VENKATARAMIAH, J. ( 1 ) THESE five writ petitions are filed by Parappa Sangappa Palled, which is a firm ot commission agents carrying on business at Bagalkot. They are directed against the urders passed by the District Judge, Bijapur, in five revision petitions filed under S. 39 (4) of the Mysore Shops and Commercial establishments Act, 1961 (hereinafter reierred to as the Act) on his file. Respondent-1 in each of these petitions was an employee of the petitioner-firm. The services of these employees were terminated by the petitioner with effect from 29-8-1968. Aggrieved by the order of termination of services the said employees preferred appeals before the Assistant labour Commissioner The Appellate Authority under S. 39 (2) of the Act, respondent-3 in these petitions, (hereinafter referred to as the appellate authority) for necessary relief. The appellate authority passed an order in each of those appeals directing the petitioner to pay one month's salary in lieu of notice and a further sum amounting to six months salary by way of compensation to each of the employees under sub-sec. (3) of s. 39 of the Act. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders of the appellate authority, the petitioner applied to the learned District Judge under S. 39 (4) of the Act. After hearing the parties, the learned District Judge dismissed the revision petitions. ( 2 ) IT may be mentioned at this stage that while passing the order on the appeal filed by Virupaxappa Sharanappa Talikote, respondent-1 in WP. 3524 of 1970, the appellate authority had permitted the petitioner to deduct from the total compensation payable to respondent-1 a sum of Rs. 950 which was admittedly due by him to the petitioner. But in the revision petition filed against that order, the learned District Judge modified the said order by directing the petitioner not to deduct the sum referred to above, but to pay a sum of Rs. 1,070 made up of one month's salary in lieu of notice and six months salary by way of compensation. The resulting position was that the petitioner had to pay by reason of the order of the learned District Judge much more than what he was liable to pay under the orders of the appellate authority. ( 3 ) AGGRIEVED by the orders passed by the learned District Judge in the aforesaid revision petitions, the petitioner has filed these petitions. The resulting position was that the petitioner had to pay by reason of the order of the learned District Judge much more than what he was liable to pay under the orders of the appellate authority. ( 3 ) AGGRIEVED by the orders passed by the learned District Judge in the aforesaid revision petitions, the petitioner has filed these petitions. Sri U. L. Narayana Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioner in all these cases, contended that the orders pased by respondents 2 and 3 in each of the above petitions wore liable to be set aside on the following grounds: (i) that no finding had been given by either of the two authorities i. e. , respondents 2 and 3, that the service of the employees in question were terminated without reasonable cause which alone in the circumstances of these cases, would confer jurisdiction on them to award compensation under S. 39 (3) of the Act; (ii) even if it is to be held that the termination of services of the employees was effected without reasonable cause, respondents 2 and 3 failed to determine what compensation should be paid to each of the employees in accordance with sub-sec. (3) of S. 39 of the Act; (iii) that no proper enquiry was held by respondent-2, the appellate authority, in order to determine whether the termination of services was for a reasonable cause or not; and (iv) so far as WP. 3524 of 1970 was concerned, the learned District Judge was wrong in modifying the order of the appellate authority to the prejudice of the petitioner. ( 4 ) ELABORATING the first contention Sri Narayana Rao argued that under sub-sec. (2) of. 39 of the Act, an employee could raise only two grounds in his appeal before the appellate authority, namely, (i) that there was nc reasonable cause for the removal or dismissal, or (ii) that he had not been guilty of mis-conduct as held by the employer. We are not concerned in these cases with the case of termination of service on the ground of misconduct. The only ground urged by the employees in these cases was that they were removed from service without reasonable cause. In order to give relief to the employees under sub-sec. We are not concerned in these cases with the case of termination of service on the ground of misconduct. The only ground urged by the employees in these cases was that they were removed from service without reasonable cause. In order to give relief to the employees under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 39 of the Act, it is necessary for the appellate authority to give a finding that the employee has been removed from service without any reasonable cause and in none of these cases, any such finding has been given by respondents 2 and 3. In support of his argument Sri Narayana Rao relied on the provisions of S. 39 of the Act. The relevant part of it is quoted below:"39. Notice of dismissal. (1) No employer shall remove or dismiss an employee who has put in service under him continuously for a period of not lest than six months, except for a reasonable cause and unless and until one month's previous notice or pay in lieu thereof has been given to him. Provided that where misconduct of an employee is brought on record with proof at an enquiry held for the purpose, he shall not be entitled to the notice or pay in lieu of such notice. (2) An employee removed or dismissed under sub-sec. (1) shall have a right of appeal to such officers having jurisdiction over such areasor such classes of employees as may be prescribed on the ground that there was no reasonable cause for the removal or dismissal or that he has not been guilty of misconduct as held by the employer. (3) Where an employee has been removed or dismissed without reasonable cause or without proof of misconduct, the employee shall, where the employer does not agree to reinstate him, be entitled to such compensation as the appellate authority may