HARI SAHU v. UNION OF INDIA (UOI) — 1971 DIGILAW 148 (ORI)

JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, C.J. - Under an agreement of licence dated 1-6-1967 between Hari Sahu (Petitioner) and the Union of India, the former was allowed to occupy the railway refreshment room at Puri as caterer from 1-6-1967 till 30-11-1967. A further extension was granted from 1-12-1967 till 31-8-1968. On 20th of January 1968, the Petitioner was intimated that the licence would not be renewed beyond 31st August 1968. On 3rd of March, 1968 the Petitioner filed O.J.C. No. 217 of 1968 for quashing the letter dated 20th of January 1968 intimating him that further extension would not be granted. After coming into force of the Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Ordinance) on 17.6.1968 the Petitioner, withdraw his writ application. An order was passed in that writ applications that the railway administration would consider the application of the Petitioner for renewal along with other applications. On 16-8-1968 the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Act, 1968 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Amending Act) came into force. On 17th of April 196) the Petitioner was intimated that the licence was given to Kangali Charan Biswal of Puri. On 29th of April 196 the Divisional Superintendent, Khurda Road, served a notice on the Petitioner directing him to vacate the refreshment room by 10-5-1969 failing which he would be evicted as unauthorised occupier. On 13th June 1969 the Estate Officer, South Eastern Railway, issued a notice u/s 4(1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants), Act, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) as amended by the amending Act. The Petitioner was asked to show cause by 10-7-1969. On 21-12-1969 the order of eviction u/s 5(1) of the Act was passed. The Petitioner preferred Misc. Appeal No. 7 of 1970 in the Court of the District Judge, Puri, who stayed the operation of the order of eviction and has referred the case u/s 113 of the CPC for determination of the question as to whether Section 5 of the Act is the ultra vires Constitution even after the amending Act inserting Section 10E was passed. 2. It was contended before the District judge, Puri; that Section 5 of the Act is void and is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution despite insertion of Section 10E by the amending Act. 3. 2. It was contended before the District judge, Puri; that Section 5 of the Act is void and is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution despite insertion of Section 10E by the amending Act. 3. For proper appreciation of this contention it would be appropriate to read the relevant provisions of the Act. The Act contains 13 sections. Section 1 gives the short title and extent. Section 2 deals with definitions. Section 3 speaks of appointment of Estate Officers. Section 4 concerns the issue of notice to show cause against order of eviction. Section 5 deals with eviction of unauthorised occupants and Section 6 with disposal of property left on public premises by unauthorised occupants. Section 7 relates to power to recover rent or damages in respect of public premises. Section 8 speaks of power of Estate Officers. Section 9 provides for appeals. Section 10 speaks of finality of orders and Section 10-A of offences and penalty. Section 10-B deals with power to obtain information and Section 10-C with liability of, heirs and legal representatives. Section 10-D speaks of recovery of rent, etc., as an arrear of land revenue. Sections 11 and 12 relate to protection of Action taken in good faith, and delegation of powers. Section 13 confers power on the Central Government to make rules. 4. It would thus appear that Sections 5 and 7 are the substantive provisions for eviction of unauthorised occupants and the power to recover rent or damages in respect of public premises, and constitute the very core of the Act. The other sections are merely ancillary and cannot independently survive if Sections 5 and 7 are void being hit by Article 14. 5. In Attorney General for Alberta v. Attorney General for Canada 1947 A.C. 503, their Lordships enunciated the principle thus: The real question is whether what remains is so inextricably bound up with the part declared invalid that what remains cannot independently survive or as it has sometimes been put, whether on a fair review of the whole matter it can be assumed that the legislature would have enacted what survives without enacting the part that is ultra vires at all. This passage was approved and followed in The State of Bombay and Anr. v. F.N. Balsara AIR 1951 S.C. 318 . This passage was approved and followed in The State of Bombay and Anr. v. F.N. Balsara AIR 1951 S.C. 318 . It is quite clear that the other sections of the Act are inextricably bound up with Sections 5 and 7. If these two sections are struck down the entire Act would be void. It would be difficult to hold that the Legislature would have enacted the other sections if Sections 5 and 7 were known to it to be void. 6. It is therefore necessary to examine whether Sections 5 and 7 of the Act are void. 7. These two sections runs thus: 5. (1) If, after considering the cause if any, shown by any person