S. K. DUTTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application in revision against two Order Nos. 48 and 49 of the same date passed by the learned Munsif, fourth Court, Alipore in Title Suit No. 153 of 1968. The landlord instituted a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent against the tenant alleging that the rent of the suit premises was Rs. 80/- per month payable according to the English calendar month. It was also alleged that the tenant was in default in payment of rent from January, 1966 to January, 1968. The landlord, in the circumstances, gave a notice to quit terminating the tenancy and the notice was duly received by the tenant. The notice required that the tenant should quit and give vacant possession of the suit premises with the expiry of January, 1968. As the tenant did not vacate, the present suit was instituted for eviction and also for recovery of Rs. 2,000/- as arrears of rents and damages. ( 2 ) THE suit was contested by the tenant defendant who stated that rents upto February, 1966 was paid and it was alleged that a sum of Rs. 150/- was paid as Corporation tax in lieu of rent and that he was entitled to adjustment thereof. It was further stated that rent was originally Rs. 80/- but was suddenly increased to Rs. 85/- by the landlord without his consent and knowledge which was objected to by him and the landlord also expressed his inability to accept rent at the old rate. The service of notice was denied and it was also stated that the notice was invalid, illegal and insufficient. In these circumstances, the defendant prayed for dismissal of the suit. ( 3 ) IT appears that on the application filed by the defendant under section 17, sub-section (2) and (2a) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, the Court determined by an order dated 28th November, 1969 that a sum of Rs. 2,240/-, as rent for twenty-eight months from March, 1966 to June, 1968 was in arrears. The tenant defendant was directed to put in the amount with interest thereon by monthly instalment of Rs. 50/- along with current rent. This order, it appears, was not assailed by the landlord and thus became final and binding between the parties in all stages of this suit. The tenant defendant was directed to put in the amount with interest thereon by monthly instalment of Rs. 50/- along with current rent. This order, it appears, was not assailed by the landlord and thus became final and binding between the parties in all stages of this suit. It further appears that the suit, after some adjournments, was taken up for hearing on 4th August, 1970 when the plaintiff gave his evidence about default and also about the notice and its service, while the defendant also gave evidence and produced some challans (Exhibit a series) showing deposit of money for rent and for arrear and the case was fixed on 6th August, 1970 for argument. On that date the defendant filed an application for stay of further hearing of the suit in view of the order passed by the Court under section 17, sub-section (2) and (2a) of the Act. On that day the learned Munsif passed orders stating that further proceedings of the suit could not be stayed but the defendant could take his objections along with the arguments in the suit. Thereafter, another application was filed by the defendant praying for short stay which was granted on terms. The present application is by the tenant against the said two orders. ( 4 ) MR. M. B. Mallick, the learned Advocate appearing for the tenant petitioner has contended that in view of the provisions of sections 17 (2) and (2a) of the Act and of the order passed on 28th November, 1969 the Court should not have proceeded with the final hearing of the suit as the petitioner had been complying with the orders in regard to deposit of current rent and arrears as stated above. According to Mr. Mallick when an order is passed under sub-section (2) and (2a) and that order is in the process of compliance, the Court is not entitled to proceed with the hearing of the suit for ejectment on the ground of default. When a default is made in compliance with the said order and the Court passes an order striking out the defence, it can then only proceed with the hearing of the suit under sub-section (3 ). Accordingly, Mr. Mallick submitted that the Court exercised its jurisdiction with material irregularity in proceeding with the hearing of the suit of that stage. ( 5 ) MR. Accordingly, Mr. Mallick submitted that the Court exercised its jurisdiction with material irregularity in proceeding with the hearing of the suit of that stage. ( 5 ) MR. A. C. Bhattacharyya, the learned Advocate appearing for the landlord-opposite party, contends that under sub-section (4) of section 17, there is no bar in the Court's proceeding with the hearing of the suit at any stage; if the tenant complies with the order under sub-sections 17 (2) and (2a) as on the date of hearing of the suit the Court will pass an order dismissing the suit for eviction and may also provide that in default of compliance of the order under sections 17 (2) and (2a) there will be decree for eviction. He further contended that on a reading of the section it would appear that there is no bar in the Court's proceeding with the hearing of a suit in such cases, even if the period during which the deposits are required to be made is not reached and the Court can proceed to hear the suit at any time. Mr. Bhattacharyya further contended that in his case the Court did got disallow the contention of the defendant but only directed that the defendant would be entitled to raised this objection at the time of the case is taken up for argument which was fixed on the same date, only a few hours latter. According to him, the defendant should have waited till the Court found against him on his application filed on 6th August, 1970. ( 6 ) TAKING