( 1 ) THIS revision application is filed by the tenant against the order passed by the Munsiff on the 20th of January, 1971, holding that at that stage it was not possible to hold that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application. It arises in this way: the respondent-landlord filed an application for eviction of the petitioner on several grounds under the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961. The contention of the tenant is that the property which has been leased out to him is an agricultural holding and not a premises as defined under the mysore Rent Control Act, and, therefore the proceedings initiated for his eviction under the provisions of S. 21 of the Rent Control Act, are not maintainable. The main contention of the tenant is that the proceedings under Rent Control Act are not maintainable at all. The tenant made a prayer to the Court to raise preliminary issue and requested the Court to dispose of that issue. The learned Judge took the view that it would be inappropriate for him to decide the matter tentatively. He therefore held, that at that stage it cannot be held that the proceedings under the Rent control Act are barred. The learned Judge also took the view that the rent Control Act did not envisage preliminary hearing on any points and he therefore held, that it is not possible to hold that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings at this stage and so rejected the prayer of the tenant. It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in this revision application. The landlord then applied for an order Under s. 29 of the Rent Control Act, to direct the tenant to deposit the rents. The court passed an order directing payment. The tenant did not deposit the amount. So an order stopping further proceedings has been passed and that is challenged in CRP. No. 361 of 1971. ( 2 ) IN my view, the learned Judge has approached the entire matter from an erroneous view. The word 'tenant' has been defined under S. 3 (r) of the Act as stating any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a premises and 'premises' is defined in S. 3 (n) as (i) a building defined in clause (a); (ii) any land not used for agricultural purposes. The word 'tenant' has been defined under S. 3 (r) of the Act as stating any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a premises and 'premises' is defined in S. 3 (n) as (i) a building defined in clause (a); (ii) any land not used for agricultural purposes. So, the proceedings under the Rent Control Act can be initiated against a tenant as defined under the Act, i. e. , a tenant of any premises. If relationship is not disputed then the Court can proceed in the matter. When the very jurisdictional fact is challenged on the ground that the property occupied by the person is not a premises, it was incumbent on the Court to determine this jurisdictional fact. If it is not determined at an early stage, irreparable damage will be caused to the tenant as in the present case. It is necessary to note that there will be no other stage when this question can be decided. If the present order is upheld then the tenant will have no opportunity to show that the proceedings are not maintainable and the order stopping further proceedings become final. This view taken by me is supported by the decision of this Court in the case of Venkataram v. P. H. Seshagiri Roa, 1065 1 Mys. L. J. 560. At page 561 this is what this Court has stated:"there is not and cannot be any dispute before me that the munsiff functioning under the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation control Act is not an ordinary Civil Court of general jurisdiction, but a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, the scope of which is defined by the special Act under which he functions. The principal purpose of that Act is briefly to control the relationship between landlords and tenants in respect of buildings, hotels and lodging houses. Unless the subject matter of the proceeding is a dispute relating to a lease of a building, hotel or lodging house and unless the parties to the proceeding are landlord and tenant in respect of such building, hotel or lodging house, the tribunals and authorities functioning under the statute would have no jurisdiction to exercise any of the powers conferred on them by that statute. In otherwords, the existence of such relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of a house, hotel or lodging house is a jurisdictional fact, in the absence of which the munsiff would have no jurisdiction to function under the statute. When the existence of that jurisdictional fact is questioned unless the statute vests in some other authority the power to decide upon the existence or otherwise of that jurisdictional fact, it is well established that it is the duty of the tribunal itself to decide whether the jurisdictional fact exists, subject no doubt to correction by the High Court, in the event of its committing an error in deciding that question. " ( 3 ) IN view of the clear observations of this Court, the Court deciding a case under the Kent Control Act has to decide whether the lease in the case is a lease of a premises as defined under S. 3 (n) of the Act, and unless a determination is made, it has no jurisdiction to go further in the matter. ( 4 ) IN M. B. Tambakad v. B. S. Homkan, 1965 1 Mys. L. J. 257. it has been laid down that- the Rent Court being a special Tribunal created by a statute is governed by the provisions of the enactment creating it. No provision is made in the house Rent Control Act for any interim order based upon what may be called prima facie material placed by the contesting parties. " ( 5 ) CRP. 44 of 1969 (3), decided on 25th of February 1971, this court has stated thus:"s. 21 of the Act provides for obtaining the eviction of a tenant' on a petition filed by the landlord against the tenant on any of the grounds specified in the said section. The words 'landlord' and 'tenant' have been defined in Ss. 3 (n) and 3 (r) respectively. When the respondent in proceedings taken under S. 2i of the Act contends that he is not the tenant and there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, the Court has to decide as a jurisditional fact whether the petitioner is the landlord and the respondent is the tenant' as defined under the Act. When the respondent in proceedings taken under S. 2i of the Act contends that he is not the tenant and there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, the Court has to decide as a jurisditional fact whether the petitioner is the landlord and the respondent is the tenant' as defined under the Act. That power to adjudicate on this question of existence of relationship of the landlord and tenant is incidental to the jurisdiction conferred on the Court under S. 21 of the Act. " ( 6 ) THE learned Advocate for the petitioner also brought to my notice the judgment of the Supreme Court, in the case of Express Newspapers' (P) Ltd. v. The Workers, AIR 1963 SC 569 . In paragraph 12 of the judgment this is what their Lordships have stated:"12. It is also true that even if the dispute is tried by the Industrial tribunal, at the very commencement the Industrial Tribunal will have to examine as a preliminary issue the question as to whether the dispute referred to it is an industrial dispute or not, and the decision of this question would inevitably depend upon the view which the industrial Tribunal may take as to whether the action taken by the appellant is a closure or a lockout. The finding which the Industrial tribunal may record on this preliminary issue will decide whether it has jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute or not. If the finding is that the action of the appellant amounts to a closure, there would be an end to the proceedings before the tribunal so far as the main dispute is concerned. If, on the other hand, the finding is that the action of the appellant amounts to a lockout which has been disguised as a closure, then the Tribunal will be entitled to deal with the reference. The finding which the Tribunal may make on this preliminary issue is a finding on the jurisdictional fact and it is only when the jurisdictional fact is found against the appellant that the Industrial tribunal would have jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute. This position is also not in dispute. The finding which the Tribunal may make on this preliminary issue is a finding on the jurisdictional fact and it is only when the jurisdictional fact is found against the appellant that the Industrial tribunal would have jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute. This position is also not in dispute. "having regard to these principles laid down in these sections, it is clear that before the Court considers the merits of the case, the Court was required to decide the main jurisdictional fact as to whether the proceedings were maintainable on the ground that the subject matter of the lease was not a premises, but was an agricultural holding; the Court has to decide this matter finally by recording evidence in the case and not tentatively. ( 7 ) IN that view of the matter, the order passed by the learned judge is erroneous. The order passed by the learned Judge on 20th of january 1971 is therefore set aside and he is directed to dispose of the proceedings in the light of the observations made in this judgment. --- *** ---