JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a second appeal by the landlord in a suit for ejectment on the ground of personal necessity from the dissident appellate judgment of the District Court setting aside the decree in his favour passed by the trial Court. The appellate Court has not questioned the finding of the personal necessity but has held that the plaintiff had not acted bona fide in this regard because sometime before the filing of the suit he had accommodation available to him, namely, three rooms on the second floor of the house but he let it out to a tenant and brought this suit for five rooms on the first floor of the same building. The appellate Court regarding this mala fide set aside the decree in favour of the plaintiff-landlord even though he was in need of more accommodation than he was occupying. ( 2. ) THE two questions therefore an, whether are inference of mala fide from a set of factual findings is a mixed question of fact and law or is one of pure fact; in the former case it will be justiciable in second appeal and in the latter not. Secondly, whether it can be held that the landlord has acced mala fide by showing a predilection to accommodation in the first floor in preference to accommodation in the second floor, and further, a predilection for one unit consisting of five rooms instead of having two rooms on the ground floor and three on the second floor. ( 3. ) THE facts of the case necessary far our purpose can be stated thus : the plaintiff-appellant owns a building in which there are two floors besides the ground. Each of the floors is divided into a number of small rooms and he has been letting these to a large number of tenants in all anything like 10 or 12. The defendant is a tenant on the first floor consisting of 5 rooms. Before the suit the plaintiff had been living in two rooms downstairs and had let all the rest of the accommodation. This seems to have been going on for quite a number of years. The defendant is a tenant on the first floor consisting of 5 rooms. Before the suit the plaintiff had been living in two rooms downstairs and had let all the rest of the accommodation. This seems to have been going on for quite a number of years. But lately the plaintiff found that for one thing his children have grown up and for another he has prospered in his business and has attained some status and wants to live with some more comfort than he had been living in the past. In particular, besides the kitchen and the living room he wanted a room for storing his goods, another for meeting guests and callers and a third for the children who are going to school. Looked at that way the accommodation of five rooms, that is to say, three in addition to the present two, looks reasonable and genuine. Incidentally, a room has been described in the evidence as anything between 10 ft. square and 12 ft. square and by no means a large area. Both the Courts have agreed that the plaintiff was in need of more accommodation than the two rooms on the ground floor he had. To be sure, for quite a number of years the plaintiff had been, as it were, punishing himself by squeezing into the narrow accommodation; but now he feels he can afford to live in better accommodation. That is also reasonable. The trial Court having granted the decree for ejectment (there being no controversy about rent-papers) the appellate Court noticed the fact that sometime ago three rooms were vacant on the second floor but the landlord did not occupy them though in area this accommodation was about the same as the deficiency which the landlord had been experiencing. He let that accommodation on rent and shortly after brought this suit for the accommodation on the first floor rented to the present defendant-respondent at Rs. 88 p. m. the rent itself having been fixed 16 or 17 years ago. It is also a fact that when the accommodation on the second floor was let on rent it was higher than what the previous occupant had been paying. This has been suggested as an index of bad faith. But the new tenant has not complained and it is a notorious fact that rents had been going up with increasing inflation. ( 4. This has been suggested as an index of bad faith. But the new tenant has not complained and it is a notorious fact that rents had been going up with increasing inflation. ( 4. ) ON behalf of the appellant it is argued that for one thing this finding of bad faith or absence of good faith is a mixed one and accordingly justiciable in second appeal. On merits it is urged that we have only to see whether the plaintiffs choice of this or that accommodation available to him is broadly speaking reasonable and his predilection for this or that accommodation is consistent with the usual behaviour of reasonable people. We cannot go further and take upon ourselves the task of allotting accommodation to the plaintiff, being as it were, rationing authority of plaintiffs own property for his use. As against this it is urged on behalf of the respondent that the finding that a particular course of action found on facts is bona fide or otherwise is one of pure fact and accordingly not justiciable in second appeal. On merits also, it is urged that when the plaintiff let go vacant accommodation on the second floor and inducted a tenant there he was not acting bona fide because it could have been equally comfortable for him to have the three rooms on the second floor along with the two rooms on the ground floor, the total being more or less the sort of accommodation he himself felt was necessary for him. ( 5. ) QUESTION No 1.-Whether a set of facts exists or does not is undoubtedly a pure question of fact and a finding on that will not be re-examined in second appeal. But when from the set of facts certain inferences are made which have a bearing on the merits of the suit one cannot hold that to be a finding of fact pure and simple. This question has been answered in the supreme Court judgment reported in Kamla v. Rup Lai. (1969 Rent Con. Rep. 1017.) There the question was, whether the predeliction shown by a landlord for a piece of accommodation on the first floor in preference to corresponding accommodation on the ground floor was bona fide or otherwise. This question has been answered in the supreme Court judgment reported in Kamla v. Rup Lai. (1969 Rent Con. Rep. 1017.) There the question was, whether the predeliction shown by a landlord for a piece of accommodation on the first floor in preference to corresponding accommodation on the ground floor was bona fide or otherwise. We are not immediately concerned with that but it was held by the Supreme Court: "whether on the facts proved the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. . . . . . . . . in a finding on a mixed question of law and fact. " Quite a number of other High Courts have given the same finding but it is sufficient to set out the decision of the Supreme Court. ( 6. ) AS against it the respondent has cited Harnarayan v. Kanhaiyalal, ( 1965 MPLJ 97 = 1964 J L J 620.) and also Virendra Singh v. Mohan Lal (1972 MPLJ Note No. 16=1970 J L J Short Note No. 107.) in both of which it has been held that whether a landlord genuinely requires an accommodation for continuing or starting his own business or that of any member of his family is a question of fact. There is no doubt about it, but we are dealing with a problem solely different, namely, the necessity being found and also a particular course of conduct by the plaintiff landlord which is also found on fact, the effect of the latter on the bona fides or otherwise of the landlord. That in view of the supreme Court decision already cited has to be treated a mixed question and accordingly justiciable in second appeal. ( 7. ) QUESTION No. 2.-That the plaintiff was really in need of additional accommodation is beyond doubt. He has himself suggested that he was in need of three more rooms which in the circumstances is, if anything, quite modest. In fact the plaintiff seems to have been struggling between two urges, one to provide accommodation for himself and his family, the minimum, consistent with his status, and the need of the school-going children. He has said three more rooms and that is bona fide. In fact the plaintiff seems to have been struggling between two urges, one to provide accommodation for himself and his family, the minimum, consistent with his status, and the need of the school-going children. He has said three more rooms and that is bona fide. Shortly before the suit when three more rooms were coming on what would be called the top-floor of the house he preferred to let them go on rent instead of occupying them and soon after wanted the accommodation on the first floor, which had two advantages. All the five rooms he needed were contiguous. He had shown two predilections; first, to prefer accommodation on the first floor instead of the second, in other words, save himself from the ad fictional inconvenience of having to climb one more stair. Certainly if he could have got all the five rooms on the ground floor itself it would have been better. But there might be other difficulties. He may have preference for the ground floor tenants or they might be paying him more rent. The only question is whether having a predilection for rooms on the first floor in preference to rooms on the second floor is so abnormal or unusual as to be called perverse or mala fide. Obviously there is more inconvenience in living on the second floor as every time one had to go up two staircases while in comparison to it the first floor requires only climbing one staircase which other things being the same is less inconvenient. Another advantage of this is that the entire accommodation occupied by the plaintiff and his family is in one piece. With the accommodation on the second floor the plaintiff and his people would have to be going up and down constantly; his predeliction for a contiguous accommodation is understandable and cannot be called perverse or abnormal ( 8. ) THERE is considerable quantity of case-law and in all these cases the view is that as long as there is nothing oblique or abnormal in the predictions" shown by the landlord his choice should be respected After all it is his own house. To quote one of the several rulings- Pt. Jhabu Mal v. Shri Kishan Dutt sharma (1969 Rent Con. Rep. To quote one of the several rulings- Pt. Jhabu Mal v. Shri Kishan Dutt sharma (1969 Rent Con. Rep. 388.): "the right of the owner is governed by the statute and the Lower appellate Court exceeded its jurisdiction in replacing the opinion of the owner in regard to his requirement by its own opinion which could not be done under the law." It is convenient to set out the gist of the case-law summarised by this Court in an earlier case and reported as Narbadabai v Kamlabai (1972 MPLJ Note No. 15 = 1965 JLJ Short Note No 102.): "in accordance with the majority view in Nandrams case and on general principles of interpretation, in the words genuine and good faith nothing more is to be read than the absence of an ulterior purpose. . . . . . . . . . The law at present does put some restrictions on the owner using his property, but it does not go so far as to tell him that he should take only that much of accommodation for his personal purposes that a Court considers sufficient, and not ask to be permitted to stretch himself more easily into the rest of the same building. . . . . . The court is not the rationing authority for house accommodation under the Act. The law only calls on it to see -whether the owner wanting for personal purpose is really requiring the accommodation for that purpose or is trying to play trick and has already planned to dispose of accommodation in some other manner. " Applying these tests it is not possible to support the finding of the first appellate Court on the bona fides of the landlord. ( 9. ) ACCORDINGLY this appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court are set aside and the decree of the trial Court revived. The respondent shall pay the appellant his costs and pleaders fee on minimum contested scale. Appeal allowed.