Judgment :- (Delivered by RAGHAVAN, J.) The first plaintiff is the appellant. The above appeal has been filed by the first plaintiff under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent with the leave of the learned Judge who heard the second appeal. The facts of the case are as follows. The plaintiffs as managers of Fathrnonbu Pallivasal in Jariklvelaikara Street, Madurai Town, filed O.S. No. 77 of 1958 on the file of the Sub-Court, Madurai, for a declaration that the plaintiffs were validly appointed trustes and the first defendant had been validly removed from the management of the said Pallivasal, for a permanent injunction restraining the 1st defendant from interfering with the plaintiffs management and for a mandatory injunction directing him to hand ever the records of the Pallivasal. The plaintiffs also prayed for a declaration that a particular sum in court deposit belongs to the Pallivasal and for a direction against the 1st defendant to surrender possession of item 2, a punja land and to leader as account of his management. The first defendant contended that the Pallisvasal mentioned in the plaint is not a mosqae or Dharga or a Makhan but is a private wakf or trust, that the Muslim residents of the street were only allowed to participate In the function in the chavadi, that item 1 is a private property in which the 1st defendant has got hereditary rights of trusteeship, that item which is dedicated to the Chavadi must be managed only by him that the suit as framed is not maintainable that the sanction of the Advocate-General required under S. 92 C.P.C. has not been obtained, and that the meeting at which the let defendant was removed is not lawful. Who trial court held that the suit is maintainable without a prayer for removal of the 1st defendant from trusteeship, that the suit is not barred under S. 926. C.P.C. that the plaintiffs were validly appointed as trustees, that the first defendant is not hereditary trustee of the Pallivasal, that the first defendant was validly removed from trusteeship, and that he is liable to reader an account of his management from the date of his appointment as trustee in 1932. The result is that the suit was decreed as prayed for. The first defendant filed A.S. No. 319 of 1961. The result is that the suit was decreed as prayed for. The first defendant filed A.S. No. 319 of 1961. The leaned Subordinate Judge confirmed the decision of the trial court on all the points and dismissed the appeal. The first defendant filed S.A. No. 1375 of 1962 to this court. Srinivasan, J. who heard the appeal up held the plea of the first defendant that the suit as framed is not maintainable for want of sanction of the Advocate-General under S. 92 C.P.C., particularly by reason of the addition of a relief in Cl. (cc.) to S. 92 by the Amending Act 66 of 1956, that the suit was also bad for the reason of the consent of the Wakf Board not having been obtained as required by S. 55(2) of the muslim Wakf Act 1954, and the procedure under S. 57 of the said Act not having been followed, that the nature of the reliefs claimed in the suit and not the character of the plaintiffs filling the suit Is the test to determise whether a suit falls under S. 92 C.P.C. or not, and that all the decisions rendered prior to the amending Act have no application, with the result the appeal was allowed and the suit dismissed. The above totters Patent Appeal has been filed against the Judgment of the learned Judge. Sri V.K.T. Chari for the appellant raised two contentions. Firstly, he contends that in respect of a Mohamedan religious endowment neither Sajjada-Nashir, nor the Muthawalli is a trustee in the technical sense of the term in whom legal title vests but that Mathavalli is only the Manager and custodian appointed for a proper administration of the institution and in support of this position he refers to the decision in Sankaranrayena Ayyar v. Poovanthaswami Temple I.L.R. 1950 Mad. 191 (F.B.) and Shahid Ganj v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhal 67 I.A. 251, 266. Secondly he contends that if the Muthawalli validly appointed files a suit against the former Muthawalli who was removed and seeks some of the reliefs contained In clause (1) of 8. 92 C.P.C., the said suit does not fall under S. 92 C.P.C., and no sanction of the Advocate-General is required for Instituting such suit. The first contention is not controverted. The controversy is only in regard to the second contention and Mr. 92 C.P.C., the said suit does not fall under S. 92 C.P.C., and no sanction of the Advocate-General is required for Instituting such suit. The first contention is not controverted. The controversy is only in regard to the second contention and Mr. Vedantachari for the respondent contends that the sanction of the Advocate-General is necessary in any suit where reliefs claimed fall under any of the reliefs mentioned in S. 92(1) of the Code. Which of the contentions is correct falls to be decided in this appeal. In this case, the suit was filed by the validly appointed trustees. Whey prayed for a declaration that the first defendant was validly removed from management of the Pallivasai for