ZINABHAI RANCHHODJI DARJI v. STATE — 1971 DIGILAW 16 (GUJ)

P. N. BHAGWATI, M. P. THAKKAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition raises an interesting but difficult question of construction of certain provisions of the Gujarat Panchayats Act 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Panchayats Act ). It is an extraordinary and unique piece of legislation framed without much scientific accuracy of language and many of its provisions are so unhappily worded that it is difficult to penetrate their confusion and obscurity. This is not the first time that we are called upon to face the complexities of this legislation and with our growing acquaintance with its provisions we must confess to a feeling of reluctant respect which one feels for an old tough sparring partner whom one has never been able to knock out. The question that arises for consideration before us turns primarily on the true interpretation of sec. 310a sub-sec. (10) of the Panchayats Act but in order to arrive at its proper determination it is necessary to state briefly a few relevant facts giving rise to the petition. ( 2 ) WHEN the elections to the Vyara Taluka Panchayat took place in 1958 the petitioner who is a resident of Vyara was elected as a member and at the first meeting of the Vyara Taluka Panchayat he was elected as its President. On his election as President of the Vyara Taluka Panchayat he became ex-officio member of the Surat District Panchayat by virtue of sec. 15 (1) (A) (i) of the Panchayats Act. He was then elected as President of the Surat District Panchayat. The consequence of his election as President of the Surat District Panchayat was that under sec. 15 (3) of the Panchayats Act he ceased to hold his office of President of the Vyara Taluka Panchayat but continued to be an ex-officio member of the Surat District Panchayat. The Surat District consists of several talukas of which one is Chorashi Taluka and for the Chorashi Taluka there was the Chorashi Taluka Panchayat constituted under the provisions of the Panchayats Act. The area over which the Surat District Panchayat and subject to the authority of the Surat District Panchayat the Chorashi Taluka Panchayat had authority included two local areas known as Render and Adajan. Render was a Nagar and Adajan was a Gram. There was a Nagar Panchayat for Render and a Gram Panchayat for Adajan. The area over which the Surat District Panchayat and subject to the authority of the Surat District Panchayat the Chorashi Taluka Panchayat had authority included two local areas known as Render and Adajan. Render was a Nagar and Adajan was a Gram. There was a Nagar Panchayat for Render and a Gram Panchayat for Adajan. Both these local areas of Rander and Adajan were by a notification dated 16th January 1970 issued by the State Government under sec. 3sub sec (3) of Bombay provincial Municipal corporation act 1949 (hereafter referred to as the Corporations Act) included in the limits of the Surat Municipal Corporation and consequent upon such inclusion a notification dated 21st January 1970 was issued by the Development Commissioner as delegate of the State Government under sec. 9 sub-sec. (2) of the Panchayats Act declaring that the local area of Rander shall cease to be a Nagar and the local area of Adajan shall cease to be a Gram from 1st February 1970. The result was that the local areas of Rander and Adajan were excluded from the limits of the jurisdiction of the Chorashi Taluka Panchayat and the Surat District Panchayat. Now from amongst co-opted members of the Chorashi Taluka Panchayat there were two who were residents of Adajan. One was Marghabhai Zinabhai Rathod who was co-opted as a representative of the Scheduled Castes and the other was Laxmiben Patel who was co-opted as lady member interested in the welfare activities pertaining to women and children. There was also one lady member in the Surat District Panchayat named Sumanben who was elected to one of the two seats reserved for women and who was registered as a voter in Rander. The question was whether these persons could continue to remain members of the respective Panchayats when Rander and Adajan were no longer within the limits of those Panchayats. The District Development Officer by his letter dated 21st March 1970 invited the attention of the Development Commissioner to these facts and sought his opinion in the matter. This was followed by a letter dated 29th April 1970 addressed by the petitioner as President of the Surat District Panchayat to the Development Commissioner where the petitioner once again requested the Development Commissioner to examine the question by taking opinion of legal experts. This was followed by a letter dated 29th April 1970 addressed by the petitioner as President of the Surat District Panchayat to the Development Commissioner where the petitioner once again requested the Development Commissioner to examine the question by taking opinion of legal experts. The Development Commissioner as it appears from the affidavit filed by him in reply to the petition on 23rd January 1971 carefully examined the question and came to the conclusion on 12th May 1970 that it was necessary to dissolve and reconstitute the Chorashi Taluka panchayat and the necessary to dissolve and reconstitute the Chorashi Taluka Panchayat and the Surat District Panchayat in accordance with the provisions of sec. 310a of the Panchayats Act. But since the question involved interpretation of legal provisions he made a reference seeking legal advice from the State Government on 13th May 1970 The State Government by a Communication dated 12th October 1970 intimated to the Development Commissioner that the legal position was that the Chorashi Taluka Panchayat and the Surat District Panchayat would have to be dissolved and reconstituted under sec. 310a of the Panchayat Act. On his view being thus confirmed by the legal advice received from the State Government the Development Commissioner addressed a letter dated 10 October 1970 to the District Development Officer requesting him to forward his proposals in regard to the reconstitution of the Chorashi Taluka Panchayat and the Surat District Panchayat. It appears that the District Development Officer in his turn invited proposals in regard to reconstitution of the Chorashi Taluka Panchayat from its President but no proposals were received from him. So far as the proposed reconstitution of the Surat District Panchayat was concerned the question was discussed at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Surat District Panchayat held on 22nd December 1970 and pursuant to the decision taken at this meeting a letter dated 24th December 1970 was addressed by the District Development Officer to the Development Commissioner forwarding a list showing the names of co-opted members of the Chorashi Taluka Panchayat and elected members of the Surat District Panchayat as also proposals for appointment of members in place of those vacating their posts as members. The Development Commissioner thereafter in exercise of the powers conferred on the State Government under sec. The Development Commissioner thereafter in exercise of the powers conferred on the State Government under sec. 310a of the Panchayats Act and delegated to him by virtue of a notification dated 13th June 1963 as amended by a subsequent notification dated 5th May 1964 passed an order dated 8th January 1971 dissolving the Chorashi Taluka Panchayat and the Surat District Panchayat with effect from 11th January 1971 and directing that with effect from the said date the members of the dissolved Panchayats shall vacate their offices and the Chorashi Taluka Panchayat and the Surat District Panchayat shall be reconstituted with members specified in Clause 3 of the Order read with Schedules I and II. Now the petitioner having ceased to hold his office as President of the Vyara Taluka Panchayat on his election