Short Note : 1. The disputed land originally belonged to one Bhawanisingh, who died in 1948 leaving behind his widow, two widows of two predeceased sons and a daughter Rajju Raja. Bhawanisingh had three sons. Raghubirsingh. Malkhansingh and Nanhe Raja All the three sons had died during the life time of Bhawanising, Raghubirsingh died unmarried. Malkhansingh had left his widow Majhali Dulaiya and Nanhe Raja left his widow Nanhi Dulaiya After Bhawanisingh's death, the land in suit along with other lands and properties of Bhawanisingh was in possession of his widow. The widow of Bhawanisingh died in 1951. Rajju Raja, the daughter of Bhawanisingh sold the suit land on 29th June 1967 in favour of one Bhagwan Kunwar. The present suit was instituted by Majhali Dulaiya and Nanhi Dulaiya against Rajju Raja and Bhagwan Kunwar for possession of the suit land. Both the Courts below held that the suit property was inherited by the plaintiffs after the death of the widow of Bhawanisingh in 1951 under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1931, and the suit was decreed. Held : The first question to be decided in this appeal is whether the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 applied to agricultural lands in Vindhya Pradesh. The topic of devolution of agricultural land under the Government of India Act, 1935, was included in List II of Schedule VII i.e. the provincial List. The topic of succession, save as regards agricultural land, was included in List III, i.e. the Concurrent List. The distribution of legislation powers was contained in section 100 of the Act. The Central legislature had no power to legislate for Governor's provinces and Chief Commissioner's Provinces. Part III of the Act dealt 'With the Governor's provinces and Part IV of the Act dealt with the Chief Commissioner's provinces. The Central legislature had power to legislate on all matters in respect of Chief Commissioner's provinces including those matters which were specified in the Provincial legislative list. It is now settled, the Act applied to all properly in the Chief Commissioner's Provinces, but to property other than agricultural land in the Governors' provinces. The application of the Act was as if it had contained a definition clause stating that property in the Act meant all property in respect of which the legislature We s competent to legislate. It is now settled, the Act applied to all properly in the Chief Commissioner's Provinces, but to property other than agricultural land in the Governors' provinces. The application of the Act was as if it had contained a definition clause stating that property in the Act meant all property in respect of which the legislature We s competent to legislate. Parliament under the Constitution could legislate for a Part 'C' State with respect to any matter, notwithstanding that such matter was a matter enumerated in the State List [See Article 246 (4)]. Further the topic of succession now wholly falls under the Concurrent List. That is to say, the States have now no exclusive power to make laws in respect of succession to agricultural land. When Parliament by Part C State Laws Act, 1950, exceeded the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 to the Part C State of Vindhya Pradesh, the effect was as if the latter Act was incorporated by reference in the former. In other words, the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act had effect in Vindhya Pradesh as if it had been enacted by Parliament in 1950 and applied to Vindhya Pradesh. As Parliament had complete legislative competence to legislate for any matter so far as Vindhya pradesh was concerned, the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act applied in Vindhya pradesh in respect of all property including agricultural land, Learned counsel for the appellant however, drew attention to section 3 of the Part C States (Laws) Act which provided that the Acts extended were to be in force in Vindhya Pradesh, as they were generally in force in the territories to which they extended before 16th April 1950. It is further argued that as the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act did not generally apply to agricultural land, therefore, it did not apply to agricultural land in Vindhya Pradesh also. In the opinion of this Court, there is no merit in this argument. As earlier pointed out, it is wrong to say that the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Ac., 1937 was not applicable to agricultural land. It applied to agricultural land in those territories which were the Chief Commissioner's Provinces. The Act had to be read as if it contained a definition clause defining property to mean "all property in respect of which the Legislature was Competent to legislate". It applied to agricultural land in those territories which were the Chief Commissioner's Provinces. The Act had to be read as if it contained a definition clause defining property to mean "all property in respect of which the Legislature was Competent to legislate". This is how the Act was generally in force in the territories to which it extended before the Commencement of the Part C State Laws Act. As Parliament had complete