an Injunction restraining the first defendant from interfering with the plaintiffs management and for directions in regard to handing over of certain money in court deposit and the records belonging to the Pallivasai, and rendering of accounts by the first defendant in regard to his management. The question is whether S. 92 of the Code applies to such a suit. Before considering this question, it will be useful to set out the provisions of S. 92 C.P.C., and Indicate Its relation to the corresponding previsions under the earlier codes. S. 92 C.P.C. runs as follows: “92(1): in the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature or where the direction of the court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate-General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate-General, may institute a suit, whether contentions or not, in the principal civil court of Original jurisdiction or in any other court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate, to obtain a decree— (a) removing any trustee; (b) appointing a new trustee; (c) vesting any property in a trustee. (cc) directing a trustee who has been removed or a person who has ceased to be a trustee to deliver possession of any trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property; (d) directing accounts and inquiries; (e) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the Interest therein shall be allotted to any particular object of the trust; (f) authorising the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged; (h) granting such farther or other relief as the nature of the case may require; (2) Save as provided by the Religions Endowments Act, 1863, for by any corresponding law in force in territories which immediately before the 1st November 1956, were comprised in part B States no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in sub S. (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with the provisions of that sob-section”. There was no corresponding provision in the Civil Procedure Code of 1859. S. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1877 was substantially the same as sub S. (1) of S. 92 of the present Code and It was continued in the Civil Procedure Code of 1882. The Civil Procedure Codes of 1877 and 1882 did not, however, embody the provisions of Sub-S. (2) of 8. 92 which makes the previous sanction of the Advocate-General imperative for the maintainability of the suit. We shall new consider the relevant decisions on the point. In Budree Dass Mukim v. Chooni Lal Joharry 33 Cal. 289, the question which arises for determination now, was exhaustively examined by Weodroffe, J. The learned Judge observed as follows: “The suit contemplated by the section is one of a representative character. It is obvious that the Advocate-General, Collector or other public officer can and do sue only representing the public, and if, Instead of these public Officers, two or more persons having an interest in the trust sue with their consent, they so sue under a warrant to represent as the objects of the trusts. See Lakshmandas Raghanath Dass v. Jugal Kishore 22. Bom. 216. See Lakshmandas Raghanath Dass v. Jugal Kishore 22. Bom. 216. It follows from this that when a person or persons are not to establish the general rights of the public, of which they are a member or members, but to remedy a particular infringement of their own Individual right, the suit is not within or need be brought under the Section. In my opinion the present suit, so far as it is brought by the plaintiffs in their individual capacity as trustees to enforce their individual claim to be such trustees of the temple in suit is not within the scope of the section”. To the same effect is the Judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Muhamad Abdul Majid Khan v. Ahmed Said Kahan 35 All. 459. In that case, the plaintiff came to court alleging that he was the original Muthavalli of a certain Wakf and that the defendant on the death of the last incumbent had unlawfully taken possession of the Wakf property, and asking to be put into possession thereof as Muthawalli, the question arose whether this was not a suit which fell within the purview of S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Judges observed: “In our opinion the scope and application of S. 92 is very limited in character in the first place, it enables, by sub-Section (1) the Advocate-General or two or more persons having an interest in a trust created for a public purpose a charitable or religious nature, to bring a suit in the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other court empowered in that behalf by the local Government, within local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject matter of the trust , is situate, where there has been an alleged breach of such trust or where the direction of the court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust and then only to obtain a decree of one or more of the kind specified in the section. Sub-S. (2) of that section enacts that, save as provided by the Religious Endowments Act of 1863, no suit, claiming any reliefs specified in