as President of the Surat District Panchayat was not the President of the Vyara Taluka Panchayat at the date of the dissolution and reconstitution of the Surat District Panchayat and could not therefore be an ex-officio member of the reconstituted Surat District Panchayat in accordance with sec. 310a sub-sec. (2) (b ). He was also not an elected member of the Surat District Panchayat and the Development Commissioner did not therefore appoint him in lieu of elected members under sec. 310a sub-sec. (2) (b ). The result was that the petitioner ceased to be a member of the Surat District Panchayat as reconstituted and with the cessation of his membership his President ship also came to an end. The petitioner therefore filed the present petition challenging the validity of the order of dissolution and reconstitution made by the Development Commissioner. ( 3 ) THERE were two grounds on which the validity of the impugned order made by the Development Commissioner was challenged on behalf of the petitioner and broadly stated they were : (A) The Development Commissioner as delegate of the State Government had no power to dissolve the Chorashi Taluka Panchayat and the Surat District Panchayat under sec. 310a sub-sec. (1) of the Panchayats Act by reason of the excepting provision contained in sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a sub-sec. (1) of the Panchayats Act by reason of the excepting provision contained in sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a and the impugned order was therefore null and void as being without authority; (B) The impugned order was made by the Development Commissioner mala fide with the object of throwing out the petitioner from his position as President of the Surat District Panchayat since he disagreed on principle with some of the persons in authority and power in the State Government and there being differences of opinion he resigned from the ruling Congress Party in the State. We shall examine these two grounds in the order in which we have set them out above. ( 4 ) RE: GROUND (A): The entire argument under this head of challenge turns on the true interpretation of Sec. 310a sub-see. (10) but in order to arrive at its proper construction it is necessary to refer to the other sub-sections of sec. 310a Which constitute the setting in which sub-see. (10) occurs. Sec. 310a was not originally in the Panchayats Act when it was enacted but it was subsequently introduced by Gujarat Act 26 of 1962. Gujarat Act 26 of 1962 came into force on 18th August 1962 and by a notification dated 7th February 1963 issued by the State Govern-ment under sec. 1 sub-sec. (3) of the Panchayats Act see. 310a was brought in to force in all districts of the State of Gujarat except the District of Dangs. Sub-sec. (1) of sec. Gujarat Act 26 of 1962 came into force on 18th August 1962 and by a notification dated 7th February 1963 issued by the State Govern-ment under sec. 1 sub-sec. (3) of the Panchayats Act see. 310a was brought in to force in all districts of the State of Gujarat except the District of Dangs. Sub-sec. (1) of sec. 310a confers power on the State Government to dissolve and reconstitute district and taluka panchayats on the alteration of limits of district or taluka and the provision it enacts runs as follows:- 310 (1) When on account of the constitution of a new district or taluka under the Land Revenue Code or for any other reason the limits of a district or as the case may be a taluka are during the term of office of the members of the district panchayat or as the case may be the talukna panchayat altered the State Government may by order published in the Official Gazette dissolve such district panchayat or taluka panchayat from a date specified in the order and direct- (I) that the district panchayat or as the case may be the taluka panchayat be reconstituted for the district or the taluka of which the district panchayat or the taluka panchayat has been dissolved or (II) that a district panchayat or taluka panchayat be established for a new district or as the case may be a new taluka which has been constituted:provided that if the new taluka or new district is a taluka or district constituted under sec. 2a of the Gujarat New Capital (Periphery) Control Act 1960 the establish-ment of the taluka Panchayat or as the case may be The district panchayat therefor may notwithstanding anything contained in this Act be postponed so long as the Gujarat New Capital (Periphery) Control Act. 1960 is in force or for such lesser period as the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette specify. The members of the panchayat which has been dissolved shall vacate their offices from the date specified in the order sub-see. (2) of sec. 310a provides for the personnel of the reconstituted taluka panchayat or district panchayat in these terms:- (2 ). The panchayat reconstituted or established under the provisions of sub-sec. (1) shall (A) if it be a taluka panchayat consist of ex-officio and associated members eligible under clauses (A) and (D) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. (2) of sec. 310a provides for the personnel of the reconstituted taluka panchayat or district panchayat in these terms:- (2 ). The panchayat reconstituted or established under the provisions of sub-sec. (1) shall (A) if it be a taluka panchayat consist of ex-officio and associated members eligible under clauses (A) and (D) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 14 and such other members as the State Government may appoint in lieu of elected members referred to in clause (B) of the said sub-sec 1) and in lieu of the elected and co-opted members referred to in clauses (B) and (C) of the said sub-sec. (1) and (B) if it be a district panchayat consist of ex-officio and associated members eligible under clauses (A) and (D) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 15 and such other members as the State Government may appoint in lieu of the elected members referred to in clause (B) of the said sub-sec. (1); and the members to be so appointed shall so far as may be practicable in the opinion of the State Government be persons who were members of the district or taluka panchayat as the case may be which has been dissolved under sub-sec. (1 ). The President and Vice-President of a panchayat so reconstituted or established shall be elected in the manner provided in this Act. Sub-sec. (10) which is the main provision which calls for interpretation was not originally a part of sec. 310a but it was subsequently introduced with retrospective effect by Gujarat Act 7 of 1966. The effect of giving retrospective operation to the introduction of sub-sec. (10) is that it must be deemed to be part of sec. 310a from the date when sec. 310a came into force. Sub-sec. (10) enacts a provision excluding the applicability of Sub-sec. (1) to (9) of sec. 310a in certain circumstances. It reads:- (10) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section shall apply or shall be deemed ever to have applied to the alteration of the limits of a district or taluka by reason of the inclusion in or exclusion from the district or taluka of any area as a result of alteration of the limits of a municipal borough into a gram or nagar or the establishment of or the alteration of the limits of a cantonment. EXPLANATION:-MUNICIPAL borough means a municipal borough constituted or deemed to be constituted under the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963now the first question which arises for consideration is whether the present case falls within the scope and ambit of sec. 310a sub-sec. (1 ). Sec. 310a sub-sec. (1) applies when there is an alteration in he limits of a district or a taluka on account of the constitution of a new district or taluka under the Land Revenue Code or for any other reason. The word district is defined in sec. 2 sub-sec. (6) to mean a district formed under the