M. R. A. ANSARI ( 1 ) THESE two appeals arise out of the judgment of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) in suit No. 208 of 1962. ( 2 ) BALBIR Kohli (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner filed an application under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) claiming compensation of Rs, 50,000. 00 for the injuries sustained by him in a motor accident which occurred on 19. 10. 1962. According to the averments in the petition, the petitioner was walking on the Nicholson Road on 16. 10. 1962 at 11 A. M. when a motor car, bearing registration No. DLD 1007, driven by one Des Raj Singh, came at full speed and leaving its proper side of the road, turned towards the opposite side of the road on which the petitioner was walking and knocked him down as a result of which he received serious injuries. The further case of the petitioner was that the driver of the car. Ram Sabad, respondent herein, had taken the car to Mori Gate side on the instructions of his employer, Mr. P. N. Khanna, the owner of the car, and that the car stopped on the way on account of some defect in the dynamo and that the driver then sought the assistance of Des Raj Singh who was a mechanic in the Punjab Motor Workshop situated nearby and while Des Raj Singh was trying to start the car and Ram Sabad was pushing it, the car started and suddenly picked up _speed and Des Raj Singh was unable to control it and the car swerved to the right side of the road and knocked down the petitioner. After the petitioner was taken to a nursing home, it was found that he sustained fracture of the skull bone and he remained in the nursing home for a number of days for treatment. Even after he was discharged from the nursing home, he continued to suffer from headache and fatigue on account of the injury to the skull bone. As a result of this injury, the petitioners s earning capacity was cosiderably reduced. He, therefore, claimed a sum of Rs. 50,000. 00 by way of compensation for the actual as well as the general damages. As a result of this injury, the petitioners s earning capacity was cosiderably reduced. He, therefore, claimed a sum of Rs. 50,000. 00 by way of compensation for the actual as well as the general damages. ( 3 ) THE petition was opposed by Ram Sabad, driver of the car and Mr. P. N. Khanna owner of the car respondents herein. According to the joint written statement filed by them, it was first of all denied that Ram Sabad was the employee of Mr. P. N. Khanna, It was further alleged that Ram Sabad had merely asked Des Raj Singh to repair the dynamo of the car and that he did not ask him to drive the car. While Ram Sabad was taking tea in the nearby restaurant, Des Raj Singh drove the car without the authority of Ram Sabad and caused the accident. Under these circumstances. Ram Sabad and Mr. P. N. Khanna denied any liability to pay any compensation to the petitioner. The Insurance Company with which the car was insured and which was also impleaded as a party by the petitioner, filed a separate written statement denying its liability to pay any compensation to the petitioner on the ground that under the terms of the insurance policy, the Insurance company was not responsible for the act of Des Raj Singh who did not hold a licence to drive the car. ( 4 ) THE following issues were framed by the learned Tribunal 1. Whether the accident resulting in the injuries to the petitioner was caused by rash and negligent act of driving of car by respondent No. 1 as alleged in para 22 of the petition ? 2. Whether respondent No. 2 is not liable on the grounds mentioned in para 22 of its written statement ? 3. To what amount, if any, as damages is the petitioner entitled ? 3. A. Whether Des Raj Singh was driving the car at the relevant time without the knowledge, authority and consent of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 as pleaded in para 22 of their written statement ? If so, its effect. ? The learned Tribunal held that the accident occurred due to the rashness and negligence of Des Raj Singh and Des Raj Singh himself was driving the car under the authority of Ram Sabad. He, therefore, held that Mr. 1 and 2 as pleaded in para 22 of their written statement ? If so, its effect. ? The learned Tribunal held that the accident occurred due to the rashness and negligence of Des Raj Singh and Des Raj Singh himself was driving the car under the authority of Ram Sabad. He, therefore, held that Mr. P. N. Khanna was vicariously liable for the rashness and negligence of Des Raj Singh. On issue No. 2, the learned Tribunal held that the Insurance company was not liable to pay any compensation to the petitioner inasmuch as the accident was caused by Des Raj Singh who was not a licensed driver. On the quantum of compensation, the learned Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 4,894. 