in pursuance of a notice u/s 4 and any evidence he may produce in support of the same and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the estate Officer is satisfied that the public premises are in unauthorised occupation, the estate Officer may, on a date to be fixed for the purpose, make an order of eviction, for reasons to be recorded therein, directing that the public premises shall be vacated by all persons who may be in occupation thereof or any part thereof, and cause a copy of the order to be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises. (2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with the order of eviction within thirty days of the date of its publication under Sub-section (1), the estate Officer or any other Officer duly authorised by the estate Officer in this behalf may evict that person from, and take possession of the public premises and may, for that purpose, use such force as may be necessary. 7. (1) Where any person is in arrears of rent payable in respect of any public premises, the estate Officer may, by order, require that person to pay the same within such time and in such installments as may be specified in the order. 7. (1) Where any person is in arrears of rent payable in respect of any public premises, the estate Officer may, by order, require that person to pay the same within such time and in such installments as may be specified in the order. (2) Where any person is or has at any time been, in unauthorised occupation of any public premises, the estate Officer may, having regard to such principles of assessment of damages as may be prescribed, assess the damages on account of the use and occupation of such premises and may, by order, require that person to pay the damages within such time and in such installment as may be specified in the order. (3) No order under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) shall be made against any person until after the issue of a notice in writing to the person calling upon him to show cause within such time as may be specified in the notice why Such order should not be made, and until his objections, if any, and any evidence he may produce in support of the same, have been considered by the estate Officer. 8. In Northern India Caterers (Private) Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Anr. AIR 1967 S.C. 1681, their Lordships struck down Section 5 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act (31 of 1959) (hereinafter to be referred to as the Punjab Act) as being discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. They held that Section 5 conferred an additional remedy over and above the remedy by way of suit and that by providing two alternative remedies to the Government and in leaving it to the unguided discretion of the Collector to resort to one or the other and to pick and choose some of those in occupation of public properties and premises for the application of the more drastic procedure u/s 5, that section has lent itself open to the charge of discrimination and as being violative of Article 14. In this view Section 5 was declared to be void. 9. Section 5 of the Punjab Act is identical with the language of Section 5 of the Act. Section 5 of the Act must be held to be hit by Article 14 on the very reasoning given in the Supreme Court decision. In this view Section 5 was declared to be void. 9. Section 5 of the Punjab Act is identical with the language of Section 5 of the Act. Section 5 of the Act must be held to be hit by Article 14 on the very reasoning given in the Supreme Court decision. On similar reasoning Sections 7(1) and (2) of the Act are discriminatory and violative of Article 14. It will be wholly superfluous to repeat the reasoning given in the aforesaid Supreme Court decision in its application to both Sections 5 and 7. 10. In Rajendra Prosad Singh Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others Section 5 of the Act was held to be void being violative of Article 14. In P.L. Mehra, etc. Vs. D.R. Khanna etc. the unanimous opinion was that Sections 5 and 7(1) and (2) were void being hit by Article 14. We are clearly of opinion that Sections 5 and 7 of the Act are void being discriminatory and hit by Article 14. The Legislature also takes the same view as would appeal from Section 10E of the amending Act. It bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of matters covered by Sections 5 and 7. As Sections 5 and 7 are void, the entire Act must be struck down as void. 11. The decision of the Supreme Court in Northern India Caterers (Private) Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Anr. declaring Section 5 of the Punjab Act void as being violative of Article 14 was pronounced on 4th of April, 1967. Soon after a Bill further to amend the Act was introduced in Parliament. During the pendency of the Bill the Ordinance was promulgated on 17-6-1968. The Ordinance was in five clauses. Clause 2 of the Ordinance laid down that during the period of operation of this Ordinance, the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupancy) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act), shall have effect subject to the amendments specified in Sections 3, 4 and 5. Clause 5 said that after Section 10-D of the principal Act, Section 10-E shall be inserted. Clause 5 said that after Section 10-D of the principal Act, Section 10-E shall be inserted. Section 10-E runs thus: 10-E. No civil Court shall has jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises or the recovery of the arrears of rent payable under Sub-section (1) of Section 7 or the damages payable under Sub-section (2) of that section or costs awarded to the Central Government under Sub-section (4-A) of Section 9 or any portion of such rent, damages or costs. 