Panchayats Act and so also the word taluka is defined in sec. 2 sub-sec. (31) to mean a taluka formed under the Panchayats Act. Sec. 10 provides for the forma-tion of districts and talukas for the purposes of the Panchayats Act. It says that a district as constituted from time to time under the Land Revenue Code except the area over which a district panchayat has no authority under sec 8 shall be a district and a taluka or mahal as constituted from time to time under the Land Revenue Code except the area over which a taluka panchayat has no authority under sec. 8 shall be a taluka. Sec. 8 sub-sec. (2) provides that a taluka panchayat or a district panchayat shall have no authority over that portion of the area in the taluka or district as the case may be which for the time being is within the limits of a city municipal borough municipal district notified area or canton-ment constituted under ally law for the time being in force. The district or taluka formed under the Panchayats Act does not therefore include the area for the time being comprised within the limits of a city municipal borough municipal district notified area or cantonment though such area would ordinarily form part of the revenue district or revenue taluka District or taluka within the meaning of the respective definition contained in the Panchayats Act would therefore mean the revenue district or revenue taluka minus the area comprised with in the limits of a city municipal borough municipal district notified area or cantonment Now it was not seriously disputed on behalf of the petitioner that the words district and taluka in sec. 310a sub-sec. 310a sub-sec. (1) must bear the meaning assigned to them under the definition clause and they would therefore mean not the revenue district or the revenue taluka but the revenue district or the revenue taluka minus the area comprised within the limits of a city municipal borough municipal district notified area or cantonment. If that be the true interpretation of the words district and taluka there can be no doubt that in the present case the limits of the Chorashi Taluka and the Surat District were altered by reason of Rander and Adajan being included in the limits of the Surat Municipal Corpora-tion. Rander and Adajan which were formerly part of Chorashi taluka and Surat District ceased to form part of Chorashi Taluka and Surat District since they were included within the limits of the Surat Municipal Corpora-tion and there was consequently alteration of the limits of Chorashi Taluka and Surat District within the meaning of sec. 310a sub-sec. (1 ). The conditions for the applicability of sec. 310a sub-sec. (1) were therefore satisfied in the present case and the Development Commissioner as delegate of the State Government could validly in exercise of the power conferred under sec. 310a sub-sec. (1) dissolve and reconstitute the Chorashi Taluka Panchayat and the Surat District Panchayat unless his power to do so was excluded by the operation of sub-see. (10) of see. 310a. ( 5 ) SEC. 310a sub-sec. (10) provides that nothing in the foregoing provisions of the section that is in sub-see. (1) to (9)shall apply or shall be deemed ever to have applied to the alteration of the limits of a district or taluka by reason of the inclusion in or exclusion from the district or taluka of any area as a result of the alteration of the limits of municipal borough or conversion of a municipal borough into a gram or nagar or the establishment of or the alteration of the limits of a cantonment. Municipal borough is defined in the Explanation to mean a municipal borough constituted or deemed to be constituted under the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 It may be pointed out at this stage that prior to the enactment of the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 there were in force in the State of Gujarat two statutes in the main providing for the apparatus of local self-Government and they were the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 and the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 The Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 provided for the constitution of a municipal district and a municipality for each municipal district. Similarly the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 provided for the constitution of a municipal borough and a borough municipality for each municipal borough. These two enactments were repealed by sec. 279 sub-sec. (1) of the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 and it was provided by see. 279 sub-see. (2) of that Act. (2 ). Notwithstanding the repeal of the said Acts- (I) any local area declared to be either a municipal borough or municipal district immediately before the date on which this Act comes into force (hereinafter referred to as the said date) shall be deemed to be a municipal borough under this Act (II) the municipalities constituted under the said Acts immediately before the said date (hereinafter called the old municipalities ) shall be deemed to be munici-palities of the respective borough (hereinafter respectively called the new munici-palities and the new boroughs ). The result was that after the commencement of the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 municipal districts constituted under the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 and municipal boroughs constituted under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 were deemed to be municipal boroughs constituted under the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 That is why there is no reference in sub-sec. (10) of sec. The result was that after the commencement of the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 municipal districts constituted under the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 and municipal boroughs constituted under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 were deemed to be municipal boroughs constituted under the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 That is why there is no reference in sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a to a municipal district constituted under the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 or to a municipal borough constituted under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 but the words municipal borough as used in that sub-section are defined by the Explanation to mean a municipal borough constituted or deemed to be constituted under the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 ( 6 ) SO far as the Surat is concerned it was originally a municipal Borough constituted under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 and on the coming into force of the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 it became a municipal borough deemed to be constituted under that Act. Now if this state of affairs had continued it is incontrovertible that sub-sec. (1) of sec. 310a would have been attracted and it would have excluded the applicability of sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a when the limits of the Chorashi Taluka and the Surat District were altered by reason of the exclusion from the Chorashi Taluka and the Surat District of the local areas of Rander and Adajan as a result of the notification dated 16th January 1970. But before the alteration of the limits of the Chorashi Taluka and the Surat District was made the municipal borough of Surat was converted into a City and the Municipality of Surat was converted into a Municipal Corporation with effect from 1st October 1966 under the provisions of the Corporations Act with the result that at the date of the alteration of the limits of the Chorashi Taluka and the Surat District there was no municipal borough of Surat and strictly speaking it could not be said that the exclusion of Rander and Adajan from the Chorashi Taluka and the Surat District was as a result of the