JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, C.J. - The Petitioner is the landlord and opposite party No. 1 is the tenant. The tenancy is according to the English calendar month. Opposite party No. 1 was inducted into the shop room in question bearing Municipality Holding No. 471 (Old 430) in ward No. 3 on the Balu bazar main read. The rent payable was Rs. 23/- per month. The tenant was also to pay the municipal tax be sides rent. House Rent Control Case No. 109 of 1960 was filed by the landlord for eviction of the tenant on the ground that he was impairing the value and utility of the room. The House Rent Controller (hereinafter referred to as the Controller) dismissed the application. The eviction was, however, ordered on 6-9-1963 at the appellate stage. A writ 'application filed by the tenant against the appellate order was dismissed on 21-10-1963. The landlord filed Execution Case No. 26 of 1964 wherein the tenant took a plea that there was a fresh tenancy. This objection was over ruled by the authorities below and the tenant filed Misc. Appeal No. 63 of 1965 in the High Court against the order allowing the execution after over ruling his objection that there was a new tenancy. In the appeal, the tenant asked for stay of the Execution case. Stay was granted subject to the condition that he would deposit the entire arrear rent from April 1965 to August 1965 and would continue payment of the current rent every month till the disposal of the appeal. The tenant did not comply with the peremptory order and the stay was vacated. Ultimately, however, the case was remanded by the High Court with a direction that unless he deposited rent from September 1965 to August 1966 his objection would not be heard. After remand, both the authorities disbelieved the case of new tenancy. The tenant filed misc. Appeal no 8 of 1967 against that order. The appeal was allowed by the High Court on the short ground that no notice u/s 106 of the T.P. Act had been served on the tenant and the tenancy had not been terminated. Thus the tenant was in arrears of rent from April 1965 to August 1965. An amount of Rs. 115/- at the rate of Rs. 23/- per month for these five months was paid on 24-8-1965. Thus the tenant was in arrears of rent from April 1965 to August 1965. An amount of Rs. 115/- at the rate of Rs. 23/- per month for these five months was paid on 24-8-1965. The tenant also fell into arrears for 13 months from September 1965 to September 1966. Re. 299/- was paid on 11-8-1966 in accordance with the peremptory order passed, by the High Court while amending the case back on remand. The tenant also fell into arrears from October 1966 to December 1966. The landlord filed S.C.C. No. 18 of 1967 on 23-1-1967 for recovery of the rent of these three months. The tenant sent the amount by Money. Order which was offered to the landlord on 14.2.1967 after service of summons on the tenant on 2.2.1967 in the S.C.C. suit. The landlord refused to receive the amount and the same was paid on 9.9.1967 after the decree was passed on 5.9.1967. Though there was no reference to the arrears in respect of municipal tax in the pleadings, documents were filed in evidence before the Controller to show that the tenant was to pay municipal tax at the rate of Rs. 32.40 ps. per annum from 1963.64 to 1965-66 for a period of three years. In respect of this amount the Municipality filed S.C.C. No. 107 of 1936 against the landlord who paid the same. To recover that amount, the landlord tiled S.C.C. No. 19 of 1)67 and realised the amount in Execution of the decree passed in his favour. The arrear was Re. 97. 30 p and including costs the tenant paid Rs. 156.40 p. At the time of argument, charts were supplied to us by Mr. Sinha for the Petitioner stating the aforesaid facts and Mr. Harichandan for the tenant accepted the correctness err the charts. Thus, the correctness of the aforesaid facts narrated by us is undisputed. Eviction of the tenant was sought on two grounds; (i) The tenant was in arrears of rent and was a habitual and wilful defaulter; (ii) He was damaging the house by burning Chulha day and night whereby its value and utility are being materially impaired. In the written Statement filed by the tenant both the allegations were denied. It was, however, not clarified as to how he was not a wilful defaulter. 2. In the written Statement filed by the tenant both the allegations were denied. It was, however, not clarified as to how he was not a wilful defaulter. 2. Both the controller and the appellate authority concurrently held that the landlord failed to establish the grounds for eviction. The writ application has been tiled under Articles 26 and 227 of the Constitution for quashing the aforesaid orders. 3. At the time of hearing the second ground of attack that the tenant damaged the house by burning Chulha day and night thereby materially impairing its value and utility was abandoned. 