JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) This criminal revision is by Party No. 2 challenging the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 2. ) Two points are urged on behalf of Party No. 2, namely, (i) that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was in error in appreciating the evidence on record and coming to unwarranted conclusions; and (ii) that, in any case, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate acted without jurisdiction in arriving at a finding contrary to the one recorded by the Civil Court. ( 3. ) After going through the record, I am satisfied that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate did not commit any error in appreciation of the evidence on record. The claim of Party No. 2 that it was in possession of the property right from 1953 till the preliminary order was passed is shown to be false by the notice published by it in an Urdu paper,The Daily Nadeem dated 29-3-1967. A perusal of that notice clearly shows that Saeed Mohd. Khan was already in possession of the property, though in his capacity as guardian of his sons and daughter (members of Party No. 2), and that he was abusing his position and possession and was disposing of the property so as to defeat the claim of the members of Party No. 2. No evidence has been put forward by Party No 2 to show that on any date after that notice the members of Party No. 2 had entered in physical possession of the property. From the complaints made by the members of Party No. 2 from time to time it would, on the contrary appear that their attempts at taking possession of the property were not successful. In my opinion, therefore, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate has not committed any error in appreciating the evidence on record. ( 4. ) The only question then that arises for my consideration is as to whether the Sub-Divisional Magistrate acted without jurisdiction in initiating the proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. To appreciate this contention, it is necessary to state a few facts. Farrukh Jehan, a member of Party No. 2, is the daughter of Saeed Mohd. Khan. The other members of Party No. 2, viz , Iqbal Mohd., Sikander Mohd. Khan and Iftikhar Mohd. Khan are all the sons of Saeed Mohd. Khan Party No. 1 consists of Saeed Mohd. To appreciate this contention, it is necessary to state a few facts. Farrukh Jehan, a member of Party No. 2, is the daughter of Saeed Mohd. Khan. The other members of Party No. 2, viz , Iqbal Mohd., Sikander Mohd. Khan and Iftikhar Mohd. Khan are all the sons of Saeed Mohd. Khan Party No. 1 consists of Saeed Mohd. Khan, the father of the members of Party No. 2, his transferees and a Bataidar, by name, Nandkishore. The transferees as well as the Bataidar claimed to be in possession of the property. Farrukh Jehan of Party No. 2 filed a civil suit against Party No. 1 for perpetual injunction in respect of the disputed land in the Court of 1st Civil Judge, Class I, Bhopal, on 22-6-1967, on the allegation that the members of Party No. 1 were trying to disturb her possession. Temporary injunction was also prayed for. The Civil Court granted temporary injunction on 21-12-1967 and that order was confirmed by the Additional District Judge on 31-1-1968. Party No. 1 thereupon approached the High Court in revision which was dismissed by the High Court on 7-2-1968. Before the order for temporary injunction was passed, some evidence was recorded and the Civil Court had come to the conclusion that on 22-6-1967, the date of the suit, Farrukh Jehan was in possession of the property in suit and was therefore entitled to temporary injunction. When the matter had gone before the High Court in revision, the High Court had passed the following order : "Shri R. S. Dabir for the applicants heard. In a suit filed by non-applicant No. 1 Farrukh Jehan against the petitioners and the other non-applicants for a declaration of title to certain lands and for a permanent injunction restraining the petitioners and the other defendants from disturbing her possession of the property a temporary injunction was issued by the Civil Judge, Class II, Bhopal, who is trying the suit, restraining the petitioners from disturbing the plaintiffs possession of the property. That order of injunction was upheld by the Additional District Judge, Bhopal, in an appeal preferred by the petitioners. The petitioners have now come up to this Court. This application must be dismissed. Both the Courts below have found that on the date of the institution of the suit the plaintiff was in possession of this property. That order of injunction was upheld by the Additional District Judge, Bhopal, in an appeal preferred by the petitioners. The petitioners have now come up to this Court. This application must be dismissed. Both the Courts below have found that on the date of the institution of the suit the plaintiff was in possession of this property. On this provisional finding of fact, which cannot be disturbed in this revision petition, the order of temporary injunction cannot be said to have been made without any justification. Shri Dabir, learned counsel for the applicants, however, urged that the petitioners were in fact in possession of the property in suit, and it is likely that the plaintiff, under cover of the order of temporary injunction issued in her favour, may dispossess the petitioners of the property. This apprehension has no basis as the order of injunction does not authorize the plaintiff to dispossess the petitioners of any property that may be in their possession. It simply restrains the petitioners from disturbing the plaintiffs possession of the property. However, it is necessary to say that the trial Court shall see that the plaintiff does not, taking unwarranted advantage of the interim order of injunction, dispossess the petitioners of any property that may be in their possession, during the pendency of the suit. With these observations, this application is rejected." From the order of the High Court it is thus clear that the finding of the Civil Court, viz., : that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property was provisional. This order also indicates that the possibility of the finding being wrong and the defendants being in actual possession of the property was not ruled out. It was also made clear in that order that if the defendants were really in possession of the property, the plaintiff could not be permitted to dispossess them tinder the cloak of the order of injunction passed in her favour. In these circumstances, it could not be said that the finding of the Civil Court was a final finding binding on all the parties and was also binding on criminal Courts. The only effect of the order of temporary injunction was that the defendants were restrained from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff, if any. In these circumstances, it could not be said that the finding of the Civil Court was a final finding binding on all the parties and was also binding on criminal Courts. The only effect of the order of temporary injunction was that the defendants were restrained from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff, if any. In this back-ground it would be significant to note how the proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were initiated. ( 5. ) After the suit for permanent injunction was filed but before the order of temporary injunction was passed, the Govindpura police had presented an application under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 21-9-1967 on the complaints made by the plaintiff in that suit (member of Party No. 2) that the defendants (Party No. 1) were disturbing her possession. On 22-9-1967, Party No. 2 filed similar application under section 145 of the Code. The two applications were amalgamated and a preliminary order was passed on 25-9-1967 calling upon the parties to file their claim? and evidence in support of their contentions. On 9-10-1967 again before the order of temporary injunction was passed by the Civil Court, an application was filed by Party No. 2 before the Magistrate that Party No. 1 was tractorising the land in order to dispossess the Party No. 2, and prayed for attachment of the property and appointment of a Receiver. An order for attachment of property and appointment of a Receiver was, therefore, passed on 10-10-1967, and one Abdul Hamid was appointed Receiver. Subsequently, at the request of the parties one Haiku was appointed as Receiver who was put in possession of the property on 30-10 1967. From this narration it is quite clear that when the proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were started the Party No. 2 was not in firm possession of the property and was anxious, somehow or the other, for getting a Receiver appointed to put Party No. 1 out of possession. It may be said that having filed a suit for permanent injunction the members of Party No. 2 were trying to establish their possession one way or the other. . It may be said that having filed a suit for permanent injunction the members of Party No. 2 were trying to establish their possession one way or the other. . I, therefore, find it difficult to hold that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was in error in holding that on the date of the preliminary order and within two months thereof the Party No. 1 was in possession of the property. ( 6. ) On behalf of Party No. 2, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Karamchand v. Union of India (A I R 1971 S C 1244) for the proposition that it is a well established principle of law that the decisions of the Civil Courts are binding on the Criminal Courts. In that case, some quantity of maize was transported from the State of Haryana to Howrah. At the destination the Railway Authorities refused to deliver the goods to the consignees on the ground that the export in question was illegal. The maize was seized by the police and the persons responsible for the export were prosecuted and the maize was forfeited. M/s. Karamchand Ganga Prasad, therefore, filed a Writ Petition before the Delhi High Court for an order directing the Government to deliver the goods to the consignees. It was urged that the restriction on movement of maize was withdrawn by the State Government and that the forfeiture was, therefore, illegal and unwarranted. The Writ Petition was, however, dismissed on the sole ground that in view of the pendency of the criminal proceedings it was inappropriate for the High Court to pronounce on the question as to whether the restriction was removed by the State Government and when it had any authority to do so. In those circumstances, it was observed by the Supreme Court that the decisions of the Civil Courts are binding on the criminal Courts and not vice versa. This decision, in my opinion, is not an authority for the proposition that where a provisional decision is reached by a civil Court for issuing interim orders, the Criminal Courts are precluded from coming to conclusions contrary to the provisional findings recorded by the Civil Court. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Sajjan Singh v. Sajjan Singh ( AIR 1969 Raj. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Sajjan Singh v. Sajjan Singh ( AIR 1969 Raj. 82 ) wherein it was held that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate acting under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not taken away only because an order of temporary injunction was passed by the civil Court subsequently. That decision came for consideration before the Supreme Court in Sajjan Singh v. Sajjan Singh (1970 2 Unreported Judgments 75 SC). The decision of that High Court was upheld by the Supreme Court and the case was sent back to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for a decision according to law. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed :- "In our opinion this case must go back to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for decision of the proceedings before him. Those proceedings commenced as far back as 1967 and the question whether there is or there is not any apprehension of breach of peace will certainly have to be decided in the light of the happenings in the civil Court. In the meantime we do not see any reason to order the setting aside the order of the High Court. It will be open to the Sub- Divisional Magistrate to consider whether the Receiver should be continued or not, but in any event, he shall not disturb the possession of Sajjan Singh (the appellant before their Lordships) so long as the temporary injunction is outstanding and pending the decision of the proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with a view to handing over the possession to the other side. With these remarks, we dismiss the appeal." ( 7. ) It is clear from the above judgment that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to deal with the application is not taken away only because in the meanwhile the civil Court has passed an order of injunction in favour of a party. It is also clear that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate can come to his own conclusions as to which of the two parties was in possession of the disputed property on the date of the preliminary order or within two months thereof. It is also clear that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate can come to his own conclusions as to which of the two parties was in possession of the disputed property on the date of the preliminary order or within two months thereof. The only effect of the order of injunction of the civil Court is that if the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that the party in whose favour the order of injunction was issued was not, in fact, in possession of the property on the relevant date, the Magistrate cannot in pursuance of his order direct delivery of the property to the successful party if the party in whose favour the injunction order was passed has somehow managed to come in possession thereof. In fact, similar was the interpretation put on the order of injunction by this Court in the revision petition referred to above, where it was observed that the order of injunction shall not authorise the plaintiff to dispossess the defendant. ( 8. ) In this case, however, a complication has arisen. During the pendency of the proceedings a Receiver was appointed. As a sequence of the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the Receiver would be required to deliver possession of the property to the successful party but a dispute may be raised as to from whose possession the property was attached and handed over to the Receiver. The possibility of the unsuccessful party in whose favour there is an order of injunction claiming that the property was attached from its possession cannot be ruled out. This will give rise to further complications. In fact, the party No. 2 has achieved its objective by getting the property attached and put in possession of the Receiver and thus create a confusion regarding actual possession. In the circumstances of the case, in my opinion, the property should continue in possession of the Receiver till the decision of the civil Court. This will safe-guard the interest of both the parties. Party No. 1 will not be unnecessarily driven to a civil suit and deprivation of mesne profits. If Party No. 2 is successful before the civil Court it will receive the possession of property from the Receiver as also profits collected by him. ( 9. ) In the result, the revision petition fails but the appointment of Receiver shall continue till the. If Party No. 2 is successful before the civil Court it will receive the possession of property from the Receiver as also profits collected by him. ( 9. ) In the result, the revision petition fails but the appointment of Receiver shall continue till the. disposal of the civil suit filed by party No. 2 Revision dismissed.RAJESH