JUDGMENT :- This second appeal by the plaintiff Kh. Tamphajao Singh raises the question what is the true import of section 132 of The Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960, hereinafter called the Act. 2. Y. Chaoyaima Singh, the husband of defendant No. 1 Leimahal Devi, was the owner of the land in dispute and prior to his death he was alleged to have leased out that land to the plaintiff. When the defendant Leimahal Devi acquired ownership of the land on succession to her husband, she allowed Tamphajao Singh to continue as tenant thereof. The plaintiff however learnt on the day of Panchami of 1966, when he went to the land for loutaba, that Leimahal Devi had sold the land on 27-1-1966 for a sum of Rs. 1,500/- to the defendant No. 2 W. Ketuki Singh, and since the sale had been made without compliance with the provisions of Section 132 of the Act, the plaintiff filed a suit on 13-4-1966 claiming a declaration that the sale made by the defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 is null and void and that he is entitled to purchase the land in preference to defendant No. 2 for a sum of Rs. 1,000/-, which, he pleaded, represented the true market value of the land, and not Rs. 1,500/- for which the sale was said to have been made by Leimahal Devi to Ketuki Singh. 3. The suit was resisted by the two defendants by a common written statement. They alleged that the plaintiff was not a tenant of Leimahal Devi on the date of the sale of tile suit land but he was in occupation only as Louphat Nekpa, which means a labourer engaged against wages for cultivation of the land. The defendants maintained that the sum of Rs. 1,500/- represented the true market price of the land on the date of its sale. 4. The trial Court decreed the suit on the findings that the plaintiff was the tenant of Leimahal Devi on 27-1-1966, and that in terms of Sec. 132 the land owner (defendant No. 1) was bound to give notice to the tenant (the plaintiff) offering to sell the land to him before he could sell it to someone else. 5. 4. The trial Court decreed the suit on the findings that the plaintiff was the tenant of Leimahal Devi on 27-1-1966, and that in terms of Sec. 132 the land owner (defendant No. 1) was bound to give notice to the tenant (the plaintiff) offering to sell the land to him before he could sell it to someone else. 5. The defendants having felt dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial Court took the matter in appeal to the Court of District Judge, who, by his judgment dated 4th of August 1969, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff with costs of both the Courts. The appeal was accepted on the footing that the only penalty incurred by the land owner for non-compliance with the provisions of Section 132 (1) of the Act is the one prescribed in Section 164 of the Act and that the sale once made cannot be challenged by the tenant. Section 164 provides that whoever contravenes any provision of the Act for which no penalty has been otherwise provided for therein shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees. In other words, in the opinion of the District Judge the land owner can flout the Parliamentary injunction of the nature stated in Section 132 with impunity and that at the worst he incurs the liability to a penalty of Rs. 500/- prescribed in Section 164 of the Act. 6. The plaintiff Tamphajao Singh having been seriously aggrieved by the decree of the District Judge filed the instant second appeal under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. 7. Since the fate of the appeal hangs by the interpretation to be placed on section 132 of the Act, it is necessary that that section should be set out in full. It reads : (1) If a landowner at any time intends to sell his land held by a tenant, he shall give notice in writing of his intention to such tenant and offer to sell the land to him. In case the latter intends to purchase the land, he shall intimate in writing his readiness to do so within two months from the date of receipt of such notice. In case the latter intends to purchase the land, he shall intimate in writing his readiness to do so within two months from the date of receipt of such notice. (2) If there is any dispute about the reasonable price payable for the land, either the landowner or the tenant may apply in writing to the competent authority for determining the reasonable price; and the competent authority, after giving notice to the other party and to all other persons interested in the land and after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, shall fix the reasonable price of the land which shall be the average of the prices obtaining for similar lands in the locality during the ten years immediately preceding the date on which the application is made. (3) The tenant shall deposit with the competent authority the amount of the price determined under sub-section (2) within such period as may be prescribed. (4) On deposit of the entire amount of the reasonable price, the prescribed authority shall issue a certificate in the prescribed form to the tenant declaring him to be the purchaser of the land, the competent authority shall also direct that the reasonable price deposited shall be paid to the landowner. (5) If the tenant does not exercise the right of purchase in response to the notice given to him by the landowner under sub-section (1) or fails