4. The only question for consideration, therefore, is whether the tenant is liable to be evicted for being in arrears of rent. 5. Mr. Sinha contends that the tenant was in arrears of rent from October 1966 to December 1966 and as such he was liable to be evicted u/s 7(2)(1) of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1967 (Orissa Act 4 of 1968)(hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). Mr. Harichandan, on The other hand, contends that as by the date of the application for eviction which was filed on 26.4.1967 the tenant was not in arrears of rent, the application u/s 7(1) was not maintainable and that the tenant was not a wilful defaulter and as such any delay in payment would not entail eviction. 6. The aforesaid contentions require careful examination of the scope and ambit of Section 7(2)(i), proviso, of the Act. It runs thus: 7(2). If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied: (i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due from him in respect of the house within thirty days after the expiry of the time fixed? It runs thus: 7(2). If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied: (i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due from him in respect of the house within thirty days after the expiry of the time fixed? in the agreement of the tenancy with the landlord for payment of rent or in the absence of any such agreement by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable he shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house and if the controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application: Provided that in any case falling under Clause (i) if the Controller is satisfied that the tenants default to payer tender rent was not willful, he may give the tenant a reasonable time not exceeding fifteen days to payer tender the rent due from him to the landlord up to the date of such payment or tender and on such payment or tender the application shall be rejected. 7. On a plain reading of Section 7(2)(i) it is clear that to entail eviction the tenant need not be in arrears of rent at the time of the filing of the application u/s 7(1) before the Controller. The language is ?the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due from him? on the due date. In case of a tenancy according to the English calendar month the latest day of payment is the last day of the month next following that for which rent is payable. To illustrate, if rent is payable for the month of December, the tenant must payer tender the rent on any date in January, not beyond 31st of that month. The tenant might have cleared all arrears by the date of the filing of the application u/s 7(1); yet, he incurs the liability for eviction if he had fallen in arrears at any time earlier within the period of limitation. Mr. Harichandan?s argument that the application for eviction u/s 7(1) is not maintainable as by the date of its filing the tenant cleared up all arrears is without substance. A similar contention was repelled by a Bench of this Court in Menakarani Hazra and Ors. v. Mohinder Singh Jaggi and Anr. Mr. Harichandan?s argument that the application for eviction u/s 7(1) is not maintainable as by the date of its filing the tenant cleared up all arrears is without substance. A similar contention was repelled by a Bench of this Court in Menakarani Hazra and Ors. v. Mohinder Singh Jaggi and Anr. 34 C.L.T. 277, See paragraph 13. A similar view was taken in Mangilal v. Sugan Chand Rathi AIR 1965 S.C. 101 , which had been decided prior to our decision in the aforesaid case but had not been brought to our notice by the learned Advocates arguing that case. The provision that came up for consideration before there Lordships was Section 4(a) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955 (Act 23 of 1955). That section runs thus: 4. No suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds: (a) that the tenant has failed to make payment to The landlord of any arrears of rent within one month of the service upon him of a written notice of demand from the landlord. Their Lordships observed thus: This provision clearly speaks of a tenant having failed to make payment to the landlord of the arrears of rent due from him within the time prescribed in that clause. It does not mean that the ground on which eviction is claimed must subsist till the date of suit. 8. The position of law is therefore clear that by the date of the application u/s 7(1) the tenant need not be in arrears. He entails The liability for eviction if he has not paid or tendered rent due from him by the last day of the month next following that for which rent is payable. 9. In this case, admittedly the tenant did not pay the rent from October to December 1966 in time. Even for the month of December 1966 the rent was payable by 31st of January 1967. But the rent was offered on 14.2-1967 after filing of the S.C.C. suit for recovery of rent on 23.1.1967. Thus though by 26.4.1967 when the application for eviction u/s 7(1) was filed the tenant was not in arrears for the months of October to December 1966, yet he was liable to eviction u/s 7(2)(i). 