84 np. as compensation to the petitioner and he made Mr. P. N. Khanna alone liable for it. Mr. P. N. Khanna has filed an appeal against the award of compensation to the petitioner and the petitioner has filed the other appeal for enhancement of the compensation. ( 5 ) THE first question for consideration is whether the accident occurred in the manner alleged by the petitioner or in the manner alleged by the respondents ? The petitioner himself was not able to throw any light upon this point as he was not aware how Des Raj Singh came to drive the car. According to him, he was going on the right side when the car came at a high speed and dashed against him and he fell down and became unconscious. According to him, he re-gained consciousness five days later. He has, however, examined a number of witnesses who are alleged to have witnessed the accident from the beginning till the end. A. W. 2 Bhisham, is one of them and he is the person who gave the first information report to the police. According to. this witness, Des Raj Singh was sitting in the driver s seat and Ram Sabad was pushing the car. " He further stated that suddenly the car started and picked up speed and went out of the control of Des Raj Singh. The evidence of this witness is sought to be challenged on the ground that in the report given by him to the police, which is marked as Ex. Public Witness2/1 it was not stated that Ram Sabad was pushing the car. The evidence of this witness is sought to be challenged on the ground that in the report given by him to the police, which is marked as Ex. Public Witness2/1 it was not stated that Ram Sabad was pushing the car. This omission is not material in view of the fact that apart from the fact that the other witnesses examined on the side of the petitioner also corroborated A. W. 2. on this point Des; Raj Singh himself, who was examined as RW1, stated in his evidence that while he was trying to start the car sitting behind the steering wheel, the car was being pushed. He does not, of course, admit that the car was being pushed by Ram Sabad. But at the same time, he did not state that the car was being pushed by some one other than Ram Sabad. It cannot, therefore, be said that A. W. 2 is improving upon his earlier statement and is not speaking the truth when he stated that Ram Sabad was pushing the car while Des Raj Singh was trying to start it. A. Ws 6 to 9 also have stated in their evidence that while Des Raj Singh was sitting behind the steering wheel. Ram Sabad was pushing the car. While some of these witnesses were not examined by the police during the investigation, the statement of A. W. 7 was recorded by the police The evidence of these witnesses considered along with the admission made by Des Raj Singh is sufficient to prove that the accident occurred while Des Raj Singh was driving the car and Ram Sabad was pushing it Des Raj Singh himself did not possess any licence to drive the car and the fact that he could not control the car after it had started also shows that he was not capable of driving the car. Des Raj Singh, in his statement, Ex. R1 made before the Magistrate in the criminal case filed against him, has also admitted that the accident occurred due to. his rashness and negligence in driving the car. Therefore, it has to be held that the accident occurred on account of the rashness and negligence of Des Raj Singh, who was authorised by Ram Sabad to start the car. R1 made before the Magistrate in the criminal case filed against him, has also admitted that the accident occurred due to. his rashness and negligence in driving the car. Therefore, it has to be held that the accident occurred on account of the rashness and negligence of Des Raj Singh, who was authorised by Ram Sabad to start the car. ( 6 ) THE next question for consideration is whether P. N. Khanna, the owner of the car, could he held vicariously liable for the accident ? Although it was contended before the learned Tribunal that Ram Sabad was not employed by P. N. Khanna to drive the car, this contention was not repeated before me, probably in view of the admission made by the respondents in their written statement that P. N. Khanna was the owner of the vehicle and Ram Sabad was his driver and also that P. N. Khannahad sent the car to Ram Sabad driver for taking his child from his residence to Nicholson Road. Therefore, the accident occurred while Ram Sabad was engaged in the discharge of his duties as the driver of P. N. Khanna. Although the owner of the car had not specifically authorised the driver to carry out the repairs to the dynamo, it would appear from the evidence of Ram Samad himself that while he was taking his master s child to Nicholson Road, the car stopped on the way on account of some defect in the dynamo. R. W. 4 could not be expected to leave the car on the road and to seek further instructions from his master. The car had not stopped due to any major break-down but only because of some minor defect in the dynamo. In the normal course, the driver of the car would have to get the defect rectified especially when the car happened to stop near a motor workshop. It cannot be said that Ram Sabad was acting in excess of his authority when he asked Des Raj Singh to repair the dynamo. Even if it is assumed for a moment that Ram Sabad was not pushing the car and that the car was being pushed by some one else. It cannot be said that Ram Sabad was acting in excess of his authority when he asked Des Raj Singh to repair the dynamo. Even if it is assumed for a moment that Ram Sabad was not pushing the car and that the car was being pushed by some one else. Ram Sabad should have expected that while repairing the dynamo and in order to see whether the dynamo was working properly, Des Raj Singh had to start the car either by using the self starter or by having the car pushed. It cannot, therefore, be said that what Des Raj Singh did was also in excess of what he was authorised to do by Ram Sabad. Therefore, the accident occurred while Ram Sabad was discharging his duties as a driver of the car in the course of his employement under P. N. Khanna. ( 7 ) IN Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Saria Devi and others, a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court has enunciated the principles regarding the master s liability for a tort committed by a servant in the following terms : "it is well established that the master is bound by the acts of the servant even if the act was unauthorised or say prohibited provided the act was within the scope of the service or employment. The principle is that when a servant does any act which he is authorised by his employment to do under certain circumstances and conditions and does it in a manner which is unauthorised and improper even then the employer is liable for the wrongful act of his servant. " The above principles were enunciated on the basis of certain English decisions which have been referred to in the reported judgment. One of those cases in Bayley v. Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Rly. Co. , in which it was held that "where a servant is acting within the scope of his employment, and in so acting does something negligent or wrongful, the employer is liable even though the acts done may be the very reverse of that which the servant was actually directed to do. Co. , in which it was held that "where a servant is acting within the scope of his employment, and in so acting does something negligent or wrongful, the employer is liable even though the acts done may be the very reverse of that which the servant was actually directed to do. " In Vimal Rai and others v. Gurcharan Singh and others, where a motor cycle was entrusted by its owner to a mechanic for repairing it and the mechanic in turn asked one of his workmen to attend to the repairs and while so doing, the workman drove the motor cycle and caused an accident by his rashness and negligence, this Court held that the owner was liable to pay compensation. The following observations of Andley, J. may be usefully quoted : "there cannot be the least doubt that so far as respondent No. 1 is concerned, the possession of respondent No. 2 was authorised. It is also clear from the evidence that respondent No. 2 entrusted the motor cycle, for repairing the defect in its kick, to the workshop of respondent No. 5. There is no evidence on behalf of the respondents that there were any instructions that the repairs were to be carried on by respondent No. 5 and nobody else. Respondent No. 5 is admittedly carrying on business as a repairer and an implied authority must be presumed to the effect that respondent No. 5 could get the defect repaired by any one in his workshop, * * * Now, in this case, the defect which was to be repaired was the defect in starting the motor cycle. No body has come forward as an expert witness to say that it was not necessary to drive the motor cycle in order to repair the starting trouble. It was for the respondents to prove conclusively that the act of driving the motor cycle for repairing the starting trouble was in excess of the authority. * * * In the absence of any satisfactory evidence in that behalf, I am of the view that it cannot be said that driving of the motor cycle was not involved in the process of repairing the starting trouble and I, therefore, find that the driving of the motor cycle was not an act in excess of authority. " The above decisions would certainly support the petitioner s case. " The above decisions would certainly support the petitioner s case. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Sitaram Motilal Kalal v. Santanuprasad Jaishanker Bhatt wherein it was held in the majority judgment of the Court as follows : "a master is vicariously liable for the acts of his servant acting in the course of his employment. For the master s liability to arise, the act must be a wrongfull act authorised by the master or a wrongfull and unauthorised mode of doing some act authorised by the master. The driver of a car taking the car on the master s business makes him vicariously liable if he commits an accident. But it is equally well settled that if the servant, at the time of the accident, is not acting within the course of his employment but is doing something for himself the master is not liable. There is a presumption that a vehicle is driven on the master s business and by his authorised agent or servant but the presumption can be met. " In that case, the owner of the car had entrusted it to one M for plying the same as a taxi. M was not merely the driver but was in entire charge of plying the taxi. M had appointed C as a cleaner for the taxi. M trained C to drive the car and took him to R. T. A. for obtaining a driving licence. When R. T. A. was conducting the test, C without giving signal took a sudden turn and injured the plaintiff s leg. On these facts, it was held that the acts of M and C viewed separately or collectively were not within the scope of their respective or even joint employment and the owner-defendant was not liable. Neither the facts of that case nor the rule laid down by the Supreme Court will, in my view, help the contention of the respondents. I have already given a finding with regard to the manner in which the accident had occurred. In view of this finding, it must be held that Ram Sabad was acting within the course of his employment when he asked Des Raj Singh to start the car for the purpose of testing the dynamo. I have already given a finding with regard to the manner in which the accident had occurred. In view of this finding, it must be held that Ram Sabad was acting within the course of his employment when he asked Des Raj Singh to start the car for the purpose of testing the dynamo. The learned counsel for the respondents has also referred to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Nalini Ranjan Sen Gupta v. Corporation of Calcutta and another2. The facts of that case were that the car was taken out by the driver accompanied by the cleaner. The driver stopped the car when he came to an obstruction and left the car in charge of the cleaner while he himself went to a shop on business. While he was absent, the cleaner put the car in motion and brought it into collision with the lamp post. On these facts, it was held that the driver of the car was not negligent and that the master was not liable for the accident. The facts of the present case were, however, quite different from the facts of that case and, therefore, the rule laid down in that case would not apply to the present case. Therefore, it must be held that the owner of the car, P. N. Khanna, is liable to pay the compensation to the petitioner for the injuries sustained by him in the accident. ( 8 ) THE last question for determination is as regards the quantum of the compensation. While the petitioner claims that he is entitled to a much higher amount by way of compensation than the one awarded by the learned Tribunal, the respondents contend that the compensation awarded is excessive. The compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal is on the basis of actual damages as well as general damages. So far as the actual damages are concerned, the learned Tribunal has accepted the receipts passed by Dr Sen in whose nursing home the petitioner had received treatment. In addition to the amount covered by these receipts, the petitioner had claimed some additional expenses on the strength of receipts said to have been issued by the nurses who were attending upon him at the nursing home and by a taxi driver whose taxi is said to have been engaged by the petitioner for going to the nursing home from time to time. These amounts were disallowed by the learned Tribunal on the ground that these receipts have not been properly proved. It is a fact that the nurses and the taxi driver who are alleged to have issued these receipts were not examined by the petitioner. It was not even elicited from the doctor who had treated the petitioner in the nursing home that the petitioner had actually utilised the services of the nurses as alleged by him. An amount of Rs. 550. 00 was claimed by way of taxi hire. But, as observed by the learned Tribunal, the petitioner has no explanation to give for this excessive payment to the taxi driver. Therefore, so far as the actual damages are concerned, I do not see any valid reason to either enhance or reduce the amount determined by the learned Tribunal. ( 9 ) AS regards the general damages, the petitioner not only claims compensation for the pain and suffering undergone by him as a result of the accident but also claims damages for the loss of his earning capacity. There can be no doubt that the petitioner would have suffered considerable pain and also mental distress on account of the accident and he is certainly entitled to compensation on this account. But with regard to the alleged loss of his earning capacity, he has hardly placed any reliable evidence on record. The evidence of the doctor only shows that the petitioner suffered from severe headache on account of the injury to the skull bone and that the petitioner would get such headache on the slightest strain. It was, however, not elicited from the doctor that this would result in any loss or diminution in the petitioner s earning capacity. The learned Tribunal has taken into consideration all the relevant factors and there are no compelling reasons for this Court to interfere with the quantum of compensation as determined by the learned Tribunal. Therefore, even as regards the general damages, I see no valid reasons, either for its enhancement or its reduction. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed There shall be no orders as to costs.