alteration of the limits of a municipal borough. The exclusion of Rander and Adajan from the Chorashi Taluka and the Surat District was as a result of the alteration of the limits of a City and not of a municipal borough and the consequent alteration of the limits of the Chorashi Taluka and the Surat District was therefore not within the plain terms of sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a. ( 7 ) BUT it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that by reason of Paragraph 1 of Appendix IV of the Corporations Act the words municipal borough in sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a should be read as referring to a municipal borough which has been converted into a city subsequent to the coming into force of that sub-section and the exclusion provision in sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a therefore applied in the present case since Surat was converted from a municipal borough into a City on 1 October 1966. The applicability of sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a was thus sought to be invoked on behalf of the petitioner by reference to Paragraph 1 of Appendix IV of the Corporations Act. To determine the validity of this contention it is necessary to construe the proper scope and ambit of that provision. ( 8 ) THE Corporations Act was enacted on 29th December 1949 and it provides in sec. 3 sub-sec. (1) that the local areas within the limits specified by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette shall constitute the City of Ahmedabad. Such notification was issued by the State Government on 1st July 1950 and with effect from that date there came into being the City of Ahmedabad and a Municipal Corpora-tion for the City of Ahmedabad. Sec. 3 sub-sec. (2) empowers the State Government from time to time by notification in the Official Gazette to constitute any other local area lying within such limits as are specified in the notification to be a City and it was in exercise of this power that the State Government notified the local area comprised within the Municipal Borough of Surat to be a City. It is provided by sec. 490 that the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 and the Bombay Village Panchayats Act 1933 shall cease to apply except as provided in the Act to any area included in the City. It is provided by sec. 490 that the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 and the Bombay Village Panchayats Act 1933 shall cease to apply except as provided in the Act to any area included in the City. Sec. 493 declares that the provisions of Appendix IV shall apply to the constitution of the Corporation and other matters specified therein. Paragraph 1 of Appendix IV which constitutes the material provision requiring to be construed reads as follows:1 References in any enactment other than the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 and the Bombay Local Fund Audit Act 1930 in force on the date immediately preceding the appointed day in a City or in any rule order or notification. made or issued thereunder and in force on such date in the said City to municipal districts municipal boroughs municipalities or borough manipulates constituted under the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 or the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 shall unless a different intention appears be construed as references to the City or to the Corporation of the said City as the case may be and such enactment rule order or notification shall apply to the said City or Corporation. The expression appointed day is defined in sec. 2 sub-sec. (2) to mean with reference to any local area the day on which such area is constituted the City of Ahmedabad or any other City as the case may be under sec. 3. With reference to the local area comprised in the City of Surat the expression appointed day would therefore mean 1st October 1966. ( 9 ) THE argument on behalf of the petitioner was that sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a was an enactment in force on the date immediately preceding 1 October 1966 in the local area which was constituted into the City of Surat and therefore by reason of Paragraph 1 of Appendix IV of the Corporations Act reference to municipal borough in sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a must be construed as reference to the City of Surat and that sub-section must be held to apply to the City of Surat. The alteration of the limits of Chorashi Taluka and Surat District by the inclusion of Rander and Adajan in the limits of the City of Surat would consequently be within the ambit and coverage of Sub-sec. (10) of sec. The alteration of the limits of Chorashi Taluka and Surat District by the inclusion of Rander and Adajan in the limits of the City of Surat would consequently be within the ambit and coverage of Sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a and would not attract the exercise of the power of dissolution and re-constitution conferred under sec. 310a sub-sec. (1 ). This argument was sought to be met on behalf of the respondents by a three-fold answer. The first answer was that sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a was not in force in the local area constituted into the City of Surat on the date immediately preceding 1 October 1966 and the condition requisite for the applicability of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 310a was therefore not satisfied. It was also contended and that was the second answer given on behalf of the respondents that the enactment contemplated in Paragraph 1 of Appendix IV was an enactment relating to the discharge of functions of a local authority and since sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a was not such an enactment Paragraph 1 of Appendix IV had no application to it. The last answer made on behalf of the respondents was that even if Paragraph 1 of Appendix IV was applicable different intention was clearly evinced in sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a read with the other provisions of the Panchayats Act and reference to municipal borough in sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a could not be construed as reference to the City of Surat so as to bring the present case within the excluding provision enacted in sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a. We shall immediately proceed to examine these rival contentions and see how far they are valid and sustainable. ( 10 ) LOGICALLY and of necessity the first question which must arise for consideration is whether sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a was an enactment in force in the local area constituted into the City of Surat on the date immediately preceding 1st October 1966. Now on the date immediately preceding 1st October 1966 the local area which was constituted into the City of Surat on 1st October 1966 was a municipal borough and it was therefore admittedly not a part of the Surat District formed under the Panchayats Act. The respondents contended that sec. 310a sub-sec. Now on the date immediately preceding 1st October 1966 the local area which was constituted into the City of Surat on 1st October 1966 was a municipal borough and it was therefore admittedly not a part of the Surat District formed under the Panchayats Act. The respondents contended that sec. 310a sub-sec. (10) was in force only in districts formed under the Panchayats Act and since the Municipal Borough of Surat was not within the Surat District formed under the Panchayats Act sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a was not in force in the municipal borough of Surat on the date immediately preceding 1st October 1966. The respondents pointed out that after sec. 310a was introduced in the Panchayats Act by Gujarat Act 26 of 1962 with effect from 18 August 1962 it was brought into force by the notification dated 7th February 1963 issued