Judgment :- (Delivered by VEERASWAMI, C.J.) The appeal arises from an order of Kallasam, J. who dismissed the appellants petition to quash an order of the State Government redacting the appellant from the cadre of Assistant Engineer to that of a supervisor. He was in the service of the erstwhile Padukottal State and seems to have actually held four posts. After the merger in 1948 and in accordance with the merger rules as to the services, he was absorbed in November 1949, as a Mechanical Supervisor, and in March 1954, promoted as Assistant Engineer, Highways. His services in that cadre were regularised in April 1957. In May next year, the Chief Engineer, Highways, charged him with having made false statements to the Superindending, Engineer Highways, about his technical qualifications. Before the explanation, which had been submitted was considered, the Superlatending Engineer, in December 1958 framed four charges and held an enquiry into them. In April 1960, in regard to the charge framed by the Chief Engineer, there was a show-cause notice against the proposed punishment, but later in July 1961, that notice was cancelled and a fresh notice combining all the charges was served on the appellant, asking him to show cause why he should not be reverted to the post of supervisor. The charges framed by the Chief Engineer was found proved and so too charges 1 to 3 framed by the Superintendent Engineer. Eventually, by the impugned order the punishment we referred to earring was imposed on the appellant. Having failed in his appeal and memorandum to the department, he moved this court but without success. Kallasam, J. found that the enquiry relating to charges 2 and 3 framed by the Superintending Engineer was vitiated on account of the fact that four witnesses relating to those charges were examined behind the back of the appellant and that, even otherwise, in as much as the depositions of those witnesses were not made available to the appellant, the enquiry in respect of those charges and the finding thereon were not legal. But the learned Judge found no case against the departmental findings relating to the rest of the charges. We may mention that even in the departmental enquiry, the fourth charge framed by the Superintending Engineer had been found not true. But the learned Judge found no case against the departmental findings relating to the rest of the charges. We may mention that even in the departmental enquiry, the fourth charge framed by the Superintending Engineer had been found not true. In that situation, two points were urged in the writ petition, which are also relterated before us, that the punishment awarded was as a result of the cumulative effect of the findings in respect of the charge framed by the Chief Engineer and charges 1 to 3 framed by the Superintending Engineer, and that since the learned Judge was of the view that the findings on charges 2 and 3 framed by the Superintending Engineer could not be sustained, the punishment also should go. This is on the assumption that there was no knowing whether if these two charges were not found, still the same punishment would have been inflicted on the appellant. On that matter, we think that State of Orissa v. Vidyabhushan Mahapatra A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 779 is conclusive against the appellant. There the Supreme Court, after holding that the findings in respect of some of the charges against a Government servant could not be supported, was of the opinion that nevertheless, the punishment in the context of the other findings on other charges could not be Interfered with. White so holding, the Supreme Court observed: “If the High Court is satisfied that if some but not all the findings of the Tribunal were ‘unassailable’, the order of the Governor, on whose powers by the rules no restrictions in determining the appropriate punishment are placed, was final, and the High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty, for, as we have already observed, the order of dismissal passed by a competent authority on a public servant, if the conditions of the constitutional protection have been complied with, is not justiciable. Therefore, if the order may be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant”. Therefore, if the order may be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant”. The protection afforded to a Government servant is what has been stated in Art. 311, and if the norms of the protection have been satisfied in form and in substance, it is not within the purview of the Court to go into the reasons on which the findings in the disciplinary enquiry were founded or which induced the punishing authority to inflict the punishment, so long as the enquiry has been consistent with the prescribed rules, In this case, charge framed by the Chief Engineer, and the first of the charges framed by the Superintending Engineer were found established, and both of them constituted substantial misdemeanour. That being the case, we are unable to accept the contention that as one cannot speculate as to whether the punishing authority would have inflicted the same punishment if it had found the appellant guilty of only the charges which stand now, the punishment awarded should go. But, it is stated that where an order is passed on several grounds taken together and one of the grounds is found to be untenable or falls to the ground, the order itself cannot be supported. For this proposition, reliance is placed on the State of Maharashtra v. B.K. Takkamore A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1353. In that case, the Supreme Court stated: “The principle underlying these decisions appears to be this. An administrative or quasi judicial order based on several grounds, all taken together, cannot be sustained, if it be found that some of the grounds are non-existent or irrelevant, and there is nothing to show that the authority would have passed the order on the basis of the other relevant and existing grounds. On the other hand, an order based on several grounds, some of which are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, can be sustained, if the court is satisfied that the authority would have passed the order on the basis of the other relevant and existing grounds, and the exclusion of the irrelevant or no-existing grounds could not have affected the ultimate opinion or decision.” In our opinion, this case falls under the alternative proposition in the excerpt. The findings on the charges which stand, no doubt, were the basis for the influction of the punishment. But it is not as if that if any one of the findings on any one of the charges was found to be not supportable, that could have made any difference to the punishment. Each finding on each charge could lead to the punishment. The charge framed by the Chief Engineer was that the appellant made a false statement as to his qualifications. That had a material bearing on his promotion and naturally the redaction in rank would have been lawful and inappropriate. So too, a punishment of that kind could have been inflicted on the finding on the first on the four charges framed by the Superintending Engineer. We are not here trying to assess whether the punishment was proper or not. We are only concerned to point out that though the punishment was inflicted in relation to the findings, it is not on a cumulative effect of all the findings taken together, but the punishment could have been inflicted on any one or more of the findings. The other ground urged before us, as was done before Kailasam, J, is that the Madras Civil Service (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules 1955, should have been applied to the appellant, and that failure to do so has vitiated the entire enquiry. Kaliasam J went upon the footing that there was no substantial difference between the procedure laid down by these rules and the general rules. But the short answer to the ground is that the findings which ultimately stand do not relate to charges of corruption. While by rule 1(c) the Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal Rules shall apply to all officers under the rule-making control of the State Government other than those mentioned in Art. 311 of the Constitution, it is not compulsory for the Government to refer all cases of disciplinary proceedings to the Tribunal. While by rule 1(c) the Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal Rules shall apply to all officers under the rule-making control of the State Government other than those mentioned in Art. 311 of the Constitution, it is not compulsory for the Government to refer all cases of disciplinary proceedings to the Tribunal. R. 4(1)(a) only says that the Government shall, subject to the provisions of R. 5, refer, among other cases, to the tribunal casts relating to gazetted efficers in respect of matters involving corruption on the part of such officers in the discharge of their official duties in as much as the punishment in this case is not ultimately founded in respect of matters involving corruption, there is no obligation on the part of the Government to refer the appellants case to the Tribunal. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsels fee Rs. 150.