JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal is directed against an order by which D. Basu J. made a rule absolute. The rule nisi was issued on an application made by the respondent B. N. Chatterjee under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The respondent was appointed in 1960 in the capacity of an officer of the industrial Management Pool. He held several posts from time to time. He was a director, the managing director, and ultimately the joint manager of the Indian Handicraft Development corporation. In 1963 he was posted as secretary to the Tea Board. 2. BY a notice being notice No. F1|19|69|imp dated nil, January, 1968 intimation was given to the respondent that under Fundamental Rule 56 (j) he was to retire from service with effect from the expiry of three months from the date of service of the notice. In his petition the respondent seeks to challenge the validity of the notice on several grounds. One of the grounds taken is that the notice of retirement has nut been and does not purport to have been given in public interest. The respondent also alleged that the notice was served on him malafide. The relevant clauses of fundamental Rule 56 are set out below : "F. R. 56 (a) Except as otherwise provided in this rule, every Government Servant shall retire on the day he attains the age of fifty-eight years. (j) Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule the appropriate authority shall, if it is of the opinion, that it is in the public interest to do so, have the absolute right to retire any government Servant after he has attained the age of fifty-five years by giving him notice of not less than three months in writing. " 3. IF the appropriate authorities apply their mind to the question of retirement and bonafide come to the conclusion on some material that an employee should be retired in public interest under fundamental rule F. R, 53 clause (j) and the opinion is not such that it is impossible for any reasonable man to form it, the court will not interfere by substituting its own discretion for the discretion exercised by those who are to exercise it under the rules. 4. THE case, however, presents certain peculiar features. 4. THE case, however, presents certain peculiar features. It appears that on the eve of issuing the notice, the tea Board had intimated to the ministry of Commerce that they were unable to recommend the continuance of the service of the respondent as secretary to the Tea Board after he attained the age of fifty-five-If the matter had rested there, and the appropriate authorities had acted on the basis of the recommendation of the Tea board and retired the respondent under fundamental Rule 56 (j) in public interest, perhaps no exception could have been taken. The Tea Board, however, recommended that attempt should be made for employment of the respondent in some other undertaking. The ministry of Commerce, it appears, tried frantically to provide the respondent with employment in some other public undertaking but failed. If it was in public interest to retire him from service why, it may be pertinently asked, did the Ministry try to secure the continuance of his service by posting him elsewhere. It may be argued, not without reason, that if no alternative employment was available and he was found unsuitable for the office he was holding it was in public interest to retire him. The learned trial judge was invited to examine the records and so were we. From a note on the file, it appears that he was retired on the ground that his character roll was indifferent. We looked into the character roll. It is not indifferent. In fact, it appears that his service record has been uniformly satisfactory. Even Mr. Bhagwan Singh, the Chairman of the Tea Board who, the respondent alleges was hostile to him out of personal pique, spoke well of his integrity, conduct and the assistance he rendered to the Tea Board. A former Chairman, mr. A. S. Bam also thought highly of his service and recommended him for employment elsewhere at a higher salary presumably on the ground that the Tea board did not offer better opportunities. It is true that in his earlier Report Mr. Bhagwan Singh remarked that he was not quite fit for secretarial work. Be that as it may, in a subsequent report he said that the respondent had worked hard during the period under report and his work had been found satisfactory. It is true that in his earlier Report Mr. Bhagwan Singh remarked that he was not quite fit for secretarial work. Be that as it may, in a subsequent report he said that the respondent had worked hard during the period under report and his work had been found satisfactory. On a perusal of the records it seems to us that the respondent had become a persona non grata in the eye of the Tea Board and the Tea Board wanted to get rid of him. The reason given for taking action under F. R. 56 (j)namely that the respondent's character roll was indifferent, is belied by the character roll itself. It is also belied by the fact that the Tea Board and the ministry of Commerce desired that he should be absorbed elsewhere and continue in service. Indifferent character roll may be an excellent ground for taking action under Fundamental Rule 56 (j) for premature retirement but such action is not consistent with the efforts made by those who seek to retire the person in question to absorb him in some other public undertaking. 5. IN the circumstances, the conclusion is inescapable that the authorities resorted to Fundamental Rule 56 (j) as a matter of last resort, that is to say, as a way out of an impasse. In our opinion, that is not a purpose germane to the Rule the description of the character roll as indifferent is wrong, if not false. This, in our opinion, perilously verges on malafides or the perverse. In his petition the respondent ascribes the notice of retirement under Fundamental Rule 56 (j) to the hostility of Mr. Bhagwan Singh, the chairman of the Tea Board. He accuses him of incivility, of petty vanities, of improper use of government transport for private and even for immoral purpose; of chagrin at his failure to help him in obtaining foreign exchange for his tours; and yet Mr. Bhagwan Singh has given the respondent a good acquittance. The 'allegations made by the respondent against Mr. Bhagwan Singh are, to say the least, unfortunate. They are not supported by particulars nor is there any corroboration of those allegations. They are vague and largely based on anonymous hearsay. The fact that Mr. Singh has not made an affidavit to deny the allegations does not, in our opinion, prove the allegations. It does not because Mr. Bhagwan Singh are, to say the least, unfortunate. They are not supported by particulars nor is there any corroboration of those allegations. They are vague and largely based on anonymous hearsay. The fact that Mr. Singh has not made an affidavit to deny the allegations does not, in our opinion, prove the allegations. It does not because Mr. " Singh is not a party to these proceedings. There can be no admission by silence in a case like this. Moreover, there is no evidence that he was aware of the allegations made against him by the respondent. Strictly speaking, Mr. Singh had no legal duty to answer those allegations. The duty was even less if he was ignorant of those allegations. We are of opinion that the wild and reckless allegations made by the respondent against Mr. Bhagwan Singh are uncalled for and not justified by evidence. The learned judge's acceptance of a part of the case made against Mr. Bhagwan Singh, namely, that Mr. Singh wanted to get rid of the petitioner out of personal grudge or will-will is again hardly justified. We have no reason to believe that Mr. Bhagwan Singh's conduct has been other than proper and honourable and we exonerate him from the charges brought against him by the petitioner. With these observations we dismiss the appeal. All ad interim orders are vacated. There will be no order as to costs.