S. (1), shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to, except in conformity with the provisions of that sub-section. Sub-S. (2) of that section enacts that, save as provided by the Religious Endowments Act of 1863, no suit, claiming any reliefs specified in S. (1), shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to, except in conformity with the provisions of that sub-section. The suit contemplated by the section is one brought in the interest of the public, through the Advocate-General, or of a section of the public or community interested in a particular public trust, through two or mere of its members with the previous sanction in writing of the Advocate-General, and dose not apply to a suit brought by an Individual to enforce his personal rights.” The learned Judges referred to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ghelabai Gourishankar v. Uderam Icharam I.L.R. 36 Bom. 29 where the Bombay High Court held that a suit to eject the trespasser from property did not fall within the scope of S. 339 of the old Civil Procedure Code. In Ayathunneesa Bibi v. Kulful Khalifa 41 Cal. 749 the learned Judges followed the decision in Bhudree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lal Jaharry 33 Cal. 789, and held that the suit for removal of a trespasser in possession of trust property is not a suit of the kind contemplated by S. 92, C.P.C., and therefore for the institution of such a suit no consent of the Advocate-General is necessary in Appanna Poricha v. Narasinga Porichia 4 L.M.L. 608=45 Mad 113 (F.B.), the question arose whether in a suit by a hereditary trustee against his contras tees praying inter alia for accounts of the trust property in their hands the sanction of the Advocate-General under S. 92 was necessary. The learned Judges held that S. 92 governed suits for the vindication of the rights of the public in public charitable trusts and had no application to suits for the vindication of the rights of management by hereditary trustees or to disputes between such trustees inter se as to their turns of management. Kumaraswami Sastriar, J. expressed the opinion that the words “directing accounts and inquiries” in Cl. Kumaraswami Sastriar, J. expressed the opinion that the words “directing accounts and inquiries” in Cl. 1(d) of S. 92 should be confined to suits by the Advocate-General, or by two or mere persons with his consent, against all the trustees for an account of their management and not by one or more trustees against the others, as such trustee has a right to call upon the others to account to him for the trust funds which he has received, even though the ether trustee comm its no breach of trust in Ganny v. Mahamed Ebrahim A.I.R. 1931 Rang. 322, the learned Judge following Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lal Johurry 33 Cal. 789 and some other eases referred to above, held that a suit brought for a declaration that the plaintiffs are the lawfally appointed trustees of the trust and that the defendants have been removed from their trusteeship by a competent authority and for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the exercise of the plaintiffs of their duties ta trustees, does not fall within the scope of 8. 92 requiring the sanction of the Advocate-Genera). In Abdur Rahim v. Abu Md. Barkat Ali A.I.R. 1928 16 (P.C.)=55 Cal. 519, the Judicial Committee rejected the contentious that all suits founded upon a breach of trust for public purpose of charitable or religions nature irrespective of the relief sought must be brought in accordance with the provisions S. 92 C.P.C. in that case, the Judicial Committee was not called open to decide whether the sanction of the Advocate-General under S. 92 C.P.C. would be necessary when trustees sued to enforce their rights. In Janaki Bai v. Tiruchitrambala Vinayakar A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 825=58 Mad. 988, Cornish J., delivering Judgment for the Bench observed: “The question, therefore, whether a suit falls within S. 92 depends not upon the character in which the plaintiff sues, but upon the nature of the reliefs sought”. In Shanmugham v. Govinda A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 92, the learned Jadges held that the correctness of the Full Bench decision Appanna Poricha v. Narasinga Poricha 4 L.M.L. 608=45 Mad 113 (F.B.) was unshaken after the decision of the Judicial Committee in Abdur Rahim v. Abu Md. Barkat Ali A.I.R. 1928 16 (P.C.)=55 Cal. In Shanmugham v. Govinda A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 92, the learned Jadges held that the correctness of the Full Bench decision Appanna Poricha v. Narasinga Poricha 4 L.M.L. 608=45 Mad 113 (F.B.) was unshaken after the decision of the Judicial Committee in Abdur Rahim v. Abu Md. Barkat Ali A.I.R. 1928 16 (P.C.)