JUDGMENT 1. APPEAL from Appellate Decrees Nos. 1141 to 1145 of 1969. APPEAL against the decree of Sri K. C. Roy, Additional District Judge, 1st Court, Howrah in Title APPEAL No. 461 of 1966, 460 of 1966, 457 of 1966, 462 of 1966 and 459 of 1966 respectively dated the 12th of July, 1968 reversing the decree of Sri N. K. Batabyal, Munsif, 5th Court, Howrah dated the 10th of September, 1966. In Nos. 1141-1142 of 1969 Sahadeb Chandra Paul. Defendant Appellant. In No. 1143 of 1969 : Pankaj Kumar Ghorai alias Roy. do. In No. 1144 of 1969 : Ekkari Roy. do. In No. 1145 of 1969 : Sm. Kamala Dasi. do. Versus. In Nos. 1141 to 1145 of 1969: Manmatha Nath Mondal and and Anr. Plaintiffs Respondents. 2. THESE five appeals are by the five tenants defendants against a common appellate judgment and decrees of reversal following it, whereby the plaintiff's five suits against the tenants defendants for recovery of possession of the respective suit premises were decreed. There were five tenancies comprised in the several rooms held by the defendants all within Municipal Holding No. 160, Kasundia Road, Howrah under the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' case is that their mother Sarat Kumari purchased the above Municipal Holding in court auction on September, 29, 1959 and the sale was confirmed on November 10, 1959. The possession of the premises was taken through court on February 19, 1960. The defendants had been tenants before Sarat Kumari's purchase in respect of the tenancies mentioned above, more particularly in the schedules of the respective plaints of the suits against the tenants, which were according to Bengali calendar month. Sarat Kumari died on May 19, 1960, leaving the plaintiffs as her heirs and legal representatives. The plaintiffs' case is that they reasonably required the suit premises for building and rebuilding after demolishing the existing structures made of split bamboo and tin-sheets with tin and tiled roofing and these structures were in old and dilapidated condition and without any facilities or modem amenities of habitation. The plaintiffs also required the suit premises for their own use and occupation after re-construction. It was further stated that the defendants were defaulters in payment of rent as they never paid any rent to them or to their predecessor nor did they validly deposit the rent with the Rent Controller. The plaintiffs also required the suit premises for their own use and occupation after re-construction. It was further stated that the defendants were defaulters in payment of rent as they never paid any rent to them or to their predecessor nor did they validly deposit the rent with the Rent Controller. The tenancies were determined by notices to quit and such notices were duly served on the defendants but as they failed to comply with the requisition, the suits were instituted for recovery of possession of the suit premises on eviction of the defendants therefrom on the aforesaid grounds and also for damages. 3. THE suits were contested by the defendants who denied that there' was any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It was further contended that they were formerly tenants of Sakhimoni Dasi and on her death became tenants under her legal heirs, her daughter Panchubala and grand-son Hirendra Nath Ghosh. As both sets of landlords claimed rent, they being in bonafide doubts as to the persons to whom rent was payable, deposited the rent with the Rent Controller in joint names of the said plaintiffs and the heirs of Sakhimoni. Further they also paid municipal rates and taxes which were payable by the landlords and for which they were entitled to adjustment. Accordingly it was stated that they were not defaulters in payment of rent. It was also stated that. the structures on the suit lands were: in good condition and not in dilapidated] condition as alleged. THE defendants; denied that the plaintiffs reasonably required the suit premises for buildings and re-building and for their own use and occupation. It was also contended that the notices were bad and were not dufy served. THE defendant*;, accordingly, submitted that the suits;, in the premises, should be dismissed. 4. THE suits were tried analogously before the learned munsif as common question of law and fact were involve!. On a trial on evidence before him the learned munsiff found that the plaintiffs failed to establish that there was any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It was also held that the notices were served on all except the defendant Pankaj who, it appears from the endorsement, refused the notice and this was also accepted as good service. THE learned munsif also found that the notices were legal, valid and sufficient. It was also held that the notices were served on all except the defendant Pankaj who, it appears from the endorsement, refused the notice and this was also accepted as good service. THE learned munsif also found that the notices were legal, valid and sufficient. It was further held that the deposits of rent with the Rent Controller were not valid and adjustments were unauthorised. It was also held that the defendant Pankaj, the appellant in S. A. No. 1143 of 1969 never made any deposit of rent with the Rent Controller also. THE learned Munsif found that the plaintiffs held the lands as thika tenants and they reasonably required the premises for buildings and rebuilding and also for their own use and occupation. In the view, however, that was taken in regard to relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, the suits were dismissed. Appeals were preferred against the said decision by the plaintiffs landlords and the appellate court held that there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and if Sakhimoni inducted some of the defendants as tenants, she did it only as an agent of Gopal whose interest was auction-purchased by Sarat Kumari. It was held that the notices determining the tenancies were legal, valid and sufficient and were duly served. The appellate court also found that the plaintiffs established that they reasonably required the suit premises for building and re-building as also for their own use and occupation and further that the defendants were defaulters in payment of rent. The appeals heard analogously were, accordingly, allowed and the plaintiffs' suits were decreed and the defendants' cross-objections against finding on default were dismissed. The present appeals are by the tenants defendants against the said decision and have been heard analogously before me. Mr. Sachindra Chandra Dasgujita appearing for the appellants, has firstly contended that the appellate court was wrong in holding that there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It was contended that the defendants were inducted in the premises by Sakhimoni and there was no evidence adduced by the plaintiffs :in support to show that they were tenants under Gopal, whose interest, as already stated, was purchased by Sarat Kumari, Mr. It was contended that the defendants were inducted in the premises by Sakhimoni and there was no evidence adduced by the plaintiffs :in support to show that they were tenants under Gopal, whose interest, as already stated, was purchased by Sarat Kumari, Mr. Monomohan Mukherjee, learned advocate appearing for the plaintiffs respondents contended that the appellate court was justified, on the materials on record, to hold that the plaintiffs established that they were the landlords of the tenants appellants in respect of the suit premises. 5. IT appears from the records that Gopal Pan was a ihika tenant in respect of the suit premises and Sakhimcni was his mother. Sarat Kumari filed a suit as early as 1935 for recovery of a loan of Rs. 5001- advanced by her to Gopal and in that suit the suit property was attached. Sakhimoni started a claim-case against the attachment in 1936 which was dismissed. Thereafter Sarat Kumari obtained the decree :in her suit against Gopal in respect of the above loan and Sakhimoni filed a regular title suit under order 21 Rule 63 of the Code for a declaration that the suit premises, meaning the tenant's interest in the land as also in the structures, belonged to her and not to Gopal and could not thus be subject iof attachment. This suit was dismissed and the appeal therefrom also was dismissed. The decree obtained by Sarat Kumari against Gopal thereafter was put into execution but the execution was stayed by the debt settlement board at the instance of Gopal. The said stay order was vacated sometime in 1958 and Isakhimoni thereafter filed (another] Title Suit in 1959 for declaration of her title in the suit premises by adverse possession. This suit was dismissed in Maroh 1962. IT may be mentioned here that during the pendency of this suit Sakhimoni died and her heirs Panchu- bala and Hiren Ghosh were substituted in her place. An appeal from that decision was also dismissed and a second appeal to this Hon'ble Court was summarily dismissed on November 16, 1965. IT appears that the plaintiffs then informed the defendants about their title and asking them to attorne and thereafter the present suits were filed on determination of the tenancy. An appeal from that decision was also dismissed and a second appeal to this Hon'ble Court was summarily dismissed on November 16, 1965. IT appears that the plaintiffs then informed the defendants about their title and asking them to attorne and thereafter the present suits were filed on determination of the tenancy. The appellate court held that Gopal was the owner of the suit premises as a thika tenant and that interest was purchased by Sarat Kumari and it is too late in the day, in my opinion, to challenge that position. If Sakhimoni who thus had no interest in the premises had inducted any tenant, she could do so only for Gopal and as his agent, as was rightly held by the appellate court. Accordingly the defendant must be held to be the tenants of Sarat Kumari and thereafter, on her death, of the plaintiffs. The relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties was, therefore, established by the several proceedings which were taken, as mentioned above. There is, therefore, no merit in this contention raised on behalf of the appellants. 