12. This Ordinance was substituted by the amending Act. The object of the amending Act appearing from the Statement of Objects and Reasons may be noticed: Recently the Supreme Court in Northern India Caterers Private Ltd. and Another Vs. State of Punjab and Another declared Section 5 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959 void on the ground that the section was discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The object and the procedure prescribed by the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 are also similar to those of the Punjab Act. In view of this it is felt that in order to meet the objection raised in the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of the Punjab, Act, suitable amendment should be made to the Public Premisses (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 so that the alternative remedy by way of suit that may be resorted to by Estate Officer in his discretion is taken away. The amending Act contains five sections. In it there is no section corresponding to Clause 2 of the Ordinance. By Section 4, Section 10-E was inserted in the same form as it was in the Ordinance. Section 5 deals with repeal and saving. The Ordinance was repealed in Section 5(1). Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any Action taken under the principal Act, as amended by the Ordinance, was deemed to have been one or taken under the principal Act as amended by Act No. 32 of 1968 or if the amending Act had come into force on the 17th day of June 1968, the date of the Ordinance. 13. Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any Action taken under the principal Act, as amended by the Ordinance, was deemed to have been one or taken under the principal Act as amended by Act No. 32 of 1968 or if the amending Act had come into force on the 17th day of June 1968, the date of the Ordinance. 13. As a result of Insertion of Section 10-E both in the Ordinance and the amending Act the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of eviction of any person in unauthorised occupation of any public premises or recovery of arrears of rent payable under Sub-section (1) of Section 7 or damages payable under Sub-section (2) of that section was taken away. If Section 10E had been a part of the Act from its very inception, then Sections 5 and 7 would not have been bit by Article 14 and the entire Act would have been valid. 14. It is however contended on behalf of the Petitioner that the Act being a post-Constitution Act, the doctrine of eclipse has no application to it. Sections 5 and 7 being hit by Article 14 the entire Act was still born and dead and non est in the eye of law. The Act is void from its very inception and cannot continue to exist for any purpose. The amending Act is not a re-enactment. Mere insertion of Section 10E without re-enactment of Sections 5 and 7 and other ancillary provisions provides no remedy for eviction and recovery of rent or damages. Section 10-E cannot resuscitate into life a dead and still born Act. The order of eviction is accordingly without jurisdiction. This contention requires careful examination. 15. To arrive at a true conclusion the scope and ambit of Article 13 of the Constitution needs close examination. The article so far as relevant runs thus: 13. (1)AU laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. (2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. (2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. The distinction between Clauses (1) and (2) of, Article 13 has been noticed in a series of Supreme Court decisions. It would however be unnecessarily pedantic to examine all those cases. It would be sufficient to refer to Mahendra Lal Jaini Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, which reviews and critically analyses the question in issue. 16. On a plain reading of Article 13(1) it is clear that all laws which were validly in force before the commencement of the Constitution would either be wholly or partially void if they are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution dealing with fundamental rights. Article 13(2) has however a different content. It prohibits the State not to make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III and any law made in contravention of this clause would be void to the extent of contravention. The meaning of the word 'void' in both the clauses is the same. It means nugatory, ineffectual or inoperative. While under Clause (1) the law Inconsistent with the fundamental right would be void from the date of The enforcement of the Constitution and not earlier" law made in contravention of Clause (2) is void ab initio. 