JUDGMENT C.S.P. Singh, J. - This is an appeal by the judgment-debtor. The facts necessary for the decision of this appeal lie in a narrow compass. The decree holder was granted rights in the land by the State Government under a deed dated 19.6.1957. A plan for the development of village Kichha had been drawn up by the State Government and the land in dispute came under that plan, but in as much as that plan was not enforced forthwith, the rights were granted to the decree-holder from year to year by a deed dated 19-6-1957. The tenure of the decree-holder were, however, precarious in as much as the decree-holder's right could be terminated on 15 days' notice. Further, clauses 6 and 8 respectively of the deed deprived the decree holder from claiming any compensation in respect of improvements made by him and prevented him from subletting the land. The judgment-debtor was in possession of the land and as such the decree-holder filed a suit for ejectment which was decreed on 20th October 1959. That decree on appeal reversed but this Court allowed the second appeal preferred by him on 24th of January, 1969. Thereafter the decree holder put his decree into execution but the execution was resisted mainly on two grounds. Firstly, it was maintained on behalf of the judgment-debtor that inasmuch as the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act had come in force in the area, he had acquired the rights of an Adhivasi under Sec. 230A of the Act and as such could not be ejected and secondly, that the `decree-holder' had no subsisting interest in the land, no execution could be taken out. The objection of the judgment-debtor has been dismissed by both the courts. In the present appeal both these contentions have been revived, and I shall deal with them seriatum. Before advantage can be taken of Section 230 A of the Act it must be shown that the decreeholder is either a bhumidhar or a sirdar. It is not the case of the appellant that the decreeholder is a bhumidhar. It is, however., maintained that the decrceeholder would become Sirdar under Section 131 (a) sub-clause (4), of the Act as applied to this area. It is not the case of the appellant that the decreeholder is a bhumidhar. It is, however., maintained that the decrceeholder would become Sirdar under Section 131 (a) sub-clause (4), of the Act as applied to this area. It would be convenient to point out at this stage that the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act did not apply to this area as it was an excluded area under Section 2 of the Act This Act was applied with certain modifications by Virtue of a Notification dated 30-6-1969. It would be useful to quote Section 131 (a) , sub-clause (4) of the Act here as the contention that Sirdari rights accrue to the plaintiff is based upon this-section. "131. Every person belonging to any of the following classes shall be called a sirdar and shall have all the rights and the subject to all the liabilities conferred or imposed upon Sirdars by or under this Act; namely- (a) every person, on the State immediately preceding the appointed day held land as- (iv) a lessee holding a lease under the provisions of the Government Grants Act, 1895 and having rights of a hereditary tenant under the terms of the lease, but not possessing the right to transfer the holding by sale. (a) every person who is admitted as sirdar of vacant land under the provisions of this Act, (b) a tenant in any of the 42 Buxari villages specified in the Annexure appended hereto, who was recorded in class X (1) in the Khatauni of the previous agricultural year, and (c) every person who in any other manner acquires the rights of a sirdar under or in accordance with the provisions of this Act." 2. It would be noticed that before Government lessees not having transferable rights can become Sirdars they must be possessed of hereditary rights under the terms of the lease. The words "hereditary rights" have not been defined in the Act but in as much as it is obvious that rights were being conferred by the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act with reference to tenures existing under the U.P. Tenancy Act, reference has to be made to the U.P. Tenancy Act for finding out the rights enjoyed by hereditary tenants under that Act. In order to determine as to whether the rights granted under the deed of 19-6-1957 were the same as hereditary rights enjoyed under the U.P. Tenancy act Comparison has to be made between the two Section 39 of the U.P. Tenancy Act gives a right of subletting to a hereditary Tenant. Sec. 65 sub-clause 2 permits the making of any improvement except such as are mentioned in sub-clause 8 of Section 3, Sec. 73 entitles a tenant to compensation in respect of improvements, Sec 74 to compensation for certain buildings which are erected without a landholder's consent. A comparison between the rights enjoyed by hereditary tenants under the U.P. Tenancy Act with the rights enjoyed under the deed of 19-6-1957 makes it abundantly clear that the rights are not in pari materia for as has been stated earlier the decreeholder could neither sublet the holding nor claim compensation for improvements. It follows, therefore, that the decree holder did