JUDGMENT : S. Acharya, J. - The Petitioner stands convicted u/s 304-A, Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced thereunder to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default to undergo S.I. for two months. 2. The prosecution case, in short, is that on 5-9-1966 at about 2.30 p.m. while the Petitioner was driving his motor cycle in a rash and negligent manner from Pratappur side, the motor cycle dashed against Jasoda Beherani, wife of P.W. 1, as a result of which she fell down at the spot. She sustained injuries, and died on the day following the occurrence. 3. The accused pleaded not guilty stating that this was a false case foisted against him. 4. Mr. Murty, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, contends that the conviction of the Petitioner cannot legally be sustained as it is not established on the prosecution evidence that the Petitioner was driving the vehicle in a rash and/or in a negligent manner as understood in legal parlance. It is urged that there is nothing on record to show that the Petitioner was driving his motor cycle in a manner from which it can be said that he acted with the consciousness of the risk that evil consequences of death were likely to follow therefrom and so the conviction of the Petitioner cannot be maintained. 5. In this case it is to be noted that out of P.W.s. 2,3, 4 and 6 who ware cited as eye-witnesses to the occurrence, P.W.s 2, 3 and 6, as found by the Court below, denied to have witnessed the occurrence, but stated only to have heard about the occurrence subsequently. The only eye-witness to the occurrence, therefore, is P.W. 4. The Court below has not taken care to sift, assess and weigh the evidence of this only eye-witness in any manner. It merely took into consideration a substance of the statement made by P.W. 4 in his examination in chief, and without comparing and assessing the same with his statements in cross-examination and the other evidence on record, it, by one stroke of pen, found that there is nothing substantial to disbelieve his evidence. It merely took into consideration a substance of the statement made by P.W. 4 in his examination in chief, and without comparing and assessing the same with his statements in cross-examination and the other evidence on record, it, by one stroke of pen, found that there is nothing substantial to disbelieve his evidence. On such consideration of his evidence along with the evidence of P.W. 5, the doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination, and the evidence of P.W. 7, the Motor Vehicle Inspector who examined the motor cycle after more than a month of the occurrence, it arrived at the conclusion that the accused drove the motor cycle in a rash and negligent manner, and on such finding it upheld the conviction of the Petitioner u/s 304-A, Indian Penal Code. It has not bestowed any consideration to find out if all the elements of the offence u/s 304 A, Indian Penal Code had been brought home against the Petitioner on the evidence on record. 6. In order to constitute an offence tinder Section 304A, Indian Penal Code the prosecution should be able to prove that the death of the person was caused by the accused by his doing an act in a rash or negligent manner. In Suleman Rehiman Mulani and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra it has been held: There must be direct nexus between the death of a person and the rash and negligent act of the accused. In Bharosi Vs. State, the implications of the words "rashness and negligence" have been elucidated thus: Rashness means doing an act with the consciousness of a risk that evil consequence will follow but with the hope that they will not and negligence is a breach of duty imposed by law. In criminal cases, the amount and degree of negligence are the determining factors. According to Russel on Crime (1950 Edition, page 641. there must be mens rea in the criminal negligence also. The learned author has said that Judges have used many epithets to describe negligence, such as 'culpable', 'Criminal', 'Gross', 'Wicked' or 'Complete Negligence'. But whatever epithet be used...in order to establish criminal liability the facts must be such that the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime. But whatever epithet be used...in order to establish criminal liability the facts must be such that the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime. In State v. Lokanath 1959 O.J.D. 703, it is held: In order to amount to criminal rashness or criminal negligence, it must be found that the rashness has been of such a degree as to amount to taking hazard knowing that the hazard was of such a degree that injury was most likely to be occasioned thereby. The criminality lies in running the risk or doing such an act with recklessness and indifference to the consequences. In this connection the decisions reported in Pritant Singh v. State 1969 C.L.T. 723, Raghunath Behera v. State 1968 C.L.T. 500, Emperor v. W.S. Priestley AIR 1944 Sind 124, H.W. Smith Vs. Emperor may also be seen. 7. The Court below has not addressed itself as to whether on the facts and circumstances appearing in the evidence on record there was criminal rashness or criminal negligence, as understood in legal parlance, on the part of the accused. In upholding the conviction of the Petitioner u/s 304 A, Indian Penal Code it has not at all bestowed any consideration on the law on the subject. 