by the State Government under sec. 1 sub-sec. (3) of the Panchayats Act and this notification provided: The Government of Gujarat hereby appoints the 7th February 1963 as the date on which the provisions of secs. 15a and 310a of the said Act shall come into force in all the districts of the State of Gujarat except the district of Dangs. The words all the districts of the State of Gujarat in this notification according to the respondents referred to the districts formed under the Panchayats Act and not the revenue districts and the argument of the respondents therefore was that sec. 310a came into force only in the districts formed under the Panchayats Act and was accordingly not in force in the Municipal Borough of Surat which was outside the Surat District formed under the Panchayats Act. This contention was sought to project the definition of district in sec. 2 sub-sec. (6) of the Panchayats Act in the Notification for the purpose of construing the words all the districts of the State of Gujarat occurring in the notification. We do not think his contention is well-founded-Our reasons for saying so are as follows. ( 11 ) THE notification dated 7th February 1963 was issued by the State Government in exercise of the power conferred by sec. 1 sub-sec. (3) of the Panchayats Act. Sec. 1 sub-sec. (3) provides inter alia that all or any of the remaining provisions of the Panchayats Act other than sec. ( 11 ) THE notification dated 7th February 1963 was issued by the State Government in exercise of the power conferred by sec. 1 sub-sec. (3) of the Panchayats Act. Sec. 1 sub-sec. (3) provides inter alia that all or any of the remaining provisions of the Panchayats Act other than sec. 1 shall come into force in respect of such class of Panchayats in such district and on such dates as the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette appoint; and different dates may be appointed in respect of different districts and different provisions. It must therefore be presumed that when the State Government issued the notification dated 7th February 1963 appointing 7th February 1963 as the date when the provisions of sec. 310a shall come into force in all the districts of the State of Gujarat except the district of Dangs the State Government must have used the expression district in the same sense in which the Legislature used it in sec. 1 sub-sec. (3) unless there is anything in the notification to suggest that the State Government intended to use the expression district in a different sense. There is no such contrary intention to be found in the notification dated 7th February 1963 and the word district in the notifica-tion must therefore bear the same meaning which it has in sec. 1 sub-sec. (3 ). That raises the question: What is the true meaning of the expres-sion district in sec. 1 sub-sec. (3) ? The argument of the respondents was that the word district in sec. 1 sub-sec. (3) must be given the meaning which the Legislature has declared in sec. 2 sub-sec. (6) that the word district shall bear whenever used in the Panchayats Act. District as defined in sec. 2 sub-sec. (6) means a district formed under the Panchayats Act and therefore in sec. 1 sub-sec- (3) also the word district must be construed to have the same meaning namely a district formed under the Panchayats Act and not a revenue district. ( 12 ) THIS contention overlooks the true object and purpose of a definition clause and ignores the opening words of the definition section namely unless the context otherwise requires. 1 sub-sec- (3) also the word district must be construed to have the same meaning namely a district formed under the Panchayats Act and not a revenue district. ( 12 ) THIS contention overlooks the true object and purpose of a definition clause and ignores the opening words of the definition section namely unless the context otherwise requires. It is now well-settled that all statutory definitions or abbreviations must be read subject to the qualification variously expressed in the definition clauses which created them and it may be that even where the definition is exhaustive inasmuch as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing it is possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or context. That is why all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words similar to the words used in the present case namely unless the context otherwise requires. Therefore in finding out the meaning of the word district in various sections of the Act the meaning to be ordinarily given to it is that given in the definition clause. But this is not inflexible and there may be sections in the Act where the meaning may have to be departed from on account of the subject or context in which the word has been used and that will be giving effect to the opening sentence in the definition section namely unless the context otherwise requires. In view of this qualification the Court has not only to look at the words but also to look at the context the collocation and the object of the words relating to the matter in question and interpret the meaning intended to be conveyed by the use of the words under the circumstances. Vide V. F. and G. Insurance Co. v. M/s. Fraser and Ross A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 971. We cannot therefore blindly adopt the meaning of the word district which is given in sec. 2 sub-sec. (6) and mechanically apply it in the interpretation of sec. 1 sub-sec. (3 ). We must see what is the sense in which the word district has been used in sec. 1 sub-sec. (3) having regard to the subject matter and the context. If we examine from this point of view it is clear that the word district in sec. 1 sub-sec. 1 sub-sec. (3 ). We must see what is the sense in which the word district has been used in sec. 1 sub-sec. (3) having regard to the subject matter and the context. If we examine from this point of view it is clear that the word district in sec. 1 sub-sec. (3) means a revenue district and not a district formed under the Panchayats Act. ( 13 ) THERE are several cogent reasons for taking this view. We may first look at sec. 1 sub-sec. (2 ). That sub-section declares that the Panchayats Act extends to the whole of the State of Gujarat. Then sub-sec. (3) provides that sec. 1 shall come into force at once. Obviously there being no territorial limitations affecting the content of this provision it would come into force at once in the whole of the State of Gujarat. Sub-sec. (3) then proceeds to add that all or any of the remaining provi-sions of the Panchayat Act shall come into force in respect of such class of Panchayats in such districts and on such dates as the State Govern-ment may by notification in the Official Gazette appoint. The State Government is given the power to appoint different dates in respect of different districts and different provisions. The Legislature having provided in sub-sec. (2) that the Panchayats Act shall extend to the whole of the State of Gujarat proceeds to say in sub-sec. (3) as to when the provisions of the Panchayats Act shall come into force in the area to which the Panchayats Act extends. The territorial coverage of sub-sec. (3) is not different from that of sub-sec. (2 ). All that sub-sec. (3) means to enact is that the State Government shall not be bound to bring the remaining provisions of the Panchayats Act into force in the whole of the State of Gujarat on the same date. The State Government may bring the remain-ing provisions into force piecemeal in different districts which go to make up the State of Gujarat. The word district in sec. 1 sub-sec. (3) must therefore mean a revenue district. Moreover it is difficult to see how the word district in sec. 1 sub-sec. The State Government may bring the remain-ing provisions into force piecemeal in different districts which go to make up the State of Gujarat. The word district in sec. 1 sub-sec. (3) must therefore mean