to deposit the amount of the price as required by sub-section (3), such tenant shall forfeit his right of purchase, and the landowner shall be entitled to sell such land to any other person. (6) The forfeiture of the right to purchase any land under this section shall not affect the other rights of the tenant in such land. This Section forms part of Chapter X of the Act which bears the heading "Rights of Tenants". The marginal heading of Section 132 is "First option to purchase". This heading of the section, it is conceded by Shri Budhachandra Singh, the learned Advocate appearing for the defendants-respondents, is indicative of a right of the nature of pre-emption as contended on behalf of the plaintiff in this Court as also in the Courts below. Let us, therefore, find out what are the essential features of such a right. In the Blacks Law Dictionary the expression "pre-emption" is defined, according to English Law, as : "The first buying of a thing. Let us, therefore, find out what are the essential features of such a right. In the Blacks Law Dictionary the expression "pre-emption" is defined, according to English Law, as : "The first buying of a thing. A privilege formerly enjoyed by the Crown of buying up provisions and other necessaries, by the intervention of the Kings purveyors, for the use of his royal household, at an appraised valuation, in preference to all others, and even without consent of the owner". According to Chamberss Twentieth Century Dictionary the term "pre-emption" means inter alia : "act or right of purchasing in preference to others". The Supreme Court dealt exhaustively with the nature of the right of pre-emption and cognate matters in the case of Audh Behari Singh v. Gajadhar Jaipuria, AIR 1954 SC 417 . It was held in that case that it is not correct to say that the right of pre-emption is a personal right on the part of the pre-emptor to get a re-transfer of the property from the vendee who has already become owner of the same, that it is true that the right becomes enforceable only when there is a sale but the right exists antecedently to the sale, that the foundation of the right is the avoidance of the inconveniences and disturbances which would arise from the introduction of a stranger into the land, and that the sale is a condition precedent not to the existence of the right but to its enforcibility. The correct legal position, the Supreme Court pointed out, seems to be that the law of pre-emption imposes a limitation or disability upon the ownership of a property to the extent that it restricts the owners unfettered right of sale and compels him to sell the property to his co-sharer or neighbour as the case may be. The crux of the whole thing, the Supreme Court observed, is that the benefit as well as the burden of the right of pre-emption run with the land and can be enforced by or against the owner of the land for the time being although the right of the pre-emptor does not amount to an interest in the land itself. The crux of the whole thing, the Supreme Court observed, is that the benefit as well as the burden of the right of pre-emption run with the land and can be enforced by or against the owner of the land for the time being although the right of the pre-emptor does not amount to an interest in the land itself. If the right of pre-emption had been only a personal right enforceable against the vendee and there was no infirmity in the title of the owner restricting his right of sale in a certain manner, a bona fide purchaser without notice would certainly obtain an absolute title to the property, unhampered by any right of the pre-emptor, and in such circumstances there could be no justification for enforcing the right of pre-emption against the purchaser on grounds of justice, equity and good conscience on which grounds alone the right could be enforced at the present day. The law of pre-emption, the Supreme Court concluded, creates a right which attaches to the property and on that footing only it can be enforced against the purchaser. 8. In a later decision reported in AIR 1958 SC 838 , Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh, the Supreme Court enunciated that the right of pre-emption is not a right to the thing sold but a right to the offer of a thing about to be sold, that this right is called the primary or inherent right, and that the pre-emptor has a secondary right or a remedial right to follow the thing sold. It is a right of substitution, the Supreme Court, added but not of re-purchase, i. e., the pre-emptor takes the entire bargain and steps into the shoes of the priginal vendee. 