JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, C.J. - The Petitioner was assessed to tax for more than Rs. 20,000/- under the Orissa Taxation (On Goods Carried by Roads or Inland Waterways) Act, 1968 (Orissa. Act 8 of 1968) by the assessing authority. The assessment was challenged by a writ application in O.J.C. No. 224 of 1969 which was dismissed. The Petitioner has applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India. At the time of hearing the application was not pressed under Article 133(1)(b). We do not consider that this is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1)(c). The only point for consideration is whether the Petitioner is entitled to leave under Article 133 (1)(a). 2. Article 133(1)(a) runs thus: 33.(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory India if the High Court certifies: (a) that the amount or value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is not less than twenty thousand rupees or such other sum as may be specified in that behalf by Parliament by law; and, where the judgment, decree or final order appealed from affirms the decision of the Court immediately below in any case other a case referred to in Sub-clause (c), if the High Court further certifies that the appeal involves some substantial question of law. 3. In determining whether Article 133(1)(a) applies, the following questions require examination: (i) Was O.J.C. No. 224 of 1969 a civil proceeding? (ii) Is the value of the subject-matter of dispute before the assessing authority and still in dispute in the appeal to the Supreme Court not less than Rs. 20,000/. (iii) Did the judgment of the High Court affirm the decision of the Tax Officer (iv) Is the Tax Officer a ?Court? within the meaning of Article 133(1)(80)? (v) If so, is the taxing authority a Court immediately below the High Court. (vi) If the judgment of the High Court is one of affirmance of the decision of the taxing authority, does the appeal to the Supreme Court involve any substantial question of law? 4. It is not disputed by Mr. within the meaning of Article 133(1)(80)? (v) If so, is the taxing authority a Court immediately below the High Court. (vi) If the judgment of the High Court is one of affirmance of the decision of the taxing authority, does the appeal to the Supreme Court involve any substantial question of law? 4. It is not disputed by Mr. Mohanty that the writ application out of which the leave to appeal to the Supreme Court arises is a civil proceeding. The meaning of the expression ?civil proceeding? is no longer res integra and is concluded by a series of Supreme Court decisions. S.A.L. Narayan Row and Ors. v. Inshwarlal Bhagwandas and Ors. AIR 1965 S.C. 1818 , was in the matter of recovery of income tax. Their Lordships observed that the expression covers all proceedings in which a party asserts the existence of a civil right conferred by the civil law or by statute and claims relief for breach thereof. The relevant portion of the observation may be extracted: If a person is called upon to pay tax which the State is not competent to levy or which is not imposed in accordance with the law which permits imposition of the tax, or in the levy, assessment and collection of which rights of the tax-payer are infringed in a manner not warranted by the statutes, a proceeding to obtain relief whether it is from the tribunal set up by the taxing statute, or from the civil Court would be regarded as a civil proceeding. The character of the proceeding, in our judgment, depends not upon the nature of the tribunal which is invested with authority to grant relief, but upon the nature of the right violated and The appropriate relief which may be claimed. (See para 8). In Ramesh and Anr. v. Gandelal Motilal Patni and Ors. 1966 S.C.D. 1064, their Lordships said that a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ to bring up a proceeding for consideration must be a civil proceeding, if the original proceeding concerns civil rights. The same view has been taken in Arbind Kumar Singh v. Nand Kishore Prasad and Anr. AIR 1968 S.C 1227 . In this case the proceeding that was pending in the High Court was to quash the assessment under the Act. It affects civil rights of the Petitioner. The same view has been taken in Arbind Kumar Singh v. Nand Kishore Prasad and Anr. AIR 1968 S.C 1227 . In this case the proceeding that was pending in the High Court was to quash the assessment under the Act. It affects civil rights of the Petitioner. The Writ application in the High Court was, therefore, a civil proceeding. 5. There is no controversy that the subject matter of the dispute before the assessing authority, the High Court and still in dispute in the appeal to the Supreme Court is not less than Rs. 20,000/-. 6. The main question for consideration in this case is whether the taxing authority was a ?Court? within the meaning of that word in Article 133(1)(a). 7. Mr. Mohanty contends that the word ?Court? occurring in the expression ?Court of first instance? in Article 133(1)(a) does not cover any body or tribunal which is not a. ?Court? within the meaning of the CPC or the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act. Reliance is placed on Jatiya Estate Ltd. v. Vithal Das Bhimji Chandrana & Co. (1956) 60 Cal. W.N. 927. That case supports the contention of Mr. Mohanty. Their Lordships observed thus: Indeed, if it was intended to give a right of appeal even in cases where the tribunal of first instance was not a Court in the strict sense of the term, it is difficult to understand why the framers of the Constitution should not have spoken of ?dispute in the Court or tribunal of first instance?, following the manner of expression used in Articles 136(1) and 227, but should have used the single word ?Court?. The conclusion appears to me to be inescapable that The word ?Court? in Article 133(1)(a) does not cover any body or tribunal which is not a Court within the meaning of the CPC or the Civil Courts Act and, therefore, does not cover the Rent Controller. It is necessary to examine the correctness of this decision. 8. In this case the writ application questioning the legality and the validity of the assessment was dismissed. If the taxing authority is construed as the ?Court of first instance? and the judgment of the High Court is one of affirmance, then no leave can be granted unless the High Court further certifies that the appeal involves a substantial question of law. To get over this huddle, Mr. If the taxing authority is construed as the ?Court of first instance? and the judgment of the High Court is one of affirmance, then no leave can be granted unless the High Court further certifies that the appeal involves a substantial question of law. To get over this huddle, Mr. Mohanty contends that it is the High Court and not the taxing authority which is the ?Court of first instance?. As the taxing authority is a quasi Judicial tribunal discharging duties judicially analogous to that of a Civil Court, Mr. Mohanty wants to fortify his argument by contending that the ?Court of first instance? must refer to a Civil Court as contemplated in the CPC and not to a tribunal. The contention suffers from an apparent fallacy even if we proceed on the assumption that the High Court in this case is the Court of first instance. It is well settled that in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution the High Court does not function as an appellate or revisional Court. In Ramesh and Anr. v. Gandalal Motilal Patni and Ors. 1966 S.C.D. 1064, their Lordships observed thus: We are concerned here with the exercise of extraordinary original civil jurisdiction under Article 226. Under that jurisdiction, the High Court does not hear an appeal or revision. The High Court s moved to intervene and to bring before itself, the record of a case decided by or pending before a Court or tribunal or any authority within The High Court?s jurisdiction. Petition to the High Court invoking this jurisdiction is a proceeding quite independent of the original controversy. The controversy in the High Court, in proceedings arising under Article 226 ordinarily is whether a decision of or a proceeding before, a Court or tribunal or authority, should be allowed to stand or should be quashed, for want of jurisdiction or on account of errors of law apparent of the face of the record (See para 16). The italic expressions would show that whether the writ application is filed against the judgment of the Civil Court or orders of tribunal or other authorities, the proceeding is quite independent of the original controversy. The jurisdiction under Article 226 is not exercised either by way of appeal or by way of revision. The italic expressions would show that whether the writ application is filed against the judgment of the Civil Court or orders of tribunal or other authorities, the proceeding is quite independent of the original controversy. The jurisdiction under Article 226 is not exercised either by way of appeal or by way of revision. That does not, however, make any difference to the conclusion that the High Court is not a Civil Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226. Article 133( 1)( a) does not require that as a condition precedent to the grant of leave the High Court must pass judgment in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction. There is no reference to exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction in the Article itself. As a matter of fact, the value of the subject matter of dispute 808 it was in the Court of first instance and still in dispute in appeal to the Supreme Court is alone to be taken into consideration. If the Court of first instance would be confined to a Civil Court of first instance, as is contended by Mr. Mohanty, then the leave application is liable to be dismissed as the High Court is not a Civil Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226. If this narrow construction is accepted, there will be no appeal to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order of the High Court in any writ application which is a civil proceeding. On the restrictive view Article 133(1)(a) would be confined in its application to cases covered by Sections 109 and 110 of the CPC only. Such a view was repelled in Ramesh and Anr. v. Gandalal Motilal Patni and Ors. 1966 S.C.D. 1064, itself. In paragraph 10 their Lordships made the following observations: Article 133 not only discards the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdictions but deliberately used words which are as wide as language can make them. The intention is not only to include all judgments, decrees and orders passed in the exercise of appellate and ordinary original civil jurisdictions but also to make the language wide enough to cover other jurisdictions under which civil rights would come before the High Court for decision. The intention is not only to include all judgments, decrees and orders passed in the exercise of appellate and ordinary original civil jurisdictions but also to make the language wide enough to cover other jurisdictions under which civil rights would come before the High Court for decision. The drafters of the Constitution were aware that 110 new jurisdiction was being conferred on the High Courts by Article 226 of the Constitution and proceedings before any Court or tribunal within the jurisdiction of the High Court, including in appropriate cases before Government would be brought before the High Court and dealt with by issuing writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. That the new jurisdiction would often result in decisions, affecting civil rights must have been apparent and the need to provide for appeals to this Court from the determinations of the High Courts must have been equally obvious. The right of appeal to this Court is thus stated in general words in Article 132, 133 as no exception not mentioned in the Articles can be impled. In fact this Supreme Court decision is itself an illustration that Article 133(1)(a) would apply to cases arising out of the orders of the tribunals. In that case the question raised was whether the Commissioner had jurisdiction to set aside the discharge of the debt ordered by the Claims Officer. This jurisdiction was challenged by a proceeding under Article 226. The High Court summarily dismissed the petition. As the other requirements of the Article were satisfied, their Lordships held that the High Court was no error in refusing the certificate under Article 133(1)(80). Another illustration is furnished by Smt. Jagadabai and Anr. v. The State of Maharastra and