a revenue district. Moreover it is difficult to see how the word district in sec. 1 sub-sec. (3) can be construed to refer to a district which is yet to be formed under the other provisions of the Panchayats Act particularly when those provisions themselves can come into force only when a notification is issued under sec. 1 sub-sec. (3 ). A district can be formed under the Panchayats Act only if the provisions of the Panchayats Act are brought into force. Then how can a noti-cation be issued by the State Government under sec. 1 sub-sec. (3) bringing into force the provisions of the Panchayats Act in a district which can exist legally as well as conceptually only after the provisions of the Act are brought into force. Sec. 1 sub-sec. (3) applies at a stage prior to the formation of the district under the Panchayats Act and the word district in that sub-section cannot possibly refer to a district which is yet to be formed under the Panchayats Act. There is also inherent evidence in the Panchayats Act to show that the word district in sec. 1 sub-sec. (3) is not used in the sense of a district formed under the Pitchouts Act. Sec. 9 provides that the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette declare any local area comprising a revenue village or a group of revenue villages or hamlets forming part of a revenue village or such other administrative unit or part thereof to be a nagar or a gram. Now if a revenue village or a group of revenue villages is comprised in a City or a Municipal Borough sec. 9 would not be in force in such revenue village or group of revenue villages on the construction contended for on behalf of the respondents since they would not be part of a district formed under the Panchayats Act. But if that be so how can the State Government invoke sec. 9 for the purpose of declaring such revenue village or group of revenue villages to be a nagar or a gram It is only if sec. But if that be so how can the State Government invoke sec. 9 for the purpose of declaring such revenue village or group of revenue villages to be a nagar or a gram It is only if sec. 9 is in force in the local area comprised in such revenue village or group of revenue villages that the State Government can acting under that section declare such local area to be a nagar or a gram. Similar would be the case also with reference to sec. 307. These sections clearly postulate that they would be in force in local areas which are not comprised within a district formed under the Panchayats Act. The word district in sec. 1 sub-sec. (3) cannot therefore be given the restricted meaning which is contended for on behalf of the respondents. It means a revenue district. The notification dated 7th February 1963 must consequently be construed as referring to revenue districts and it must be held that sec. 310a was in force in the revenue district of Surat which would include the municipal borough of Surat from 7th February 1963 and a fortiori on the date immediately preceding 1st October 1966. ( 14 ) THAT takes us to the next contention of the respondents as to the true scope and ambit of Paragraph 1 of Appendix IV. What are the enactments contemplated in this Paragraph ? Does this Paragraph apply to every enactment where there is a reference to municipal districts municipal boroughs municipalities or borough municipalities or is it confined only to those enactments which relate to discharge of functions by a local authority ? The clearest answer is provided by the language of the Paragraph which is plain and unambiguous and does not admit of any doubt or controversy. There is noting in the language to restrict the applicability of the Paragragh to any particular kind of enactments. The words used are words of the widest amplitude namely any enact-ment and therefore barring the three enactments specifically excluded every enactment would be covered provided it is in force on the date immediately preceding the appointed day in a City. If such an enactment contains any reference to municipal districts municipal boroughs municipalities or borough municipalities constituted under the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 or the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 and by reason of sec. If such an enactment contains any reference to municipal districts municipal boroughs municipalities or borough municipalities constituted under the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 or the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 and by reason of sec. 279 (2) (xi) of the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 these words must now be read to mean municipal boroughs or municipalities constituted or deemed to be constituted under the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 such reference shall be construed as reference to the City or to the Corporation of the said City as the case may be and such enactment shall apply to the said City or Corporation. It is difficult to understand how Paragraph 1 can be confined to enactments relating to discharge of functions by a local authority. The Paragraph speaks of reference in an enactment to a municipal borough or municipality which is to be construed as reference to the city or corporation as the case may be. The reference may be to the local area or to the local authority and it may be in any enactment in force in the local area on the date imme-diately preceding the appointed day. The Paragraph does not say that the reference to the local area must be in an enactment relating to discharge of functions by the local authority. That would be reading words in the Paragraph which are not there Some limitation on the width and amplitude of the words any enactment was sought to be introduced by the respondents by reference to the last part of the Paragraph which says: such enact-ment. . . . shall apply to the said City or Corporation. But we fail to see how these words have any limitative effect. They merely reiterate the necessary consequence of the rule of construction set out in the opening part of the paragraph namely that the continuity of application of an enactment to a local area or to a local authority shall not be affected by the conversion of a municipal borough into a City and a municipality into a Corporation. They merely reiterate the necessary consequence of the rule of construction set out in the opening part of the paragraph namely that the continuity of application of an enactment to a local area or to a local authority shall not be affected by the conversion of a municipal borough into a City and a municipality into a Corporation. If prior to the conversion of a municipal borough into a City an enactment was in force in the municipal borough and applied to it it shall after the conversion apply to the City: its continuity of applica tion to the local area shall remain unbroken despite the conversion and it shall be read as if the words municipal borough in it were construed to mean the City. So also if an enactment applied to a municipality prior to its conversion it shall continue to apply when the Municipality is converted into a Corporation as if the word municipality was sub-stituted by the word Corporation. That is the effect of Paragraph 1 and it is clearly supported by the marginal note to that Paragraph which reads: Construction of references in other enactment. Any other construction would rob the Paragraph of its full meaning and effect and considerably reduce its utility. Take for example notification issued under a statute like the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 which applies the provisions of the Act to a particular industry in the municipal borough of Surat. If the contention urged on behalf of the respondents were correct namely that Paragraph 1 has application only to enactments relating to discharge of functions by a local authority such a notification would not be covered by