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1971 DIGILAW 174 (KAR)

LAKSHMIDAS v. AROORCHAND

1971-06-16

DATAR

body1971
( 1 ) THE plaintiff is the petitioner in this revision petition. OS. No. 22 of of 1968 has been filed by him for accounts of the dissolved partnership firm known as Aroorchand Shamsundar of which the plaintiff was one of the partners. In paragraph 11 of the plaint the valuation of the suit has been given and it reads thus:"the plaintiff is prepared to pay the court fee due on his share of the profits, after the same is duly ascertained. In order to initiate the taking of accounts in this suit, the plaintiff approximately estimates his share therein after all payments are made to him so far at Rs. 1000 and court fee of Rs. 75 is paid thereon under S. 34 of the Mysore Court fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958. " ( 2 ) IT appears that the defendants contended that the valuation made therein was not correct and accordingly several issues were raised on the pleadings, but issue No. 3 is the issue with which we are concerned which reads: "whether the suit is undervalued for the purpose of jurisdiction and court fee and the suit is beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court. " on this issue, the learned trial Judge has recorded the following findings:"the plaintiff is directed to value his suit in accordance with his sworn testimony contained in the affidavit dated 31-1-1968 or as mentioned in his deposition. The plaintiff is given one week's time to value his suit as stated above. " ( 3 ) THE learned Judge has also stated that the question of jurisdiction would be reserved till the plaintiff values his suit properly as directed. It is the correctness of this order of the learned trial Judge that is challenged in this revision petition. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the interpretation placed by the Court below on the provision of S. 34 of the Mysore court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 is entirely erroneous. It was submitted that under the Act what he was expected to give was an estimate of the value of his share of partnership. When such estimate has been given, it is not open to the Court to go behind it unless it is shown that it is arbitrary. It was submitted that under the Act what he was expected to give was an estimate of the value of his share of partnership. When such estimate has been given, it is not open to the Court to go behind it unless it is shown that it is arbitrary. It was further submitted that the question of arbitrariness did not arise in the present case having regard to the nature of the claim made by the plaintiff when he himself is seeking for accounts of the partnership firm and is not in possession of the account book. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the submission made in the affidavit dated 31-1-1968 when seeking an order of attachment could not have been relied upon. Similarly it was submitted that the statement made in the deposition could not be taken for the purpose of determining the valuation of the suit inasmuch as the statement made in the plaint was the correct one. S. 34 of the Mysore Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 reads:"34. Suits for dissolution of partnership: (1) In a suit for dissolution of partnership and accounts or for accounts of dissolved partnership fee shall be computed on the value of the plaintiff's share in the partnership as estimated by the plaintiff. (2) If the value of the plaintiff's share as ascertained in the suit exceeds the value as estimated in the plaint, no decree, or where there has been a preliminary decree, no final decree, shall be passed in favour of the plaintiff, no payment shall be made out of the assets of the partnership and no property shall be allotted as for the plaintiff's share until the difference between the fee actually paid and the fee that would have been payable had the suit comprised the whole of the value so ascertained is paid. (3) No final decree shall be passed, no money shall be paid and no allotment of property shall be made in favour of defendant in any such suit as, for or on account of his share of the assets of the partnership until the fee computed on the amount or value of his share of the assets of the partnership is paid. " ( 5 ) THE provisions of S. 36 of the Madras Court Fees Act, 1955 is in pari materia with S. 34 of the Mysore Act. " ( 5 ) THE provisions of S. 36 of the Madras Court Fees Act, 1955 is in pari materia with S. 34 of the Mysore Act. The question similar to the one raised in this petition was raised before the High Court of Madras in the case S. Parameswaran v. S. Sarveswaran, AIR 1960 Mad 260 . The Madras High Court considering the provisions of the Act has laid down the following principle. "when the plaintiff purports to make