JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - This is a decree-holder's appeal against the decision of the Executing Court in a proceeding u/s 47 Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The short facts are that Appellant' obtained a decree for possession of a house and levied Execution in E.P. No. 73 of 1966 for getting possession through Court. When the decree-holder and The Court Officers came to the village for The purpose of taking possession, the villagers intervened and brought about a compromise. The terms of the settlement reached, in the village on that day were that the title of the decree holder in respect of the house is honoured. The judgment debtors would be free to purchase the property for Rs. 3, 500/-. On the date of agreement Rs. 500/- was paid out of the consideration money to the decree-holder. The balance amount of Rs. 3000/- was to be paid on or before 28.2.1968 and the judgment-debtors were to take sale deed from the decree-holder. If judgment-debtors would not comply with the terms of the agreement the advance of Rs. 500/- would stand forfeited and they would be obliged to vacate possession. The decree-holder proceeded with the Execution case as the judgment-debtors did not comply with the terms. On 4.3.1968, a petition u/s 47, CPC was filed by the judgment-debtors pleading that the decree had been superseded by the agreement and it became in executable. On 13.3.1968, a counter was filed by the decree-holder clearly admitting the contract, but asserting that there was a breach of the agreement from the side of the judgment-debtors and was, therefore, no longer enforceable ad the decree-holder was entitled to recovery of possession. The learned Subordinate Judge of Berhampur as the executing Court sustained the objection u/s 47. CPC and the present appeal is directed against that determination. 3. The agreement had not been produced before the Executing Court, but an application was made for receiving additional evidence in this case by the Appellant decree-holder and by consent of parties the agreement has now been received as additional evidence and has been marked as Ext. A. The agreement is dated 25.12.1967 and it specifically provides that on or before 28.2.1968 the judgment debtors would pay the balance amount of Rs. 3000/- and obtain the sale deed. If the judgment-debtors do not conform to the terms, then the allowance of Rs. A. The agreement is dated 25.12.1967 and it specifically provides that on or before 28.2.1968 the judgment debtors would pay the balance amount of Rs. 3000/- and obtain the sale deed. If the judgment-debtors do not conform to the terms, then the allowance of Rs. 500/- would not be refundable and the decree-holder would be entitled to get possession of the property. 4. The effect of this compromise on the Execution case has now to be determined. In AIR 1939 80 (Privy Council), their Lordships were dealing with a case of compromise in an execution proceeding. Sir George Rankin delivering the judgment of the Board stated that the Code contained no general restriction of the parties' liberty of contract with reference to their rights and obligations under the decree. In the absence of express statutory authority it is not possible to regard Order 20, Rule 10 CPC as excluding any possibility of the parties coming to B valid agreement for time to which the Court u/s 47 will have regard. If it appears to the Court, Acting u/s 47, that the true effect of the agreement was to discharge the decree forthwith in consideration of certain promises by the debtor, then no doubt the Court will not have occasion to enforce the agreement in execution proceeding but will leave the creditor to bring a separate suit upon the contract. If, on the other hand, the agreement is intended to govern the liability of the debtor under the decree and to have effect upon the time or manner of its enforcement, it is a matter to he dealt with u/s 47. In such a case to say that the creditor may perhaps have 80 separate suit is to misread the Code, which by requiring all such matters to be dealt with in Execution discloses a broader view of the scope and functions of an executing Court. A fair and ordinary bargain for time in consideration of a reasonable rate of interest cannot be regarded as an attempt to give jurisdiction to a. Court to amend or vary the decree. Such a bargain has its effect upon the parties rights under the decree and the Executing Court u/s 47 has jurisdiction to ascertain its legal effect and to enforce the bargain. Such a bargain has its effect upon the parties rights under the decree and the Executing Court u/s 47 has jurisdiction to ascertain its legal effect and to enforce the bargain. The dictum laid down in the aforesaid case has been quoted with approval by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Motilal v. Md. Hasan Khan 1968 S.C.D. 907. The agreement of December, 1967 certainly did not wipe out the decree forthwith. On the other hand it stipulated that on the failure of the judgment-debtors to satisfy the terms the decree would operate and the judgment-debtors would get dispossessed. The true effect was to suspend execution of the decree until 28.2.1968 when the judgment-debtors were to pay the balance and obtain a title deed transferring the property to them. Thus the decree for recovery of possession remained in tact until by the contingency indicated in the agreement title of the decree-holder was to be lost. The stand of the judgment-debtors is not that the balance amount of Rs. 3000/- has been paid by the time indicated. The Executing Court is clearly wrong in supposing that the decree-holder was still willing to perform the agreement. He has obviously overlooked the contents of paragraph 6 of the counter of the decree-bolder wherein it had been stated that 88 the judgment-debtors had failed to fulfil the contract they were no longer entitled to enforce their rights under the agreement. The rule of estoppel relied upon by the learned Subordinate Judge has no basis particularly in the setting of the present case. The proper conclusion to reach in such circumstances would be that the decree remained and was Executable unless the judgment-debtors acted upto the terms contained in the agreement. 5. The real relief of the judgment-debtors lay in a suit for specific performance of the contract. Ordinarily the Executing Court is not entitled to affect the decree or annihilate it unless parties by their subsequent Action agree to do so. The Executing Court Acted contrary to law in holding that the decree had ceased to be Executable on account of the contract contained in Ext. A. The appeal has to succeed. I would accordingly vacate the order of the learned Subordinate Judge and allow the appeal. The decree-holder shall be entitled to his costs.