17. The doctrine of eclipse applies to valid pre Constitution: laws while it has no application to post-Constitution laws. The doctrine of eclipse means that a valid pre-Constitution law which became void either in whole or in part becomes inoperative 80 long as its inconsistency with Part III exists. Such a law however does not disappear from the statute book as its existence before the date of the Constitution is recognised. The moment the pre-Constitution valid law is amended-so as to remove the inconsistency it resuscitates or revives into life. The eclipse or coverage that was cast on account of the inconsistency disappears. The moment it is Drought in conformity with the Chapter of Fundamental Rights. The theory of eclipse has however no application to a Post-Constitution Act. The reason is apparent. A ban is imposed by Article 13(2) on The Legislatures not to enact any law which is inconsistent with the fundamental rights. The moment it is Drought in conformity with the Chapter of Fundamental Rights. The theory of eclipse has however no application to a Post-Constitution Act. The reason is apparent. A ban is imposed by Article 13(2) on The Legislatures not to enact any law which is inconsistent with the fundamental rights. If in disobedience of the mandate any such law is passed it is a dead or still born law and is to be ignored for all purposes. In other words, though physically the law assumed a shape and form, in the eye of law, it has no existence. This analysis is fully supported by Mahendra Lal Jaini Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others. The relevant passages in paragraphs 23 and 24 may profitably be extracted: 23.xx xx xx But there is one vital difference between the pre-Constitution and post-Constitution laws in this matter. The voidness of the pre-Constitution laws is not from inception. Such voidness supervened when the Constitution came into force; and so they existed and operated for sometime and for certain purposes; the voidness of post-Constitution laws is from their very inception and they cannot therefore continue to exist for any Purpose. This distinction between voidness in one case and The voidness in the other arises from the circumstances that one is a pre-Constitution law and The other is a post-Constitution Law; but the meaning of the word "void" is the same in either case, namely, that the law is ineffectual, nugatory and devoid of any legal force or binding effect. xx xx xx So far as pre-Constitution laws are concerned, the amendment of the Constitution which removes the inconsistency will result in the revival of such laws by virtue of the doctrine of eclipse, as laid down in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and Others Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another for the pre-existing laws were not still born and would still exist though eclipsed on account of the inconsistency to govern pre-existing matters. But in the case of post-Constitution laws, they would be still-born to the extent of contravention. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another for the pre-existing laws were not still born and would still exist though eclipsed on account of the inconsistency to govern pre-existing matters. But in the case of post-Constitution laws, they would be still-born to the extent of contravention. And it is this distinction which results in the impossibility of applying the doctrine of eclipse to post-Constitution laws, for nothing can be revived which never had any valid existence xx xx xx xx Therefore, in the case of pre-Constitution laws what an amendment to the Constitution does is to remove the shadow cast on it by this declaration. The law thus revives. However, in the case of the, second clause, applicable to post-Constitution laws, the Constitution does not recognise their existence, having been made in defiance of a prohibition to make them such defiance makes the law enacted void. In, their case therefore there can be no revival of an amendment of the Constitution, though the bar to make the law is removed, so far as the period after the amendment is concerned. xxx xxx xxx All post-Constitution laws which contravene the mandatory injunction contained in the first part of Article 13(2) are void, as void as the laws passed without legislative competence and the doctrine of eclipse does not apply to them xx xx xx. 18. The underlined sentence (herein italics) in paragraph 23 in the aforesaid Supreme Court decision furnishes the key to the solution of the problem. A post-Constitution law void on account of its inconsistency with the fundamental right does not exist for any purpose. The expression "for any purpose" means "all purposes" which includes the "purpose of amendment of the void post-Constitution law". The ratio of this Supreme 'Court decision is enough to reject the contention of Mr. Pal. 19. As has already been stated, the principal Act was void from its inception, Sections 5 and 7 thereof being hit by Article 14 and the entire Act being void as the residual sections cannot survive without Sections 5 and 7. The Act does not exist for purpose of amendment even though it has not been physically destroyed. 