determine, provided that such compensation shall not exceed an amount calculated at one month's pay for every year of service subject, in any case to the maximum of six months' pay. (4) Any person aggrieved by an order of the appellate authority may apply to the District Judge for revision of such order and subject to the result of such application, the decision of the appellate authority shall be final and binding on both the employer and the person employed. " ( 5 ) A reading of sub-sees. (4) Any person aggrieved by an order of the appellate authority may apply to the District Judge for revision of such order and subject to the result of such application, the decision of the appellate authority shall be final and binding on both the employer and the person employed. " ( 5 ) A reading of sub-sees. (2) and (3) of S. 39 of the Act would show that it is necessary for the appellate authority to come to the conclusion that either one or the other ground referred to therein has been made out in a given case. When the termination of service is for a reasonable cause or when it is effected on the ground of misconduct of an employee proved at an enquiry held for the purpose by the employer, the employee would not be entitled to any compensation at all. This is clear from sub-sec. (3) of S. 39 of the Act which prescribes that where an employee has been removed or dismissed without reasonable cause or without proof of misconduct, the employee shall where the employer does not agree to reinstate him, be entitled to such compensation as the appellate authority may determine and in no other case can compensation be awarded under sub-sec. (3) of S. 39 of the Act. In view of what is stated above we are of the opinion that it is necessary for the appellate authority under S. 39 of the act to give a finding that the services of an employee have been terminated without reasonable cause or when the termination is on the ground of misconduct, the said termination has been made in the absence of misconduct proved at an enquiry held for the purpose. The appellate authority will have no jurisdiction to grant compensation under sub-sec. (3) of s. 39 of the Act otherwise. We have gone through the orders passed by the appellate authority and the learned District Judge. We find that there is no specific finding recorded by either of them holding that the employer in these cases terminated the services of the employees concerned without reasonable cause. We find that the omission to do so amounts to an error appparent on the face of the record and the impugned orders are liable to be set aside on that ground alone. We find that the omission to do so amounts to an error appparent on the face of the record and the impugned orders are liable to be set aside on that ground alone. ( 6 ) THE next submission of Sri Narayana Rao was that respondents 2 and 3 were wrong in directing payment of the maximum compensation payable under S. 39 (3) of the Act without applying their mind to the cases before them. Sub-sec (3) of S. 39 of the Act provides that the appellate authority has to determine what compensation would have to be paid by an employer in each case subject to the maximum prescribed thereunder. We find in these cases that no such attempt has been made by respondents 2 and 3 They have awarded in each case the maximum compensation that can be awarded to each of the employees without giving reasons in support of their order. The contention of Sri Narayana Rao has, therefore, to be accepted. ( 7 ) IT was next contended by Sri Narayana Rao that the appellate authority in these cases did not hold proper enquiry into the question whether the termination of the services was for a reasonable cause or not. Sri k. S. Savanur, the learned Counsel for respondent-1 in WP. 3512 of 1970, contended that it was not obligatory on the part of the appellate authority to hold any enquiry at all while deciding the case before him. In support of his argument he relied upon a decision of this Court in Bombay indra Bhavan v Ramachandra Sastry, 1964 Mys. L. J. Suppl. 671. On going through this deciaion carefully. We are of the opinion that it does not lay down what Sri savanur is contending for The question for decision in that cage was whether an employer should have held an enquiry before issuing a notice of termination of service to an employee for a reasonabe cause. This Court came to the conclusion that in such a case no enquiry need be held by the employer. This Court came to the conclusion that in such a case no enquiry need be held by the employer. That is not the same thing as saving that in an appeal under s. 39 (2) of the Act, the appellate authority is precluded from holding any enquiry when the termination of service is based on a reasonable cause and not on the ground of misconduct A fair reading of sub-secs (2) and (3) of S 39 of the Act would show that it is obligatory on the part of the appellate authority to hold an enquiry to determine whether relief should be given to the employee or not in such a case. We, therefore, hold that a proper enquiry has to be held by the appellate authority before deciding an appeal filed before him against termination of service on the ground of reasonable cause. ( 8 ) IT was lastly contended by Sri Narayana Rao that the learned District judge was wrong in ordering the petitioner to pay a larger amount than what had been ordered to be paid by the appellate authority under the order impugned in WP 3524 of 1970. It is not necessary to go into the said question in this case in view of the order that we propose to pass in these cases. ( 9 ) SINCE we have come to the conclusion that there is no finding given either by respondent 2 or 3 in these cases whether the removal from service of the employees concerned was for a reasonable cause or not, we are of the opinion that these petitions will have to be allowed quashing the orders passed by respondents 2 and 3 in each of these cases and that the matters should be sent back to the appellate authority (respondent-3) for fresh disposal in accordance' with law and the observations made above. We order accordingly. In the circumstances of the cases, there will be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .