HONNIAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiff for a decree declaring his title to the suit schedule properties, lor recovery of possession from the defendants, and for recovery of mesne profits from the date of suit till the date of delivery of the suit schedule properties to him. The facts that have given rise to this appeal are briefly thus: The plaintiff is a Hindu governed by the law of Mithakshara. The plaint schedule properties originally belonged to one Sinagarappa, paternal grandfather of the plaintiff and after his death, his sons Peddanna, Hanumanthappa, karappa, Honnurappa, Vasanthappa (father of the plaintiff) succeeded to the properties and held the same as joint family properties. The plaintiff's father and his brothers lived as members of a joint Hindu family. The other brothers of Vasanthappa died issueless leaving behind them Vasanthappa and the plaintiff as the only surviving coparceners. The plaintiff's father was in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties till his death in 1948 and thereafter the plaintiff succeeded to the properties as the sole surviving coparcener. At that time the plaintiff was s minor and on the date of the suit, he was aged about 20 years. During his minority, the 5th defdt. Narayanappa claiming himself as a de facto guardian of the plaintiff sold all the items of the suit schedule properties to defendants 1 to 4. We are concerned in this appeal only with the sale of item No. 1 in favour of defendant 2 under Ext. D-4 date 1 5-2-1959 after the coming into force of the Hindu Minority and Guardian ship Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). ( 2 ) THE trial Court decreed the claim of the plaintiff in respect of all the suit items except item No. 1. Aggrieved by that decision, the plaintiff preferred R. A. No. 178 of 1965 and defendants. 1 and 4 preferred R. A. No. 30. of 1965 on the file of the District Judge, Tumkur. The main questions involved in the case were: (i) whether the 5th defendant sold the suit schedule properties to other defendants for legal necessity and benefit of the plaintiff ? (ii) whether the alienations were binding on the plaintiff ? 1 and 4 preferred R. A. No. 30. of 1965 on the file of the District Judge, Tumkur. The main questions involved in the case were: (i) whether the 5th defendant sold the suit schedule properties to other defendants for legal necessity and benefit of the plaintiff ? (ii) whether the alienations were binding on the plaintiff ? (iii) whether the plaintiff ratified the acts of the 5th defendant, and if so, is he estopped from the bringing the suit. ( 3 ) ON the first question, both the Courts came to the conclusion that the 5th defendant had not sold the properties for legal necessity and benefit of the plaintiff. On the question of ratification, the lower appellate court disagreeing with the trial Court came to the conclusion that the ratification evidenced by the agreement Ext. D-5 dated 23-7-1961, was vitiated by fraud and undue influence. In the above view, the lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal of defendants 1 and 4 and allowed the appeal of the plaintiff. As against this, defendant 2 has preferred this second appeal. ( 4 ) THIS second appeal has been referred to a Division Bench by Jagan- natha Shetty, J. , on the ground that it involves a substantial question of law regarding interpretation of S. 11 of the Act. The trial Court came to the conclusion that defendant 5 was not an illatom son-in-law of the family and as such could not be considered as a de facto guardian of the plaintiff, who was a minor then. The landing of the lower appellate Court on this question is also the same. ( 5 ) EVEN assuming as contended by Mr. Srinivasan for defendant 2, that defendant 5 was an illatom son-in-law of the family and a de facto guardian of the plaintiff, in view of the provisions contained in S. 11 of the Act he could not have disposed of or dealt with the properties of the plaintiff when he was a minor on the ground that he was a de facto guardian of the minor. Mr. Srinivasan however contended that in view of the agreement Ext. D-5 dated 23-7-1961 executed by the plaintiff, after he attained majority, agreeing to re-purchase item No. 1 for a sum of rs. 2,5000, i. e. for the same amount that defendant 2 paid under the sale deed Ext. D-4, the sale under Ext. Mr. Srinivasan however contended that in view of the agreement Ext. D-5 dated 23-7-1961 executed by the plaintiff, after he attained majority, agreeing to re-purchase item No. 1 for a sum of rs. 2,5000, i. e. for the same amount that defendant 2 paid under the sale deed Ext. D-4, the sale under Ext. D-4 effected by defendant 5 in favour of defendant 2 stood ratified, and, therefore, the plaintiff could not impeach it. S. 11 of the Act provides that after the commencement of this Act no person shall be entitled to dispose of or deal with the property of a Hindu minor merely on the ground of his or her being a de facto guardian of the minor. From the wording of the section it is clear that it brings about a material change in the law relating to de facto guardians under hindu Law. In view of the prohibition contained in the express terms that after the commencement of this Act no person has right or authority to dispose of minor's property as de facto guardian of such minor, any transfer purporting to be on behalf of the minor made by a de facto guardian is void abinitio. If that is the legal position, the question is whether the minor after attaining majority can validate the same by ratifying it either expressly or by necessary implication. ( 6 ) MR. Srinivasan relies upon two decisions in support of his contention that the minor can ratify the alienations made by a de facto guardian during his minority after he attains majority. The first decision is the one in Panchu v. Harishikesh Ghose, AIR. 1960 Cal. 446. That was a ease which related to an alienation prior to the Act came into force. In that case the alienations had been made by the de facto guardian for the benefit of the minor. After reviewing a number of decisions, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that an alienation by a de facto guardian made for legal necessity or for the benefit of a minor could not be impeached on the ground that the alienation was made by a person who was merely a de facto guardian. After reviewing a number of decisions, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that an alienation by a de facto guardian made for legal necessity or for the benefit of a minor could not be impeached on the ground that the alienation was made by a person who was merely a de facto guardian. In the course of the judgment, the learned Judge observed that a sale by a de facto guardian of a minor which was not made for legal necessity or for the benefit of the minor was not binding on the minor and when the alienation by de facto guardian was for legal necessity or for the benefit of the minor, it coud be ratified by the minor on his attaiinng majority The other case to which reference was made is one in Kailash Chandra Pradhan v. Ranjani Kanta Panda, AIR. 1945 Pat. 298. ( 7 ) IN this case it was held as follows:"the distinction between the powers of the two classes of guardians lies in the fact that while the de jure guardian is under the law clothed with authority to deal with the minor's property, the de facto guardian is not clothed with similar authority, though if the latter alienates the minor's property for his benefit, the Court will uphold the transaction. In the case of an alienation by a de jure guardian, not for the benefit of the minor, the guardian acts in excess of his authority derived under the law, whereas in the case of a similar alienation by a de facto guardian, his act is wholly unauthorised. In the latter case, however, the minor may choose to ratify the transaction, though it is not binding on him. To that extent the alienation is voidable. " ( 8 ) THIS case is also one decided before the coming into force of the Act. Therefore, neither of them is of any assistance to the appellant. As the law stands after the coming into force of the Act, under no circumstance, a de facto guardian can transfer the minor's property merely on the ground of his being a de facto guardian. Therefore, neither of them is of any assistance to the appellant. As the law stands after the coming into force of the Act, under no circumstance, a de facto guardian can transfer the minor's property merely on the ground of his being a de facto guardian. If in those circumstances, defendant 5 claiming himself to be a de facto guardian alienated the properties of the minor plaintiff after the coming into force of the Act, the transfers are void and if that be so, the question is whether void transactions could be ratified by a minor after he attains majority. The effect of the transaction being void is that no title passes to the alienee and the minor continues to be the owner of the property even after such transfer. Under ext. D-5, according to Mr. Srinivasan. the plaintiff agreed to purchase item No. 1 from defendant 2 for a sum of Rs. 2,500, being the amount defendant 2 is said to have paid under Ext. D-4 as consideration. The position is that the plaintiff by entering into such an agreement was intending to buy his own property. In that event, it cannot be said that the agreement is supported by consideration muchless such an agreement could validate the alienation made by a de facto guardian during the minority of the plaintiff. A ratification in law implies that the person who ratifies had the authority when the transfer took place to authorise the transaction and being a minor he was not competent to authorise such an act and if that be so, he cannot validate it by ratifying it subsequently when he attains majority. The view taken by us is supported by the Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court in Govind Ram v. Piran Ditfd, AIR. 1935 Lah. 561. The view taken by us is supported by the Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court in Govind Ram v. Piran Ditfd, AIR. 1935 Lah. 561. wherein it was held that subsequent ratification by a person on attaining the age of majority of a transaction which was originally null and void by virtue of the fact that he entered into it while still a minor, does not form a valid contract on which a suit can be maintained; since the contract entered into by the minor during his minority is a nullity and unenforceable at law, no question therefore, of its ratification arises, and the consideration which passed under the earlier contract cannot be imported into the contract into which the minor entered on attainment of majority. Therefore, whatever may be the position before the Act came into force, there cannot be any doubt that after the coming into force of the Act, in view of the provisions of S. 11 of the Act, a minor on attaining majority cannot validate a sale by a de facto guardian by ratification. Even otherwise in this case the lower appellate Court found that Ext. D-5, on which reliance is placed, was obtained by defendant 2 by exercising undue influence and fraud. That being a finding of fact, in second appeal this Court will be reluctant to interfere with that finding unless it is manifestly perverse. We do not find any reason to interfere with the finding of the lower appellate Court in this regard. For the reasons stated above, this appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. --- *** --- .