Paragraph 1 and it would not be possible to read it as applying the provisions of the Act to the particular industry in the City of Surat when the Municipal Borough of Surat is converted into the City of Surat. A fresh notification would be necessary. But that is the very thing which is sought to be avoided by the general provision enacted in Paragraph 1. Many more of such examples can be cited but it is not necessary to do so since one example is sufficient to emphasize the point we are making. We have therefore no doubt that the applicability of Paragraph 1 is not confined to enactments relating to discharge of functions by a local authority. Many more of such examples can be cited but it is not necessary to do so since one example is sufficient to emphasize the point we are making. We have therefore no doubt that the applicability of Paragraph 1 is not confined to enactments relating to discharge of functions by a local authority. It applies to every enactment which is in force in a local area on the date immediately preceding the day on which it is constituted into a City. Sub-sec. (10)of sec. 310a must therefore beheld to be within the ambit and coverage of Paragraph 1 and the consequences set out in that paragraph must follow unless it can be shown that a different intention is manifested by the Legislature. ( 15 ) WE must then proceed to consider whether a different intention can be said to have been evinced by the Legislature in enacting sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a so as to negative the consequence which would otherwise flow from the applicability of Paragraph 1. Now in ascertaining whether there is different intention manifested by the Legislature the line of inquiry should be not whether sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a is compatible with the non-applicability of Paragraph 1 but whether it is incompatible with the applicabitity of that Paragraph. Does sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a manifest an intention incompatible with the full effect of Paragraph 1 ? Has the Legislature said in sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a read either singly or in the context of other provisions that it shall not apply to municipal boroughs converted into Cities notwithstanding Paragraph 1 ? This is the approach which must be adopted in determining whether a different intention is manifested by the Legislature. Vide State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 84. ( 16 ) TO spell out different intention the respondent relied on three circumstances. One was the omission to use the word city in sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a. The respondents pointed out that in sec. 8 sub-sec. (2) the Legislature had used the word City while defining the authority of taluka panchayat and district panchayat but when it came to enact sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a it deliberately and advisedly omitted the word city and merely used the words municipal borough. (10) of sec. 310a. The respondents pointed out that in sec. 8 sub-sec. (2) the Legislature had used the word City while defining the authority of taluka panchayat and district panchayat but when it came to enact sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a it deliberately and advisedly omitted the word city and merely used the words municipal borough. This omission said the respondents was significant and it clearly evinced an intention on the part of the Legislature to exclude the effect of Paragraph 1 by declaring that sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a shall not apply to cases arising out of alteration of the limits of a municipal borough converted into a city. We do not think this contention is well-founded. It is true that the word City is omitted from sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a hut the only effect of the omission is that this sub-section would not therefore of its own force apply to cases arising out of alteration of the limits of a City. It is precisely because on its Own terms sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a refers only to a municipal borough and makes no reference to a City that the question arises whether by reason of Paragraph 1 municipal borough must be so construed as to include municipal borough converted in to a city subsequent to the coming into force of that sub-section. The absence of the word City cannot therefore be of any relevance in determining whether the Legislature intended to exclude the applicability of Paragraph 1. It cannot be said merely from the absence of the ward City that there is anything in sub-se:. (10) of sec. 310a which militates against the applicability of Paragraph 1 or makes the applicability of Paragraph 1 inconsistent with it. Sub-sec (10) of sec 310a and Paragraph 1 can stand together without creating any apparent or real inconsistency. It is therefore not possible to find a positive intention in sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a even if that sub-section were to be read in the context of other provisions that notwithstanding Paragraph 1 it shall not apply where there is alteration of the limits of a municipal borough converted into a City subsequent to the coming into force of sec. 310a. (10) of sec. 310a even if that sub-section were to be read in the context of other provisions that notwithstanding Paragraph 1 it shall not apply where there is alteration of the limits of a municipal borough converted into a City subsequent to the coming into force of sec. 310a. ( 17 ) THE second circumstance which was strongly relied upon on behalf of the respondents was that if Paragraph 1 were held to be applicable in the construction of sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a it would give rise to an anomaly namely that alteration of the limits of a district or taluka by reason of alteration of the limits of the Ahmedabad City would not attract the applicability of sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a while alteration of the limits of a district or taluka arising by reason of alteration of the limits of other cities which may be constituted subsequent to the coming into force of that sub-section would be covered by that sub-section. This result surely contended the respondents could never have been intended by the Legislature and it was therefore indicative of the legislative intent that sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a should not apply where there is alteration of the limits of a district or taluka by reason of alteration of the limits of a city even if the city were constituted by conversion of a municipal borough subsequent to the coming into force of that sub-section. Now the city of Ahmedabad was constituted on 1st July 1950 by virtue of a notification issued by the State Government under sec. 3 sub-sec. (1) of the Corporations Act and sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a was admittedly not in force at that date. Paragraph 1 cannot therefore in any view of the matter be availed of for contending that sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a applies in a case where there is alteration of the limits of a district or taluka by reason of altera-tion of the limits of the City of Ahmedabad and sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a being applicable the power of the State Government to dissolve and reconstitute the taluka or district panchayat in such a case would be intact. But this result arises because the City of Ahmedabad was constituted before sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a came into force and the condition for the applicability of Paragraph 1 is not satisfied. (10) of sec. 310a being applicable the power of the State Government to dissolve and reconstitute the taluka or district panchayat in such a case would be intact. But this result arises because the