9. Two features of the right of pre-emption that stand out, and which are highly relevant to the case in hand, are that it is a right which attaches to the property involved and that the pre-emptor can consequently enforce his claim against the vendee and compel the latter to make over the possession of the property to him on getting the purchase price. The heading "Rights of Tenants" of Chapter X under which Section 132 finds place, the phraseology of the section itself, and its marginal heading "First option to purchase" are clearly expressive of the legislative intention that the tenant has a right to the first offer of sale if the owner wants to dispose of the land, and the corollary that follows from this right is that in case the landowner sells the land in violation of the provisions of the section, the tenant can pursue the property in the hands of the purchaser. Therefore, irrespective of the fact whether or not any penalty is provided for non-compliance with the provisions of section 132 on the part of the owner, the tenant can legitimately take recourse to legal proceedings for enforcing the right vouched to him by that section. The penalty of Rs. 500/-prescribed by Section 164 of the Act for, contravention of any provision of the Act was not meant to be, I feel convinced, an alternative for the obligation of the land owner arising out of the right guaranteed to the tenant by Section 132. The land involved in a given case may be worth lakhs of rupees and a small penalty of Rs. 500/- may be willingly incurred by an unscrupulous owner who is out to transfer the land to some one other than the tenant, or such a light burden may be borne by a purchaser who happens to be a victim of land hunger. That would be the cheapest way of getting over the restrictions imposed on the owner and thereby defeating the legislative intendment so eloquently and explicitly expressed in section 132, obviously as a measure of national policy that the land must ultimately go into the ownership of the actual tiller. Shri Budhachandra Singh very fairly conceded that he was not in a position to support the finding of the learned District Judge. He agreed that section 132 must have its full play and that too in complete oblivion of what is stated in Section 164 of the Act. Section 132. I feel satisfied, is a provision of mandatory nature and so the owner can commit its breach at his own peril and at the peril of the vendee. The penal provision enacted in Section 164 only shores up the conclusion that the Parliament meant strict compliance of its mandate outlined in Section 132. Section 132. I feel satisfied, is a provision of mandatory nature and so the owner can commit its breach at his own peril and at the peril of the vendee. The penal provision enacted in Section 164 only shores up the conclusion that the Parliament meant strict compliance of its mandate outlined in Section 132. The tenant cannot be deprived of his right and privilege of the offer of first purchase only for the reason that the Government intends taking, or has taken, recourse to Section 164. The right conferred by Section 132 is for the personal benefit of the tenant, while the penalty mentioned in Section 164 is conceived in the interest of public policy. The right and the penalty provided by the two sections are not mutually exclusive; both can stand side by side. I would therefore hold that the interpretation placed by the District Judge on Sec. 132 cannot be sustained and so the plaintiff Tamphajao Singh can very rightly assert his claim to the first option for purchase of the land in dispute. 10. According to sub-section (2) of Section 132 of the Act the reasonable price of the land involved is to be determined by the competent revenue authority in case of dispute between the land owner and the tenant in that respect, and Section 159 of the Act enjoins that no suit or other proceedings shall, unless otherwise expressly provided for in the Act, or in any other law for the time being in force, lie or be instituted in any civil court with respect to any matter arising under and provided for by the Act. The proviso appended to that section states that if in a dispute between parties a question of title is involved, a civil suit may be brought for the adjudication of such question. Since the plaintiff had pleaded that the price of Rs. 1,500/- charged by Leimahal Devi from Ketuki Singh was much more than the true market price of the land in dispute and the two defendants had maintained in their joint written statement that Rs. 1,500/- correctly represented the market price of the land, the trial Court was legally justified in referring the parties to the competent revenue authority for getting determined the reasonable price of the land. 1,500/- correctly represented the market price of the land, the trial Court was legally justified in referring the parties to the competent revenue authority for getting determined the reasonable price of the land. However, that course can now be dispensed with since Shri Manisana Singh, the learned Advocate appearing for the plaintiff-appellant, has to-day offered to pay Rs. 1,500/- to the defendant No. 2. Therefore, this Court can now decree the suit for possession by pre-emption on payment of Rs. 1,500/- by the plaintiff. Shri Budhachandra Singh agreed to such a decree being passed. 11. The decree in a pre-emption suit is to be made in accordance with the provisions of Rule 14, Order XX, of the Civil Procedure Code. Therefore, on allowing the appeal and setting aside the decree of the District Judge, I award the plaintiff a decree for possession by pre-emption of the land in dispute on his paying Rs. 1,500/- to the defendant No. 2 Ketuki Singh by 1st of June 1971, and direct that on payment into the Court of that sum by the plaintiff on or before 1st of June 1971 the defendant No. 2 shall deliver possession of the property to him. However, if the sum of Rs. 1,500/- is not so paid, the suit shall stand dismissed with costs. It was agreed between the parties counsel that if Rs. 1,500/- are deposited by the plaintiff by the date fixed the parties shall bear their own costs in all the three Courts and I order accordingly. Appeal allowed.