Judgment Bhargava, J.-This appeal has been filed by Binoy Kumar Mukherjee on the basis of a certificate under Article 133(1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution, challenging the order of the High Court of Patna dismissing his petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The appellant, by that petition, had challenged the order of termination of his services while he was holding the post of Regional Transport Officer and Secretary, North Bihar Regional Transport Authority, Muzaffarpur. His service was terminated with effect from February 23, 1963. 2. The relevant facts are that by an order dated February 7, 1948, the Government of Bihar re-organised its Transport Establishment and sanctioned a number of posts including two posts of Enforcement Officers for a period of five years with effect from March 1, 1948. The appellant was appointed to one of these posts of Enforcement Officers on April 22, 1949. There was no specific mention whether he was being appointed permanently, or temporarily though the post, to which he was appointed, had been created for a period of five years only. On November 21, 1951, he was appointed temporarily to act as Regional Transport Officer and Secretary. Regional Transport Authority, in a higher scale, and he continued to work in that scale until his services were terminated as mentioned above. The posts of Regional Transport Officer and Secretary were also temporary; but the State Government by an order dated December 2, 1954, made them permanent with effect from December 1, 1954. The incumbents of the posts, who had been entertained on temporary basis and had been working as such till November 30, 1954, were to continue to hold temporarily the corresponding posts sanctioned permanently on the same scale of pay and allowances with effect from December 1, 1954, till specific orders could issue in each case regarding the confirmation or otherwise in the permanent posts of the particular incumbents, or May 31, 1955, whichever happened to be earlier. Under this order, the appellant continued to work temporarily in the post of Regional Transport Officer and Secretary which had become permanent under this order dated December 2, 1954. Thereafter, various orders were passed extending the time up to which the temporary holders of the posts were to continue temporarily in those posts without orders of confirmation. Under this order, the appellant continued to work temporarily in the post of Regional Transport Officer and Secretary which had become permanent under this order dated December 2, 1954. Thereafter, various orders were passed extending the time up to which the temporary holders of the posts were to continue temporarily in those posts without orders of confirmation. On each occasion, there was a general direction that this continuance in temporary capacity was to be effective until orders were passed as regards confirmation or otherwise and, in the alternative a date was fixed in the same manner as had been fixed in the order dated December 2, 1954. Thus in the first letter, subsequent to the letter dated December 2, 1954, granting extension, which was issued on June 18, 1955, the date which was indicated was October 31, 1955, up to which the temporary appointment was to continue. Similar orders were passed on October 21, 1955, extending the date to February 29, 1956; on February 27, 1956, extending the date to August 31, 1956; on August 10, 1956, extending the date to February 28, 1957; on January 30, 1957, extending the date to February 28, 1958; and on February 25, 1958 extending the date to February 28, 1959. Thereafter the last order of extension was issued on September 29, 1959, and on this occasion, no date was mentioned for the period of extension. This time, there was only the general direction that those incumbents, who had not been either confirmed or discharged, were to continue to hold temporarily their respective posts on the same scale of pay and allowances till specific orders could issue in each case regarding their confirmation or otherwise. The appellant then continued in service until the year 1963 when, by the order dated January 24, 1963, his services were terminated with effect from February 23, 1963, thus giving him one month s notice from the date of issue of the letter. This was the order which the appellant challenged by his petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court. The High Court having dismissed the petition, the appellant has now come up to this Court in appeal. 3. This was the order which the appellant challenged by his petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court. The High Court having dismissed the petition, the appellant has now come up to this Court in appeal. 3. In this case, it is not disputed that the initial appointment of the appellant in the year 1949 was to a temporary post which had been created for a period of only five years, so that it could not be inferred that his appointment was in a permanent capacity. It is true that, in the order, there was no mention that he was being appointed temporarily; but, since the post, to which he was appointed, was to exist for a period of five years only, all that can be implied is that his appointment was for the same period. That period expired on April 21, 1954. Before the expiry of this period of five years, he had, however, been promoted to a higher post of Regional Transport Officer and Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, and was acting in that capacity temporarily under the order dated November 21, 1951. In December, 1954, when the posts in the Department were made permanent, he was under these orders holding the post of Regional Transport Authority, in a temporary capacity. Consequently, he continued in the same capacity under the order dated December 2, 1954. Under that order, he was to continue to act temporarily until orders could be passed regarding his confirmation or otherwise, or until the May 31, 1955, whichever date be earlier. The next order which was passed, was issued on June 18, 1955. The argument on behalf of the appellant was that no orders of his confirmation or otherwise having been passed before May 31, 1955, and that date having passed, it should be deemed that he had become permanent in the post which he was holding, because that post itself had been made permanent. On the face of it, this plea has no force at all. In the letter dated December 2, 1954, the period for which he was appointed to act temporarily was indicated by referring to three different circumstances. The first was that he was to continue until order was passed regarding his confirmation. The second was that some order may be made otherwise, which obviously referred to an order discharging him from service. In the letter dated December 2, 1954, the period for which he was appointed to act temporarily was indicated by referring to three different circumstances. The first was that he was to continue until order was passed regarding his confirmation. The second was that some order may be made otherwise, which obviously referred to an order discharging him from service. The third was that he could continue till May 31, 1955. Since no orders of confirmation or otherwise were passed before May 31, 1955, he could claim that he was entitled to continue temporarily up to that date. The letter did not give any authority for his continuance in service subsequent to that date. He was, however, allowed to continue without any fresh orders which were issued after an interval on June 18, 1955. During the period between May 31, 1955 and June 18, 1955, he continued to work without any letter of authority. It cannot be held that, during this period, he automatically became confirmed or permanent. From his continuance in the post without any specific orders, the only inference that can be drawn is that the Government allowed him to continue in the same capacity in which he was working up to May 31, 1955. His continuance in the same capacity could be implied when the Government took no steps to pass specific orders either confirming or discharging him up to the target date of May 31, 1955, up to which his temporary appointment had been extended. There is nothing at all in the letter dated December 2, 1954 which could justify an inference that on June 1, 1955, he was to hold the post permanently, even though no order of his confirmation was passed. In support of the plea that the appellant should be deemed to have been confirmed from June 1, 1955, reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant on the following passage in the judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh{ (1968) 3 SCR 1 : AIR 1968 SC 1210 : (1969) 1 SCJ 243}: "The initial period of probation of the respondents ended on October 1, 1958. By allowing the respondents to continue in their posts thereafter without any express order of confirmation, the competent authority must be taken to have extended the period of probation up to October 1, 1960 by implication. By allowing the respondents to continue in their posts thereafter without any express order of confirmation, the competent authority must be taken to have extended the period of probation up to October 1, 1960 by implication. But under the proviso to Rule 6(3), the probationary period could not extend beyond October 1, 1960. In view of the proviso to Rule 6(3) it is not possible to presume that the competent authority extended the probationary period after October 1, 1960, or that thereafter the respondents continued to hold their posts as probationers." 4. That decision, instead of assisting the appellant, goes directly against him. In that case, the initial period of probation ended on October 1, 1958. No order of confirmation having been passed, this Court held that the period of probation must be taken to have been extended up to October 1, 1960 by implication. On that analogy, when the temporary appointment of the appellant was up to May 31, 1955 and no order of confirmation was passed while permitting him to continue in the same post, the only inference that could be drawn was that his temporary appointment had been extended. On June 18, 1955, therefore, when fresh orders were issued, the appellant could only be deemed to be holding the post temporarily. In that case, the period of probation could not be extended beyond October 1, 1960, under a particular rule and, consequently, the Court held that the extension of the period of probation terminated on October, 1960. In the case before us, no such inference follows, because no rule exists laying down any particular period beyond which the temporary appointment of the appellant could not have been continued. The temporary appointment could continue indefinitely. In fact, with effect from June 18, 1955, orders were passed successively extending the time of temporary appointment of the appellant up to February 28, 1959, and in each case, the order was issued before the period of temporary appointment expired. Once again, there was a gap in 1959, as the next order extending indefinitely the temporary appointment of the appellant was issued on September 29, 1959. Once again, there was a gap in 1959, as the next order extending indefinitely the temporary appointment of the appellant was issued on September 29, 1959. During the period between February 28, 1959 and September 29, 1959 also, the appellant can only be deemed to have continued to work temporarily on the same principle on which it has been held by us that he did so between June 1, 1955 and June 18, 1955. The result is that the appointment of the appellant has throughout been in a temporary capacity, so that his services could any time be terminated by giving him one month s notice. This is exactly what the Government did. Consequently, the submission that the order of termination was bad and should have been passed, after giving an opportunity to the appellant to show case against it, must be rejected. 5. Another point mentioned by learned counsel for the appellant was that, subsequently, the appellant applied in another department for appointment in a public sector industry and, on enquiry, the Government gave information to new employer that the services of the appellant had been terminated because he had not been found suitable. It was urged that giving of this information indicated that the appellant s services had been dispensed with as a measure of punishment; and the order of termination of service was void for want of compliance with the requirements of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The order, by which the services of the appellant were terminated was an order of termination simpliciter and did not contain any reflection on the conduct or work of the appellant. The mere fact that, subsequently, the Government gave information on enquiry as to the background reason which led the Government to terminate the services cannot convert that order into an order of dismissal so as to attract the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 6. The appeal has no force and is dismissed ; but, in the circumstances of this case, we make no order as to costs. For Citation : (1972) 4 SCC 209