JUDGMENT Laksmi Prasad, J. - This is a defendant's second appeal arising out of a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment. The only point that has been urged before me in support of the appeal is that which has been raised through civil Miscellaneous Application No. 775(S) of 1969. The suit for ejectment was filed after obtaining permission under section 3 of the U.P. Act No. III of 1947. The point raised in the course of arguments is based on the allegation that the application for permission under section 3 of the Act was given before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Lucknow, who after retaining it on his file till the stage of arguments passed it on to another officer who ultimately passed the order according permission. On the facts it is argued that the particular officer who accorded permission had no jurisdiction to pass the order. It is to be noticed that it is not suggested that the officer who passed the order according sanction did not exercise the delegated powers in that behalf of the District Magistrate, as was done by the Rent Control and Eviction officer himself before whom the application was initially presented. The only argument is that since the Rent Control and Eviction officer had no authority to transfer the case arising out of that application from his file to that of the officer who pissed the order, the latter officer got no jurisdiction to pass the order and if be did so it must be treated as null and void having been passed without jurisdiction. I am of the view that this contention is without any substance. The jurisdiction of the officer who actually passed the order in the instant case depended not on the order of transfer nor could it be taken away by an absence of an order of transfer. He had the jurisdiction by virtue of the power delegated in his favour as provided in section 2 of the U P. Act No. 11I of 1947. A similar matter in connection with certain provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this court in Shirlo Prasad v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1970 A.W.R. 52(H.C.). A similar matter in connection with certain provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this court in Shirlo Prasad v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1970 A.W.R. 52(H.C.). It held that the jurisdiction of the Deputy Director who disposed of the revision did not depend on an order of transfer having been passed by a competent authority, but it was inherent because of the conferment of revisional powers on him in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act The decision in that case clearly indicates that the contention raised on behalf of the appellant is without any substance. In support of the decision given in that case reference is made to two cages of Patna High Court, namely, Jhakar Ahlr v. Province of Bihar, AIR 1945 Patna 98. which is a Full Bench decision and Posan Singh and others v. Inderdeo Singh and others, AIR 1952 Patna 328, which is a Division Bench case. In AIR 1952 Patna the point that arose for decision was if a decision given by an Additional Munsif whose was not a court of institution was had for the reason that the suit in which that impugned decision was given had not been transferred to his court by a competent authority. The point was answered in the negative. The following observations made by the learned Judges may be useful to reproduce : "To sum up, the Additional Munsif, Third Court, had inherent jurisdiction to try the suit. All that was necessary was that certain procedure should have been followed in order to remove the case from the file of the Additional Munsif, Second Court, to his file. The failure to obtain this order was a defect of procedure which has been cured by waiver." 2. It is thus obvious that merely because there was no order of transfer removing the case from the file of the Rent Control and Eviction officer, Lucknow to that of Shri N.C. Khare who passed the impugned order or because there was an order of transfer passed by an authority not competent to pass it, it cannot be said that the permission accorded by Shri S.N. Khare would be no permission and it would be wholly ineffective in the eye of law. I accordingly over. rule the contention. 3. No other point has been urged. 4. I accordingly over. rule the contention. 3. No other point has been urged. 4. The appeal is dismissed with costs.