10. But the rent was offered on 14.2-1967 after filing of the S.C.C. suit for recovery of rent on 23.1.1967. Thus though by 26.4.1967 when the application for eviction u/s 7(1) was filed the tenant was not in arrears for the months of October to December 1966, yet he was liable to eviction u/s 7(2)(i). 10. Similarly the tenant was also in arrears in respect of the municipal tax which under the agreement he was to pay. Indisputably be was in arrears for three years from 1963-64 to 1965-66 and ultimately paid Rs. 156.40 p. in full satisfaction on 14.4.1969 after the decree was put into Execution. The expression ?rent? has not been defined in the Act. Law is (sic) settled that in the absence of a statutory definition the dictionary meaning of the word is to be taken into consideration. In Chamber?s Twentieth Century Dictionary ?Rent? means ?periodical payment for use of another?s property, sep, houses and lands?. Thus the Municipal tax payable by the tenant under the agreement of tenancy constitutes ?rent? within the meaning of the Act. The same view has been taken in Karnani Properties Ltd. v. Miss Augustine and Ors. AIR 1957 S.C. 309 and Tarakaswar Rysack v. Sakina bibi AIR 1956 Cal. 185 . By non payment of the Municipal tax agreed upon between the parties the tenant also fen into arrears of rent. 11. We should next examine the scope and ambit of the proviso to Section 7(2)(1). Mr. Sinha advances two contentions on this head: (i) Even if the tenant is not a wilful defaulter he is not entitled to the benefit of the proviso as he was not in arrears of rent on the date of the filing of the application u/s 7(1) in which case it is not open to the Controller to give him a reasonable time not exceeding fifteen days to payer tender rent: (ii) The tenant was a wilful defaulter and the proviso has no application. 12. The first contention has no substance. It Is to be noticed that to get the benefit of the proviso the tenant is not only to payer tender the arrears of rent due but he shall payer tender the rent due from him up to the date of payment or tender as directed by the Controller under the proviso. 12. The first contention has no substance. It Is to be noticed that to get the benefit of the proviso the tenant is not only to payer tender the arrears of rent due but he shall payer tender the rent due from him up to the date of payment or tender as directed by the Controller under the proviso. To illustrate, a tenant was in default for the month of May 1971 as he did not tender or pay the rent on or before 30-6.1971. The application for eviction u/s 7(1) was filed in the first week of July. The Controller passes an order under the proviso on 1.9.1971 directing the tenant to payer tender the rent due by (sic)-1971. In such a case the tenant will pay the arrears of rent not only for May 1971 in respect of which he was in arrears by the time of filing of the application but also for the months of June to August 1971 in respect of which rent was due though the same was not the subject matter of the litigation. The introduction of this additional obligation to make payment of all the rents due up to date renders the proviso to cover both the classes of cases. That is to say, tenants in default by the date of the application and tenants not in default by that date are entitled to the benefit of the proviso. The same view had been taken in Menakarani Hazra Ors. v. Mohinder Singh Jaggi and Anr. 34 C.L.T. 277, (See paragraph 19) in connection with the discussion of an argument whether Section 7(1)(i) of the 1958 Act which corresponds to Section 7(2)(i) is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. In paragraph 19 of that case an illustration was given. Therein it was stated that where the Controller gave the tenant time till 16th of January 1967 to payer tender the rent he would be entitled to the benefit of the proviso if he paid or tendered the rent till 16-1-1967. This observation of ours requires slight modification to this extent that the payment or ?tender would be made till 31st of December 1966 to get the benefit of the proviso. The tenancy was according to the calendar month and the payment was not to be made for each day. The expression ?up to the date of such payment or tender? This observation of ours requires slight modification to this extent that the payment or ?tender would be made till 31st of December 1966 to get the benefit of the proviso. The tenancy was according to the calendar month and the payment was not to be made for each day. The expression ?up to the date of such payment or tender? occurring in the proviso is to be confined to the payment or tender up to the end of the calendar month preceding the date fixed by the Controller for payment under the proviso. On the aforesaid analysis, the first contention has no force. 