JUDGMENT R. L. Gulati, J. - The case giving rise to this Special Appeal has had a chequered history. 2. The appellants, who are three in number, are real brothers. They filed i suit under Section 232 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition. and Land Reforms Act on December 28, 1954 against respondent Nos. 4 to 18 (hereinafter referred to as the contesting respondents) for the recovery of possession of the land in dispute on the allegation that they were the recorded occupants of the same in 1356 fasli and had thus acquired adhivasi rights, but had been forcibly dispossessed. The suit was originally decreed exparte, but the exparte decree was subsequently set aside and the suit was thereafter dismissed on the merits. The appellants then filed an appeal before Commissioner, Agra Range, Agra, who remanded the same for a retrial holding that the contesting respondents were to establish that there was a voluntary surrender of the disputed land by the appellants and as the issue of voluntary surrender had been deleted, the appellants had been prejudiced in their case. The contesting respondents then applied in revision to the Board of Revenue. During the pendency of this revision, the village in which the disputed land is situated came under the consolidation operations. 3. It appears that the land in dispute was previously the sir and khudkasht of a Zamindar by the name of Kashi Prasad. According to the case of the contesting respondents, there was a voluntary surrender of the land by the appellants, where after fresh leases were granted by the Zamindar to them and the land came in their cultivatory possession. On the basis of those leases the names of the contesting respondents were recorded in 1359 fasli. 4. During the consolidation proceedings the appellants filed an objection under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act before the Consolidation Officer praying that the appellants be declared sirdars and the names of the respondents be expunged. The consolidation Officer rejected the objection of the appellants. Thereafter the appellants preferred an appeal before the Settlement Officer consolidation, who by his order dated March 30, 1961 dismissed the appeal. The consolidation Officer rejected the objection of the appellants. Thereafter the appellants preferred an appeal before the Settlement Officer consolidation, who by his order dated March 30, 1961 dismissed the appeal. The appellants then preferred a second appeal before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who held that so far as the statement of the appellants surrendering the rights in proceedings for correction of paper were concerned, they were neither in the form of a compromise before the court nor were made on oath and as such no importance could be attached to them. However, he dismissed the appeal on the ground that the suit filed by the appellants in the lower court for possession was time-barred and as such the appellants had lost their right. The appellants then applied in revision before the Director of Consolidation, who by his order dated September 13, 1961 allowed the same holding that the suit was within time. He, however, remanded the case to the Consolidation Officer for a fresh decision. When the matter came before the Consolidation Officer on remand, he once again dismissed the objection holding that the appellants had surrendered the land on their own accord and their suit for recovery of possession was barred by time. He further held that the entries of 1356 fasli were wrong. The appellants once again filed an appeal before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), who by his order dated May 14, 1962 set aside the order of the Consolidation Officer holding that the alleged surrender by the appellants in Panchayati Adalat was no surrender according to law and was not even a compromise and that the suit for regaining the possession filed by the appellants was within time. He accordingly allowed the appeal and declared the appellants to be the sirdars. The contesting respondents then filed a second appeal before the Deputy Director of Consolidation who by his order dated July 31, 1962, dismissed the same. It appears that the question as to whether there was voluntary surrender or not was not raised before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The contesting respondents then applied in revision to the Director of Consolidation, who by his order dated September 4, 1962, allowed the revision and ordered that the names of the contesting respondents be entered as sirdars. Thereupon the appellants filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution which has been dismissed by brother Dwivedi. The contesting respondents then applied in revision to the Director of Consolidation, who by his order dated September 4, 1962, allowed the revision and ordered that the names of the contesting respondents be entered as sirdars. Thereupon the appellants filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution which has been dismissed by brother Dwivedi. Hence this Special Appeal. 5. Sri N.C. Upadhya, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that the order of the Director of Consolidation is without jurisdiction. His contention is that the question as to whether the appellants had voluntarily surrendered their rights was a question of fact which had been decided in their favour by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the Director of Consolidation had no power to interfere with that finding in exercise of his jurisdiction under Section 48 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood at the material time. 6. Admittedly the case is governed by Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holding Act, as it stood prior to its amendment in 1963. The revisional jurisdiction of the Director of Consolidation, prior to 1963, was restricted to questions of jurisdiction only. He could not record a finding of fact, nor could he interfere with a finding of fact recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in a second appeal, who was the final fact finding authority. This position does not appear to have been contested before the learned Single Judge. However, the learned Single judge was persuaded to dismiss the writ petition on the ground that no manifest injustice had been done as a result of the order passed by the Director of Consolidation, even if he exceeded in his jurisdiction. 