not acquire rights of a Sirdar under Section 131 (a) sub-clause 4 of the Act as applied to the area, and as such advantage of Sec. 230-A could not be taken by the judgment-debtor. It has, however, been contended that the purpose of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act was to confer rights on all tenure holder whether they were holding from the State directly or from intermediaries, and to put such an interpretation would not be in consonance with the scheme of the Act, and the proper approach to the interpretation of the section would be to ascertain as to whether the rights enjoyed by the decree holder were substantially those which were enjoyed by hereditary tenants, and if that is so, the decree holder should be held to have become a Sirdar under that Act. The argument is plausible, but the underlying purpose of statute cannot he used as an aid to cut down the plain meaning of a particular section of that statute, and specially so in a case where the meaning is not dubious. The language of Section 131 (a) sub clause 4 is clear and contains a mandate to compare the rights under the lease deed granted to a person with the rights enjoyed by hereditary tenants, and it is only in case the rights of the two are similar that the Government lessee becomes a Sirdar. The language of Section 131 (a) sub clause 4 is clear and contains a mandate to compare the rights under the lease deed granted to a person with the rights enjoyed by hereditary tenants, and it is only in case the rights of the two are similar that the Government lessee becomes a Sirdar. Further it is obvious that the statute itself excluded by Section 2 (b), estates owned by the State Government and empowered the State Government to apply the Act with such modifications and exceptions not affecting the substance as the circumstances of the case required. This indicates that the Legislature did not think it necessary to apply the provisions of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act forthwith, as it may have thought that the rights of tenure holders in Government estates would be fully protected by the terms of the leases granted by the State Government, which would be in conformity with the purposes of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. Thus the contention of the appellant that he acquired adhivasi rights under Sec. 230-A fails. 3. It is now necessary to consider the second contention. It has been seen that the decree holder did not acquire the rights of a Sirdar under Section 131 (a) sub-clause 4 of the Act, and neither did he become a bhumidhar under Section 130, but the mere fact that he does not come within either of these two categories would not mean that the rights which he was enjoying under the deed dated 19-6-1957 automatically came to an end as soon as the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act was enforced in the area. In areas where intermediaries existed the estate visited in the State free from all encumbrances, and it is well settled by decisions of this Court that the result of the vesting was to bring to an end the rights of tenureholders existing under the U.P. Tenancy Act and to grant fresh rights under the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. In the present case, however, there has been no vesting, as the area appertaining to the lease was always owned by the State Government, and as such, the consequences set out under Section 6 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act do not come in play in respect of such areas, with the result that the rights of leaseholder save such leaseholders which become either Bhumidhars or sirdars are governed by the term of their existing leases. There is nothing in the provisions of the U.P.Z.A and L.R. Act to suggest that the classes of tenures set out under Section 129 are exhaustive and in case it is not possible to bring a tenure within the ambit of Section 129 the rights enjoyed by such a tenureholder comes to an end by the enforcement of the Act. At one stage it was suggested by the respondent that the decree holder became a Government lessee as provided for under Sec. 133-A of the Act. Considerable controversy area as to whether the appellant became a Government lessee as provided for under Sec. 133-A of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act and as to whether Sec. 133-A of the Act would be effective in view of the apparent conflict between this section and Secs. 130 and 131 of the Act as applied to this area. It is not necessary to go into this question, as even if the contention of the counsel for the respondent is accepted that Section 133 (A) of the Act has been rendered ineffective on account on its inconsistency with Secs. 130 and 131 of the Act, which prevail in view of their being subsequently introduced with modifications, the rights of the decreeholder still continue on the view that I have taken. The result, therefore, is that the rights of the decreeholder granted by the deed dated 19-6-1957 continue till such time that they are terminated in accordance with its provisions, and as such the decreeholder had a right to execute the decree. 4. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.