the points in the reverse order I find that the trial court stated expressly in the order that the hearing of the suit could not be stayed, which was the prayer made by the defendant in the application. In view of the application filed, I am of opinion, the Court should have directed a stay of the hearing till the said application of 6th August, 1960 was disposed or by it. I, therefore, find nothing wrong in the defendant's coming up against the said order in this Court and the contentions, to the contrary made by Mr. Bhattacharyya on this point, are overruled. ( 7 ) AS to the other contention on a reading of section 17, it appears to me that the scheme of the Act has been laid down in clear and precise terms. Bhattacharyya on this point, are overruled. ( 7 ) AS to the other contention on a reading of section 17, it appears to me that the scheme of the Act has been laid down in clear and precise terms. The tenant is required to make certain payments or deposits of arrear and current rent or damages within certain period under sub-section (1 ). If a dispute is raised by the tenant regarding the same then under sub-section (2) such dispute will have to be heard and decided by the Court after ascertaining rate of rent and arrear and the Court will direct payment or deposit of the same within time fixed by it. Under sub-section (2a) the Court can extend the time for payment or deposit required to be made under sub-section (1) or (2) and the Court may also direct the payment of rents, arrear or current, by such instalment as it deems fit after considering the circumstances and on hearing the parties if application for extension of instalment is made within such time mentioned in sub-section (2b ). Under sub-section (3) again it is provided that if a tenant fails to pay or make any deposit, referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), within such extended time as provided in clause (a) or to pay or deposit any instalment within such time as permitted under clause (b) of sub-section (2a), the Court will order striking out the defence against delivery of possession and shall then proceed with the hearing of the suit. In sub-section (4), it is provided that if the tenant goes on making the deposits or payments as required under sub-section (2) and (2a), no decree or order for delivery of possession of the premises to the landlord on the ground of default in payment of rent by the tenant shall be made by the Court but the Court may allow such costs as it may deem fit to the landlord. There is a proviso to sub-section with which we are not presently concerned. There is a proviso to sub-section with which we are not presently concerned. It will appear from an examination of the above provisions that if a tenant goes on complying with the orders passed by Court under sub-section (2) and (2a) the Court will not be in a position to take up the case for hearing for the reasons that the period during which the deposit was to be made has not been reached in view of the orders passed under those sub-sections. This will also be clear from sub-section (3) that it is only when a default is made in compliance with the orders under sub-section (2) and (2a) the Court will strike out the defence and proceed with the hearing of the case. The cumulative effect of the said sub-section as also of sub-section (4) appears to me that the Court is precluded from hearing the suit for delivery of possession on the ground of default in payment of rent when the tenant had been duly complying with the orders passed under those sub-sections by the Court earlier. In the present case, as we have seen, it appears that there is no case by the plaintiff as late as on 4th August, 1970, when the case was taken up for peremptory hearing, that there has been any such default which would result in an order contemplated under sub-section (3 ). Accordingly, the Court was not competent to take up the case for hearing of the suit at that stage when the suit was for delivery of possession on the ground of defaulting in payment of rent. Accordingly, the trial court was in error in taking up of the case at that point of time. For the reasons given above, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Bhattacharyya. The suggestion of Mr. Bhattacharyya that the Court could pass a conditional decree which is not warranted by law. It may be mentioned that the hearing of a suit for delivery of possession on grounds other than default in payment of rent is not required to be stayed, for in such cases, if the tenanted is not precluded from defending his suit against delivery of possession, the hearing of the suit may proceed in the usual way in spite of any order under sub-sections (2) and (2a ). ( 8 ) IN the result, this Rule is made absolute and the Order No. 48 dated 6th August, 1970 to the effect that further hearing of the suit could not be stayed is set aside and further hearing of the suit is stayed for the present. It appears from record, to which my attention has been drawn by Mr. Bhattacharyya, that there has been another application filed by the landlord opposite party under section 17 (3) of the Act stating that the defendant has not complied with the order of the Court passed on 28th November, 1969 and praying for appropriate orders. That application could not be heard because of the issue of the Rule in the mean time. This application will now be heard by the Court as expeditiously as possible and in accordance with law, and if the Court finds that there has been such default, the defence against delivery of possession will be struck off and the Court will proceed to hear the suit as laid down in sub-section (3) of section 17 of the Act from the stage it was heard. ( 9 ) IN the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Let the records go down as quickly as possible. Rule made absolute.