jurisdiction to legislate in respect of any matter so far as Vindhya Pradesh was concerned, the word "property" as used in the Act ought to be construed to include agricultural land in Vindhya Pradesh, Haridas v. Hukmi, AIR 1965 Punjab 254, Mithanlal v. State of Delhi, AIR 1958 at page 682-685, Bhaiyalal v. State of M. P., AIR 1962 SC 981 at 985, Re Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, AIR 1941 PC 72, relied on. 2. The second question to be examined in this appeal is whether the suit land constituted separate property of Bhawanisingh within the meaning of section 3 (1) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act. On this question, the argument of the learned counsel for the applicant is that although he was the sole surviving coparcener at the time of his death, the property in his possession was joint family property and not his separate property. It is true that the property held by the last surviving coparcener cannot be regarded as "separate property" within the meaning of section (1) of the Act, but the difficulty in accepting this argument is that it proceeds on the assumption that the land in suit was coparcenary property or ancestral property of Bhawanisingh. The only allegation in the plaint is that the land was Bhawanisingh's property. There h neither any plea nor evidence that the land was ancestral property of Bhawanisingh or that it was acquired by him as coparcenary property. There is no presumption that joint family owns any coparcenary property. In the absence of any allegation that the suit land was Bhawanisingh's ancestral or joint family property, the case must be decided on the footing that it was Bhawanisingh's separate property. There is no presumption that joint family owns any coparcenary property. In the absence of any allegation that the suit land was Bhawanisingh's ancestral or joint family property, the case must be decided on the footing that it was Bhawanisingh's separate property. It is true that had the land been ancestral property or had it been coparcenary property of Bhawanisingh and his sons, it could not have been taken to be separate property on the ground that Bhawanisingh was the sole surviving coparcener at the time of his death. It must therefore be held that the land was separate property of Bhawanisingh at the time of his death Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi, AIR 1945 FC 25 page 34, Manoharlal v. Bhuribai, AIR 1972 SC 1369 , referred to. 3. The last question argued by the learned counsel for the appellant was that as Bhawanisingh died in 1948, before the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 was extended to Vindhya Pradesh, section 3(1) bf the Act was wholly inapplicable even though the widow of Bhawanisingh died in 1951, after coming into force of the Act. Under the Hindu law, the widow comes as an heir after son, grandson and great son. Further, under the Hindu Law, a predeceased son's widow is not an heir at all. Under section 3 (1) of the Act, the widow gets the same shale as a son Similarly, the widow of a predeceased son inherits in like manner' as a son under the proviso When Bhawanisingh died in 1948 the Act was not applicable, as it was extended to the territories concerned on 16th April 1950. The widow to Bhawanisingh inherited the suit land as limited heir under the Hindu Law. The plaintiffs are widows of predeceased sons did not, in 1948, get any interest as heirs of Bhawanisingh. The widow of Bhawanisingh died in 1951. The Act had then come into force. The widow of Bhawanisingh held the limited estate of a Hindu widow. On her death, the succession reopened to the last male holder i.e. Bhawanisingh. The plaintiffs are widows of predeceased sons did not, in 1948, get any interest as heirs of Bhawanisingh. The widow of Bhawanisingh died in 1951. The Act had then come into force. The widow of Bhawanisingh held the limited estate of a Hindu widow. On her death, the succession reopened to the last male holder i.e. Bhawanisingh. The settled position under the Hindu Law is that where, a limited owner succeeds to any estate the succession to the estate on her death has to be decided on the basis that the last full owner died on that date and in deciding as to who are the heirs of the last full owner, one has to see the law as applicable on the date of the death of the limited owner. In this view of the matter, the plaintiffs who are widows of predeceased sons and recognised as heirs under section 3 (1) of the Act cannot succeed in preference to the daughter of the deceased as section 3 (1) cannot be applied. Under the Hindu Law, the plaintiffs were not heirs at all. After the death of the widow of Bhawanisingh in 1951, the suit land vested in defendant Rajju Raja who is his daughter. She was therefore entitled to sell the land in favour of the second defendant. The plaintiffs having no title to the suit land cannot challenge the alienation made by defendant Rajju Raja. Dayal Singh v. Dhan Kaur, AIR 1974 SC 665 , Dunichand v. Anar Kali, AIR 1946 PC 173 , Jasuda Kaur v. Phul Kuer, AIR 1958 patna 600, Lakhanlal v. Bichu Main, AIR 1960 Patna 181, Hindu Law (6th Edition) page 757 by Raghavachariar, relied on. Appeal allowed.