20. True that the Act would continue to exist so far as other States are concerned where it has not been declared void either by the High Court having jurisdiction or the Supreme Court. The Act does not exist for purpose of amendment even though it has not been physically destroyed. 20. True that the Act would continue to exist so far as other States are concerned where it has not been declared void either by the High Court having jurisdiction or the Supreme Court. This does not however affect the position that so far as this State is concerned the. Act is void and non est from the very inception. 21. The aforesaid view gets full support from B. Shama Rao Vs. The Union Territory of Pondicherry. The facts of that case may be stated in short. On 30th of June 1965 the Legislative Assembly for the Union Territory of Pondicherry had passed the Pondicherry General Sales Tax Act X of 1965. Section 1(2) of that Act provided that it would come into force on a date to be appointed by the Pondicherry Government. Section 2 provided that the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959 as in force in the State of Madras immediately before the commencement of the Pondicherry Act shall be extended to Pondicherry subject to certain modifications. The Pondicherry Government issued notification on 1st March 1966 appointing April let, 1966 as the date of the commencement. Prior to the issue of the notification the Madras Legislature bad amended the Madras Act and consequently it was the Madras Act as amended up to let April 1966 which was brought into force in Pondicherry. Thus though the Legislative Assembly for the Union Territory of Pondicherry had passed the Pondicherry General Sales Tax Act X of 1965 by adopting the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959 as it stood on 30th of June 1965, yet it adopted the Madras Act as amended up to 1st April 1966 by issue of the notification regarding date of commencement. The Madras amendments in between 30th of June 1965 and 1st. April 1966 had not been adopted by the Pondicherry Legislature and by mere issue of notification the amended law came into force in Pondicherry. After the Act came into force the Petitioner in that case was served with a notice to get himself registered as a dealer under the amended Madras Act. April 1966 had not been adopted by the Pondicherry Legislature and by mere issue of notification the amended law came into force in Pondicherry. After the Act came into force the Petitioner in that case was served with a notice to get himself registered as a dealer under the amended Madras Act. After the petition was filed the Pondicherry Legislature passed the Pondicherry General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, III of 1966 whereby Section 1(2) of the principle Act was amended to, read that the latter Act "shall come into force on the 1st of April 1966". Collections previously made were also validated. It was contended in that case on behalf of the Petitioner that as the principal Act was void ab initio on account of excessive delegation, the amending Act could not resuscitate into life the principal Act which was still born. This contention was accepted by the majority. They held that the Pondicherry Act, X of 1965 was still-born on account of excessive delegation of legislative power and could not be revived by the amending Act of 1966. The amending Act had been passed on the footing that there was in existence a valid Act though in fact it was non est. 22. This decision was approved as good law in Devi Das Gopal Krishnan and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others. Therein the facts were that u/s 5 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 as it originally stood, an uncontrolled power was conferred on the provincial Government to levy every year on the taxable turnover of a dealer a tax at such rates as the said Government might direct. Under that section the Legislature effaced itself in the matter of fixation of rates and it did not give any guidance either under that section or under any other provisions of The Act and hence Section 5 was declared to be void. This did not, however, affect the charging Section 4 there being a clear distinction between chargeability and quantification of tax. Though tax cannot be realised without it being quantified, the non-quantification does not destroy the liability under the charging section. Liability was to be distinguished from its enforceability. The charging Section 4 is intact and what was struck down is Section 5 which provides for rates. The charging Section 4 was valid and so also other sections incidental thereto. Though tax cannot be realised without it being quantified, the non-quantification does not destroy the liability under the charging section. Liability was to be distinguished from its enforceability. The charging Section 4 is intact and what was struck down is Section 5 which provides for rates. The charging Section 4 was valid and so also other sections incidental thereto. The Legislature therefore had the power to amend Section 5 by fixing rates at not exceeding 2 pies in a rupee. B. Shama Rao Vs. The Union Territory of Pondicherry was accepted as good law though it was distinguished in its application to the facts of that case. That decision was not applicable in as much as the charging section was valid, the Act was within legislative competence but quantification of tax could not be done until the Legislature prescribed the rates by amendment. 