JUDGMENT : Shambhu Prasad Singh, J. 1. The appellant, Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Bihar Region, made an application under Section 75(2) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act') on the 29th August, 1966, for recovery from the respondents of employees' contribution for the period from 15.12.57 to 31.12.64 on account of overtime wages paid by the employer. The respondents resisted the claim on the ground that the claim in respect of any period before three years of the date of application was time barred. The court below has accepted the contention of the respondents and held that the appellant was entitled to claim employees' contribution from 30.8.63 only and not for the period before that date. Being aggrieved by that ORDER :, the appellant has preferred this appeal. In support of its ORDER :that the claim for employees' contribution for the period before 30.8.63 was barred by limitation the court below has relied on Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 and Section 77(1A) of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondents had to concede that the claim could not be held to be barred either by Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act or Section 77(1A) of the Act. In (1) Town Municipal Council, Athani V. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli (A.I.R. 1969 SC 1335) it has been observed that it was not possible to hold that the intention of the legislature was to drastically alter the scope of Article 137 (corresponding Article in the old Act being Article 181) so as to include within it all the applications irrespective of the fact whether they had any reference of the Code of Civil Procedure. It has further been observed in that case that this Article would not apply the applications made to Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court which are mere Quasi-Judicial Tribunals and not Courts in the real sense of the term. In (2) Letters Patent Appeal No. 31 of 1956 (Bihar State Electricity Board V. Monghyr Electric Supply Co. JUDGMENT : dated 21st May, 1971) myself, B.D. Singh, J. concurring, held that Article 137 of the new Limitation Act would apply only to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure and not even to applications under the Indian Arbitration Act filed before a regular court. JUDGMENT : dated 21st May, 1971) myself, B.D. Singh, J. concurring, held that Article 137 of the new Limitation Act would apply only to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure and not even to applications under the Indian Arbitration Act filed before a regular court. The reasons for the said view have been given in detail in that JUDGMENT : and it is not necessary to repeat them here. It is obvious, therefore, that the court below has erred in holding that the claim of the appellant was partly barred by Article 137 of the new Limitation Act. 2. By referring to Section 77(1A) of the Act in support of its finding that the claim of the appellant was partly barred, the court below has shown that it has applied itself to the matter superficially. Sub-section (1A) of Section 77 of the Act was not there on the date the application was made by the appellant. It was inserted by Act 44 of 1966, and came into force with effect from 28th of January, 1968. An application filed on 29th August, 1956, therefore, could not be held to be barred by Sub-section (1A) of Section 77. The court below ought to have applied itself more carefully while considering the contention of the respondents that the claim of the appellant was barred by Sub-section (1A) of Section 77 of the Act. 3. Mr. Krishna Prakash Sinha, learned counsel for the respondents, however, attempted to support the ORDER :of the court below with reference to Rule 17 of the Bihar Employees' Insurance Courts Rules, 1952. This rule runs as follows: 17. Limitation: (1) Every application to the Court shall be brought within twelve months from the date on which the cause of action arose or as the case may be the claim became due: Provided that the Court may entertain an application after the said period of twelve months if it is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient reasons for not making the application within the said period. (2) Subject as aforesaid the provisions of Parts II and III of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908), shall, so far as may be, apply to every such application. According to Mr. K.P. Singh, the appellant could have made a claim on account of employees' contribution only in respect of the period of 12 months before filing of its application. According to Mr. K.P. Singh, the appellant could have made a claim on account of employees' contribution only in respect of the period of 12 months before filing of its application. He conceded, however, that as there was no appeal or cross-objection on behalf of the respondents, the ORDER :of the court below has to stand and that even if his contentions were to be accepted, the case shall have to be sent back for consideration by the court below whether the delay in making the application can be condoned or not under the proviso to Rule 17(1). 4. Mr. J.C. Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant, however, urged that Rule 17 was ultra vires of the rule-making power. It may be stated that almost all the States framed similar rules under the Act and Rule 17 of the Rules framed by them prescribed a period of limitation of 12 months for an application under the Act. The vires of the rule was challenged before different High Courts. In (3) M/s. A.K. Brothers V. Employees' State Insurance Corporation (A.I.R. 1965 All 410), the Allahabad High Court held that the rule was intra vires. In (4) Employees' State Insurance Corporation V. Madhya Pradesh Government (A.I.R. 1964 MP 75), (5) M/s. Solar Works V. Employees' State Insurance Corporation (A.I.R. 1964 Mad 376), (6) United India Timber Works V. Employees' State Insurance Corporation (A.I.R. 1967 Pun 166, Full Bench) and (7) the Employees' State Insurance Corporation V. Bharat Barrel and Drum Manufacturing Co. (A.I.R. 1967 Bom 472), the High Courts of Madhya Pradesh, Madras, Punjab and Bombay held that the rule was ultra vires. It is Section 96 of the Act which confers power on the State Government to make rules not inconsistent with the Act with regard to all or any of the matters enumerated under various clauses of Sub-section (1) of that Section. Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) is as follows: the procedure to be followed in proceedings before such Courts, and the execution of ORDER :s made by such Courts. 5. It was contended by Mr. K.P. Sinha that limitation is a matter of procedure and, therefore, Rule 17 could be validly made by the State Government under Clause (b) of Section 96(1) of the Act. 5. It was contended by Mr. K.P. Sinha that limitation is a matter of procedure and, therefore, Rule 17 could be validly made by the State Government under Clause (b) of Section 96(1) of the Act. In the case of (3) M/s. A.K. Brothers V. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, the Allahabad High Court relying on a passage in Halsbury's Laws of England that the provisions of statutes of Limitation which the remedy and not the right are rules of procedure only held that the rule could be validly made. Even though the attention of the learned Judges was drawn to the fact that the Act itself contained provisions about limitation as regards certain proceedings and did not prescribe any specific period of limitation for application under Section 75, they held that there was no inconsistency between the rule and any provision of the Act. With all respects, I think that the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in this case is not correct. What to speak of provisions of other chapters of the Act, there are sufficient materials in Chapter VI (which contained Section 75) itself to show that the legislature did not intend to confer power on the rule-making authority to make rules prescribing limitation for applications under Section 75. Section 82 which is in the same chapter provides for an appeal from an ORDER :of Employees' Insurance Court to the High Court. It also prescribes a period of limitation for such an appeal as 60 days. If the legislature would have intended to confer power on the rule-making authority to make rules regarding limitation, it could have very well left the period of limitation for appeal also to be prescribed by that authority. Again Section 76 which is also in the same chapter, while providing for the place where proceedings are to be instituted, says that the provisions of that section were subject to other provisions of the Act and any rule made by the State Government. The provisions of Section 75 have not been made subject to any rule made by the State Government. This also shows that it was not the intention of the legislature to vest the rule-making authority with power to make rules prescribing limitation for applications under Section 75 of the Act. The provisions of Section 75 have not been made subject to any rule made by the State Government. This also shows that it was not the intention of the legislature to vest the rule-making authority with power to make rules prescribing limitation for applications under Section 75 of the Act. The Ace itself appears to have been enacted for the benefit of the employees by providing for insurance for them by contribution from employers and it is not expected that the legislature would have vested power in the rule-making authority to provide for limitation for applications for contribution. One of the reasons given by the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Courts is that if rule could be validly made as to the place of suing, which was also a matter of procedure, it could be made also with regard to limitation. They failed to notice in this connection that Section 76 of the Act, which dealt with institution of proceedings, was by legislature itself made subject to rules, if any, made by the State Government. 6. In the case of (4) Employees State Insurance Corporation V. Madhya Pradesh Government (A.I.R. 1964 MP 75), the learned Chief Justice observed that the rule of limitation was not a matter of procedure simplicitor and also pointed out how the prescription of limitation by rule making authority was inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. No doubt, there are some inaccuracies in the statements in that JUDGMENT : as to the sections of the Act which prescribed limitation. The inconsistencies pointed out between the rule prescribing limitation and other provisions of the Act are glaring. The decision in the case of (5) Messrs Solar Works V. Employees' State Insurance Corporation (A.I.R. 1964 Mad 376) is very instructive. With reference to Article 145 of the Constitution and various other Statutes, both Central and of Madras State, Anantanarayanan, J. has pointed out that where an Act itself does not provide for limitation with reference to a particular matter and the delegation of power to make rules is conferred by a section of the Act which does not expressly or impliedly relate to the power to prescribe time, the authority to which the power is delegated, namely, the State cannot make a rule prescribing limitation. 7. 7. The Full Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in (6) United India Timber Works V. Employees' State Insurance Corporation (A.I.R. 1967 Pun 166) is interesting. The Bench was constituted of Falshaw, C.J., I.D. Dua and D.K. Mahajan, JJ. I.D. Dua and D.K. Mahajan, JJ. in the case of (8) K.R. Beri & Co. V. Employees' State Insurance Corporation (A.I.R. 1962 Pun 308) held an application by Corporation to be barred by limitation on the basis of Rule 17. In the case of (9) Chanan Singh V. Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation (A.I.R. 1953 Pun 422), Falshaw, C.J. had also held that limitation was purely a matter of procedure and therefore, the State Government could validly make Rule 17. The three learned Judges, who constituted the Bench in the case of (6) United India Timber Works overruled their own JUDGMENT :s in the cases of (8) K.R. Beri and Co. and (9) Chanan Singh and held Rule 17 to be ultra vires. Dua, J. who delivered the main JUDGMENT : also pointed out that the expression 'procedure to be followed' in Section 96(1)(b) of the Act was of narrower import and cannot be construed to mean to confer a power on the rulemaking authority to prescribe limitation for institution of proceedings. In the case of (7) the Employees' State Insurance Corporation V. Bharat Barrel and Drum Manufacturing Co. (A.I.R. 1967 Bom 472) a Bench of Bombay High Court has elaborately discussed the matter, apart from pointing out that a rule prescribing limitation was inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. The learned Judges have also emphasised that the expression 'procedure to be followed' can refer to only matters which arise after institution of the proceedings and not before its institution or at the time of its institution. They relied on an observation of the Supreme Court in the case of (10) Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. V. Gopal Bhiwa (A.I.R. 1964 SC 752) that failure of the legislature to make any provision for limitation cannot be deemed to be an accidental omission. 8. Had the matter not been examined in detail by different High Courts, I would have referred to the various provisions of the Act and reasonings in support of the view that Rule 17 is ultra vires in greater detail. 8. Had the matter not been examined in detail by different High Courts, I would have referred to the various provisions of the Act and reasonings in support of the view that Rule 17 is ultra vires in greater detail. No useful purpose will be served by merely repeating what has been said in the JUDGMENT :s of Madras, Punjab and Bombay High Courts, referred to above. I am in respectful agreement with the views of the aforesaid High Courts and that of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. With due respect I venture to say that the view of the Allahabad High Court does not appear to be correct and convincing. I, therefore, hold that Rule 17 is ultra vires of the powers of the rule making authority and no part of the claim under application filed by the appellant on 29th August, 1956 can be held to be barred by it. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the JUDGMENT : and ORDER :of the court below are set aside and it is held that no part of the claim made in the application of the appellant is barred by time. The court below is directed to call upon the respondents to pay to the Corporation employees' contribution on account of over-time wages paid which they are liable to pay according to the provisions of the Act. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no ORDER :as to costs. I agree.