13. The second contention is that the tenant was a wilful defaulter. In Menakarani Hazra and Ors. v. Mohinder Singh Jaggi and Anr. 34 C.L.T. 277, the meaning of ?wilful defaulter? was enunciated by us (See para 16), Twofold meanings were taken from the Oxford Dictionary. It was said therein that if the non-payment was deliberate, intentional, obstinate or self-willed it was wilful. It was further said that a habitual defaulter was necessarily wilful even though the converse may not be true. 14. It would be pertinent to notice that the landlord?s house is in occupation of the tenant. Rent is the quid pro quo for use and occupation of tile house. The acquisition of the right of user and occupation by the tenant is to be compensated by the obligation to pay rent. Such right and obligation are correlative and go hand in hand. The liability to pay rent for the use and occupation of the tenant accrues on the expiry of The month of tenancy and the latest due date of payment had been statutorily fixed, as the last day of the succeeding month. The liability to pay is not contingent upon landlord?s demand for payment. If there is deliberate and intentional violation of this obligation the default is wilful. The default may have ?either; positive or negative aspect. Reckless indifference to make Payment of rent in time illustrates the negative aspect. As to the meaning of ?wilful default? a similar view had been taken in Khivraj Shordia v. G. Maniklal Bhatted AIR 1966 Mad. 67 , (see Para 9). 15. In the case the tenant is guilty of conscious violation of his obligation and of reckless indifference. He was a chronic defaulter. As to the meaning of ?wilful default? a similar view had been taken in Khivraj Shordia v. G. Maniklal Bhatted AIR 1966 Mad. 67 , (see Para 9). 15. In the case the tenant is guilty of conscious violation of his obligation and of reckless indifference. He was a chronic defaulter. Rent from April to August 1965 was paid by him on 24.8.1965 by an order of the High Court imposing conditions while granting stay in M.A. Nos. 63 of 1965. On 11-81966 be paid rent of Rs. 299/-. for a period of thirteen months from September, 1965 to September 1966. Rent from October to December 1966 was tendered on 14.2.1967 after the filing of S.C.C. No. 18 of 1967. Municipal tax for three years from 1963.64 to 1966-66 was paid after the filing of the S.C.C. suit and Execution case. The totality and cumulative effect of all the circumstances and the prior conduct of the tenant are taken into account, there is no escape from the conclusion that the tenant was a wilful defaulter. There is nothing in the written statement or in evidence to explain the chronic defaults. 16. Reliance was placed by Mr. Harichandan on Jammula Narasimhulu v. Kotini Sitaram and Anr. 31 C.L.T. 331, in support of the contention that no demand was made by the landlord for payment of rent and as such the default was not wilful. This decision IS distinguishable on facts. In that case the findings of the Controller and the appellate authority were that the land lord refused to accept rent when tendered. The tenant opened a separate account in his own name in the Urban Co-operative Bank and deposited the monthly rent regularly. In such circumstances the Court came to the conclusion that the default was not wilful though there was admittedly non-payment of rent for the months of January to April 1959. The word ?wilful? was given the correct meaning in that case but on facts the case is distinguishable. Whether the default is wilful or not would depend upon the fact and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down. 17. We would, therefore, conclude by saying that the tenant was a wilful defaulter in this case and is not entitled to the benefit of the proviso. 18. It was lastly contended by Mr. 17. We would, therefore, conclude by saying that the tenant was a wilful defaulter in this case and is not entitled to the benefit of the proviso. 18. It was lastly contended by Mr. Harichandan that when the Controller and the appellate authority have concurrently found that the tenant was not a wilful defaulter the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction should not quash their orders. The limit and amplitude of the jurisdiction of the Court was fully examined in Menkarani Hazra and Ors. v. Mohinder Singh Jaggi and Anr. 34 C.L.T. 277. The authorities below fell into error in appreciating the import and significance of the expression ?wilful?. On account of such misconception of law they exercised their jurisdiction with material irregularity in applying the correct law to the facts. Accordingly, they committed errors apparent on the face of the record which require to be corrected by issue of a writ of certiorari. The objection on this score is without force. 19. In the result, the application for eviction filed by the Petitioner u/s 7(i) of the Act is allowed. A writ of certiorari be issued quashing the impugned orders of the Controller and the appellate authority dismissing the application for eviction. The writ application is allowed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 100/-. B.K. Patra, J. 20. I agree. Final Result : Allowed