City of Ahmedabad was constituted before sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a came into force and the condition for the applicability of Paragraph 1 is not satisfied. It is not indicative of any inconsistency between sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a and Paragraph 1. It is a consequence which would arise also in the case of any other enactments which are enacted by the Legislature subsequent to 1st July 1950 when the City of Ahmedabad was constituted. A similar consequence would also arise where an enactment is enacted by the Legislature subsequent to the constitution of any City under the Corpora-tions Act. Such an enactment would be applicable in relation to municipal boroughs converted into cities subsequent to the coming into force of such enactment but would not apply in relation to a municipal borough converted into a City prior to such date. This consequence arises by reason of the force and effect of the language of Paragraph 1 and is the result of sheer accident of legislation being enacted prior to the constitution of a City or subsequent to it. Merely because by reason of the operation of Paragraph I on a particular set of facts the City of Ahmedabad is left out of the ambit and scope of sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a or for the matter of that any other City is left out of the scope and purview of any other enact-ment is no ground for refusing to give effect to the plain language of Paragraph 1. We cannot spell out a different intention merely from the circumstance that the City of Ahmedabad would not be covered by sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a while the other Cities would be so covered. The principle underlying Paragraph 1 seems to be that where an enactment was in force in a local area and applied in relation to it it must continue to apply notwithstanding that the local area is converted from a municipal borough into a City. Here in the present case if the local area of Surat had continued to be a municipal borough which it was when sub-sec. (10) of sec. Here in the present case if the local area of Surat had continued to be a municipal borough which it was when sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a came into force and the alteration of the limits of Chorasi Taluka and Surat District had taken place as a result of had been altered by the inclusion of Rander and Adajan in the limits of the Municipal Borough of Surat sub-sec. (10) of se. 310a would have applied then is there any reason from the point of view of sec. 310a why the Legislature should have intended that a different consequence shall ensue if the same alteration takes place at a time when the Surat Municipal Borough is converted into the City of Surat. There is no conceivable reason why the consequence which would have followed from the alteration of the limits of the local area of Surat when it was a Municipal Borough should not follow when the same alteration takes place in the limits of the same local area of Surat after it is constituted into a City. So far as the City of Ahmedabad is concerned this reasoning can have no application since sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a at no time applied in relation to the local area of Ahmedabad and hence the principle of continuity underlying paragraph could have no application. There is therefore no inconsistency or in-compatibility in reading Paragraph 1 into sub-sec. (103 of sec. 310a which would compel us to infer a different intention on the part of the Legislature so as to negative the applicability of that Paragraph. ( 18 ) WE now proceed to consider the last circumstance relied upon by the respondents in support of their contention that a different intention is manifested by the Legislature. The respondent urged that the words conversion of a municipal borough into a gram or nagar could not by their nature be applicable to a City since a City would ordinarily have a population of more than two lakhs and there could therefore be no reasonable possibility of a City being converted into a gram or nagar. The respondent urged that the words conversion of a municipal borough into a gram or nagar could not by their nature be applicable to a City since a City would ordinarily have a population of more than two lakhs and there could therefore be no reasonable possibility of a City being converted into a gram or nagar. Now it is true that it would be almost impossible to conceive of a situation where a City might be converted into a gram or nagar but this would only mean that no occasion would arise in such a case to invoke the words conversion of a municipal borough into a gram or nagar. These words would not be rendered meaningless or redundant by projecting Paragraph 1 into sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a. They would continue to apply to a situation where a municipal borough is converted into a gram or nagar. If the effect of reading Paragraph 1 into sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a were to render any part of that sub-section superfluous or meaningless or absurd it would have been a strong argument for the respondents to say that the Legislature could never have intended that Paragraph 1 should apply in the construction of sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a. No Legislature can be attributed an intention to produce superfluity meaning-lessness or absurdity. But here as we have pointed out above the words conversion of a municipal borough into a gram or nagar are not rendered meaningless or redundant and the argument of the respondents based on the existence of these words must therefore be rejected. ( 19 ) WE are therefore of the view that sub-sec. (10) of sec. 310a applied in the present case and the operation sec. 310a sub-sec. (1) was excluded and the State Government had accordingly no power to dissolve and reconstitute the Surat District Panchayat. The impugned order made by the Development Commissioner as delegate of the State Government was therefore without authority and void in so far as it relates to the Surat District Panchayat. ( 20 ) RE: GROUND (B ). On the view taken by us as regards Ground (A) it is unnecessary for us to examine the validity of Ground (B) and we do not therefore propose to deal with it though it was argued before us by the parties. . ( 20 ) RE: GROUND (B ). On the view taken by us as regards Ground (A) it is unnecessary for us to examine the validity of Ground (B) and we do not therefore propose to deal with it though it was argued before us by the parties. . ( 21 ) WE therefore allow the petition and make the rule absolute by issuing a writ of mandamus quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 8th January 1971 made by the Development Commissioner under sec. 310a of the Panchayat Act to the extent to which it relates to the Surat District Panchayat. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 will pay the costs of the petition to the petitioner. ( 22 ) THE learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 applies for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution. As we have pointed out at the outset the petition involves a highly interesting and debatable question of public importance affecting the administration of Panchayats and the case is therefore a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. We accordingly grant leave under Article 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution. The parties are agreed before us that for a period of fifteen days from to-day the petitioner will not function as President of the Surat District Panchayat nor will the reconstituted Surat District Panchayat elect its President and Vice-president or function in any other manner whatsoever. The District Development Officer will of course be entitled to continue to discharge his function and duties under the Panchayats Act. .