7. It appears that the Deputy Director of Consolidation proceeded on the ground that as between the appellants and the contesting respondents the claim of the appellants had a preference inasmuch as the former's claim was based upon the entry of 1356 falsi whereas the claim of the contesting respondents was based on their cultivatory possession of 1359 fasli. The learned Single Judge has relied upon the decision of this Court in Juthan Singh v. Badri, 1962 A.L.J. 870, where a contrary view has been taken. The learned Single Judge has relied upon the decision of this Court in Juthan Singh v. Badri, 1962 A.L.J. 870, where a contrary view has been taken. It has been held in that case that the persons becoming adhivasis by virtue of their cultivatory possession in 1959 fasli would have preference over persons becoming adhivasis by virtue of their being recorded as occupants in the khasra of 1356 fasli. The learned Single Judge took the view that in view of that decision, the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation was manifestly erroneous in law and if the Director of Consolidation set aside that order, the appellants could not be said to have suffered any manifest injustice. 8. With respect, we do not agree with the approach of the learned Single Judge. It is now well settled that justice must be done according to law. An order which is admittedly without jurisdiction and which seeks to deprive a party of the fruits of a litigation which had become final could not be said to be anything but unjust. However, there is a stronger reason upon which the appellants are entitled to succeed. 9. Assuming that the contesting respondents were in cultivatory possession in 1359 fasli in pursuance of the lease granted to them by the Zamindar on the voluntary surrender of the land by the appellants, the contesting respondents could not succeed unless they were able to show that they were in cultivatory possession for the whole of the year 1359 fasli. No admittedly as also according to the finding recorded by the Consolidation Officer, the contesting respondents came in possession of the land in dispute after the execution of the leases in their favour. The leases are alleged to have been executed in the months of September and November, in 1359 fasli, whereas that year starts from 1st July. Obviously the contesting respondents could not have been in cultivatory possession for the whole of the year of 1359 fasli. 10. The leases are alleged to have been executed in the months of September and November, in 1359 fasli, whereas that year starts from 1st July. Obviously the contesting respondents could not have been in cultivatory possession for the whole of the year of 1359 fasli. 10. In Smt. Sonawat v. Sri Ram, 1968 A.L.J. 313, the Supreme Court has held that for purposes of Section 3 of the U.P. Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act, 1952, before a person can claim the status of an asami or an adhivasi, he must establish that he was in cultivatory possession of the land during the year 1359 fasli and that the cultivatory possession to be recognised for purposes of that Act must be lawful and for the whole year of 1359 fasli. On the facts found and admitted in this case, the contesting respondents were not and could not have been in cultivatory possession of the whole of the year 1359 fasli. 11. For the reasons stated above, we are of opinion that the appellant's writ petition ought not to have been dismissed. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents has raised a number of points in support of the order of the Director of Consolidation. They raise the question whether the application under Section 232 was a competent proceeding, inter alia, on the ground that meanwhile the appellants had lost their status as adhivasis and had become sirdars by virtue of Sec. 240-B (a) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and land Reforms Act, whether an application under Section 232 would be against a sirdar in view of the provision in Section 19 that a sirdar was entitled to possession, and whether the respondents who had only a one-fourth share in the land in dispute could be granted relief in respect of the entire land. 13. These questions have not yet received the attention of the learned Single Judge. As we are of opinion that this Special Appeal should be allowed and are setting aside his judgment, we propose to send the case back to a learned Single Judge for disposing of the writ petition in accordance with law on the merits of the case. 14. Accordingly, the Special Appeal is allowed, the judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside, and the case is remanded to a learned Single judge for its disposal afresh in accordance with law. 14. Accordingly, the Special Appeal is allowed, the judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside, and the case is remanded to a learned Single judge for its disposal afresh in accordance with law. The connected writ petitions will also be placed before the learned Single Judge for decision. There is no order as to costs of the Special Appeal.