JUDGMENT T.C. Raghavan, Ag. C.J. 1. One question alone has been argued before us in this appeal, viz., whether the Kalancham office (the office of the personal estate) maintained by the Palace Controller of his Highness the Maharaja of Cochin comes within the definition of 'commercial establishment' under the Kerala Shops & Commercial Establishments Act, 1960. A learned Single Judge held that it fell under the definition; and in the appeal the correctness of that decision is being challenged. 2. In a similar case reported as The Superintendent, Koodalmanickom Devaswom v. Kunhan Kartha (1961 KLJ 647), the same learned Judge held that the office of the Koodalmanickom Devaswom Irinjalakuda was an establishment that fell within the same definition: and in the present case too the learned Judge came to the same conclusion. The earlier decision was taken up in appeal before the Division Bench in The Superintendent, Koodalmanickom Devaswom v. K. P. Kunhan Kartha (Writ Appeal No. 117 of 1967); and the Division Bench set aside that decision, since the matter was compromised between the parties, and left "the matter open for consideration in an appropriate case untramelled by anything said in that judgment". As already stated, the learned Single Judge expressed the same opinion in this case as he expressed in the earlier case. 3. Now, S.2(4) of the Act defines 'commercial establishment' to mean "a commercial or industrial or trading or banking or insurance establishment, an establishment or administrative service in which the persons employed are mainly engaged in office work, hotel, restaurant, boarding or eating house, cafe or any other refreshment house, a theatre or any other place of public amusement or entertainment and includes such other establishment as the Government may, by notification in the Gazette, declare to be a commercial establishment for the purposes of this Act, but does not include a factory to which all or any of the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 (Central Act 63 of 1948) apply". The counsel of the appellant has argued that in this definition there are two parts, the first part being that "a 'commercial establishment' means a commercial or industrial or trading or banking or insurance establishment", and the second part being that ''an establishment or administrative service in which the persons employed are mainly engaged in office work, etc.". The counsel of the appellant has argued that in this definition there are two parts, the first part being that "a 'commercial establishment' means a commercial or industrial or trading or banking or insurance establishment", and the second part being that ''an establishment or administrative service in which the persons employed are mainly engaged in office work, etc.". And the counsel has argued further that the second part is an explanation of the first part, and that 'an establishment' in the second part must also be a 'commercial establishment' as mentioned in the first part. This argument, though, at first blush, appears to be somewhat attractive, on closer scrutiny, turns out to be pointless. The word 'establishment' used in the second part of the definition does not appear to be used in the sense in which it is defined under S.2(8), which says that 'establishment' means a shop or a commercial establishment. If the word 'establishment' used in the second part means a 'commercial establishment' as defined, the second part will not be of much help in understanding the meaning of the first part. We are therefore of opinion that the word 'establishment' in the second part of the definition is used in the meaning the word has in common parlance, viz., "An organised staff of employees or servants, including, or occasionally limited to, the building in which they are located." (vide Shorter Oxford English Dictionary), with the result that a 'commercial establishment' will mean an establishment or administrative service in which the persons employed are mainly engaged in office work, etc. This meaning is fortified by S.3 of the Act dealing with exemptions. Sub-s.(1) of S.3 exempts a few categories of establishments and persons from the application of the Act the entire Act, while sub-s.(2) of S.3 exempts the establishments mentioned therein from S.10 alone: in other words, to the establishments and persons coming under sub-s.(2) all the provisions of the Act excepting S.10 apply. And establishments mentioned in S.3(2), for instance, in clause (c) thereof, include clubs and residential hotels, hostels attached to schools or colleges, and establishments maintained in boarding schools, in connection with the boarding and lodging of pupils and resident masters. And establishments mentioned in S.3(2), for instance, in clause (c) thereof, include clubs and residential hotels, hostels attached to schools or colleges, and establishments maintained in boarding schools, in connection with the boarding and lodging of pupils and resident masters. These establishments will come within the definition of 'commercial establishment' under S.2(4) only if the expression is given the wider meaning of an establishment in which the persons employed are mainly engaged in office work, etc., and will not be contained in the definition, if the definition is confined to 'commercial establishments' as contended by the counsel of the appellant. The intention of the legislature is quite clear: it is to include even clubs and residential hotels, hostels attached to schools or colleges and establishments maintained in boarding schools, etc., within the definition. 4. Thus, the conclusion of the Single Judge is correct; the same is confirmed; and the appeal is dismissed. However, we pass no order regarding costs.