to be confirmed leaving open the Defendant No. 1 to work out his remedy successfully against such settlement in favour of Plaintiff not withstanding Ext. A under the provisions of Estates Abolition Act, which he has already pursued in the meantime. He accordingly allowed the appeal, set, aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and passes a decree declaring the Plaintiff?s status as a tenant under The State Government and confirmed his possession thereon. Being aggrieved by this decision, Defendant No. 1 has come up in second appeal. 4. He accordingly allowed the appeal, set, aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and passes a decree declaring the Plaintiff?s status as a tenant under The State Government and confirmed his possession thereon. Being aggrieved by this decision, Defendant No. 1 has come up in second appeal. 4. Law is now well-settled that the hearing of an appeal under the procedural law of India is in the nature of re-bearing and therefore in (sic) the relief to be granted in a case on appeal, the appellate Court is entitled to take into account even facts and events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against. Consequently, the appellate Court is competent to take into account legislative changes since the decision in appeal was given and its powers are not confined only to see whether the lower Court?s decision was correct according to the law as it stood at the time when its decision was given. See Lachmeshwar Prasad Shuki and Ors. v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri and Ors. AIR 1951 P.C. 5. This view of the Federal Court was reiterated in Gumalpura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setm Veerayya and Ors. AIR 1959 S.C. 577 , and had been consistently followed in this Court, Janardan Naik and Anr. v. Khegeswar Naik and Ors. AIR 1963 Orissa 130 : 1963 C. L. T. (Notes 91) 63, and Radhacharan Das Babaji v. Bhima Patra AIR 1965 Orissa 1. The learned Subordinate Judge was, therefore, right in taking into consideration the events that transpired subsequent to the institution of the suit, namely the vesting of the disputed property in the State under the provisions of The Orissa Estates Abolition Act and the settlement of the disputed lands with the Plaintiffs in accordance with the provisions of Sections 7 and 8.A of the Act. Regarding the consequences of such vesting the view that was held by this Court was that rights and liabilities created in respect of properties which latter on vested in the State under the provision is of the Act and which are subsequently settled with the person creating the rights and liabilities, continue to exist. Regarding the consequences of such vesting the view that was held by this Court was that rights and liabilities created in respect of properties which latter on vested in the State under the provision is of the Act and which are subsequently settled with the person creating the rights and liabilities, continue to exist. It was accordingly held by a Bench of this Court in Brundaban Chandra Dhir alias Krushna Chandra Singh v. Natabar Chandra Dhir I.L.R, 1963 Cuttack 914, that where a certain item of property consisting of (sic) lands of the proprietor with buildings standing thereon was charged under a maintenance decree and after the abolition of the estate it was settled with The proprietor as a tenant subject to payment of fair and equitable rent, the charge on the item of the properties attached to the decree prior to the date of vesting continues to exist and the decrial amount can be realised by sale of that property. This decision was rendered by the Bench relying on a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Sidheswar Prasad Singh and Ors. v. Ram Saroop Singh and Ors. AIR 1953 Pat. 412. Relying on this decision, a learned single Judge of this Court held in Bhagaban Rath v. Annada Das 34 (1968) C.L.T. 1289, that: Section 5(a) lays down that The entire estate including various subject matters dealt with therein shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances, and such intermediary shall cease to have any interest in such estate other than the interest expressly saved by or under the provisions of the Act. It would thus be clear that whatever interest has been expressly saved did not vest in the State. Section 6(1) thus saves the properties mentioned therein from vesting in the State and they shall be deemed to be settled by the State Government with such intermediary. The process of vesting and saving operates simultaneously. The properties so saved continue to be the properties of the ex-intermediaries without the title being in any way extinguished at any time subject to payment of fair and equitable rent. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider this aspect of law with reference to the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 in Shivashankar Prasad Saha and Anr. v. Baikunth Nath Singh and Ors. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider this aspect of law with reference to the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 in Shivashankar Prasad Saha and Anr. v. Baikunth Nath Singh and Ors. AIR 969 S.C. 911, and held: All estates notified u/s 3 vest in the State free of an encumbrances. The quondam proprietors and tenure-holders of those Estates lose all interests in those Estates. As proprietors they retain no interest in respect of them whatsoever. But in respect of the lands enumerated in Section 6 the State settled on them the rights of raiyats. Though in fast the vesting of the Estates and deemed settlement of riayat?s rights in respect of certain classes of lands included in the Estates took place simultaneously, in Jaw the two must be treated as different transactions; first there was a vesting of the Estates in the State absolutely and free of all encumbrances. Then followed the deemed settlement by the State of raiyat?s rights on the quondam proprietors. Therefore in law it would not be correct to say that what vested in The State are only those interests not coming within Section 6. What was stated above with reference to the Bihar Land Reforms Act would be fully applicable to cases governed by the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951, as there are similar provisions in the latter Act corresponding to the provisions of The Bihar Act referred to above. In laying down the law as stated above, the Supreme Court overruled the contrary view expressed in the Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Sidheswar Prasad Singh and Ors. v. Ram Saroop Singh and Ors. AIR 1953 Pat. 412. In this view of the matter, the decision of our Court reported in Brundaban Cnandra Dhir alias Krushna Chandra Singh v. Natabar Chandra Dhir ILR 1963 Cuttack 914, and Bhagaban Rath v. Annada Das 34 (1968) C.L.T. 1289, can no longer be deemed to be good law. It is, therefore, clear that the disputed property as such vested in the State free of all encumbrances thereby putting an end to whatever title either the Plaintiff or Defendant No. 1 had in the property. Then followed the settlement of the disputed lands with the Plaintiff as evidenced by Ext. 7. The Plaintiff thus acquired a fresh title to the disputed lands under Ext. Then followed the settlement of the disputed lands with the Plaintiff as evidenced by Ext. 7. The Plaintiff thus acquired a fresh title to the disputed lands under Ext. 7 and it is this title which was declared in his favour by The learned Subordinate Judge. 5. It is argued by Mr. Dasgupta learned Advocate appearing for the Appellant that before any settlement contemplated by Section 7 of the Act is made, two conditions have to be satisfied, namely, that the person making the application should have been the intermediary and he should have been in khas possession of the property on the date of vesting, and as the learned Subordinate Judge had found that the Plaintiff had Executed the sale deed Ext. A and had received consideration thereunder, he had lost his title to the property although be continued to be in possession thereof and that consequently he had ceased to be the intermediary in respect of the property and was therefore not entitled to obtain settlement u/s 7 of the Act. This contention is clearly untenable. The jurisdiction to decide claims made under Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Act is exclusively vested in the revenue Courts and Section 39 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in respect of any order passed by the Revenue Officer under Chapter II in which Sections 6, 7, Sand 8-A occur. The correctness of the order passed by the Revenue Officer under Ext. 7 cannot therefore be questioned in a Civil Court. Mr. Dasgupta then contended that the moment the vesting took place in March, 1963, the Civil Court lost jurisdiction to deal further with the matter and consequently the suit which was then pending in the Civil Court ought to have been dismissed on that ground. This contention is also clearly unacceptable. By reason of Section 39 of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts has been taken away inter alia in respect of proceedings taken under ?Chapter? II to VI of the Act. What the Civil Court was caned upon to decide was not in respect of any such matters. It was caned upon to declare the title In respect of the disputed property on the round that although the Plaintiff Executed a Kabala in respect thereof in favour of Defendant, the title sill remained with him. II to VI of the Act. What the Civil Court was caned upon to decide was not in respect of any such matters. It was caned upon to declare the title In respect of the disputed property on the round that although the Plaintiff Executed a Kabala in respect thereof in favour of Defendant, the title sill remained with him. During the pendency of this litigation, a certain event had happened which culminated in the passing of the order Ext. 7 by the Revenue Court and this had the effect of conferring? on the Plaintiff a fresh title in respect of the disputed property. It is this freshly acquired title which was declared by the decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge. As was rightly pointed out by the learned Subordinate Judge, if Defendant No. 1 is aggrieved by the decision of the Collector as embodied in Ext. 7, his remedy, if any, would lie with the revenue authorities and not in a Civil Court. 6. In the result, I find no merit in this appeal which accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. Final Result : Dismissed