JUDGMENT G.L. Oza, J. 1. This is an appeal arising out of the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Shajapur, in C.O. Suit No. 12-A of 1964. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that the ginning factory and the houses in suit, as described in the plaint, are properties situated in Nalkheda. These properties were attached in execution proceedings of a decree in favour of the respondent Basantilal (now dead) who had obtained a money-decree against the respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4. The appellant had filed an objection under Order 21, rule 58, Civil Procedure Code, which was rejected by the executing Court on 13th Match 1963. Against this order, the appellant filed a revision petition before this Court. That revision petition was rejected by the order of this Court dated the 29th November 1963. After the dismissal of the revision petition, the plaintiff appellants filed the present suit on 27th November 1964 under Order 21, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code for a declaration that the properly was not liable to attachment. The trial Court dismissed this suit on a preliminary point of limitation, and so the present first appeal has been filed. 3. Shri Chaphekar, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that objections under Order 21, rule 58, Civil Procedure Code were dismissed on 13th March 1963 and a revision petition (C. R. No. 210 of 1963) was filed on 24th April 1963. It was dismissed on 29th November 1963 and the present suit was filed on 27th November 1964 within one year from the dismissal of the revision petition. Learned counsel contended that in view of the language of section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as it now stands, the plaintiff is entitled to the time required in filing the revision petition also. He contended that the revision petition was filed on 24th April 1963 within the period prescribed for a revision petition as he had to obtain a certified copy of the order and then alone he could file a revision petition. He contended that the revision petition was filed on 24th April 1963 within the period prescribed for a revision petition as he had to obtain a certified copy of the order and then alone he could file a revision petition. According to the learned counsel, in these circumstances not only the time during which the revision petition was pending in the High Court would be excluded but even the period from the date of the order upto the date of filing of the revision petition would also be excluded because that is also the time spent in filing a revision petition with due diligence and consequently the conclusion arrived at by the Court below could not be accepted. In support of his contentions, learned counsel relied on Mst. Duliyabai v. Vilayatali 1959 MPLJ 430 : AIR 1959 MP 271 and Tirumareddi v. State of A. P. AIR 1965 AP 388 . Learned counsel further contended that by the amendment in the Limitation Act 'revision' has been specifically added in sub-section (2) of section 14, but even before that in Venkataswami v. Sarabai AIR 1943 Mad 633 , the view taken was that the time spent in revision against an order rejecting an objection under Order 21, rule 58 could be excluded. According to the learned counsel, although there was some controversy on that question till now, ultimately by the amendment it has been set at rest. 4. Shri Mathur, learned counsel for the legal representatives of the respondent Basantilal, contended that even if the time spent in revision has to be excluded, the only time that could be excluded in the present case was between 24th April 1963 to 29th November 1963, that is the time from the date of the filing of the revision petition to the date of the dismissal of the revision petition. He contended that the time between 13th March 1963 to 24th April 1963 could not be excluded and in that view of the matter the conclusion arrived at by the Court below was correct. 5. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, as it Stands, clearly provides for exclusion of the time that may be taken in prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding and sub-section (2) of section 14 now provides that such proceedings may be in the nature of appeal or revision. 5. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, as it Stands, clearly provides for exclusion of the time that may be taken in prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding and sub-section (2) of section 14 now provides that such proceedings may be in the nature of appeal or revision. Sub-section (2) of section 14 is as under:-- In Computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding h prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. It is, therefore, clear that the time required in prosecuting a revision application in this Court would be excluded. In fact, the trial Court also took the same view. But the learned trial Judge felt that the time required after the order in the objection petition and upto the date of the filing of the revision petition could not be excluded because that could not be said to be time spent in prosecuting the revision application before this Court. 6. It cannot be doubted that when time required in prosecuting a revision petition has to be excluded, the time required in obtaining a certified copy of the order sought to be revised and in filing the revision petition has also to be excluded. The same has been the view in Duliabai v. Vilayatali where it was observed that:-- What would be the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding in a Court of appeal? Certainly, the time requisite for obtaining the certified copy under section 12 of the Limitation Act would be included within the meaning of the section. Also the limitation prescribed for the filing of an appeal would be included, if the appeal be filed on the last day of limitation. Certainly, the time requisite for obtaining the certified copy under section 12 of the Limitation Act would be included within the meaning of the section. Also the limitation prescribed for the filing of an appeal would be included, if the appeal be filed on the last day of limitation. In Tirumareddy v. State of A. P., a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that:-- What follows on this discussion is that both on authority and on the language of section 14, there is no scope for limiting the ambit of section 14 to pendency of infructuous proceedings in a Court of law and to disregard the time taken for taking the indispensable and preparatory steps to institute proceedings which ultimately prove to be fruitless. Consequently, it cannot be disputed that the plaintiff were entitled to the exclusion of time between 13th March 1963 to 24th April 1963. 7. Although before the amendment the word "revision" was not included in sub-section (2), still so far this Court is concerned the time required in prosecuting a revision petition has also been excluded. In Kunwarbai Rathodniji v. Jasraj 1961 MPLJ 206 : 1961 JLJ 143 , it was held that the power of the High Court to entertain a revision under section 115 can be invoked to any order of the trial Court, though this can be done on limited grounds. If a litigant belives bona fide that he can get the necessary redress in a revision, the time spent in revision could certainly be excluded. In this decision, reliance was placed on Dinkar Rao v. Ratansi and others 1938 NLJ 107 : AIR 1938 Nag 300 : ILR 1939 Nag 422. Consequently, so far as this Court is concerned, even before the amendment the time spent in prosecuting a revision petition could be excluded within the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act as it stood then. 8. Consequently, in the light of the discussion above, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the Court below dismissing the plaintiff-appellants' suit on the ground of limitation is set aside. As the suit was only dismissed on a preliminary ground, it be sent back to the trial Court for proceeding further in the suit in accordance with law. As the suit was only dismissed on a preliminary ground, it be sent back to the trial Court for proceeding further in the suit in accordance with law. The appellants shall be entitled to costs of this appeal from the respondent, Basantilal's legal representatives Counsel's fee as per schedule if certified. Appeal allowed