Judgment :- 1. The point that arises for determination in this Civil Revision Petition is whether a succession certificate should be obtained under S.214 of the Indian Succession Act (Act 39 of 1925) by the legal representatives of the mortgagee when they seek to get a decree in a suit instituted by them to recover the mortgage money by the sale of the mortgaged property. 2. This question has arisen in £ suit instituted by the revision petitioners against defendants 1 to 4. The revision petitioners and defendants 5 to 8 are the legal representatives of one Abdul Rahman Meeya Pillai, who died on-29-3-1961. The mortgage in question was executed in favour of the aforesaid Abdul Rahman Meeya Pillai. The petitioners alone instituted the suit though the defendants 5 to 8 supported them. The trial court following the decision reported in Kundan Lal v. Banwari Lal, 1969 Allahabad Law journal 946 held that the mortgage debt is also a "debt" within the meaning of S.214 of the aforesaid Act. The Allahabad High Court followed an earlier Full Bench decision of that court in coming to that conclusion. The Full Bench decision is reported in Fateh Chand v. Mohammed Bux, ILR. 16 All. 259, where the Chief Justice Edge held that a mortgagor is entitled to as much protection as any other debtor when he is sued by a person who claims to be entitled to the assets of a deceased creditor. This remark may be perfectly true. But, the protection to which the mortgagor is entitled ought to be the same whether the security is in the form of a simple mortgage or a mortgage by conditional sale. 3. The other High Courts in India did not agree to this view. The High Courts of Madras, Bombay, Calcutta, Patna, Nagpur and Travancore-Cochin held that the mortgage debt does not come within the ambit of a "debt" defined under S.214 of the Indian Successions Act. 4. The decision in Fateh Chand v. Mohammad Bux, ILR.16 All 259 has been expressly dissented from in the following decisions. (7) Mohamed Yousuff v. Abdul Rahim, 26 Calcutta 839. (2) Palaniandi Pillai v. Veerammal, 29 Madras 77 and (3) Nan Chand Kemchand v. Yenawa, 28 Bombay 630. In the last of these decisions, the question was whether a personal decree which was prayed for could be described as a decree for payment of a debt. (7) Mohamed Yousuff v. Abdul Rahim, 26 Calcutta 839. (2) Palaniandi Pillai v. Veerammal, 29 Madras 77 and (3) Nan Chand Kemchand v. Yenawa, 28 Bombay 630. In the last of these decisions, the question was whether a personal decree which was prayed for could be described as a decree for payment of a debt. Their Lordships held that such a decree was a decree for payment of debt, but the final decree for sale of the mortgaged property could not be described as a decree for payment of a "debt" within the meaning of that Section. In Narayana Pillai Narayana Pillai v. Eravi Narayana Panicker,1956 KLT. 852, there is an observation that with regard to the execution against the property charged on the immovable property, no succession certificate is necessary. These decisions had been followed in subsequent rulings. 5. In Ruprai Ranoji v. Ramrao Bhagwantrao, AIR. 1952 Nagpur 88, a case arose out of an application for execution by the decree holder for the enforcement of the charge by the sale of the property in the possession of the judgment-debtor who failed to pay the maintenance allowance due to the decree holder. The claim for maintenance was made on the basis of a will left by the deceased testator. Though the claim was to recover the maintenance due to the widow from the estate of the testator, the principle as to whether the debt would come within the definition of a "debt" under S 214 of the Indian Succession Act has to be considered in the light of the other decisions on the point. 6. In Kaviraj Basudevanand v. Raghubir Saran Rastogi and others, AIR. 1955 Patna 284 held that though a decree passed under 0.34 R.6 CPC. may be a decree for payment of a debt, the final decree for the sale of the mortgaged property cannot be described as a decree for payment of the 'debt' within the meaning of S.214 of the Indian Succession Act and its execution cannot be held to be barred because the applicant has not produced a succession certificate along with this execution application. 7. In Raghubir Narain Singh v. Raj Rajeshwari Prasad Singh and others, AIR. 7. In Raghubir Narain Singh v. Raj Rajeshwari Prasad Singh and others, AIR. 1957 Patna 435, it was held that a final decree for the sale of the mortgaged property could not be described as a debt for payment of the 'debt' within the meaning of S.214 and its execution cannot be held to be barred on the ground that the applicant has not produced a succession certificate along with his execution application. Lastly, it is held in A. Ramiswaviiv. Venkamma, AIR? 1963 Andhra Pradesh 135 that a debt contemplated by S.214 would not include a debt for enforcement of the mortgagee's rights as against the mortgaged property as it is not a decree for debt. It is also pointed out that the mere fact that the personal remedy is still available to the mortgagee would not make any difference. The earlier decisions of the High Courts of Madras, Calcutta, Bombay, Patna and Rangoon had been followed in that case. It is not necessary to go into those cases. It is sufficient to say that no succession certificate is necessary in this particular case. 8. For passing a preliminary decree or final decree for sale of the property or even execution of the decree thereof for the realisation of the mortgage money in a suit or its execution instituted by the legal representatives of the mortgagees, they shall not be asked to produce a succession certificate as required by S.214 of the Indian succession Act, 1925 as the debt defined in that Section does not include a decree for the enforcement of the mortgagee's right as against the mortgaged property. In view of this finding, I am of the opinion that the order of the Munsiff cannot be sustained. 9. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The order to produce a succession certificate is set aside. The Munsiff will proceed with the trial of the suit on the other contentions. No costs.