=55 Cal. 519 Varadachari J. in his separate but concurring judgment observed: “An examination of the earlier cases in India will show that even when a suit was not intended to enforce a right in the nature of the rights of a trustee but related to the enforcement of the obligations of the defendant in the performance of the trust for the benefit of the public, it had been held that a suit of that kind need not necessarily be brought only in conformity with the provisions of S. 539 but may be brought either under O. 1, R. 8, C.P.C., or even independently of it. It is in this sense that their Lordships point out that the question had arisen this country whether the provisions of S. 539 were merely permissive or mandatory. The question of permissive or mandatory cannot possibly arise in respect of a suit which cannot be brought in a representative character at all. All that the Judicial Committee intended to lay down and did lay down was that wherever the cause of action on which the suit is founded is one which could hive sustained a representative all the procedure prescribed by S. 92 must necessarily be followed and no suit could be maintained in any other form. I particularly wish to point out that in this judgment, their Lordships did not add the Sentence which is somehow introduced in a later judgment of this court, namely, that the character of the plaintiff is immaterial. It is only in the Judgment of this court in Janaki Bai Ammal v. Vinayakar of Melmandai 58 Mad. 988, Cornish J. in attempting to restate the effect of the decision of the Privy Council, pats the antithesis in the following words: “Whether the suit falls within S. 93 depends not upon the character in which the plaintiff sues but upon the nature of the relief sought”. With great respect I would state that this is not the proper test to be applied and was certainly not the test laid down by the Judicial Committee. With great respect I would state that this is not the proper test to be applied and was certainly not the test laid down by the Judicial Committee. It has sometimes been said that whenever relief is sought on the allegation of a breach of trust, the suit must necessarily be brought is conformity with S. 92, if it in any manner relates to a public charitable trust. Here again, I think this will not be a safe or a conclusive test, because as allegation of breach of trust may in certain circumstances be necessary even when a co-trustee is trying to assert or vindicate his own rights against other co-trustees who are in management. See Narapanan v. Mootha Poduval 53 Mad. 216. The test seems to me to have been stated with fallness aud accuracy in the passage that I have already cited from Sri D.P. Mallas book. Even in Bombay the principle that S. 92 will not apply to suits Instituted for the vindication of the right of management vested in the plaintiffs baa always been recoganised See Nowroji v. Dastur Kharsetji 26 Bom L.R. 950 and Narayana v. Vasudeva 26 Bom L.R. 950 particularly the Judgment of Fawcett, J. but differences have arisen mainly on the construetion of the scope of the plaint in each ease”. The passage referred to by the learned Judge is contained in Mallas Cede of Civil Procedure, 13th Edition, at page 406 as follows: “It is not every suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in Sab-S. 1 that should be brought with the consent of the Advocate General, but these suit, only which besides claiming of those reliefs are brought by individuals as representatives of the general public.” In Tirumalai Tirupati Devasthanam Committee v. Krishnuyya I.L.R. 1943 Mad. 619 (F.B.) the facts are that a suit was filed by the general trustee of a public temple against the trustees in respect of certain offerings in cash and kind contributed by devotees for being made over to that temple, praying for a decree directing accounts and inquiries and for recovery of such offerings or their value to be ascertained on such accounts being taken. The learned Judges followed the decision in Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lal Johurry 31 Cal. 789, overruled the decision of the Full Beach in Janaki Bai v. Tiruchitrambalam Vinayakar A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 825=58 Mad. The learned Judges followed the decision in Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lal Johurry 31 Cal. 789, overruled the decision of the Full Beach in Janaki Bai v. Tiruchitrambalam Vinayakar A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 825=58 Mad. 988, and held that in deciding whether suit falls under S. 92 of the Cede the court must go beyond the reliefs prayed and have regard to the capacity in which the plaintiffs are suing and to the purpose for which the suit is brought. The question next arises whether the amendment of S. 92, C.P.C. by the addition of Cl. (cc), affects the position. Having regard to the decision in Tirumalai Tirupati Devasthanam Committee v. Krishnayya I.L.R. 1943 Mad. 619 (F.B.) which lays emphasis on the character of the suit and not on the reliefs claimed, we are of opinion that the Cl. (cc) which is only a further relief added to S. 92(1) does not alter the position as that leaves untouched the question whether the court should have regard to the capacity in which the suit was filed. Mr. Vedantachari appearing for the respondents referred to Jambulinga Pathar v. Akiland Asari 1927 Mad. 886 where emphasis was laid on the relief claimed Ignoring the character and nature of the suit. In that case the learned Judges followed the earlier unreported decision of this court in Abdul Karim Sahib v. Abdul Kareem Sahib O.S.A. No. 106 of 1925. In the unreported case, the plaintiff claiming to be the lawfal Muthawalli of a mesquite alleged that the defendant was appointed manager of the mosque by the congregation, that, as the defendant was introducing into the original mosque service new customs till then not observed in that mosque, he was removed by the Muhammedan worshippers at a meeting and that the plaintiff was appointed as Muttawalli of the said mosqae and was instructed to file a suit and obtain possession of the mosqae and its endowments from the defendant. Laying emphasis on the relief claimed, the learned Judges held that the suit fell within the scope of S. 92 C.P.C., and the sanction of the Advocate-General was necessary. Mr. Vedantachary next cited the decision in Subramania Pillai v. Krishnaswamy Somapajir I.L.R. 42 Mad. Laying emphasis on the relief claimed, the learned Judges held that the suit fell within the scope of S. 92 C.P.C., and the sanction of the Advocate-General was necessary. Mr. Vedantachary next cited the decision in Subramania Pillai v. Krishnaswamy Somapajir I.L.R. 42 Mad. 668 in that case the suit was instituted by two out of three trustees of a temple for a declaration that the appointment of the 8th defendant in the vacancy created by the death of the 3rd trustee, by the Devasthanam Committee was invalid-Abdul Rahim, J. referred to the argument of Mr. Rangachari that suits by trustee did not come within S. 92, C.P.C., and characterised it as an unsound argument. The Bench referred to the reliefs claimed and also the language of Sub-S. (2) of S. 92 C.P.C., and held that want of sanction under S. 92 wag fatal to the maintainability of the suit. The above case is distinguishable from the present case in that in the former case emphasis was laid more on the reliefs than on the character of the suit. The decision in Balakrishna Odayar v. jagannadha Chariar 48 M.L.J. 534 does not support the contention of Mr. Vedantachari. Mr. Vedantachari then cited the decision is Sundara Ayyar v. Murari Varada Aiyyar 42 L.W. 264. The Head note thereinruas as follows: “The mere fact that the plaintiffs may in a sense be trustees will not necessarily preclude the application of S. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, if the reliefs in the suit relate not to the vindication of their personal rights but to the advancement of the interests of the institution itself by securing more efficient management. Thus a suit whose avowed object is the furtherance of the interests of the institution itself by the framing of a scheme and appointing certain persons as trustees from amongst the members of the plaintiffs family who are alleged to be the trustee of the institution and who are not able to agree among themselves upon proper management falls under the section and hence not maintainable in the absence of the sanction provided by it”. In all the above decisions cited by Mr. Vedantachari emphasis was laid on reliefs claimed ignoring the character of the plaintiffs who filed such suits. In all the above decisions cited by Mr. Vedantachari emphasis was laid on reliefs claimed ignoring the character of the plaintiffs who filed such suits. Further, the above decisions were rendered prior to the decision of the Fall Beach in the Tirumalai Tirupathi Devasthanams Committe v. Krishnayya I.L.R. 1943 Mad. 619 (F.B.). In fact the order of reference to the Full Bench refers to Subramania Pillai v. Krishnaswamy Somayejir I.L.R. 1943 Mad. 619 (F.B.) which is one of the decisions cited by Mr. Vedantachari. As mentioned already, by the introduction of clause ( sc ) a farther relief to the reliefs enumerated in sab S. (1) of S. 92 has been added. That by Itself is of no consequence in the present case, the new by appointed Muthawallis have filed the present suit qua mathawallis for recovery of properties and moneys belonging to the trust and also for accounts from the former trustee and this suit is not filed on behalf of the general public, for which alone S. 92 of the Code will be applicable. We are also of opinion that S. 55 of the Muslim Wakfs Act 1954 is not applicable. Srinivasan J. while referring to the Fall Beach decision in the Tirumalai-Tirupathi Devasthanam Committee v. Kiishnapya I.L.R. 1943 Mad. 619 (F.B.), erroneously held that the character in which the suit was brought would not merely depend on the character of the plaintiffs but on the reliefs and on the nature of the reliefs sought for is the action. We are of opinion that the above view of the leaned Judge is contrary to the decision of the Fall Bench in the Tirumalai-Tirupathi Devasthanams Committee v. Krishnayya I.L.R. 1943 Mad. 619 (F.B.). In the result the Letters Patent Appeal is allowed and the decree of the trial court as confirmed by the first appellate court is restored, the appellant will be entitled to his costs. C.M.P. Nos. 6050 and 6051 of 1969 (L.R.) and guardian petitions) are ordered. C.M.S.A. Nos. 71 to 73 of 1963 are between the same parties arising out of different orders made in execution applications. Whey will be posted before a single Judge for disposal.