6. THE next question is about the legality and validity of the notices. It has been contended that the notices were bad in law as they did not state the commencement of the tenancies. In the notices it was stated that the tenancies would stand determined with the expiry of the following Bengali Calendar month or the English Calendar month according to the tenancy of the defendants. It may be noted that the plaintiffs were not aware about the month of the tenancy of the defendants and accordingly the notices were issued in the manner. It has been contended on behalf of the appellants that the notices should also state the commencement of the tenancies and in absence of such statement the notices were not valid. It would, however, appear to me that the notice, as required under see. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, should only state that the tenancy is determined with the expiry of month of the tenancy. Here by way of caution the landlords had mentioned both English and Bengali Calendar months its they were unaware of the month of the tenancy. THE commencement of the tenancy need not be stated in notices under section 106 of, the Transfer of Property Act or section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Here by way of caution the landlords had mentioned both English and Bengali Calendar months its they were unaware of the month of the tenancy. THE commencement of the tenancy need not be stated in notices under section 106 of, the Transfer of Property Act or section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. THE notices, therefore, cannot be held to be invalid for the above reason. It may be mentioned here that in the plaints the plaintiffs have stated categorically that the month of the tenancies was according to Bengali Calendar month and that position has also been accepted by the defendants. It can, therefore, be said that no illegality attached to the impugned notice. As to their service, we have already seen that those were served on all defendants except Pankaj who refused the same but such refusal also tantamounts to valid service and accordingly it is held that the notices were legal and valid and they were duly served on all the defendants. 9, THE next point that has been urged by Mr. Dasgupta is about the question of default. He has contended that the courts below did not consider the question as to whether the tenants were defaulters in payment of rent in proper perspective. It appears that exce;pt Pankaj all the tenants deposited rent with the Kent Controller in the joint names of the plaintiffs and the heirs of Sakmmoni. Such deposits in the joint names were occasioned by the fact that rent was being demanded by two different sets of landlords and the defendants having doubts as to the persons entitled to the same were entitled to make-the deposits in the joint names, as provided in sec. 21(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. THE courts below in coming to their conclusion that the defendants were defaulters do not appear to have considered the deposit challans (Ex. G series) with reference to the respective dates of deposit. THE courts should have also considered whether Municipal rates and taxes that were being paid by them against rent. THE courts below in coming to their conclusion that the defendants were defaulters do not appear to have considered the deposit challans (Ex. G series) with reference to the respective dates of deposit. THE courts should have also considered whether Municipal rates and taxes that were being paid by them against rent. It would appear from the judgment of the appellate court that there is no finding about the claim for such adjustment or the ad- missibility of such claim and the appellate court had simply affirmed the findings of the trial court' which also suffer from the infirmity of absence of any detailed examination in this respect. There is another statement in the judgment of the appellate court that the question of default was not challenged by the defendants and Mr. Mukherjee submitted that after such concession the defendants appellants should not be allowed to raise this point once again. It, however seems to me that the appellate court must have based this observation on a casual remark of the learned advocate for the defendants and this cannot preclude the defendants from challenging the findings on default, as otherwise the cross-objection filed by the defendants before the lower appellate court would have been dismissed as not pressed and if default was conceded, there could be no scope of any dispute. In the view I have taken it is necessary that these cases, except the suit against Pankaj, should be sent back to the lower appellate court for a consideration of the question of default with reference to the deposit challans (Exts. G series) as also the municipal taxes receipts which are all marked as exhibits if the claim for adjustment of such taxes paid by tine tenants is found by the court as admissible. The next point that requires