23. With respect, we are in general agreement with the conclusion of the Majority in P.L. Mehra, etc. Vs. D.R. Khanna etc., . Mr. Pal brought to our notice that the amendment has been accepted as valid in Nanak Chand Lachhaman Dass v. Estate Officer cum Executive Engineer Madhopur AIR 1969 Punj. 304, H. Wali Mohad. and Ors. v. Administrator Municipality and Ors. AIR 1969 J. & K. 88, and M.S. Oberoi v. Union of India through Estate Officer Chandigarh AIR 1970 Punj. & Harayana 407. In non of these decisions there was any discussion of the difficult question in issue. With respect, we are unable to accept them as laying down good law. 24. Mr. Pal, however, contends that there is Indian Legislative Practice of making amendment by way of reference to the void Act and such amendment in essence amounts to re-enactment. Reliance is placed on Dasu Khan and Others Vs. Mohan Bhagat and Others an some other authorities in line with it. The aforesaid Patna decision days that even if the parent statute is held to be unconstitutional, there is authority for' the view that "a statute, unconstitutional in its entirety, may be amended, provided the amendment qualifies as a complete and independent statute in and of itself. This decision has not taken into consideration the observations of the Supreme Court in Mahendra Lal Jaini Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others to the effect that the void law does not exist for any purpose and B. Shama Rao Vs. This decision has not taken into consideration the observations of the Supreme Court in Mahendra Lal Jaini Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others to the effect that the void law does not exist for any purpose and B. Shama Rao Vs. The Union Territory of Pondicherry, . 25. There cannot be any controversy that there can be a complete re-enactment of a void statute after introducing necessary amendments to remove the inconsistency. An independent amending Act not complete in itself as a piece of re-enactment is of no use as it does not revive the provisions of the parent Act which are void ab initio. With respect, we are inclined to hold that the Patna decision has too broadly stated the law. 26. Mr. Pal next contended that the Ordinance introduced a complete re-enactment of the void Act. Reliance is placed on Clause 2 of the Ordinance which lays down that during the period of this Ordinance, the Public Premises, (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 shall have effect subject to the amendments specified in Sections 3, 4 and 5 and on the preamble to the Ordinance laying down that it was further to amend the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. On our analysis that the principal Act was void ab initio and cannot be used for any purpose including that of amendment, the Ordinance cannot revive the still-born Act by mere reference to it. 27. Even assuming that the Ordinance revived The Act on the footing that it was a re-enactments by way of reference to the principal Act, the amending Act went back upon it. There is no provision in the amending Act corresponding to Clause 2 of the Ordinance. It cannot be construed as a re-enactments in any sense of the term. 28. The result, therefore, is that despite the fact that the Ordinance and the amending Act were brought into force with a view to revive and resuscitate into life the Act, they failed to achieve their purpose as they were oblivious of the constitutional position that a still born or dead Act cannot be revived into life except by way of complete re-enactment. In such a re-enactment full retrospective operation could also be given to the provisions of the Act. In such a re-enactment full retrospective operation could also be given to the provisions of the Act. The Legislature did not achieve its object of restoring the Act to its pristine glory by the Ordinance and the amending Act though it intended to do so. 29. We would now sum up our conclusion thus: (i) Sections 5 and 7 of the Act are void being hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. (ii) Sections 5 and 7 constitute the very core of the Act and the other provisions of the Act which are merely ancillary to those sections cannot independently survive as they are inextricably bound up with those sections. (iii) The entire Act is void. It was still born and dead. (iv) The Ordinance and the amending Act do not constitute re-enactment of the Act. They are not self-contained and complete in themselves. (v) The Act cannot resuscitate into life either by the Ordinance or by the amending Act or by both together. 30. On the aforesaid analysis, there can be no eviction of the Petitioner under the provisions of the Act as amended. The order of eviction dated 21-12-1969 passed by the Estate Officer, South Eastern Railway, is without jurisdiction and contrary to law and is liable to be quashed. 31. In the result, the reference made u/s 113, CPC by the District Judge, Puri is answered for reasons as indicated above. In the circumstances, parties will bear their own costs. The records be sent back at once for immediate disposal of the pending appeal. S.K. Ray, J. 32. I agree.