an estimate in regard to what he would get on the taking of an account there would necessarily be an element of some guess or speculation. There is bound to be some kind of inaccuracy if one were to consider it in relation to the actual amount that would ultimately be found due. But if the estimate is on the face of it a sham one or so obviously wrong or if the other portions of the plaint make it clear that that is not the real estimate which the plaintiff himself had in mind it would be open to the Court to look at the plaint and ascertain what the real estimate is but so long as there is no other averment in the plaint which renders the plaintiff's estimate a sham one or which shows that the estimate was some other amount the Court would be bound to accept the estimate as given by the plaintiff. Reality and not accuracy is the test for ascertaining a proper valuation under Section 36 (1 ). If the estimate were a sham estimate the Court can ask the plaintiff to make a proper estimate. But mere inaccuracy in the estimate cannot make it a sham one and therefore the Court would not be entitled to embark upon an enquiry as to what the result of the account taking will be so as to find out the real value of the relief. " ( 6 ) IF the principle laid down in the above decision is applied to the facts of this case, it may be seen that there is no averment in the plaint which renders the plaintiff's estimate a sham one or which shows that the estimate was wrong. It may also be noted that on the face of the plaint it cannot be said that the estimate made by the plaintiff is either sham one or obviously wrong one. It may also be noted that on the face of the plaint it cannot be said that the estimate made by the plaintiff is either sham one or obviously wrong one. On the contrary the plaintiff has stated that he values his share approximately and after all payments made to him are taken into consideration, his share would be Rs. 1000. Since it cannot be said that the estimate is a sham one or is opposed to the averments made in the preceding paragraphs of the plaint, the Court was not entitled to go behind the same. In arriving at the above decision, Ramachandra Iyer j. as he then was, followed the principles laid down in (1905) 1 KB. 602 and (1937) 1 KB. 201. After considering the above decisions, the madras High Court held that for finding out whether the valuation given by the plaintiff is correct, it is the reality and not the accuracy that counts. In my view, the principles laid down by the Madras High Court should be applied to the case on hand. ( 7 ) IN a decision reported in Suryanarayan v. Vizianagaram, AIR 1932 Mad. 565 . it was held as under:"the plaintiff is entitled to give the court fee on the value he has thought fit to give to the relief sought notwithstanding that he has through mistake or inadvertence stated the value for the purposes of jurisdiction at a different figure. " ( 8 ) IN Dhanji Ramji v. Kalyanji Ramji, AIR. 1956 Nag 175. Kotwal, J. as he then was. has stated: "the question whether the relief claimed is arbitrarily valued cannot arise where the plaintiff has no material in his possession or control which would enable him to definitely evalute his relief. " having regard to these authorities, it has to be held that under S. 34 of the act, what is required to be stated by the plaintiff in the plaint is his estimate. ( 9 ) IF the estimate is on the face of it obviously wrong or if the other portions of the plaint make it clear that it is not the real estimate, then it would be open to the Court to determine as to whether the estimate is real. In the absence of any other material in the plaint, the Court would be bound to accept the estimate as given in the plaint. In the absence of any other material in the plaint, the Court would be bound to accept the estimate as given in the plaint. Further, the question of holding that the estimate is arbitrary would not arise in most of the cases as there would be no material with the plaintiff to evalute his relief. In my view, in the present case, as the plantiff did not have any material in his possession which would enable him to definitely evaluate his relief and as the provisions of S. 34 (2) and (3) of the Act fully protect the interests of the State, it is not open to the Court to go behind the estimate. In that view, the order passed by the learned trial Judge on 25th January 1971 ordering the plaintiff to make a fresh valuation as stated therein is set aside and in its place, it is held that the court fee paid by the plaintiff on the plant in accordance with the provisions of S. 34 of the Act is correct. ( 10 ) AS the learned Judge has not decided the question of jurisdiction, it is open to him to decide it in accordance with law. In the result, the revision petition is allowed without any order as to costs. --- *** --- .