JUDGMENT : A. Misra, J. - Opp. party No. 1 filed an application under Order 33,Code of Civil Procedure for permission to institute a suit in forma pauperies against the present Petitioner and 3 others for cancellation of a registered sale deed dated 22-1-1965 executed by her husband and for recovery of possession. That was registered as Misc. Case No. 175 of 1968. The said Misc. Case was contested by the present Petitioner and after due enquiry and hearing as contemplated under Order 33, Rule 7,Code of Civil Procedure it was rejected by an order dated 30.4.1969 and opp. party No. 1 was directed to pay the requisite Court fee on the plaint, Opp. party No. 1 instead of paying Court fee as directed filed a fresh application under Order 33 Rule I,Code of Civil Procedure on 15.5.1969 for permission to sue in forma pauper is in respect of the same cause of action against the same parties. Among other things, the application was resisted on the ground that Order 33 Rule 15,Code of Civil Procedure is a bar to the maintainability of the second application. For opp. party No. 1, it was contended that the previous application having been rejected under Order 33 Rule 5, CPC for noncompliance with the requirements of Rules 2 and 3 and not on merits under Rule 7, the bar of Rule 15 will not apply. The learned subordinate Judge accepted this contention of opp. party No. 1 and held that the present application is not barred under Order 23 Rule 15, Code of Civil Procedure, besides holding on the evidence that opp. party No. 1 had not the means to pay the requisite Court fee. The present civil revision is directed against the aforementioned order. 2. The only point for consideration in this revision is whether in the circumstances Order 33 Rule 15, CPC will be a bar. It is not disputed that if the order in the previous misc. Case is one under Order 33 Rule 5, Code of Civil Procedure, Rule 15 will not be attracted. On the other hand, if the order on The previous ?application is construed as one under Order 33 Rule 7(3) Code of Civil Procedure, Rule 15 will be clearly a bar to the entertainment of the second application. 3. Case is one under Order 33 Rule 5, Code of Civil Procedure, Rule 15 will not be attracted. On the other hand, if the order on The previous ?application is construed as one under Order 33 Rule 7(3) Code of Civil Procedure, Rule 15 will be clearly a bar to the entertainment of the second application. 3. According to learned Counsel for Petitioner, when the refusal to allow an application takes place at a point of time when the stage of Rule 7 is reached after notice on the opp. parties, the order amounts to a refusal under Rule 7(3) which will necessarily attract the bar of Rule 15. On the other hand, learned Counsel for opp. party No. 1 contends that refusing to allow within the meaning of Order 33 Rule 15,Code of Civil Procedure must be refusal to allow on merits on the evidence that may be adduced by the parties on the question of pauperism and not refusal of an application on account of non-compliance with the requirements of Rules 2 and 3. Therefore, where the previous application is not refused on merits, the order must be construed as one under Rule 5 only irrespective of the stage at which it is passed and such an order will not be hit by Rule 15, Code of Civil Procedure. 4. For a proper appreciation of the respective contentions, it is necessary to refer to the scheme and sequence of the relevant provisions contained in Order 33,Code of Civil Procedure Rule 1 permits institution of suits in forma pauper is and defines the expression ?pauper?. Rule 2 provides for the contents of an application for permission to sue in forma pauper is. Rule 3 provides for, the manner of presentation of an application in Court and under Rule 4, where the application is in proper from and duly presented, the Court may examine the Applicant regarding the merits of the claim and his properties. Rule 5 empowers the Court to summarily reject an application where it is not framed or presented in the manner prescribed under Rules 2 and 3 or on other grounds mentioned in the different clauses there under. Rule 5 empowers the Court to summarily reject an application where it is not framed or presented in the manner prescribed under Rules 2 and 3 or on other grounds mentioned in the different clauses there under. Rule 6 provides that if the Court does not summarily reject it under Rule 5, it shall fix a date for receiving evidence in proof or disproof of pauperism that may be adduced and giving notice to the opp. party and the Government pleader. Then Rule 7 provides that after making a memorandum of the substance of the evidence, if any, that may be adduced and hearing arguments, if any, that may be advanced on the question whether the Applicant is subject to any of the prohibitions in Rule 5, the Court shall either ?allow or refuse to allow? the application to sue as a pauper. Thus, from the sequence in which the provisions occur, it is patent that the bar of Rule 15 applies only where the Court refuses to allow an application under Rule 7(3) and not where it has summarily rejected an application under Rule 5. 5. The question for consideration in this revision is whether the order on the previous application which is Ext. B is one under Rule 7(3) or one under Rule 5, Code of Civil Procedure. There is no dispute that in the previous Misc. Case No. 175 of 1968, the application was not summarily rejected, but notice was issued on all the opposite parties therein and the present Petitioner entered contest. Opposite party No. 1 herein who was the Petitioner in that case was examined and cross-examined on the date fixed. The Court came to the finding that the pauper Applicant was in possession of about II decimals of land which she had not disclosed in her application nor indicated the value thereof. Therefore, the application was rejected for non compliance with the requirements of Rule 2 without specifically recording a finding as to whether she had the means to pay the requisite Court fee or not. From these facts it is clear that the order rejecting the previous application was passed at toe stage of Rule 7 on the evidence recorded under that provision. From these facts it is clear that the order rejecting the previous application was passed at toe stage of Rule 7 on the evidence recorded under that provision. It is argued that even in those circumstances when the Court did not reject the application on a decision on merits about the pauperism of the Applicant, but on a ground which merited rejection under Rule 6, the order must be deemed to be one under the said rule and not under Rule 7(3). In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the decisions reported in Ramzan Ali v. Satul Bibi AIR 1948 All. 244 , Chandrabhagabai v. Ramchandra AIR 1947 Nag. 14, Umrao Johan Begam v. Haimunnissa AIR 1942 Oudh 169, Bombay Belting Co. v. Saw Pujmo Singh AIR 1965 Cal. 233 . These decision are clearly distinguishable. In the decision reported in Ramzan Ali v. Satul Bibi AIR 1948 All. 244 , which has been relied upon by the lower Court, it was held: Where an application to sue as a pauper has been rejected not on merits but on the ground that it bad neither been duly signed nor duly verified by the Applicant as required by Rule 2, a second application by the Applicant to sue as a pauper in respect of the same right to sue is not barred under Rule 15 even if notice had been issued to the opp. party under Rule 6, From the facts of that case, it appears that during the examination of the Applicant, it transpired that her signature had been taken on a blank paper and that the body of the application as well as the verification were filled in by her husband. The Court, therefore, dismissed the application with the observation: The application was thus not validly Executed and is defective with the consequence that it is not maintainable and is rejected but not on merits. This order of rejection was construed as not amounting to a refusal to allow the application to sue as a pauper but was clearly intended to be a rejection for not being in proper form. In the decision reported in Chandrabhagabai v. Ramchandra AIR 1947 Nag. This order of rejection was construed as not amounting to a refusal to allow the application to sue as a pauper but was clearly intended to be a rejection for not being in proper form. In the decision reported in Chandrabhagabai v. Ramchandra AIR 1947 Nag. 14, it was held that where an application or leave to sue as a pauper is dismissed for default and the stage of recording evidence as to pauperism had not been reached, the dismissal cannot be deemed to be refusal within the meaning of Rule 7(3) and Rule 15. In dealing with the distinction between rejection under Rule 5 and refusal to allow under Rule 7, it was observed: An order under Rule 5 is made before the Applicant is allowed to prove that he is a pauper and when the opposite party and the Government Pleader are not even present. Rue 7 speaks of an order refusing to allow the application to sue as a pauper. The order under that rule is made after considering the entire evidence of the Applicant and that, if any, of the opposite party. The above decision can have no application to the facts of the present case as the order of rejection in question was passed in the presence of opposite party No. 1 after examination of one witness for the Petitioner. The facts of the case reported in Umrao Johan Begum v. Haimunnissa AIR 1942 Oudh 169, are also clearly distinguishable, inasmuch as, the previous application was dismissed as withdrawn and not disallowed on the evidence. The decision reported in Bombay Belting Co. v. Sew Pujao Singh AIR 1965 Cal. 233 , also related to withdrawal of a previous application. On the other band, the decisions reported in Province of Orissa v. Dibyasingh Panda AIR 1941 Pat 595, Radhika Prasad v. Syama Gharan AIR 1966 Pat. 387 , and Harendra Kumur v. G.B. Syndicate AIR 1958 Cal. 182 , clearly lay down that if the order in the previous case is passed at the stage of Rule 7 after service of notice under Rule 6, it amounts to a refusal and Rule 15 will operate as a bar. In the decision reported in Province of Orissa v. Dibyasingh panda AIR 1941 Pat 595 the order bad been passed before service of notice had been effected on one of the opposite parties. In the decision reported in Province of Orissa v. Dibyasingh panda AIR 1941 Pat 595 the order bad been passed before service of notice had been effected on one of the opposite parties. Therefore, it was held that actually the stage of Rule 7 for disposal of the pauper application had not been reached and Rule 15 will not be a bar to the maintainability of the second application. In enunciating the principle, their Lordships followed the observations in the decision reported in AIR 1933 Cal. 5498 that where after service of notice under Order 33 Rule 6 the Petitioner did not appear and his application was dismissed for default, the order of dismissal would operate as a bar under Order 33 Rule 15, Code of Civil Procedure. In the decision reported in Radhika Prasad v. Syama Gharan AIR 1966 Pat. 387 , it was held that where it is proved that the notice under Order 33 Rule 6 had been served on the opposite party and yet on the date fixed for hearing the Applicant does not appear to take proper steps, it must be held, there being default that The dismissal is under Order 33 Rule 7 and Order 33 Rule 15 will apply to such a case and be a bar to a fresh application being entertained. To the same effect is the decision reported in Harendra Kumar v. C.B. Syndicate AIR 1958 Cal. 182 . 6. Thus, the preponderance of authority is in favour of the view that if the rejection or refusal of a pauper application bad taken place at the stage of Rule 7 after service of notice under Rule 6, it amounts to a refusal and Rule 15 will be so bar. Rule 7(1) contemplates examination of witnesses and recording of memorandum of the evidence. Under Sub-rule (2), Court is to bear the arguments which the parties may desire to offer on the question whether on the face of the application and on the evidence taken by the Court, the Applicant is or is not subject to any of the prohibitions in Rule 5 and Sub-rule (3) provides for allowing or disallowing pauper application. There is nothing in Rule 7 to confine the Court?s decision to the question of pauperism or otherwise. There is nothing in Rule 7 to confine the Court?s decision to the question of pauperism or otherwise. It has to consider whether the Applicant is subject to any of the prohibitions under Rule 5, one of them being framing and presentation of the application in the manner prescribed by Rules 2 and 3. In the present case, after recording of evidence and hearing arguments of the parties, the previous application was rejected on the ground that it did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 2. Agreeing with the view expressed in the decisions of the Calcutta and Patna High Courts referred to above I am clearly of opinion that this amounts to an order under Rule 7(3), and such, a second application is barred under Rule 15. The order of the Court below is liable to be set aside. 7. In the result, I allow the revision but in the circumstances without costs, set aside the order of the Court below and direct that the pauper application filed by opposite party No. 1 be dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed