VENKATARAMIAH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners in these 18 petitions, filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, are manufacturers of beedies in different places in the state of Mysore. They have challenged in these petitions the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 (Central Act 32 of 1966), (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the Rules framed thereunder by the Government of Mysore in exercise of the powers conferred on it under S. 44 of the Act, namely, the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) (Mysore) Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules ). They have also prayed for the issue of a writ, order or direction restraining the respondents from enforcing all or any of the provisions of the Act and the Rules against them The respondents in these writ petitions are the Union of India, State of Mysore and some of the officials ot the Department of Labour, Government of Mysore. In one of the cases, a Labour union has been impleaded as a respondent on its own application. The Act came into force in the State of Mysore on 10-11-1969 by virtue of a notification issued by the Government of Mysore in exorcise of its power under sub-sec. (3) of S. 1 of the Act. A brief outline of some of the main provisions of the Act and the rules is given below. ( 2 ) THE preamble of the Act shows that it was enacted with the object of providing for welfare of the workers in beedi and cigar industry and to regulate their conditions of work and for other matters connected therewith. S. 2 of the Act defines some of the expressions which are used in the Act. ( 2 ) THE preamble of the Act shows that it was enacted with the object of providing for welfare of the workers in beedi and cigar industry and to regulate their conditions of work and for other matters connected therewith. S. 2 of the Act defines some of the expressions which are used in the Act. It may be relevant to extract here the definitions of some of those expressions:"2 (d) 'contractor' means a person who, in relation to a manufactoring process, undertakes to produce a given result by executing the work through contract labour or who engages labour for any manufacturing process in a private dwelling house and includes a subcontractor, agent, munshi, thekedar or sattedar; (e) 'contract labour' means any person engaged or employed in any premises by or through a contractor, with or without the knowledge of the employer, in any manufacturing process; (f) 'employee' means a person employed directly or through any agency, whether for wages or riot, in any establishment to do any work, skilled, unskilled, manual or clerical, and includes (i) any labour who is given raw materials by an employer or a contractor for being made into beedi or cigar or both at home (hereinafter referred to in this Act as 'home worker'), and (ii) any person not employed by an employer or a contractor but working with the permission of, or under agreement with, the employer or contractor. (g) 'employer' means, (a) in relation to contract labour, the principal employer, and (b) in relation to other labour, the person who has the ultimate control over the affairs of any establishment or who has, by reason of his advancing money, supplying goods or otherwise, a substantial interest in the control of the affairs of any establishment, and includes any other person to whom the affairs of the establishment are entrusted, whether such other person is called the managing agent, manager, superintendent or by any other name. (h) 'establishment' means any place or premises including the precincts thereof in which or in any part of which any manufacturing process connected with the making of beedi or cigar or both is being, or is ordinarily carried on and includes an industrial premises. (h) 'establishment' means any place or premises including the precincts thereof in which or in any part of which any manufacturing process connected with the making of beedi or cigar or both is being, or is ordinarily carried on and includes an industrial premises. ' (i) 'industrial premises' means any place or premises (not being a private dwelling house), including the precincts thereof, in which or in any part of which any industry or manufacturing process connected with the making of beedi or cigar or both is being, or is ordinarily, carried on with or without the aid of power. (k) 'manufacturing process' means any process for, or incidental to making, finishing or packing or otherwise treating any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal as beedi or cigar or both. (m) 'principal employer' means a person for whom or on whose behalf any contract labour is engaged or employed in an establishment. " ( 3 ) S. 3 of the Act prohibits establishment of an industrial premises without obtaining a licence granted under the Act. S. 4 of the Act provides for the procedure for the issue, renewal and cancellation of a licence. It contains certain matters to which the licensing authority should have regard in the matter of the issue or renewal of a licence. S. 5 of the Act provides for an appeal by an aggrieved party against any decision of the licensing authority under S. 4 of the Act. S. 6 of the Act authorises the appointment of Inspectors and S. 7 enumerates the powers of the Inspectors. Ss. 8 to 16 of the Act require an employer who has established an industrial premises to provide certain amenities referred to therein. They deal with clearness, ventilation, provision for drinking water, latrines and urinals, provision for washing facilities, establishment of creches when more than 50 females are employed, provision of first-aid facilities and maintenance of canteens. Ss. 17 to 20 of the Act refer to the number of working hours during which the employees should be required or allowed to work in an industrial premises and the wages payable to employees for overtime work and other allied matters such as interval for rest and the period of spread-over of working hours. S. 21 of the Act insists upon the industrial premises remaining closed once a week. Ss. S. 21 of the Act insists upon the industrial premises remaining closed once a week. Ss. 26 and 27 of the Act apply not merely to employees in an industrial premises, but also in an establishment. ( 4 ) THEY provide for the grant of annual leave with wages and the method of computation of wages payable for the period of annual leave. S. 44 of the Act authorises the State Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. ( 5 ) THE main contentions of the petitioners are, (a) that there was no need to promulgate the Act; (b) that the Parliament was not competent to pass the Act, and (c) that some of the provisions of the Act and Rules are violative of Art. 19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government, the several allegations made by the petitioners have been denied. ( 6 ) WE propose to refer briefly to the circumstances which led to the passing of the Act in order to appreciate the rival contentions raised by the parties before us and in doing so we have relied upon the pleadings in the above cases and some of the decisions cited before us in the course of the arguments. ( 7 ) BEEDI and cigar industry is fairly a large one in the States of Maharastra, andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Mysore. Several lakhs of workers are engaged in manufacturing and selling of beedies. The workers are not well organised and hence there has been scope for exploitation of workers by the employers. It is to be gathered from the material before us that there are at least four systems adopted by the industry in order to secure labour for the manufacture of beedi and cigar. ( 8 ) THE first system is one in which the entire manufacturing process is carried on by a few self-employed people belonging to a family who do not engage any other labour at all. In the second system, the employer engages workers who carry on manufacturing process at a place or places maintained and run by him under his or his manager's direct supervision and control. In the second system, the employer engages workers who carry on manufacturing process at a place or places maintained and run by him under his or his manager's direct supervision and control. The third system is one in which the manufacturer supplies processed tobacco and leaves to workers who carry them to their homes where they roll them into beedies or cigars and deliver the finished product to the manufacturer against payment of a certain sum of money for the number of beedies or cigars rolled and delivered, and the fourth system is one in which the manufacturer would supply tobacco and leaves and entrust the work to contractors (they are also called munshies, thekedars, etc. in some places), who engage workers to roll them into beedies or cigars either at a place or places established and maintained by them under their supervision or who would in their turn hand-over tobacco and leaves to workers who would take them to their homes, roll them into beedies or cigars and deliver the finished product against payment of wages by the contractors, who in their turn will hand-over the same to the manufacturers against payment of money at rates higher than the fates at which the workers are paid by the contractors. ( 9 ) WE are not concerned in these cases with the self-employed persons who are not affected by the Act. S. 43 of the Act says that nothing contained in the Act shall apply to a owner or occupier of a private dwelling house who carries on any manufacturing process in such private dwelling house with the assistance of the members of his family living with him in such dwelling house and dependent on him unless the owner or occupier himself is an employee of an employer to whom the Act applies. Explanation to S. 43 defines the expression 'family' as the spouse and children of the owner or occupier. None of the petitioners before us is one such owner or occupier. Explanation to S. 43 defines the expression 'family' as the spouse and children of the owner or occupier. None of the petitioners before us is one such owner or occupier. ( 10 ) IN the other three systems adopted by the beedi and cigar industry, owing to the illiteracy, poverty and want" of organising ability prevalent amongst them, there has been large scope for exploitation of workers by the powerful manufacturers and employers who are fortunate enough to build up a large business mainly on account of the good-will commanded by the trade-mark or trade-name adopted by them. Some of the evils of which the workmen have been victims are stated to be, (1) insanitary conditions prevailing in the premises where they are asked to work, (ii) lack of leave facilities, (iii) the svstem of rejection of rolled beedies or cigars very often without any valid reason as sub-standard ones commonly known as 'chhat' compelling the workers to receive lower rates of wages for such rejected products which are ultimately sold by the manufacturers for the same price at which other products accepted by them as conforming to the prescribed standard, are sold, resulting in undue gain to them, and (iv) arbitrary stoppage of supply of tobacco and leaves to workmen resulting' in their periodical unemployment. In order to alleviate the suffering of the workmen employed in beedi and cigar industry, there were attempts made in some of the States in India from time to time to regulate their working conditions by resorting to certain legal measures to which we shall hereafter make a brief reference. ( 11 ) IN the area now comprised in the State of Maharastra in or about the year 1957 action was taken to enforce provisions of the Factories Act against beedi manufacturers who were getting beedies rolled by workmen at places which were under the control of manufacturers by instituting prosecutions under Factories Act for violation of Section 79 thereof. ( 11 ) IN the area now comprised in the State of Maharastra in or about the year 1957 action was taken to enforce provisions of the Factories Act against beedi manufacturers who were getting beedies rolled by workmen at places which were under the control of manufacturers by instituting prosecutions under Factories Act for violation of Section 79 thereof. ( 12 ) IN one of those cases it was contended on behalf of the manufacturer involved in that case thai since there was no agreement or contract of service between him and the person who rolled beedies and since certain material ingredients which were necessary to establish the relationship of employer and employee between the manufacturer and the workmen, were found wanting, the manufacturer was not liable to be proceeded against under the Factories Act. The said proceedings ultimately terminated in the Supreme Court in Shankar Balaji Waje v. State of Maharstra, AIR. 1962 SC. 517 in which it was held as follows:" It is true, as contended for the State, that persons engaged to roll beedies on job work basis could be workers, but only such persons would be workers who work regularly at the factory and are paid for the work turned out during their regular employment on the basis of the work done. Piece-rate workers can be workers within the definition of 'worker' in the Act, but they must be regular workers and not workers who come and work according to their sweet will. It is also true, as urged for the State, that worker, within the definition of that expression in the Act, need not be a whole-time worker. But, even then, the worker must have, under his contract of service, an obligation to work cither for a fixed period or between fixed hours. The whole conception of service does not fit in well with a servant who has full liberty to attend to his work according to his pleasure and not according to the orders of his master. But, even then, the worker must have, under his contract of service, an obligation to work cither for a fixed period or between fixed hours. The whole conception of service does not fit in well with a servant who has full liberty to attend to his work according to his pleasure and not according to the orders of his master. " ( 13 ) IN the above view of the matter, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that workers who attended a particular place appointed by the manufacturer for the purpose of rolling beedies could not be considered as workers within the meaning of that expression under the Factories Act since there was lack of supervision of the work turned out by the workmen and the relationship of employer and employee was not otherwise established in that case. In the course of the said decision, the Supreme court referred to the provisions of Section 85 of the Factories Act, which authorised the State Government bv a notification to declare that all or any of the provisions of the Factories Act as applicable to any place wherein a manufacturing process was being carried on notwithstanding that the persons working therein were not employed by the owner thereof, but were working with the permission or in agreement with such owner and observed that the provisions of the Factories Act made a distinction between workers a- defined bv S. 2 (l) of that Act and persons who were not employed by the owner of a permises, but were working with the permission of or under agreement with him. Hence, on the facts of the above case, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution instituted under the Factories Act against the manufacturer involved in that case was unsustainable. Hence, on the facts of the above case, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution instituted under the Factories Act against the manufacturer involved in that case was unsustainable. Since the terms under which workers engaged in the beedi and cigar industry in the State of Maharastra and elsewhere were by and large similar to those found in Shankar Balaji wage's case (1) the Government of Maharastra issued a notification in exercise of its powers under S. 85 of the Factories Act declaring that all the provisions of the said Act would apply to the places specified in that notification wherein a manufacturing process was carried on notwithstanding that the persons working therein were not employed by the owner of such places, but were working with the permission of or under agreement with such owner. The effect of the said notification was to make beedi rollers in places set out therein 'deemed workers' and on that account entitled to the benefits provided for the workers under the Factories Act. ( 14 ) THE validity of the said notification was challenged again by some of the beedi manufacturers and the Supreme Court by its decision in Bhikusa yamasa Kshatriya (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1591 upheld the validity of the notification. The Supreme Court in that case observed as follows:"to conclude: in our judgment S. 85 which authorises the State government to issue a notification applying all or any of the provisions of the Act to any place in which a manufacturing process is carried on, and which involves the consequences that the place is deemed a factory and the persons working therein are deemed workers is not by itself discriminatory so as to infringe Art. 14 of the Constitution; nor does the provision amount to authorising imposition of unreasonable restriction upon the fundamental right of the owner of the factorv to carry on his business. The impugned notification issued under S. 85 (1) is also not open to attack on the ground that the State has issued the notification by selecting some out of the places in which bidi manufacturing processes are carried on. Nor does the notification in so far as it seeks to apply the provisions of the Act imposing upon the owner or an occupier of the factory obligation to grant annual leave with wages impose any unreasonable restriction. Nor does the notification in so far as it seeks to apply the provisions of the Act imposing upon the owner or an occupier of the factory obligation to grant annual leave with wages impose any unreasonable restriction. " ( 15 ) IN the course of the said judgment it was however observed as follows by the Supreme Court while dealin ; with Ss. 79 and 80 of the Factories act which provided for annual leave with wages:"s. 79 clearly applies to workers who work for the full period of employment during factory hours and for the prescribed number of days and it may appear at first sight somewhat inappropriate that the benefit of annual leave with wages should be extended by Notification under S. 85 (1) to persons who do not work for the hours fixed for the establishment. But it is in our judgment clear that S. 79 if it is made applicable by notification under S. 85 would apply to those workers only who work in the factory for the full period prescribed under Ss. 61, 71 and 66 (i)of the Factories Act by the employer for not less than the number of qualifying days. A 'deemed worker' who is paid only for work done by him and who ip under no obligation to attend at any fixed time' may be entitled to benefit of annual leave with wages only if he fulfils the working conditions applicable to workers as defined in S. 2 (1)of the Act. The privilege of working for a period less than the period prescribed for regular workers in a factory will not, if he works for less than the prescribed hours, come to the aid of a deemed worker so as to enable him to claim the benefits of S. 79; but that privilege will not deprive him, if he fulfils the conditions relating to the duration of work, of the benefit of S. 79. The fact that a deemed worker in a factory, to which S. 79 is extended by a notification, by virtue of hits contract or otherwise is not bound to attend at times fixed by the owner of the factory does not mean that he can never fulfil the conditions relating to attendance for earning leave with wages. The fact that a deemed worker in a factory, to which S. 79 is extended by a notification, by virtue of hits contract or otherwise is not bound to attend at times fixed by the owner of the factory does not mean that he can never fulfil the conditions relating to attendance for earning leave with wages. If a deemed worker attends the factory for the full duration fixed during a calendar year, he would be entitled to the benefits of sections 79 and 30 of the Act. " ( 16 ) SINCE many of the workers who were engaged in the manufacturing of beedies and cigars were those who did not work in any place belonging to a particular owner either with his permission or under an agreement with him, but on the other hand they were persons who were taking tobacco and leaves issued by the manufacturers to their homes for rolling them into beedies and cigars and even when the workmen work in a place belonging to a particular owner with his permission or under agreement with him, having regard to the conditions of work prevailing therein, it was not possible for the workers to avail themselves of all the benefits of the Factories Act particularly those relating to annual leave with wages. ( 17 ) THE relief that the workers got by the notification issued by the Government of Maharashtra under S. 85 of the Factories Act was only to a limited extent. Further, the existence of the system of engaging workers through contractors, who were invariably impecunious and not in a position to meet the legal obligations cast on them by law, made it also possible for the manufacturer who engaged the labour through the contractors to escape the liability of any sort towards the contract labour. It was sought to be contended on behalf of the manufacturers who engaged such contract labour that the contractor who engaged labour was an independent contractor, and, therefore, under law the manufacturer was not regponsible for any of the obligations under the Factories Act or any other law which would have been otherwise applicable to the case. It was sought to be contended on behalf of the manufacturers who engaged such contract labour that the contractor who engaged labour was an independent contractor, and, therefore, under law the manufacturer was not regponsible for any of the obligations under the Factories Act or any other law which would have been otherwise applicable to the case. Disputes arose between certain manufacturers of beedies and workmen, who had been employed by the contractors of the manufacturers for the purpose of, rolling beedies or cigars for and on behalf of the manufacturers, in respect of certain demands made by the workmen against the manufacturers in the State of Madras and on a reference of the said disputes for adjudication, the Industrial Tribunal held that the system of manufacture of beedies through the so-called contractors was a mere comouflage devised by the manufacturers. It found that the contractors were indigent persons and served no particular duties and discharged no special functions and they were not independent contractors as claimed by the manufacturers. ( 18 ) IT, therefore, came to the conclusion that the beedi workers were the employees of the manufacturers notwithstanding that they were employed by the contractors who accordingly the Tribunal were themselves nothing more than the employee or branch managers of the employers It finally held that the reduction in the wages of the workmen who had been affected by the manufecturers was unjustified and restored the rates of wages which were prevailing before such reduction the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal were challenged before the High Court of Madras in two writ petitions. The learned Single Judge who heard. them found that there could be no industrial dispute within the meaning f S. 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act since according to him neither the beedi roller nor the intermediary was the employee of the manufacturers, who were the petitioners in the writ petitions, and, therefore he set aside the awards passed bv the Tribunal. The workmen" preferred appeals against the said judgment of the learned Single Judge before a Division Bench of the High Court of Madras, whicfh allowed the anpeals and upheld the awards of the Tribunal. The matter was taken up therafter by the beedi manufacturers before the Supreme Court. The supreme Court in D C. Dewan Mohideen Sahib v. United Bidi Workers union Salem, (1964) 2 LLJ. The matter was taken up therafter by the beedi manufacturers before the Supreme Court. The supreme Court in D C. Dewan Mohideen Sahib v. United Bidi Workers union Salem, (1964) 2 LLJ. 633 SC, upheld the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras high Court. After reviewing the law relating to the relationship that existed between the manufacturers of beedies and the workmen who were engaged through contractors or intermediaries, the Supreme Court observed as follows:"it is in the light of these decisions that we have to decide whether the workmen who work under the so-called independent contractors in these cases are workmen of the appellants. It has been found bv the tribunal and this view has been confirmed by the appeal court that the so-called independent contractors were mere agents or branch managers of the appellant. We see no reason to disagree with this view taken by the tribunal and confirmed by the appeal court on the facts of these cases. We arp not unmindful in this connection of the view taken bv the learned single Judge when he held that on the agreements and the facts found the so-called intermediaries were independent contractors. We are however of opinion that the view taken by 1he appeal Court in this connection is the right one. As the appeal Court has rightly pointed out, the so-called independent contractors were indigent persons who were in all respects under the control of the appellants. There is in our opinion little doubt that this system has been evolved to avoid regulations under the Factories act. Further, there is also no doubt from whatever terms of agreement are available on the record that the so-called independent contractors have really no independence at all. As the appeal Court has pointed out, they are impeeunious persons who could hardly afford to have factories of their own. Some of them are even ex-employees of the appellants. The contract is practically one-sided in that the proprietor can at his choice supply the raw materials or refuse to do so, the so-called contractors having no right to insist upon the supply of raw materials to him. The so-called independent contractor is even bound not to employ more than nine persons in his so-called factory. The contract is practically one-sided in that the proprietor can at his choice supply the raw materials or refuse to do so, the so-called contractors having no right to insist upon the supply of raw materials to him. The so-called independent contractor is even bound not to employ more than nine persons in his so-called factory. The sale of raw materials to the so-called independent contractor and resale by him of the manufactured bidis is also a mere comouflage, the nature of which is apparent from the fact that the so-called contractor never paid for the materials. All that happens is that when the manufactured bidis are delivered by him to the appellants, amounts due for the so-called sale of raw materials is deducted from the so-called price fixed for the bidis. In effect all that happened is that the so-called independent contractor is supplied with tobacco and leaves and is paid certain amounts for the wages of the workers employed and for his own trouble. We can therefore see no difficulty in holding that the so-called contractor is merely an employee or an agent of the appellants as held by the appeal Court and as such employee or agent he employs workers to roll bidis on behalf of the appellants. The work is distributed between a number of so-called independent contractors who are told not to emplov more than nine persons at one place to avoid regulations under the Factories Act. We are not however concerned with that aspect of the matter in the present appeals. But there can be no doubt that the workers employed by the so-called contractors are really the workmen of the appellants who are employed through their agents or servants whom they choose to call independent contractors. It is however urged that there is no control by even the agent over the bidi workers. Now the evidence shows that the bidi workers are permitted to take the leaves home in order to cut them so that they might be in proper shape and size for next day's work; but the real work of filling the leaves with tobacco (i. e. rolling the bidis) can only be done in the so-called factory of the so-called independent contractor. No tobacco is ever given to the workers to be taken home to be rolled into bidis as and when they liked. No tobacco is ever given to the workers to be taken home to be rolled into bidis as and when they liked. They have to attend the so-called factory of the so-called independent contractor to do the real work of rolling bidis. As was pointed out by this Court in Birdhichand sharma's case ( (1961) 2 LLJ. 86 ) (vide supra), the work is of such a simple nature that supervision all the time is not required. In Birdhichand Sharma case (vide, supra) supervision was made through a system of rejecting the defective bidis, at the end of the day. In the present case we have not got the full terms of the agreement and it is therefore not possible to say that there was no kind of supervision or control over the workers and that the so-called independent contractors had to accept all kinds of bidis whether made up to standard or not. It is hardly likely that the so-called independent contractor will accept bidis which are not up to the standard; for that is usually the system which prevails in this trade as will be apparent from the facts of the many bidi-manufacturing cases to which we have referred. We are therefore not prepared to hold, in the absence of any evidence one way or the other, that there is no supervision whatsoever of the work done by the workers. In the circumstances, we are of opinion that the relationship of master and servant between the appellants and the workmen employed by the so-called independent contractors is established. " ( 19 ) FROM the observations of the Supreme Court extracted above, it is clear that the introduction of the system of engaging labour through persons who were known as contractors, sattedars, etc. , was only with a view to avoiding the obligations imposed by the Factories Act on the manufacturers. This, however, was based on the facts which were established in those proceedings. Even this decision could not go to the assistance of home workers who took tobacco and leaves to their homes for purpose of manufacturing beedies. At this stage the Parliament stepped in and passed the Act which is challenged before us. This, however, was based on the facts which were established in those proceedings. Even this decision could not go to the assistance of home workers who took tobacco and leaves to their homes for purpose of manufacturing beedies. At this stage the Parliament stepped in and passed the Act which is challenged before us. ( 20 ) EVEN though the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to a bill which is ultimately passed into an Act, may not be a true guide regarding the meaning to be given to the provisions of the Act, it may be looked into by Courts to understand the object with which the Act is passed. It may also sometimes assist Courts in understanding the mischief the Act seeks to remedy. We shall, therefore, refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of employment) Bill, 1965, which ultimately came to be passed as the Act. "the working conditions prevailing in the beedi and cigar establishments are unsatisfactory. Though at present the Factories Act, 1948, appplies to such establishments, there has been a tendency on the part of employers to split their concerns into smaller units and thus escape from the provisions of the said Act. A special feature of the industry is the manufacture of beedies through contractors and by distributing work in the private dwelling houses where the workers take the raw materials given by the employers or the contractors. Employer-employee relationship not being well defined the application of the Factories Act has met with difficulties. The labour is unorganised and not able to look after its interests. One or two State Governments passed special Acts to regulate the conditions of work of these workers but found themselves unable to enforce the law owing to the fact that the industry is highly mobile and tended to move on to an area where no such restrictive laws prevailed. It became necessary therefore to have Central legislation on the subject. The Bill seeks to provide for the regulation of the contract system of work, licensing of beedi and cigar industrial premises and matters like health, hours of work, spread-over, rest periods, overtime, annual leave with pay, distribution of raw-materials, etc. It became necessary therefore to have Central legislation on the subject. The Bill seeks to provide for the regulation of the contract system of work, licensing of beedi and cigar industrial premises and matters like health, hours of work, spread-over, rest periods, overtime, annual leave with pay, distribution of raw-materials, etc. It may be mentioned here that in the States of Madras and Mysore, there were Acts passed by the State Legislatures with the object of regulating the conditions of workers in the industry. In Mysore, the Mysore beedi Industrial Premises (Regulation of Conditions of Work) Act, 1964, was passed. The said Act however was not brought into force till 1966 when the Parliament passed the Act in question. On the coming into force of the Act passed by the Parliament, the Mysore Act of 1964 became inoperative. " ( 21 ) IN the State of Madras a similar Act by name the Madras beedi Industrial Premises (Regulation of Conditions of Work) Act, 32 of 1958, had been passed with provisions almost similar to the Act in question. Its validity was upheld by the High Court of Madras in Abdur rahim v. State of Madras, (1961) 2 Mad. L. J. 42 except to the extent it was made applicable to the owner or registered user of a trade-mark, after negativing the contentions similar to those raised in these petitions. ( 22 ) WE shall proceed to examine the various contentions of the petitioners hereafter. Since the contentions of the petitioners in all these petitions are more or less overlapping, we shall collectively deal with the submissions made by the Counsel for the petitioners on each point. The first submission on behalf of the petitioners was that there was no need for the passing of the Act since the workers did not agitate for it and the conditions under which the beedi and cigar workers functioned, did not warrant it. We are not impressed by the contention having regard to the various Legislative and executive actions taken in various states and the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill, which has been extracted above, and the observations of the Supreme court in some of the cases referred to above. We are not impressed by the contention having regard to the various Legislative and executive actions taken in various states and the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill, which has been extracted above, and the observations of the Supreme court in some of the cases referred to above. Moreover, it is the duty of parliament to enact appropriate laws to secure to all workers conditions of work ensuring decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and to prevent unscrupulous exploitation of labour (vide Art. 43 of the Constitution of India ). The decision on the question whether there is a need for the legislation or not finally rests with the Legislature and it is not for the Courts to express any opinion on it. The Courts are concerned only with the constitutionality or otherwise of the legislation. ( 23 ) THE next contention urged on behalf of the petitioners was one relating to competency of the Parliament to pass the Act. It was contended that the Act was one passed with respect to beedi and cigar industrt and that any law regulating the industry can be passed by the State Legislature only, in view of Entry 24 of List II of the Sevenuth Schedule of the Constitution of India, and it was not shown that it came under Entry 7 or Entry 52 of List I, when alone Parliament could have power over the said topic. In support of the above submission reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court. In Calcutta Gas Co. (proprietary) Ltd. v. State of W. B. , AIR. 1962 SC 1044 in which while construing Art. 246 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court observed as follows:"the power to legislate is given to the appropriate Legislatures by Art. 246 of the Constitution. The entries in the three Lists are only legislative heads or filds of legislation; they demarcate the area over which the appropriate Legislatures can operate. It is also well settled that widest amplitude should be given to the language of the entries. But some of the entries in the different Lists or in the same list may overlap and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with each other It is then the duty of this Court to reconcile the entries and bring about harmony between them. But some of the entries in the different Lists or in the same list may overlap and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with each other It is then the duty of this Court to reconcile the entries and bring about harmony between them. " ( 24 ) IN the light of the observations of the Supreme Court, it was contended that the Act directly interfered with beedi and cigar industry, and, it was one which fell under Entry 24 of List II, and therefore, the Parliament could not pass the Act. It was also contended that there being no relationship of employer and employee between the workers who were engaged through contractors or by contractors on the one hand and the manufacturers on the other, and there being no scope for supervision of the work of persons who receive tobacco and leaves to roll them into beedies or cigars (who are styled as 'home workers), the Act which in the main dealt with the conditions of such workers could not be considered as falling within Entry 24 of List III which relates to "welfare of labour including conditions of work, provident fund, employer's liability, workmen's compensation, invalidity and old-age pension and maternity benefits". ( 25 ) THE decision of the Supreme Court in Shankar Balaji Waje's case (1) was relied on to show that there was no relationship of employer and employee between the manufactures and home-workers and between manufacturers and those who worked under contractors or sattedars. It was argued that by adopting artificial definitions of the expression 'employer' and employee' the Parliament could not bring the law within the scope of Entry 24 of list III. It was however contended on behalf of the respondents that the act fell within the scope of Entry 24 of List III, and, therefore, the Parliament was competent to pass it. In order to appreciate the contentions of the parties, it is necessary to ascertain the object of the legislation, the mischief of which it seeks to remedy and in what respects it affects the people concerned. As the preamble of the Act discloses, the object of the Act is to ameliorate the working conditions of persons engaged in beedi and cigar industry. Ss. As the preamble of the Act discloses, the object of the Act is to ameliorate the working conditions of persons engaged in beedi and cigar industry. Ss. 8 to 28 relate to the amenities to be provided for workers at the industrial premises and the leave facilities to be accorded to them. The Act also seeks to provide for a machinery for settlement of disputes between manufacturers and workers. The pith and substance of the law, therefore, is one concerning labour. The expression 'labour' means 'workers' collectively. That takes within its ambit all persons who make a living bv hard work and does not exclude those who are not actually employees. Even if it is to be held that the case of the workers who are not employees, as it is ordinarily understood, cannot fall within the scope of Entrv 24 of List III, the Act cannot be held as one falling within Entry 24 of List II. It may be that, incidentally but not in the main, the Act may trench upon the topic covered by Entry 24 of List II. ( 26 ) THAT does not however make any difference. Reference may be made at this stage, to a decision of the Supreme Court in Chaturbhai M. Patel v. Union of India, AIR. 1960 SC. 424 wherein it is held as follows:"in every case where the legislative competence of a legislature in regard to a particular enactment is challenged with reference to the entries in the various lists it is necessary to examine the pith and substance of the Act and if the matter comes substantially within an item in the Central List it is not deemed to come within an entry in the Provincial list even thoughg "the classes of subjects looked at singly overlap in many respects". It is within the competence of the central legislature to provide for matters which may otherwise fall within the competence of the Provincial legislature if they are necessarily incidental to the effective legislation by the Central legislature on a subject of legislation expressly within its power. " ( 27 ) WE are satisfied that the Act does not fall within Entry 24 of List- II but it falls within Entry 24 of List III. " ( 27 ) WE are satisfied that the Act does not fall within Entry 24 of List- II but it falls within Entry 24 of List III. Even if it does not fall within entry 24 of List III, the Act is protected by Entry 97 of List I. Our view receives suppport from a decision of the Bombay High Court in Spl C. A. Nos. 409 to 411 of 1968 etc. , Bom. H. C. Spl. C. A. 409 to 411/68, decided on 16/17-7-1970 and in Thakur Savdekar (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, APHC. WP. 2587/68 WP. No. 2587 of 1968 and other connected cases decided on 26-8-1970) of the High Court of Andhra pradesh. In these two decisions, the competency of the Parliament to pass the act in question was questioned and it was held by the High Courts of bombay and Andhra Pradesh that the Act came within Entry 24 of List iii, and, therefore, the Parliament was competent to pass the same. We, therefore, reject the above contention of the petitioners. ( 28 ) IT was next urged by the petitioners that Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act were unconstitutional since thev conferred arbitrary power on the licensing authority in the matter of grant or renewal of licence to establish an industrial premises within the meaning of the Act. An industrial premises is a place (other than a dwelling house) where any manufacturing process is carried on. S. 29 (3) of the Act prohibits carrying on of manufacturing process in places other than industrial premises. Proviso to S. 29 (3) of the Act excludes its application to dwelling houses where manufacturing process is carried on by homeworkers Sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 29 of the Act provide for the carrying on of the process of wetting or cutting of tobacco in any place other than an industrial premises with the previous permission of the State Government S 3 of the Art prescribes that no industrial promises shall be established without a licence issued under the Act and S 4 provides for the procedure for the issue and renewal of licence to establish industrial premises. By S. 5 of the Act, a party who is aggrieved by an order of the licensing authority under S 4 of the Act, is entitled to prefer an appeal to the appellate authority. By S. 5 of the Act, a party who is aggrieved by an order of the licensing authority under S 4 of the Act, is entitled to prefer an appeal to the appellate authority. The agrument of the petitioners in this behalf is that S. 4 of the Act does not provide sufficient guidance to the licensing authority in the mater of issue and renewal of licences. In support of their contention, the petitioners relied upon the following passage in the decision of the Supreme Court in Harakchand ratenchand Bonthic v Union of India, AIR. 1970 SC. 1453:"we now come to S. 27 of the Act which relates to licensing of dealers. It was stated on behalf of the petitioners that the conditions imposed by sub-sec. (6) of S. 27 for the grant of renewal of licences are uncertain, vague and unintelligible and consequently wide and unfettered power was conferred upon the statutory authorities in the matter of grant or renewal of licence. In our opinion this contention is well founded and must be accepted as correct. S. 27 (6) (a) states that m the matter of issue or renewal of licences the Administrator shall have regard to 'the number of dealers existing in the region in which the applicant intends to carry on business as a dealer". But the word 'region' is nowhere defined in the Act. Similarly S. 27 (6) (b) requires the Administrator to have regard to "the anticipated demand, as estimated by him, for ornaments in that region". The expression 'anticipated demand' is a vague expression which is not capable of objective assessment and is bound to lead to a great deal of uncertainty similarly the expressions "suitability of the applicant" in s. 27 (6) (e) and "public interest" in S. 27 (6) (g) do not provide any objective standard or norm or guidence. For these reasons it must be held that clauses (a), (b), (g) and (g) of S. 27 (6) impose unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right of the petitioner to carry on business and are constitutionally invalid. For these reasons it must be held that clauses (a), (b), (g) and (g) of S. 27 (6) impose unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right of the petitioner to carry on business and are constitutionally invalid. It was also contended that there was no person why the conditions for renewal of licence should bp as rigorous as the conditions for initial grant of licence the requirement of street conditions for the renewal of licence renders the entire future of the business' of the dealer uncertain and subject it to the caprice and arbitrary will of the administrative authorities. There is justification for this argument and the requirement of S. 26 of the Act imposing the same conditions for the renewal of the licence as for the initial grant appears to be unreasonable. In our opinion clauses (a), (b), (e) and (g) are inextricably bound up with the other clauses of S. 27 (6) and form part of single scheme. The result is that clauses (a), (b), (c), (e) and (g) are not severable and the entire S. 27 (6) of the Act must be held invalid. S. 27 (2) (d) of the Act states that a valid licence issued by the Administrator "may contain such conditions, limitations and restrictions as the Administrator may think fit to impose and different conditions, limitations and restrictions may be imposed for different classes of dealers". On the face of it, this sub-section confers such wide and vague power upon the administrator that it is difficult to limit its scope. In our opinion S. 27, (2) (d) of the Act must be struck down as unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on business. It appears, however, to us that if S. 27 (2) (d) and S. 27 (6) of the Act are invalid the licensing scheme contemplated by the rest of S. 27 of the Act cannot be worked in practice. It is, therefore, necessary for Parliament to enact fresh legislation imposing appropriate conditions and restrictions for the grant and renewal of licences to dealers. In the alternative the Central Government may make appropriate rules for the same purpose in exercise of its rule-making power under S. 114 of the Act. It is, therefore, necessary for Parliament to enact fresh legislation imposing appropriate conditions and restrictions for the grant and renewal of licences to dealers. In the alternative the Central Government may make appropriate rules for the same purpose in exercise of its rule-making power under S. 114 of the Act. " ( 29 ) IT was argued for the petitioners that S. 4 of the Act also suffers from the same infirmly as pointed out bv the Supreme Court in the above decision. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioners overlooks certain distinguishing features which are to be found in S. 4 of the Act. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 4 requires the applicant for a licence to specify the minimum number of employees proposed to be employed at any time of the day in a place or premises and the application shall also be accompanied by a plan of the place or premises. Rule 3 of the Rules provides for the details to be furnished along with the application. Sub-sec. (3) of S. 4 of the Act requires the competent authority to have regard to the following matters, (a) suitability of the place or premises which is proposed to be used for the manufacture of beedi or cigar or both; (b) the previous experience of the applicant; (c) the financial resources of the applicant including his financial capacity to meet the demands arising out of the provisions of the laws for the time being in force relating to welfare of labour; (d) whether the application is made bona fide on behalf of the applicant himself or is benami of any other person, and (e) welfare of the labour in the locality, the interest of the public generally and such other matters as may be prescribed. The licensing authority is required by sub-sec. (8) of S. 4 of the Act to communicate his reason in writing when he refuses to grant or renew a licence. S. 5 of the Act provides for an appeal to the appellate authority against such order. The preamble and the provisions of the Act afford enough guidance to the licensing authority and the appellate authority in the matter of disposal of applications for licences. S. 5 of the Act provides for an appeal to the appellate authority against such order. The preamble and the provisions of the Act afford enough guidance to the licensing authority and the appellate authority in the matter of disposal of applications for licences. The insistence on the passing of a speaking order while refusing an application for the grant or renewal of a licence and the provision for an appeal against such an order, are sufficient safe-guards against any arbitrary exercise of power by the licensing authority. It is no doubt true that conferment of arbitrary power on a licensing authority without necessary guidance, would be violative of Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution, but when the said power is sufficiently controlled by necessary guidance and there are other built-in safe-guards preventing the abuse of power, it would be valid. What we have stated above is in accord with the view of the Supreme Court expressed in Kishan Chand Arora v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, AIR. 1961 SC 705. In that case the Supreme Court was concerned with the power conferred upon the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta in the matter of issue of licence for establishing eating houses Repelling 'the contention of the petitioner that the power conferred upon the Commissioner of Police was arbitrary and, therefore, should be considered as one imposing unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioner to carry on trade or business, the Supreme Court observed as follows:"the contention on behalf of the petitioner is that the first part of S. 39 confers an absolute discretion on the Commissioner to grant or to refuse a licence just as he pleases and that the second part of the section merely provides for certain conditions to be imposed in case the Commissioner pleases to grant a licence. We are however of opinion that when we are judging a law passed in 1866 to decide whether it satisfies the test of constitutionality based on Art. 19 (1) (g) and art. 19 (6), we should take the section as a whole and see whether on a fair reading of the section it can bp said that there is no guidance for the Commissioner in the matter of granting or refusing licenses and his power is arbitrary. 19 (6), we should take the section as a whole and see whether on a fair reading of the section it can bp said that there is no guidance for the Commissioner in the matter of granting or refusing licenses and his power is arbitrary. Tf such guidance can be found on a fair reading of the section, there would be no reason for striking it down simply because it has not been worded in a manner which would show immediately that considerations arising from the provisions of art. 19 (1) (g) and Art. 19 (6) were in mind naturally those considerations could not be in the mind of the legislature in 1866 We have therefore to see whether an Act passed before the Constitution came into force can be reasonably and fairly read as containing guidance in the matter of licensing, as in this case If it can be fairly and reasonably read to contain guidance it should not be struck down. If, on the other hand, on a fair and reasonable construction of the section as a whole, we come to the conclusion that there is no guidance in it and the discretion vested in the Commissioner is absolute and arbitrary it will have to be struck down. What then does the section provide. It certainly gives powers to the Commissioner to grant licences at his discretion. Those words, however, by themselves do not necessarily mean that the Commissioner has the power to act arbitrarily and grant licences where he pleases and refuse where he does not please to do so. The section provides further that the licence has to be granted upon certain conditions and those conditions have to satisfy two objects, namely, (i) securing of the good behaviour of the keepers of the said houses or places of public resort and entertainment and (ii) the prevention of drunkenness and disorder among the persons frequenting or using the same. Of course, it is implicit in the section that a licence will only be granted to a person who is the keeper of an eating house. We cannot read the section as laying down that the discretion is absolute and that the imposing of conditions for the aforesaid two objects only arises after that absolute discretion has been exercised in favour of the grant of licences. We cannot read the section as laying down that the discretion is absolute and that the imposing of conditions for the aforesaid two objects only arises after that absolute discretion has been exercised in favour of the grant of licences. We see no unfairness or unreasonableness in reading the section to mean that the Commissioner shall satisfy himself (i) that the person applying for a licence is the keeper of an eating house, meaning thereby that he has a place where he can carry on the business or trade and that he actually and effectively has control and possession of that place, (ii) that the keeper is a person of good behaviour so that the eating house may not become a resort of criminals and persons of ill-repute, and (iii) that the keeper is in a position to prevent drunkenness and disorder among those who come to the eating house. This section appears in the Police Act, the purpose of which is to maintain law and order and that is why we find that the two objects to be secured when granting licences are the good behaviour of the keeper himself and the prevention of drunkenness and disorder among those who frequent the eating house. It seems therefore to us that S. 39 clearly provides that the Commissioner will use his discretion in deciding whether the person applying for a licence is in actual and effective control and possession of the place where the eating house is to be kept and is thus the keeper thereof. He will also satisfy himself that the keeper is a person of good behaviour and further that be is able to prevent drunkenness and disorder in the eating house. If he is satisfied on these three matters, it seems to us that the section contemplates that the discretion will be exercised in favour of the grant of a licence. We cannot accept that even though the Commissioner may be satisfied that the person applying for a licence has actual and effective control of the place where he is going to keep the eating house is a person of good behaviour and can prevent drunkenness, and disorder among the elientele, he will still go on to refuse the licence. We cannot accept that even though the Commissioner may be satisfied that the person applying for a licence has actual and effective control of the place where he is going to keep the eating house is a person of good behaviour and can prevent drunkenness, and disorder among the elientele, he will still go on to refuse the licence. The discretion that is given to him is to satisfy himself on the three points and if he is satisfied about them he has to grant the licence. On the other hand, if he is not satisfied on any one or more of these points he will exercise the discretion by refusing the licence. As for the conditions which will be inseretd in the licence, they are only for the purpose of carrying on the two objects specified in the section. " ( 30 ) IN the above view of the matter, the Supreme Court repelled the contention that S. 39 of the Calcutta Act was unconstitutional. Similarly in the instant case it has to be observed that the object of the Act being very clear the competent authority would not refuse a licence even though he is satisfied that the applicant is able to comply with the requirements of the act effectively. He is bound in the circumstances of the case to dispose of the application for grant or renewal of a licence on objective considerationd. There is hardly any scope for an arbitrary disposal of such an application. The same view has been taken by the High Court of Bombay in the writ petitions referred to above on the question of validity of Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act. Ss. 3 to 5 of the Madras Act 32 of 1958 which were almost identical were also upheld by the Madras High Court in Abdur Rahim v. State of Madras. ( 31 ) THE petitioners however relied upon the decision of the Andhra Pradesh high Court referred to above in which it has taken the view that ss. 3 and 4 of the Act were unconstitutional on the ground that they violated art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. With all respect to the learned Judges who decided that case, we cannot subscribe to the view taken by them. 3 and 4 of the Act were unconstitutional on the ground that they violated art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. With all respect to the learned Judges who decided that case, we cannot subscribe to the view taken by them. In order to come that conclusion, the High Court of andhra Pradesh relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, state of A. P. v. Nalla Raja Reddy, AIR 1967 SC. 1458 and Kantilal Bobulal v. H. C. Patel, AIR. 1968 SC. 445. Neither of these two cases appears to be relevant for the question. The question for decision before the Supreme Court in the first case was one relating to the fixation of a minimum flat rate of assessment for dry and wet lands in Andhra Pradesh without any classification of the lands in question. It was further found that the imposition of the assessment had been left to the arbitrary discretion of officers not named under the Act without giving any remedy to the assessee for questioning the correctness of any of the important stages concerned in the matter of assessment such as ayacut, taram, rate or classification, or even in regard to the calculation of the figures. In those circumstances, the Supreme court felt that the levy under the Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue (Additional assessment) and Cess Revision Act (22 of 1962) as amended by andhra Pradesh Land Revenue (Additional Assessment) and Cess Revision (Amendment) Act (23 of 1962), was invalid. Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act are not similar to Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act which was under consideration of the Supreme Court in the above case. Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act are not similar to Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act which was under consideration of the Supreme Court in the above case. In the second case, the Supreme court was dealing with the validity of the provisions of Bombay Sales tax Act, which provided that if any person collected any amount by way of tax in contravention of the provisions of that Act and if any registered dealer collected any amount by way of tax in excess of the amount payable under the Act, the amounts so collected shall, without prejudice to any prosecution that may be instituted against such person or dealer, as the case may be for an offence under this Act, be forfeited to the State government and such person or dealer, as the case may be shall within the prescribed period, pay such amount into a Government treasury and in default of such payment, the amount shall be recovered as an arrear of land revenue. The Supreme Court found in that case that there had not been a proper machinery provided for determination of the question whether really any excess amount had been collected by a party and that the act was silent as to the machinery and procedure to be followed in determining the question as to whether there had been a contravention of that section and if so to what extent. This case again has no bearing on the point, namely, the constitutional validity of Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act are not unconstitutional. ( 32 ) THE next contention of the petitioners was that in view of the language employed in defining the expressions 'contract labour', 'contractor', 'employer', 'establishment', and 'principal employer' in the Act, liabilities are sought to be imposed on persons who would not be in a position to comply with the provisions of the Act. It was argued that persons who entrust tobacco and leaves to independent contractors to get them rolled into beedies or cigars and to deliver the finished products to them, are made responsible for certain obligations imposed on the employers under the Act in relation to labour employed by the contractors whether such employment was either within their knowledge or without their knowledge. ( 33 ) IT was submitted that in common law, a person cannot be made responsible for the actions of an independent contractor and that he should not be penalised for the contravention of any law by such an independent contractor. According to them, the persons with whom they have dealings are independent contractors and they have no sort of control over them. So also, when tobacco and leaves are given to home workers directly by the petitioners, the home workers would not be under their control at all, and, therefore, they should not be made responsible for providing any amenities or leave facilities so far as those home workers are concerned. It should be mentioned here that Ss. 3 to 5 deal with licensing of industrial premises, Ss. 8 to 16 dealt with the provision of amenities for workars in the industrial premises, Ss. 17 to 23 deal with the working hours, wages for over-time work, interval for rest, spread-over of working hours and weekly holidays in industrial premises and Ss. 24 and 25 also deal with industrial premises. These provisions do not apply to home workers directly appointed or to home workers appointed by or through contractors. These provisions apply to the industrial premises as defined under S. 2 (i) of the Act which excludes a private dwelling house from the definition of industrial premises. If a person establishes an industrial premises, there is nothing wrong in making him responsible for provision of amenities and leave facilities to the employees working therein. Similarly, if a person establishes an industrial premises through an agent or a manager for him or on his behalf, he should be equally responsible for the provision of amenities and leave facilities for the workers therein. In the case of labour employed through a contractor, the principal employer would be liable as the employer within the meaning of that expression only when the contract labour is employed for him or on his behalf in an establishment. This is clear from the definition of the expression 'principal employer' in S. 2 (m) of the A^ct which reads, 'principal employer' means a person for whom or on whose behalf any contract labour is engaged or employed in an establishment. This is clear from the definition of the expression 'principal employer' in S. 2 (m) of the A^ct which reads, 'principal employer' means a person for whom or on whose behalf any contract labour is engaged or employed in an establishment. What the Parliament has done is only to adopt the language of S. 182 of the Indian Contract Act which defines an 'agent', as a person employed to do any act for another. If a contractor employs labour for or on behalf of another person, the person for whom or on whose behalf the labour is so employed or engaged, becomes the principal employer, and, therefore, the employer in relation to contract labour under clause (a) of S. 2 (g) of the Act. If the contractor has not engaged the labour either for or on behalf of a manufacturer, then the manufacturer cannot be the principal employer. The question, therefore, is one of fact. In each case it must be established before a person can be called a principal employer in relation to contract labour, that the contract labour is employed for him or on his behalf. Similarly, clause (b) of S. 2 (g) of the Act defines the word 'employer' in relation to labour other than contract labour as the person who has ultimate control over the affairs of any establishment or who has, by reason of his advancing money, supplying goods or otherwise a substantial interest in the control of the affairs of any establishment, and includes any other person to whom the affairs of the establishment are entrusted, whether such other person is called the managing agent, manager, superintendent or by any other name, is also an employer. Wo do not find any difficulty in understanding the meaning of the second part of the definition of the word 'employer' referred to above. If a person is proved to be having ultimate control over the affairs of any establishment in either of the two way's mentioned in clause (b) of S. 2 (g), he would be an employer who would be liable to comply with the obligations imposed on the employer under the Act. Here again whether a person has ultimate control over the affairs of an establishment or not is to be decided on the facts of each case. Here again whether a person has ultimate control over the affairs of an establishment or not is to be decided on the facts of each case. We may at this stage refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in V. P. Gopala Rao v. Public Prosecutor, A. P. , AIR 1970 SC 66 , which relates to a beedi factory: " It is a question of fact in each case whether the relationship of master and servant exists between the management and the workmen. The relationshipp is characterised by contract of service between them. In Short v. J. W. Henderson Ltd. (1946 SC (HL) 24 at pp. 33- 34) Lord Thankerton recapitulated four indicia of a contract of service. As stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed. Vol. 25 p. 448 article 872: 'the following have been stated to be the indicia of a contract of service, namely, (1) the master's power of selection of his servant; (2) the payment of wages or other remuneration; (3) the master's right to control the method of doing the work; and (4) the master's right of suspension or dismissal (1946) SC (HL) 24, at pp. 33, 34; gould v. Minister of National Insurance, (1951) 1 KB 731 at p. 734; (1951) All. E. R. 368 at p. 371; Pauley v. Kenaldo Ltd. , (1953 ). 1 all. E. R. 226 (C. A.), at p. 228; but modern industrial conditions have so affected the freedom of the master that it may be necessary at some future time to restate the indicia; e. g. , heads (1), (2) and (4) and properly also head (3), are affected by statutory provisions (Short v. J. W. Henderson Ltd. (1946 SC (HL)24, supra at p. 34" ). ( 34 ) IN Dharangadhra Chemical Works v. State of Saurashtra (1957 scr. 152) the Court held that the critical test of the relationship of master and servant is the master's right of superintendence and control of the method of doing the work. Applying this test workmen rolling bidies were found to bo employees of independent contractors and not workers within S. 2 (1), in State of Kerala v. Patel V. M. (supra) and Shankar Balaji Waje v. State of Maharastra (1962-1 lab. Applying this test workmen rolling bidies were found to bo employees of independent contractors and not workers within S. 2 (1), in State of Kerala v. Patel V. M. (supra) and Shankar Balaji Waje v. State of Maharastra (1962-1 lab. L. J. 119) while they were found to be workers within S. 2 (1) in Birdhichand Sharma v. First Civil Judge, Nagpur ( (1961) 2 Lab. L. J. 86) and workmen within the meaning of S. 2 (s) of the Industrial disputes Act in D. C. Dewan Mohideen Saheb and Sons v. Secy. United bidi Workers' Union ( (1964-2 Lab. L. J. 533 ). ( 35 ) THERE is no abstract a -prior test of the work control required for establishing a contract of service. In 1946 SC. (HL) 24 (supra) Lord thankerton quoting Lord Justice Clerk's dicta in an earlier case said that the principal requirement of a contract of service was the right of the master "in some reasonable sense" to control the method of doing the work. As pointed out in Birdhichand's case ( (1961) 2 Lab. L. J. 86) (Supra) the fact that the workmen have to work in the factory imply a certain amount of supervision by the management. The court held that the nature and extent of control varied in different industries and that when the operation was of a simple nature the control could be exercised at the end of the day by the method of rejecting the bidis which did not come up to the proper standard. ( 36 ) IT is to be seen in all these writ petitions, the petitioners appear to have some sort of control over the establishment where beedies are being manufactured since they have the right to reject beedies which are substandard ones. But it is not necessary for ua to express any opinion in these writ petitions on the question whether the petitioners are employers within the meaning of S. 2 (g) of the Act or not in respect of any particular class of workmen. We do not have necessary material to decide this question. But it is not necessary for ua to express any opinion in these writ petitions on the question whether the petitioners are employers within the meaning of S. 2 (g) of the Act or not in respect of any particular class of workmen. We do not have necessary material to decide this question. But we are however of the opinion that if the petitioners are either principal employers under S. 2 (m) or otherwise employers under clause (b) of S. 2 (g) of the Act, then they would te responsible for the obligations imposed on an employer in relation to the contract labour engaged for them or on their behalf by the contractor or for the labour working in an establishment, as the case may be. If it is found that they are not responsible on the ground the persons with whom they are dealing are independent contractors, then such independent contractors would have to be considered as the employers within the meaning of the Act. Hence we do not find any substance in the above contention of the petitioners. ( 37 ) IT was next urged that Ss. 26 and 27 of the Act which provide for the grant of annual leave for a worker who has worked for 240 days in a year and payment of wages lor that period of leave on the basis ot his average daily earning, as etermined by S. 27 of the Act, are unworkable in the case of beedi and cigar workers and they imposed an unreasonable burden on the manufacturers. This submission of the petitioners was made particularly in relation to the case of home-workers. According to the petitioners it is not possible to find out whether a home-worker has actually worked for 240 days in a year and to determine his average daily earning since there is no control over the working hours and the number of manufacturers for whom a home-worker can act as a home-worker during a specified period. It was contended that a homeworker may roll beedies or cigars for more than one manufacturer during the same period. ( 38 ) UNDER those circumstances, it was contended that these two sections would be unworkable. It is to be seen that the Rules framed under the act provide for the maintenance of a home-workers log book (form No. 14) and home-workers employment register (form No. 15 ). ( 38 ) UNDER those circumstances, it was contended that these two sections would be unworkable. It is to be seen that the Rules framed under the act provide for the maintenance of a home-workers log book (form No. 14) and home-workers employment register (form No. 15 ). In form No. 14 the particulars such as date of work, number of beedies or cigars manufactured and the wages received by the worker, will have to be entered. The total number of days worked in each month also have to be shown. In form no. 15, beedies manufactured by each home-worker should be entered under the appropriate date. If these two forms are properly maintained, it is possible to find out whether a home-worker has qualified himself for the annual leave under S. 26 of the Act and it would also be possible to make a computation of the wages payable for that period under S. 27 of the Act. Explanations 1 and 2 to S. 27 of the Act set out the method to be adopted in making the computation. The home-worker will get by way of wages for the leave period, only the amount corresponding to the number of beedies manufactured by him for a particular employer. Under those circumstances, whether he works for more than one employer or not, would become immaterial. Similarly, whether he has worked for the same number of working hours as a worker in an industrial premises also would be immaterial because if ho has worked for a less number of hours correspondingly he gets lessor payment. There is, therefore, no difficulty in making computation of the wages payable for the annua leave period under Ss. 26 and 27 of the Act, and there is no justification in denying the same to a homeworker when a worker in an industrial premises is entitled to receive wages for the period of annual leave. ( 39 ) THE next submission made on behalf of the petitioners was one based on S. 31 of the Act which imposes restrictions on the employer regarding termination of the servcies of an employee. ( 39 ) THE next submission made on behalf of the petitioners was one based on S. 31 of the Act which imposes restrictions on the employer regarding termination of the servcies of an employee. It provides that no employer shall dispense with the services of an employee who has been employed for a period of six months or more, except for a reasonable cause, and without giving such employee at least one month's notice or wages in lieu of such notice and it provides for an enquiry to be held by the employer when the services of an employee arc to be dispensed with on the ground of misconduct and for a forum for appeal against such an order passed by the employer at the end of a disciplinary enquiry. It also provides for reinstatement of an employee v/ho has been dismissed without following the procedure prescribed therefor or without any justification. The contention is that this section should not have been made applicable to homeworkers. ( 40 ) THIS section seeks to remedy one of the vices which was found to prevail in beedi industry namely, arbitrary stoppage of the supply of tobacco and leaves to a home-worker and the consequent denial of wages which he would have otherwise earned. As already stated, every employer is expected to maintain registers in form Nos. 14 and 15 prescribed by the Rules which would show the number of home-workers in the employment of a manufacturer and the period during which he has worked continuously under him. There ran be no justifiable reason to hold that S. 31 is unconstitutional. The security of tenure of employment is one of the basic ideas underlying any labour welfare policy and it is one of the duties cast on the State by Article 43 of the Constitution of India to see that the employees are not made victims of arbitrary 'hiring and firing' by the employers. We see no substance in this contention. ( 41 ) THE last submission was in respect of clauses (r), (s) and (t) of sub-sec. We see no substance in this contention. ( 41 ) THE last submission was in respect of clauses (r), (s) and (t) of sub-sec. (2) of S. 44 of the Act, which authorises the State Government to prescribe rules in regard to the manner in which sorting or rejection of beedi and cigar or both, shall be carried out, the fixation of minimum limit of the percentage of rejection of beedi or cigar or both manufactured by an employee and specification of the place at which wages should be paid to workers who receive directly or through an agent raw materials for the manufacture of beedi or cigar or both at home. Rules 27 to 30 of the Rules have been framed pursuant to clauses (r), (s) and (t) of sub-sec. (3) of s. 44 of the Act. Rule 27 provides for settlement of dispute in regard to issue of raw materials, rejection of beedies or cigars and payment of wages for such rejected beedies or cigars. The Inspector is required to decide the case after giving an opportunity to parties to represent their respective cases and an appeal is provided against an order under Rule 27 to the chief Inspector. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioners that Rule 29 imposes an unreasonable restriction on the employer because it compels him to accept beedies even when they are substandard ones and the quantity of substandard beedies or cigars or both exceeds 5 per cent. There is no basis for this apprehension. What Rule 29 provides is that ordinarily an employer is entitled to reject 2 per cent of the beedies or cigars or both received from an employee as sub-standard or 'chhat' and he is authorised to reject upto 5 per cent after re-cording reasons therefor. But if the employer finds that the quantity of substandard beedies or cigars or both is above 5 per cent, then he has to refer the matter to the Inspector who is authorised to decide the question. Therefore, we do not find that Rule 29 of the Rules compels the employer to accept substandard beedies or cigars when the quantity of such products is above 5 per cent of the total quantity received from the worker. Therefore, we do not find that Rule 29 of the Rules compels the employer to accept substandard beedies or cigars when the quantity of such products is above 5 per cent of the total quantity received from the worker. ( 42 ) HAVING given our anxious consideration to all the contentions urged by the petitioners, we are of the opinion that all the restrictions which are imposed by the Act and the Rules on the employers are protected by art. 19 (6) of the Constitution of India. They are all reasonable restrictions conceived in public interest. Before parting with the above case we feel it appropriate to refer to what Mukherjea, J. (as he then was) said in A. K opalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC. 27 to 93. He observed: "there cannot be any such thing as absolute or uncontrolled liberty wholly freed from restraint, for that would lead to anarchy and disorder. The posssesion and enjoyment of all rights, as was observed by the Supreme Court of America in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, general order and morals of the community. ( 43 ) THE question, therefore, arises in each case of adjusting the conflicting interests of the individual and of the society. In some cases, restrictions have to be placed upon free exercise of individual rights to safeguard the interests of the society; on the other hand, social control which exists for public good has got to be restrained, lest it should be misused to the detriment of individual rights and liberties. Ordinarily, every men has the liberty to order his life as he pleases, to say what he will, to go where he will, to follow any trade, occupation or calling at his pleasure and to do any other thing which he can lawfully do without let or hindrance by any other person. On the oher hand for the very protection of these liberties and society must arm itself with certain powers. No man's liberty would be worth its name if it can be violated with impunity by any wrong-doer and if his property or possessions could be preyed upon by a thief or a marauder. On the oher hand for the very protection of these liberties and society must arm itself with certain powers. No man's liberty would be worth its name if it can be violated with impunity by any wrong-doer and if his property or possessions could be preyed upon by a thief or a marauder. The society, therefore, has got to exercise certain poxvers for the protection of these liberties and to arrest, search, imprison and punish those who break the law. Tf these powers are properly exercised, they themselves are the safeguards of freedom, but thev ran certainlv be abused. ( 44 ) THE police may arrest anv man and throw him into prison without assigning any reason they may search his belongings on the slightest pretext : he may be subjected to a sham trial and even punished for crimes unknown to law. What the Constitution, therefore, attempts to do in declaring the rights of the people is to strike a balance between individual liberty and social control. To me it seems that Art. 19 of the Constitution gives a list of individual liberties and prescribes in the various clauses the restraints that mav be placed upon them' by law, so that they may not conflict with public welfare or general morality. In the result, we hold that there is no substance in any of the contentions raised by the petitioners and the writ petitions fail and are dismissed. The petitioners shall pay the costs of the State of Mysore. Advocate's fee rs. 100 in each petition. --- *** --- .