consideration is about the ground of eviction being the alleged reasonable requirement of the plaintiffs for their own use and occupation. There is mo dispute that the interest of the plaintiffs in the suit lands is that of a thilka. tenant and, therefore, they cannot be said to be the owners of the lands. Under Sec. (f) prior to amendment r (ff) after amendment, in an action for eviction on the ground of own use and occupation it is necessary that tire landlord must be the owner as well. tenant and, therefore, they cannot be said to be the owners of the lands. Under Sec. (f) prior to amendment r (ff) after amendment, in an action for eviction on the ground of own use and occupation it is necessary that tire landlord must be the owner as well. In the decision in (1) Yogamaya Pakhira v. Santi Sudha Bo*e I.L.R. (1968!) 2 Cal. 70 i-t was held that the expression "owner" must be given its ordinary connotation or dictionary or usual meaning, that is, a person having full and absolute ownership of the disputed property and would not include a permanent lessee. On the authority of the above decision which is of a division bench and is binding on me, I hold that the plaintiffs are not entitled to a decree for eviction on the ground of their requirement of the premises for their own use and occupation, they not being the owners of the premises and as thika tenants they are liable to eviction on certain grounds. 7. THE other ground on which ejectment is sought for is for building and re-building. On this point also the decision of the appellate court suffers from serious infirmity. It would appear that in the proceedings no final plan in respect of the proposed constructions was submitted by the plaintiffs. What was filed was a sketch plan and a provisional one, as admitted by the plaintiffs' engineer. THE sketch plan is of no importance since it is not a final plan as it could be altered or amended at any time. THE requirement of a plan becomes all the more necessary in view of the provisions of clause (f), which, along with clause (ff), was substituted for the original clause (f) in subsection (1) of Sec. 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 by its Second Amendment Act (Act XXXIV of 1969). By the said Act the provisions of the new clause (f) as stated above, as also of Sec. ISA as a new section were made to apply to all pending suits and appeals. For the purposes of giving adequate relief to the tenants, if they are found entitled to the same, as provided in sec. 18A, it is also necessary that there should be a final plan of buildins and. rebuilding on the basis whereof the court would decree the plaintiffs' suits if their claim is established. For the purposes of giving adequate relief to the tenants, if they are found entitled to the same, as provided in sec. 18A, it is also necessary that there should be a final plan of buildins and. rebuilding on the basis whereof the court would decree the plaintiffs' suits if their claim is established. 8. IN that view of the matter, bath on. the ground of default and on the ground of building and, re-building it is necessary that the suits, other than the suit againit Pankaj, should go back to the lower appellate court on remand for a decision on these two grounds which, according to the plaintiffs, are the grounds for the eviction of the defendants from the suit premises for that purpose the court will afford opportunity to the plaintiffs to adduce such evidence as they may be advised with like opportunity to the defendants to adduce evidence in rebuttal. The court, on the materials on record as also on such evidence as may be adduced, will determine the question as to whether the defendants other than the defendant Pankaj are defaulters in payment of rent and also whether the plaintiffs require the premises for building and re-building and on such findings dispose of the suits. The question of the plaintiffs' financial condition to erect the necessary constructions has not been disputed before me and no further evidence need be given and the findings of the court of appeal below on this respect is not disturbed. IN the result, Second Appeal No. 1143 of 1969 filed by Pankaj is dismissed without any order as to costs. The other four appeals are allowed and the judgments under appeal in regard to the finding about default, building and re-building as also own use and occupation are set aside and the fir din-is in regard to the ethers are affirmed. The said four suits are now sent back to the lower appellate court on remand for its adjudication of the two grounds of eviction, namely, default and the question of requirement of the suit premises by the plaintiffs on the ground of building and re-building and on such findings as may be arrived the said court shall finally dispose of the suits. There will, however, be no order as to costs in any of these appeals in this court. There will, however, be no order as to costs in any of these appeals in this court. The appellate court will take expeditious steps for hearing of the appeals. Let the records be sent down as early as possible.