ORDER K.B. Srivastava, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and the prayer is for the issue of a writ of prohibition prohibiting the Presiding Officer, Labour Court at Lucknow, Opposite Party No. 2, from proceeding into the matter of adjudication on the basis of Annexures 1 and 3 and for the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing Annexure 3. 2. The facts giving rise to this petition, may now be stated. The petitioner Vishin Das is the proprietor of two tailoring concerns, M/s. Karachi Tailors, Nazirabad and M/s. Reliable Tailors, Nazirabad, in the City of Lucknow. He alleges that the concern in the name and style of Reliable Tailors is now defunct and no longer in existence. He further alleges that Mohammad Mushoorur Rahman alias Chunny, Opposite Party No. 4, was not a workman in either of these two concerns but used to work as a casual tailor on piece rate basis. He terminated his job as a tailor with effect from November 15, 1966. His cause was espoused by the Bazar Karmachari Sangh, Opposite Party No. 3, and on the basis, that State of U.P., Opposite Party No. 1, referred the dispute of termination of the job as an Industrial Dispute for adjudication by the Labour Court, Opposite Party No. 2, under Section 4-K, U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petitioner filed a written statement in the Labour Court and, inter alia, took the pleas that (1) there was no Industrial Dispute and the reference (Annexure 1) was consequently without jurisdiction and for that reason did not confer any jurisdiction upon the Labour Court to adjudicate into the matter, and (2) assuming that it was an Industrial dispute, it was not espoused by any Union registered for one trade only and as such the Bazar Karmachari Sangh was not entitled to represent Mohammad Mashoorur Rahman before the Labour Court. The petition has been traversed in the counter-affidavit. The Labour Court treated additional issues Nos. The petition has been traversed in the counter-affidavit. The Labour Court treated additional issues Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 as preliminary issues and found on Issue No. 1 that Bazar Karmachari Sangh was competent to represent Mohammad Mashoorur Rahman under Section 6-1 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the State Act), read with Rule 40, U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1947; on Issue No. 2, that the individual dispute had been properly espoused by the Bazar Karmachari Sangh and it had thus become an Industrial Dispute; and in any case, an individual dispute shall be deemed to be an Industrial Dispute within the meaning of Section 2-A, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act); on Issue No. 3, that Mashoorur Rahman was a workman within the meaning of Section 2 (Z) of the State Act; on Issue No. 4, that the reference was not bad, irrespective of the fact whether Mashoorur Rahman was a tailor in the one or the other establishment. In view of these findings, the Labour Court decided to fix a date to go into the merits of the case and hence this writ. 3. It was held in D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee, A.I.R. 1953 SC 58, as follows:- "The words "industrial dispute" convey the meaning to the ordinary mind that the dispute must be such as would affect large groups of workmen and employers ranged on opposite sides on some general questions on which each group is bound together by a community of interests - such as wages, bonuses, allowances, pensions, provident fund, number of working hours per week, holidays and so on. Even with reference to a business that is carried on, we would hardly think of saying that there is an industrial dispute where the employee is dismissed by his employer and the dismissal is questioned as wrongful. Even with reference to a business that is carried on, we would hardly think of saying that there is an industrial dispute where the employee is dismissed by his employer and the dismissal is questioned as wrongful. But at the same time, having regard to the modern conditions of society where capital and labour have organised themselves into groups for the purpose of fighting their disputes and settling them on the basis of the theory that in union is strength, and collective bargaining has come to stay, a single employee's case might develop into an industrial dispute, when as often happens, it is taken up y the trade union of which he is a member, and there is a concerted demand by the employees for redress." In C.P.T. Service Ltd. v. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan, A.I.R. 1957 SC 104 Venkatarama Ayyar, J., speaking for the Supreme Court, observed that the question whether a dispute by an individual workman would be an Industrial dispute has evoked considerable conflict of opinion both in the High Courts and in Industrial tribunals, and three different views have been expressed thereon, namely, (1) a dispute which concerns only the rights of the individual workers cannot be held to be an Industrial dispute, (2) a dispute between an employer and a single employee can be an Industrial Dispute, and (3) a dispute between an employer and a single employee cannot per se be an Industrial Dispute, but it may become one if it is taken up by the Union or a number of workmen. After enumerating the three different views, the correct position was laid down thus:- "The preponderance of judicial opinion is clearly in favour of the last of the three views stated above, and there is considerable reason behind it. Notwithstanding that the language of Section 2 (k) is wide enough to cover a dispute between the employer and a single employee, the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act does appear to contemplate that the machinery provided therein should be set in motion, to settle only disputes which involve the rights of workmen as a class and that dispute touching the individual rights of a workman was not intended to be the subject of an adjudication under the Act, when the same had not been taken up by the Union or a number of workmen. If that were the correct position, the respondent was not entitled to apply under Section 16 (2) of the Act as the workmen in the industry had not adopted his dispute as their own and chosen to treat it as their casus belli with the company." However, the Supreme Court did not express any final opinion on the question whether a dispute simpliciter between an employer and a workman would be an Industrial dispute. In Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, U.P., A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 532, adverting to the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, their Lordships delivered themselves thus:- "Thus viewed the provisions of the Act lead to the conclusion that its applicability to an individual dispute as opposed to dispute involving a group of workmen is excluded unless it acquires the general characteristics of an industrial dispute, viz., the workmen as a body or a considerable section of them make common cause with the individual workman and thus create conditions contemplated by Section 3 of the U.P. Act which is the foundation of State Governmental action under that Act." Indeed, their Lordships went on further to hold that the decided cases to the extent that they take a contrary view, that is to say, an individual dispute is comprised in an Industrial Dispute must, unless there is something peculiar as to facts, be held to have been wrongly decided. See also Bombay Union of Journalists v. The Hindu, A.I.R. 1963 SC 318; Workmen of M/s. Dharam Pal Prem Chand v, M/s Dharam Pal Prem Chand, A.I.R. 1966 SC 182. 4. In the instant case, the other tailors in the two establishments of the petitioner have not acted in concert with Mohammad Mushoorur Rahman; nor it is his case that they have espoused his cause so as to make his own cause the casus belli with the petitioner. His case is that his dispute has been espoused by the Bazar Karamchari Sangh, a registered Trade Union, which fact is not in dispute. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, however, is that the Bazar Karamchari Sangh is not entitled to espouse the cause, because it is not the Union of the workmen of the two tailoring concerns. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, however, is that the Bazar Karamchari Sangh is not entitled to espouse the cause, because it is not the Union of the workmen of the two tailoring concerns. In A.I.R. 1966 SC 182, the Supreme Court laid down the broad proposition that a dispute raised by a dismissed employee cannot become an Industrial dispute unless it is supported either by his Union or in the absence of a Union, by a number of workmen; and unless such a limitation was introduced, claims for reference may be made frivolously and unreasonably by dismissed employees and that would be undesirable. This view was reiterated in Workmen of Indian Express v. Management, (1969) 1 SCC 228 : (A.I.R. 1970 SC 737), wherein their Lordships made the following observations: "But in (1965) 3 SCR 394 : (A.I.R. 1966 SC 182) this Court, after reviewing the previous decisions, distinguished the case of Hindu, Bombay and held that notwithstanding the width of the words used in Section 2 (k) of the Act a dispute raised by an individual workman cannot become an industrial dispute, unless it is supported either by his union or in the absence of a union by a number of workmen, that a union may validly raise a dispute though it may be a minority union of the workmen employed in an establishment, that if there was no union of workmen in an establishment a group of employees can raise the dispute which becomes an industrial dispute even though it is a dispute relating to an individual workman and lastly that where the workmen of an establishment have no union of their own and some or all of them have joined a union of another establishment belonging to the same industry, if such a union takes up the cause of the workman working in an establishment which has no union of its own, the dispute would become an industrial dispute if such a union can claim a representative character in a way that its support would make the dispute an industrial dispute." 5. It is the admitted case of the parties that the tailors of the two tailoring establishments have no Union of their own. That being so, it becomes necessary to find out whether or not the Bazar Karamchari Sangh is a Union of another establishment belonging to the same industry. It is the admitted case of the parties that the tailors of the two tailoring establishments have no Union of their own. That being so, it becomes necessary to find out whether or not the Bazar Karamchari Sangh is a Union of another establishment belonging to the same industry. The Bazar Karamchari Sangh is a Union of such employees as are employed in a "shop" or "commercial establishment", in the sense in which these two terms are defined in the U.P. Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhisthan Adhiniyam, 1962. It is apparent, therefore, that it is open to a salesman in a shoe shop, tailoring establishment, a wholesale sugar shop, a retail sugar shop, a chemist shop etc. etc. to join the Bazar Karamchari Sangh. The only common feature is that they will all be employees in one shop or the other of any description whatsoever, without any other common link between them and without any community of interest so far as their individual shops are concerned. It will be difficult to hold that such a Union would be a Union representing one industry. I, therefore, agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Bazar Karamchari Sangh was not competent to espouse the cause of Mohammad Mashroorur Rahman. 6. The learned counsel for Mohammad Mashroorur Rahman has, however, contended that in view of the amendment of the Central Act by the insertion of Section 2-A, the position has materially changed and an individual dispute will become an Industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any Union of workmen is a party to the dispute. Section 2-A was inserted in the Central Act by the Industrial Dispute (Amendment) Act, (No. 35 of 1965). This section reads as follows: - "2A. Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute." 7. The material question involved, therefore, is as to whether there is any repugnancy between the State Act and the Central Act with regard to the scope, ambit and amplitude of an "Industrial dispute"; and if so, which Act will have paramountcy, the State Act or the Central Act. The material question involved, therefore, is as to whether there is any repugnancy between the State Act and the Central Act with regard to the scope, ambit and amplitude of an "Industrial dispute"; and if so, which Act will have paramountcy, the State Act or the Central Act. Both the Acts are in occupation of the same field, namely, Item No. 22 "Trade Unions", Industrial and Labour Disputes, in List III of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. Under Article 246 of the Constitution, both the Union and the State Legislatures have concurrent powers to legislate with respect to this item. Under clause (1) of Article 254, the general rule laid down is that in case of repugnancy of a State law with a Union law relating to the same matter in the concurrent List, the Union law will prevail and the State law will fail to the extent of the repugnancy, whether the Union law is prior or subsequent to the State Law. Clause (2) of Article 254 has engrafted an exception to this general rule, namely, that if the President assents to a State law which has been reserved for his consideration under Article 200, it will prevail notwithstanding its repugnancy to an earlier law of the Union. The State law was so reserved and received the assent of the Governor-General on December 21, 1947 under Section 76 of the Government of India Act, 1935. This exception, however, has to be read subject to the proviso to Article 254 of the Constitution. The proviso empowers the Union Parliament to repeal or amend a repugnant State law even though it has become valid by virtue of the President's assent or the Governor-General's assent, as the State law in question was enacted before the commencement of the Constitution. This power of Parliament, however, can be exercised only by making another law relating to the same concurrent subject. It has been seen above that under the State law, individual dispute is not an Industrial dispute and cannot become so, unless it is backed by a number of workmen in the same Industry or by a Trade Union of that Industry. However, under the subsequent Central Act, an individual dispute shall be deemed to be an Industrial dispute, no matter whether it is or it is not espoused by other workmen or by a Trade Union. However, under the subsequent Central Act, an individual dispute shall be deemed to be an Industrial dispute, no matter whether it is or it is not espoused by other workmen or by a Trade Union. Is or is there not repugnancy between these two provisions, is the vital issue in the case. It is well known that while ultra vires refers to incompetency, repugnancy refers to inconsistency; and the question of repugnancy under Article 254 will only arise when both Parliament and the State Legislature are seized of the same matter and have the power to enact laws concurrently. Etymologically, things are inconsistent when they cannot stand together at the same time; and one law is inconsistent with another law when the command or power or provision in the one law conflicts directly with the command or power or provision in the other as when one Legislature says `do' and the other says `don't'. See Clyde Engineering Co. v. Cow-burn, (1926) 37 CLR 466; Shyamakant v. Rambhajan, (1939) FCR 193 : A.I.R. 1939 FC 74; and Australian Boot Trade v. Whybrow and Co., (1909) 10 CLR 266. It appears to me that the two different provisions in the State and the Central Acts cannot be obeyed simultaneously as there is express inconsistency in the actual terms of the two Acts, namely, that one cannot be obeyed without disobeying the other. While the State law says that an individual dispute will not be an Industrial dispute, except in certain conditions; the Central Act says that an individual dispute shall be deemed to be an Industrial dispute, without anything more, that is to say, "notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute." Parliament had the power under the proviso to cl. (2) of Article 254 to enact at any time any law in respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State. It is true that Parliament has not directly amended Section 2 (k) (sic) of the State Act, but it cannot be denied that there is an implied amendment by the insertion of Section 2-A in the Central Act. It is true that Parliament has not directly amended Section 2 (k) (sic) of the State Act, but it cannot be denied that there is an implied amendment by the insertion of Section 2-A in the Central Act. I am of the view, therefore, that the Central law will prevail over the existing State law and that being so, the dispute in the instant case must be deemed to be an Industrial dispute. 8. The last question argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Bazar Karamchari Sangh was precluded from representing Mohammad Mashoorur Rahman before the Labour Court. Section 6-I of the State Act deals with representation of parties. Sub-section (3) of this section says that no officer of a Union shall be entitled to represent any party unless that Union has been registered for one trade only. Rule 40, U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, is also to the same effect. I have held earlier that the Bazar Karamchari Sangh is not registered for one trade only. However, I am of the view that this is a mere irregularity and not an illegality which will vitiate the proceedings. The provision is directory and not mandatory and there is no penalty attached that a representation other than in the manner provided, will be fatal. A case can be visualized, where A graduate in law, not yet enrolled, appears and conducts a case before a Court. In such a case, whatever remedies may be open against that graduate under the Bar Councils Act or some other enactment, the proceedings before the Court will not fall to the ground and a binding judgment and decree can nevertheless be made. The similar appears to be the case in the matter of representation before a Labour Court. The Bazar Karamchari Sangh may be incompetent to represent, but it has represented and no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner by that representation. I am, therefore, of the view that the reference made by the State to the Labour Court was valid and Annexure 1 cannot be quashed, with the result that it must be held that the Labour Court has jurisdiction over the matter. Annexure 3 which is the interlocutory order passed by the Labour Court cannot also be quashed; nor can it be prohibited from proceeding further in the matter. 9. Annexure 3 which is the interlocutory order passed by the Labour Court cannot also be quashed; nor can it be prohibited from proceeding further in the matter. 9. Altogether, therefore, this writ petition has no force and is dismissed with costs.