8. Apart from the above, in this case 3 out of the 4 witnesses, who were cited by the prosecution as witnesses to the occurrence, did not support the prosecution case. The Court below, as said above, has not bestowed care to sift or assess the evidence of P.W. 4, the only eye-witness to the occurrence in any manner. P.W. 4 is none other than the brother of the husband of deceased Jasoda. According to P.W. 4 he was engaged in weeding operations in his own field, away from the main road, at the time of the occurrence. He admitted that he was examined by the Officer-in-charge of the police station after 15 days of the occurrence, though investigation in the case started from the date of occurrence. While he stated in his examination in chief that he witnessed the occurrence from his field when he was engaged in weeding operation, before the police he stated that he saw the occurrence when he was at the hotel of Dandapani. While he stated in his examination in chief that he witnessed the occurrence from his field when he was engaged in weeding operation, before the police he stated that he saw the occurrence when he was at the hotel of Dandapani. According to P.W. 9 the hotel of Dandapani was half a furlong away from the place of occurrence and according to P.W. 4 himself Dandapani's hotel was about a furlong away from the place of occurrence. P.W. 4 of course admitted in his cross-examination that just before the occurrence he was in the hotel of Dandapani, but he states that just a few moments before the occurrence he had returned from the hotel to his fields near about the place of occurrence. P.W. 10 has stated that there was a quarrel between P.W. 4 and the father of the Petitioner previous to the occurrence. Because of the significant features mentioned above it becomes difficult to place implicit reliance on the evidence of this solitary witness. 9. According to P.W. 4 there were other females along with the deceased when the occurrence took place, but no such female supported the prosecution case P.W. 7, the Motor Vehicle Inspector who examined the motor cycle after one month of the date of occurrence, did not find any appreciable damage to the vehicle. Its mechanical condition was alright. The speedometer and the horn, however, were not working. The motor cycle was seized from the house of a pleader during the absence of the Petitioner, and a month thereafter P.W. 7 examined the same. It cannot, therefore be said that the defects found in the horn and the speedometer was existing at the time when the accident took place. Moreover, it is not proved that the motor cycle examined by P W. 7 was actually the motor cycle used by the Petitioner at the relevant time. On the above considerations, nothing substantial turns out against the Petitioner on the evidence of P.W. 7. 10. Apart from the above, there is nothing on record on which it can be said that at the time when the occurrence took place the accused was driving his motor cycle in a rash and/or negligent manner, as understood in law. On the above considerations, nothing substantial turns out against the Petitioner on the evidence of P.W. 7. 10. Apart from the above, there is nothing on record on which it can be said that at the time when the occurrence took place the accused was driving his motor cycle in a rash and/or negligent manner, as understood in law. The only evidence to this effect is that of P.W. 4, who merely stated that the Petitioner who was driving the motor cycle 'at a great speed dashed against Jasoda'. Apart from this he does not state as to how, in which side of the road and in what manner the incident took place. His evidence, for reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs, cannot be given much credenee, and there is nothing to corroborate his sole testimony to the above effect. It is not known what actually he means by saying 'great speed'. Criminal rashness or negligence cannot be ascertained merely from such evidence of speed of the vehicle. The accused was driving through the P.W D. Huma-Aska main load. It is in the evidence of P W 9, the Investigating Officer that there was no residential house near the spot and the hotel of Dandapani, half a furlong away from the place of occurrence, was the nearest house in the locality. This suggests that there was no human habitation near about the place of occurrence. There is absolutely no evidence on record that there was any other person or vehicular traffic or any traffic congestion on the said road, excepting the deceased and the few females, if at all, with her, at the time of the occurrence. The main road in the country side was, therefore free, enabling the drivers to drive fast on that road with a reasonably high speed without being conscious of a risk that evil consequences will follow therefrom. So merely from the speed of the vehicle, without other considerations of adverse surroundings, situation and circumstances existing at the time of the occurrence, about which there is nothing in the evidence on record, it cannot at all be said that the act of the accused amounted to criminal rashness or criminal negligence. 11. So merely from the speed of the vehicle, without other considerations of adverse surroundings, situation and circumstances existing at the time of the occurrence, about which there is nothing in the evidence on record, it cannot at all be said that the act of the accused amounted to criminal rashness or criminal negligence. 11. In the absence of a finding and/or evidence regarding presence of culpable rashness and/or criminal negligence on the part of the Petitioner and in view of the untrustworthy and unconvincing nature of the only eyewitness examined in this case, and because of the other shortcomings in the prosecution evidence discussed above, it is to be held that the prosecution has not been able to bring home the offence u/s 304 A, Indian Penal Code against the Petitioner. He is accordingly liable to be acquitted of the same. 12. In the result, therefore, the conviction of the Petitioner u/s 304-A, Indian Penal Code and the sentence passed thereunder are hereby set aside and he is acquitted of the same. Fine, if paid, be refunded to the Petitioner. 13. The revision is allowed. Final Result : Allowed