Anr. AIR 1970 S.C. 1972 . There, certain statute imposing a ceiling on land holdings was declared valid by the High Court. As its decision affected property of more than Rs. 20,000/- their Lordships held that a certificate should have been issued under Article 133(1)(a). In that particular case, however, no leave was granted as by the time the leave was sought the decision of the High Court had already been reversed by the Supreme Court. As its decision affected property of more than Rs. 20,000/- their Lordships held that a certificate should have been issued under Article 133(1)(a). In that particular case, however, no leave was granted as by the time the leave was sought the decision of the High Court had already been reversed by the Supreme Court. Moreover, on the restrictive interpretation there would be no occasion for the applicability of the clause ?where the judgment, decree or final order appealed from affirms the decision of the Court immediately below in any case other than a case referred to in Sub-clause (c), if the High Court further certifies that the appeal involves some substantial question of law? whenever leave for appeal to the Supreme Court is sought against any judgment in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226. The same conclusion also follows from the extract given by us from S.A.L. Narayan Rowand Ors. v. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas and Ors. AIR 1965 S.C 1818 , in paragraph 4 of this judgment. While discussing the nature of a civil proceeding it was emphasised that the character of the proceeding depends not upon the nature of the tribunal which is invested with authority to grant relief but upon the nature of the right violated. Our view is fully supported by Ramappa Kadappa Konnur v. Venkappa Basappa Hunashikatti and Anr. (1969) 2 Mys. L.J. 455. With respect, we agree with the analysis made therein and dissent from the view expressed in Jatiya Estate Ltd. v. Vithal Das Bhimji Chandrana & Co. (1956) 60 Cal.W.N. 927. We would close up this part of the discussion by concluding that the expression ?Court of first instance? in Article 133(1)(a) would take within its sweep 81 tribunal or the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The taxing authority in this case and not the, High Court would be the Court of first instance. 9. The next point for consideration is whether the taxing authority is a Court immediately below the High Court in this case. The meaning of the expression ?Court immediately below? is also no longer res integra. In Ladli Parshad Jaiswal v. The Kamal Distillery Co. Ltd. and Ors. 9. The next point for consideration is whether the taxing authority is a Court immediately below the High Court in this case. The meaning of the expression ?Court immediately below? is also no longer res integra. In Ladli Parshad Jaiswal v. The Kamal Distillery Co. Ltd. and Ors. AIR 1963 S.C. 1279 , their Lordships observed that a Court subordinate to the High Court is a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court whereas a Court immediately below is the Court from whose decision the appeal has been filed. See Durga Prasad and Anr. v. Banaras Bank Ltd. AIR 1963 S.C. 1372; and T.B. Nataraja Singh v. T.B. Govindraja Singh and Ors. 1968 S.C.D. 374. The word ?appeal? therein is necesarily to be construed in the gneric sense meaning that the judgment was under challenge before the High Court in exercise of any jurisdiction in which it can pass judgment, decree or final order. Thus, even though the taxing authority in this case is not subordinate to The High Court involving The concept of superintendence, yet it is a Court immediately below the High Court within The meaning of Article 133(1)(a). 10. We next proceed to examine if the judgment of the High Court affirmed the decision of the taxing authority. In Tirumalachetti Rajaram v. Tirumalachetti Radhakrishnayya Chetty and Ors. AIR 96 S.C. 795, The test of affirmance was laid down as follows: the test of affirmance prescribed by the clause can best be satisfied if we take The appellate decree in its entirety and enquire whether the said decree affairs the decision of the trial Court considered in its entirety. It is a matter of comparing the appellate decree with the decision of the trial Court under appeal. If the appellate decree affirms the decree of the trial Court it is a decree of affirmance if there is a variation made by the appellate decree in the decision of the trial Court the appellate decree is not a decree of affirmance and this position would not be affected whatever the variation is made in favour of the intending appellate or against him and whether the variation made is minor or major. (See para 4). In this case the writ application to quash the assessment order passed by the taxing authority was dismissed. The judgment of the High Court is therefore one of affirmance. 11. (See para 4). In this case the writ application to quash the assessment order passed by the taxing authority was dismissed. The judgment of the High Court is therefore one of affirmance. 11. It would thus be seen that the value of the subject matter of dispute before the assessing authority was and still in dispute in appeal to the Supreme Court is not less than Rs. 20.000/-. The judgment of the High Court against which leave to appeal is sought was passed in a civil proceeding. The judgment of the High Court is one of affirmance of the assessment order of the taxing authority which is a Court immediately below the High Court. Thus most of the conditions have been fulfilled. The only other question for consideration is whether the appeal involves any substantial question of law. It is now well settled that when a point of law is covered by a decision of the Supreme Court, then it would not be a substantial question of law. In our judgment we have considered the various Supreme Court decisions applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that there is no substantial question of law involved in this case. 12. As the judgment of this Court is one affirmance and does not involve any substantial question of Jaw, no leave can be granted under Article 133(1)(a). 13. In the result, the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. B.K. Patra, J. 14. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed