JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - This appeal is directed against the appellate judgment of our learned brother Patra, J. in Second Appeal No. 388 of 1967 disposed of on 2-8-1968. 2. The Respondent who was a minor at the date of the suit sued through his father for a declaration that the date of birth of his was 12-8-1950 and not 10-1.1952 as entered in the records of the Defendants. He wanted a mandatory injunction against the Defendants for correcting the record by incorporation of the correct date of birth in the registers and certificates. The suit was filed on 16-1-1967. It was pleaded that when the Plaintiff was admitted into class VII of the Maharaja Boys? High School, Parlakimedi, by mistake his date of birth was entered as 10-1-1952 in the admission register of that school (ext. H). The Plaintiff got promoted to the matriculation class in due course and submitted his application for admission to the High School Certificate Examination of the year 1965 (Ext. A) on 27-12-1964. Therein he mentioned his date of birth as 10-1-1952. On 1-5-1965, the father guardian of the Plaintiff applied (Ex. B) to the Inspector of Schools, Ganjam for correction of the record so far as the date of birth was concerned. He enclosed an affidavit sworn by him in support of that fact and a copy of the horoscope of the Plaintiff as also a certificate of the Civil Surgeon regarding the probable age of The Plaintiff were also submitted. The Inspector forwarded these documents under his letter (Ext. 3) dated 4.5-1965 to the Secretary, Board of Education (Defendant No. 2). The forwarding letter of the Inspector contained a statement that the Plaintiff?s claim appeared to be valid. The Board rejected the request and intimation was sent under Ext. 6 dated 13-9-1965 to the Inspector of Schools about the decision. Ext. J is the proceeding of the meeting of the examination Committee of the Board on the basis whereof the application for correction of the age was rejected. The Plaintiff made some farther attempts for correction of the record, but ultimately failed. 6 dated 13-9-1965 to the Inspector of Schools about the decision. Ext. J is the proceeding of the meeting of the examination Committee of the Board on the basis whereof the application for correction of the age was rejected. The Plaintiff made some farther attempts for correction of the record, but ultimately failed. He was interested in getting into the Medical College for the M.B.B.S. degree and as the minimum age for admission is said to be 17 and as he was by the date of birth indicated in the High School examination certificate, not of that age, he was not entitled to admission. This was so on account of the mistaken entry and is said to have given the cause of Action for the suit. 3. The Defendants filed separate written statements, but essentially took the same defence. It was claimed that the allegation of the Plaintiff about his correct date of birth was not true and the entry as made earlier was correct. It was further asserted that since the entry was on the basis of the disclosure made on behalf of the Plaintiff and was accepted as correct at the time the application for appearing at the High School Certificate examination was made in 1964, there was no merit in the Plaintiff?s allegation about in accuracy of the date of birth. It was further alleged that the Plaintiff was not entitled to the correction in the manner it has been asked for. 4. Five issues were raised at the trial. The learned Trial Judge on the basis of the evidence on record came to a clear conclusion that the Plaintiff?s Actual date of birth was 12-8-1950 and not 10-1-1952. This occasion of the trial Court was based upon both documentary as also oral evidence. He next found that the record was accordingly erroneous and required to be corrected. He thus decreed the suit. The appeal before the learned Additional Subordinate Judge was dismissed and the decree of the trial Court was affirmed. The Defendants appealed before this Court and it was also dismissed. The finding reached by the original Court, and the first appellate Court about the Actual date of birth was not seriously disputed before the learned single Judge as would appear from the judgment of the second appeal. 5. The Defendants appealed before this Court and it was also dismissed. The finding reached by the original Court, and the first appellate Court about the Actual date of birth was not seriously disputed before the learned single Judge as would appear from the judgment of the second appeal. 5. This appeal under Clause 10 of the Orissa High Court Order has been filed on the grant of leave by the learned single Judge. The learned Additional Government Advocate on behalf of the Appellants rightly makes no attempt to reagitate the finding regarding the date of birth. Even if he did, we are afraid that has become a clear finding of fact not open to challenge at this stage. The learned Additional Government Advocate, however, raised two interesting questions of law: (1) According to him a suit of this type is not provided for within the scope of Section 34 of the new Specific Relief Act. That section of the statute provides in a comprehensive manner for declaratory decrees. Since this suit with the reliefs asked for does not come within the purview of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, the Courts below had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the decree granted is liable to be reversed. (2) Such suit is also not cognizable in civil Court and is not a matter directly coming within the ambit of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These two points raised by the learned Additional Government Advocate require careful consideration. Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act provides: Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any parson denying or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the Plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no Court shall make any such declaration where the Plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. Explanation..... The learned Counsel for the Appellants contends that there is no dispute about the ?legal character? Explanation..... The learned Counsel for the Appellants contends that there is no dispute about the ?legal character? or with reference to right to any property so far as the Plaintiff is concerned and, therefore, the relief asked for in this suit is not such that the suit is one for declaration of statue or right. Accordingly it is contended that the suit must be taken to have been in framed and would not be maintainable. 6. The expressions ?legal Character? and ?right to any property? have been used in the section disjunctively so as to entitle the Plaintiff to a declaration on the exclusive basis of either the one or the other. It is not contended by any of the parties before us that the relief asked for in this case is of a right to property. The Plaintiff represented by Mr. Rath who has succeeded in this Court and also before the two Courts below has taken the stand that the dispute is with reference to the ?legal character? of the Plaintiff and that proposition is being disputed by the learned Additional Government Advocate for the Defendants. We shall, therefore proceed to examine whether the relief asked for in the suit is with reference to the legal character of The Plaintiff. It seems to have been accepted by consensus of judicial authority that these words are equivalent to legal status, and legal status is the legal right when it involves the peculiarity of the personality arising from anything unconnected with the nature of the Act itself which the person of inherence can enforce against the person of incidence. As our learned brother has indicated in his judgment, the phrase ?legal character? has no statutory definition, but this phrase occurs in two statutes in Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and in Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act. No judicial decision has been cited before us where an attempt to define this phrase has been made, but there are various decisions dealing with this question and with reference to them what is meant by the phrase can be well understood. In Ramkrishna v. Narayana AIR 1915 Mad. 584, dealing with this phrase a Bench of that Court said: We take it that a man?s ?legal character? is the same thing is a man?s status. A man?s status or ?legal character? In Ramkrishna v. Narayana AIR 1915 Mad. 584, dealing with this phrase a Bench of that Court said: We take it that a man?s ?legal character? is the same thing is a man?s status. A man?s status or ?legal character? is constituted by the attributes which the law attaches to him in his individual and personal capacity, the distinctive mark or dress, as it were, with which the law clothes him, apart from the attributes which may be said to belong to normal humanity in general. ?According to Holland, the Chief varieties of status among natural persons may be referred to the following causes: (1) sex, (2) minority, (3) patria potestas? and ?manus?, (4) coverture, (5) celibacy, (6) mental defect, (7) bodily defect, (8) rank, caste and official position, (9) slavery, (10) profession, (11) civil death, (12) illegitimacy, (13) heresay, (14) foreign nationality and (15) hostile nationality: We think that a declaration that a valid personal contract still subsists between the Plaintiff and Defendant 1 is not a right to declare a title to a legal character or a title to right to property. In Punjab National Bank v. Balikram AIR 1940 Cal 225, Sen, J. dealt with the matter thus: A declaration of a legal right is a different thing from a declaration of a legal character. The word ?character? means status, it is something more than a mere right. The declaration of a person?s right operates as against a particular person or group of persons against whom? the right is claimed, whereas a man?s status is something which defines his position not in relation to any particular person or group of persons but in relation to the rest of the world; his status distinguishes him from the rest of the world. To say that a person is not a partner of a firm is not to declare his status or legal character, it is merely to declare his position with respect to the particular firm. A Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Lalji Haridas v. Mulji Manilal AIR 1966 Guj. 159 , after (sic) with approval the rliotum laid down in Ramkrishna v. Narayana AIR 1915 Mad. A Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Lalji Haridas v. Mulji Manilal AIR 1966 Guj. 159 , after (sic) with approval the rliotum laid down in Ramkrishna v. Narayana AIR 1915 Mad. 584, stated: Thus in that decision legal character has been equated to a man?s status and the test laid down is whether apart from The attributes which belonged to normal humanity in general, does a person possess any distinctive attributes which the law attached to him. It was those distinctive attributes which gave him distinctive mark or dress, which constituted his legal character. In the present case it could not be doubted that the Benamidar who has in that capacity distinctive attributes, giving him special representative capacity and a distinctive character and position of a legal trustee has the legal character of his own. Reverting to the discussion on this aspect in another part of the judgment it has been said keeping in background the Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Noor Jehan Begum v. Eugene Tiscenko AIR 1942 Cal. 325. ?The words ?legal character? in Section 42 were wide enough to include the status of a person. In order to entitle the Plaintiff to bring a suit u/s 42, it was not necessary that the Defendant should Actually deny the Plaintiff?s legal character. If the claim which might be set rip by the Defendant is a hindrance to the Plaintiff in the exercise of his or her rights or would expose him or her to liability if he or she disregarded it, he or she might come to Court for a declaration that the claim so set up by the Defendant was Dot well founded. Even if we accept the ratio as laid down by the Madras High Court of equating the term ?legal character? with a man?s status, the test would be fully satisfied so far as the present case is concerned. In Salmod on jurisprudence, 1957, Eleventh Edition, at page 292, Salmond has summarised different senses in which the term status is employed. Out of four meanings given by him, the first, which is the most comprehensive use of the term is to include in the man?s status his whole position in the law the sum total of his legal rights, duties, liabilities, or other relations, whether proprietary or personal, or any particular group of them separately considered. Out of four meanings given by him, the first, which is the most comprehensive use of the term is to include in the man?s status his whole position in the law the sum total of his legal rights, duties, liabilities, or other relations, whether proprietary or personal, or any particular group of them separately considered. It is in this sense that Salmond says that we speak of the status of a land owner, of a trustee, of an Executor, of a solicitor, and so on. It is much more common, however, to confine the term in question to some particular description of legal condition some particular kind of status in his wide sense. Hence the other and specific meanings were given to the said term....As for example, personal status of a free man, of a citizen of a husband, of a father etc. or the status of an alien, a lunatic, or an infant, but not of a landowner or a trustee. Thus, the status of a trustee is distinguished only in reference to the usage of the term in connection with & personal status as distinguished from other proprietary relations." 7. Since ?legal character? and ?status? have been equated, the learned Additional Government Advocate referred to some of the standard authorities on jurisprudence who have referred to the term ?status? and given its meaning. Prof. Keeton in his book ?The Elementary Principles of jurisprudence? has referred to ?status? thus: It has been defined 88 ?The legal position of the individual in or with regard to the rest of the community.? Every legal person, therefore, has a status, but not every legal incapacity involves abnormal statue. A drunken man can hardly be said to have a special status, although drunkenness entails incapacity. The status of a lunatic, however, h definitely abnormal. The line of distinction is hard to draw, but the question whether a special status exists or not may best be answered by considering what degree of permanency attaches to the disability of the person considered. A purely temporary disability is not deviation from normal status. On the other hand, a special status need not be life long. Lunacy may be, and infancy always is, a terminable disability. Prof. A purely temporary disability is not deviation from normal status. On the other hand, a special status need not be life long. Lunacy may be, and infancy always is, a terminable disability. Prof. Holland after categorising the chief varieties of status has stated: An of the facts included in this list, which might be extended, have been held, at one time or another to differentiate. The legal position ?of persons affected by them from that of persons of The normal type. Dealing with minority be has indicated: Minors are, as a rule, capable of holding and receiving property, and liable for their wrongful Acts, but incapable of making a will, or of entering into a valid contract without the approval of a guardian or of Borne public authority. The exception to this rule, in favour of upholding an infant?s contracts for necessaries, is obviously made in the interest of the infant himself; ?no magno incommodo afficiantur, nemine cum his contrahents, et quodammodo commercia cis interdicatur.? Infants are, however, unless under the age of consent, which differs under different systems, not incapacitated from entering into the contract of marriage. The age of fun majority is differently fixed under different systems, and it may be remarked that. English law, in dividing human life for most of the purposes of private Jaw into two periods only, that which precedes and that which follows the age of twenty-one, has departed from the theory of the Roman Lawyers and their followers. This theory, which postpones the date of full majority till the completion of the twenty-fifth year, distinguishes in the preceding period, infancy, proximity to infancy, and a qualified majority attained by girls at the age of twelve, and by boys at the age of fourteen years. Salmond in his famous book on Jurisprudence has stated: The term status is used in a variety of senses. It is used to refer to a man?s legal condition of any kind, whether personal or proprietary. A man?s status in this sense includes his whole position in the law the sum total of his legal rights, duties, liabilities or other legal relations, whether proprietary or personal, or any particular group of them separately considered. Thus we may speak of the status of a landowner, of a trustee, of an executor, of a Solicitor and so on. A man?s status in this sense includes his whole position in the law the sum total of his legal rights, duties, liabilities or other legal relations, whether proprietary or personal, or any particular group of them separately considered. Thus we may speak of the status of a landowner, of a trustee, of an executor, of a Solicitor and so on. More commonly it (status) is used to denote his personal legal condition in so far as concerns his personal rights and burdens, to the exclusion of his proprietary relations. A person?s status, in this sense, is made up of smaller groups of personal rights and their correlative burdens, and each of these constituent groups is itself also called a status. Thus the same person may have at the same time the status of a free man, of a citizen, of a husband, of a father and so on. So we speak of the status of an alien, a lunatic, or an infant; but not of a landowner or trustee. Status is used by Borne writers to signify a man?s personal legal condition, so far only as it is imposed upon him by the law without his own consent, as opposed to the condition which he has acquired for himself by agreement. The position of a slave is a matter of status, the position of a free servant is a matter of contract. Marriage creates a status in this sense, for although it is entered into by way of consent, it cannot be dissolved in that way, and the legal condition created by it is determined by the law, and cannot be modified by the agreement of the parties. A business partnership, on the other band, pertains to the law of contract and not to that of status. Prof. Dicey in his Conflict of Laws refers to status thus: Every person has a certain civil status, consisting of his capacity or incapacity under the laws of his country for the acquisition and exercise of legal rights and for the performance of legal acts. Thus A?s status or personal condition may confer upon him the greatest measure of capacity to enjoy and to exercise rights and the smallest measure of disability or incapacity. Such is the position of a person of full age who is sane, legitimate, unmarried and solvent. Thus A?s status or personal condition may confer upon him the greatest measure of capacity to enjoy and to exercise rights and the smallest measure of disability or incapacity. Such is the position of a person of full age who is sane, legitimate, unmarried and solvent. He has in England the capacity to inherit property, to make a will, to bind himself by contracts, to change his domicile, to mention but some aspects of a person?s condition. On the other hand, A?s status or personal condition may fall short of the greatest measure of capacity to enjoy and to exercise rights and may subject him to some measure of disability or incapacity. Thus if he is illegitimate, he does not inherit, except from his mother, as a legitimate person would do; whilst if he is an infant, he is not bound by contracts which bind adults and he cannot make a will. As A?s position is in these instances marked off from the condition of a person enjoying the greatest measure of capacity to enjoy and to exercise rights and subject to the smallest measure of disability or incapacity, it receives a name such as that of illegitimacy or of infancy; and A has status which may in every general terms be described as being the legal position of A in or with regard to the rest of a community. Dr. Allen in his book ?Legal Duties? and Prof. Paton in his book on jurisprudence have also made reference to this term. Status, according to them, may be described as the fact or condition of membership of a group of which the powers are determined extrinsically by law, status affecting not merely one particular relationship, but being a condition effecting generally though in varying degree a member?s claims and powers. Status is not merely a basis for classification, but a matter of great political, legal, and social importance. We have referred to various Jurisprudence writers with reference to the term ?status? in order to indicate that though there is in general a consensus of view about what the term means, yet many of them have referred to new aspects, categories and classifications and have given varying illustrations of what constitute ?status?. 8. We have referred to various Jurisprudence writers with reference to the term ?status? in order to indicate that though there is in general a consensus of view about what the term means, yet many of them have referred to new aspects, categories and classifications and have given varying illustrations of what constitute ?status?. 8. In words and Phrases (West Publishing Co.) it has been said, ?The word ?status?, as applied to the relationship of parent and child, husband and wife, or other like relation, is not synonymous with the word ?right?, but is to be construed as meaning ?relationship?, and hence the word ?status? does not necessarily empty the existence of the right of inheritance. Status means a legal personal relationship, not temporary in its nature nor terminable at the mere will of the parties, with which third persons and the state are concerned. The legal social relation and condition of the parties, as husband and wife, or otherwise, is what we understand by the term ?status?. In Corpus Juris Secundum it has been said: As applied to a person, ?status? has reference to and means, the person?s legal social relation and condition; the legal position of the individual in or with regard to the rest of the community; a person?s condition arising out of legal status. Thus, as applied to a person, ?status? means condition, such as being an infant, a slave, a married man or woman, a ward, or a prisoner, and it can be determined only by the state and not by agreement of the parties. Thus in legal dictionaries the term has also been understood in various different senses though broadly speaking there is unanimity about what it refers to or signifies. Status is often confused with capacity. Capacity is the incidence of status. Status has, therefore, to be distinguished from its incidence. One of the qualities of status is its universality. 9. Since the phrase ?legal character? and the word ?status? have been equated and have already referred to how the term ?status? has been understood, we shall now proceed to examine whether the date of birth of the Plaintiff can be held to be; matter in relation to ?status? or to appertain to ?legal character? of the Plaintiff. There is no dispute that with reference to the date of birth minority or majority of a person is determined. has been understood, we shall now proceed to examine whether the date of birth of the Plaintiff can be held to be; matter in relation to ?status? or to appertain to ?legal character? of the Plaintiff. There is no dispute that with reference to the date of birth minority or majority of a person is determined. Similarly it is with reference to that event that the right of franchise, the right to enter into service, the right of continuing in service, the right to deal with property, the right of getting married and the right to perform various other Acts depend. With The advancement of society and increase of regulation of relationship and social Activities by laws of The State, the date of birth of a person has assumed and is still assuming greater importance. Date of birth has become even a material basis for admission into technical or professional courses. There is no denying of the fact that directly associated with this event is the status of minority or majority of a person. Though the learned Additional Government Advocate does not quarrel with These aspects of the matter, yet he has contended that the date of birth by itself is not a status of a person. We have also no doubt in our mind that if the concept of date of birth is kept desiccated from the consequences that flow out of it or the incidence that event carries, it may not relate to status or legal character of the person whose date of birth is in question. But in Actual life, in social relationship, and in matters of the world the event of the date of birth, cannot be so desiccated and is really not a matter disjunctive from the status of the person, minority or majority, as has been indicated by Borne of the Jurisprudence writers, is a matter relating to status and that is a matter which directly flows out from the fact as to when a person was born. Thus "date of birth" of a person is an event directly associated with the status of that person and appertains to his status. In essence it is a factor directly contributing to the personality of the person concerned. It goes to cloth him with an attire of capacity or disability. 10. Thus "date of birth" of a person is an event directly associated with the status of that person and appertains to his status. In essence it is a factor directly contributing to the personality of the person concerned. It goes to cloth him with an attire of capacity or disability. 10. We have not the benefit of a direct judicial pronouncement on the question pointedly raised before us. Mr. Rath for the Respondent relied upon a single Judge decision of the Calcutta High Court in V.G. Ray v. South Eastern Railway 1969 Labour and Industrial Cases 1017. An employee under the South Eastern Railway obtained correction of his date of birth in the School certificate by institution of a suit against the University which granted the certificate. Later he wanted the employer to correct the service record where the former age before correction by the decree had been indicated. When the employer refused to Act in accordance with the decree, the employee came before the High Court in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. Basu, J. referred to the Railway Rules in regard to entry of age in the service record and found that the entry once made was unalterable ordinarily. He further found: The judgment at annexure ?B? is not a judgment in remand does not bind anybody who was not a party thereto. There was nothing which prevented the Petitioner to impaled the Respondents as Defendants in the said suit which was obviously brought u/s 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. Under that section anybody who is entitled to any Legal character may institute a suit for a declaration of that character against ?any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character?. There is no doubt that the Railway had either denied or was interested to deny the legal character of the Petitioner, with respect to his age or date of birth and because of their refusal to accede to his request to correct the Entry in the Service Record that he had instituted suit No. 51 of 1961. Reliance is placed by Mr. Rath on the following lines: There is no doubt that the Railway had either denied or was interested to deny the legal character of the Petitioner, with respect to his age or date of birth. Reliance is placed by Mr. Rath on the following lines: There is no doubt that the Railway had either denied or was interested to deny the legal character of the Petitioner, with respect to his age or date of birth. Though the learned Judge has so stated, the dispute which has now been raised does not appear to have been raised and decided in the said case. We are, in the circumstances, not in a position to accept that decision as a precedent for our purpose. 11. Date of birth or otherwise stated when one was born is an aspect firmly and irretrievably attached to the man. Status of minority (or majority) directly flows out of it and the event of the time of birth (or the date of birth) is such an important element in building of the status of a man in various aspects of his position in society that we are not in a position to accept the contention of the learned Additional Government Advocate that it cannot be taken to be a part of his legal character. Let us take for instance the case of a person who was born on 1-1-1900. His record of the date of birth is shown to be 1-1-1905. By statute provision has been made that on the completion of the 18th year a person becomes major and full rights in the manner indicated by some Jurisprudence writers which we have already referred to inner in him thereafter. In the illustration given by us if the erroneous entry is allowed to continue, disability of minority would continue to attach to the person for 5 more years and his status would remain impaired during that period. Under our Criminal Jurisprudence age is The basis for liability in some cases. Up to a particular period a person is said to be incapable possessing criminal animus. Liability in respect of the next range is contingent whereas full criminal liability attaches after the attainment of a particular age. Jurisprudence writers have referred to the position of a convict as status. Even the position of an under trial is said to be a matter of status. Would not his age at the relevant point of time thus affect his personality and give rise to different consequences? Would that not be on the basis that is an incidence of his status at the material point of time? Even the position of an under trial is said to be a matter of status. Would not his age at the relevant point of time thus affect his personality and give rise to different consequences? Would that not be on the basis that is an incidence of his status at the material point of time? There is only one answer and it is in the affirmative. Statute, though ordinarily a permanent feature or meant to attach to a person for a length of time may have also changing aspects. Today?s minor may become a major with passing of time. A person may be a lunatic today and a normal one a few months after. A person may be a thief today and following his acquittal a gentleman. 12. Keeping these aspects in view we are led to hold that the date of birth is so intermingled with the status of a person that it must be taken to be directly connected with the legal character of the person at any point of time and, therefore; for correcting the entry relating to the date of birth a suit would lie and declaration can be obtained under the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 13. It has not been the contention of the learned Additional Government Advocate that the suit suffers from the defect covered by the proviso to the section. In fact consequential reliefs have been asked for in this case. What was being contended was that the declaration asked for is not one covered by the parent provision of Section 34 which we have just indicated. 14. Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act does not cover the entire field of declaratory decrees. This position was made clear by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee as early as 1898. II Fisher v. Ors. 26 Ind. App. 16, Lord Macnaghten spoke for the Judicial Committee thus: Now, in the first place it is at least open to doubt whether the present suit is within the purview of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. (now Section 34). There can be no doubt as to the origin and purpose of that section. It was intended to introduce the provisions of Section 50 of the Chancery Procedure Act of 1852 as interpreted by judicial decision. (now Section 34). There can be no doubt as to the origin and purpose of that section. It was intended to introduce the provisions of Section 50 of the Chancery Procedure Act of 1852 as interpreted by judicial decision. Before the Act of 1852 it was not the practice of the Court in ordinary suits to make a declaration of right except as introductory to relief which it proceeded to administer. But the present suit is one to which no objection could have been taken before the Act of 1852. It is in substance a suit to have the true construction of a statute declared, and to have an Act done in contravention of the statute rightly understood pronounced void and of no effect. That is not the sort of declaratory decree which the framers of the Act had in their mind. Chief Justice Sulaiman delivering the judgment of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Sri Krishna v. Mahabir AIR 1933 All 488 , stated: There is no doubt that Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act is not exhaustive so as to exclude all other forms of declaratory suits. He referred to another decision of the Privy Council in Partab Singh v. Bhabuti Singh 40 I.A. 182, in support of his conclusion. A Bench of the Madras High Court in Krishnaveni Ammal v. Soundararajan AIR 1945 Mad. 53 , had similarly stated that Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act was not exhaustive. Some Courts in India have taken the view that the entire field of declaratory decrees was covered by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. But the matter now is no more open to doubt in view of a recent decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ramraghava Reddy v. Seshu Reddy AIR 1967 S.C. 436 . It has been held that Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act is not exhaustive of the cases in which a declaratory decree may be made and the Courts have power to grant such a decree independently of the requirements of the Section A Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Asansol Electric Supply Co. v. C. Daw 75 C.W.N. 704, have said: It is true that the Plaintiffs themselves are not entitled (in the case before their Lordships) to any legal character or to any right & as to any property. v. C. Daw 75 C.W.N. 704, have said: It is true that the Plaintiffs themselves are not entitled (in the case before their Lordships) to any legal character or to any right & as to any property. The suit has been instituted by the Plaintiffs for the benefit of the company and if the suit is decreed the company will be benefited. It is not for the personal interest of the Plaintiffs that the Plaintiffs instituted the instant suit. The question is whether the instant suit comes within the purview of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In this connection we may refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Ramraghava Reddy v. Seshu Reddy AIR 1967 S.C. 436 . The Plaintiffs in that case instituted a suit for a declaration that the compromise decree was not binding on the deity. It was held by the Supreme Court that a declaration of that character namely, that the compromise decree was not binding upon the deity was in itself a substantial relief and had immediate coercive effect and that a declaration of that kind fell outside the purview of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and would be governed by the general Provisions of the CPC like Section 9, or Order 7, Rule 7. In the aforesaid Supreme Court decision, the Plaintiffs were the worshippers of the deity and the suit was brought for the benefit of the deity. On the basis of the said Supreme Court decision it can be held that the declarations prayed for in the instant suit fall outside the purview of Section 34 and will be governed by the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In short, Section 34 does not constitute an exhaustive code as to declaratory relief in India. 15. Even if Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act was not applicable to the case before us and date of birth was not connected with the legal character of the Plaintiff in such manner as to confer upon him the benefit of Section 34 of the Act for obtaining the declaration, we are of the view that a suit of the type now instituted was cognizable u/s 9, Code of Civil Procedure. u/s 9, CPC a civil Court has jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. u/s 9, CPC a civil Court has jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. We have not been shown any statutory bar of the civil Court?s jurisdiction in this matter, nor has it been contended by the learned Additional Government Advocate that there is any implied bar in the matter to the jurisdiction of the civil Court. The learned Additional Government Advocate has, however, contended that the relief for the correction of the date of birth is not a dispute of civil nature and, therefore, Section 9, CPC could not cover it. We have already indicated while dealing with the question of legal character that date of birth is not a matter directly appertaining to right to property. But the same reasoning which we advanced to hold that it was a matter directly appertaining to the legal character of the person would apply to hold that it was directly connected with civil rights, such as, the tight to Office, the right to franchise, the right to continue in service up to a particular age or even in dealing with property. Thus it is difficult for us to accede to the contention raised on behalf of the Appellants that the present dispute is not one within the four corners of Section 9, Code of Civil Procedure. 16. It was next canvassed that the relief granted in the suit cannot be in the mandatory form of a direction to correct the certificate, but it should have been at the best a decree for reconsideration of the matter by the Board of Secondary Education. We have examined the Orissa Secondary Education Act. There is no provision in the Act or the Regulations made thereunder about the entry relating to date of birth. Section 11 of the Act, as far as material, provides: Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions, namely: x x x (b) to grant diplomas or certificates to successful candidates; x x x The entry of the date of birth in one of such certificates is in dispute in the suit and is said to be erroneous. The certificate has thus a statutory existence. The certificate has thus a statutory existence. There is, however, no statutory provision made in the Act or in The Regulations under the Act relating to the manner of making the certificate or prescribing for its contents. Thus if a dispute is raised about an erroneous entry in the statutory certificate, no clear and final jurisdiction is vested by the statute on the Board or any of its committees to decide the matter. If the dispute is one of civil nature, unless it is shown that its cognizance is excluded either expressly or by implication, the civil Court would have jurisdiction to examine the correctness of the matter. Authorities are abundant about this proposition and we do not propose to refer to any. 17. If the statute has not conferred jurisdiction either in a general way or with finality to decide the dispute about the correctness of the entry relating to the date of birth on a statutory body, the basis for the contention raised by the learned Additional Government Advocate loses its importance. He has been contending that our jurisdiction must be saturated with the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and if in similar circumstances as the present one in a writ application the relief was only for reconsidering the matter in accordance with law, once the Court was satisfied that the matter had not been properly disposed of, the decree in the suit should be only for reconsidering the matter over again in accordance with law and not for correcting the entry. In other words, the learned Additional Government Advocate wanted to say that the discretion vested in the Board and the civil Court was not vested with appellate jurisdiction It was open to the Court to find out whether the statutory authority had properly Acted and on satisfaction being reached that it had not so Acted it was open to the Court to call upon the statutory authority to Act again in accordance with law after its decision was set aside. We are not prepared to accept this contention because once the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit the dispute being of civil nature and the jurisdiction of the Court not being ousted, it would he open to the Court to decide the matter finally and in full. We are not prepared to accept this contention because once the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit the dispute being of civil nature and the jurisdiction of the Court not being ousted, it would he open to the Court to decide the matter finally and in full. Besides, as we have already indicated, it has not been shown to us that it was the intention of the legislature to leave a dispute of this type within the domain of the statutory authority. Once that is not the statutory provision or even the intention, jurisdiction of the civil Court is at large and must be taken to cover the entire field of dispute. Its decree can be in terms of what in this case it has been. 18. The learned Additional Government Advocate had also contended that the Plaintiff had no cause of Action. In Ext. 12 the age on a particular date during the year of admission was required to be 17, and we find the evidence in support of the age was prescribed to be the High School Examination Certificate. It may have been open to the authorities concerned to embark upon an enquiry at the instance of the Plaintiff to find his age and prefer their finding to the entry in the High School Examination certificate, but to our mind there was enough scope for the Plaintiff to feel aggrieved in this setting about the entry in the High School Examination certificate. It cast a aloud over his right to be considered for admission merely on account of the erroneous entry and he was, therefore, entitled to the assistant of the Count, once the authorities concerned refused to correct the entry, to ask for its correction. The erroneous entry was an impediment in the way of the Plaintiff for being considered for selection to the professional course of a doctor and, therefore, he came to the Court for the relief he has asked for. 19. Though our reasons have been different, we think the conclusion we reach is the same as has been reached by our, learned brother and, therefore, the appeal must fail. It is dismissed. We think it appropriate to direct both the parties to bear their own costs of this appeal. 20. As we close, we must indicate a fact which we had kept out of our mind until now. It is dismissed. We think it appropriate to direct both the parties to bear their own costs of this appeal. 20. As we close, we must indicate a fact which we had kept out of our mind until now. The Plaintiff on the basis of the decree of the trial Court took admission into a Medical College within this state and is a student now of the 4th year class of the M. B.B.S. Course. The learned Additional Government Advocate had asked us to keep that aspect out of our mind and not to allow our decision to be affected by the consideration of the fact that if the Plaintiff lost in the suit he would lose the benefit of his study for these four years. We conclude by saying that we did not permit that consideration to abuse our mind and our judgment has not at all been affected by it. B.C. Das, J. 20. I, agree. Final Result : Allowed