BHARGAVA, J.—This is a plaintiffs appeal against the judgment and decree dated 18th December, 1965, of the District Judge, Alwar. 2. The plaintiffs are the sons of Umrao Singh who died on 16th April, 1962, leaving behind properties which are mentioned at items Nos. 1 to 11i of Schedule Ka annexed the plaint. Before his death, Umrao Singh by his will dated 10th May, 1961, bequeathed these properties in favour of Mst. Patashi his wife. The defendants in the suit are Mst. Patashi, the step-mother of the plaintiffs, Prem Narain and Durgaprasad the other two sons of Umrao Singh, and Mst. Ratti Devi, daughters of Umrao Singh. Plaintiffs case is that until 10th September, 1961, Umrao Singh and his sons constituted an undivided Hindu family. On 10th September, 1961, the plaintiffs served a notice upon Umrao Singh of their intention to separate and demanded a partition of the properties. However, Umrao Singh died on the 16th April, 1962, without effecting partition of the properties. Plaintiffs case is that the disputed properties were jointly acquired by them and the deceased Umrao Singh and the plaintiffs are entitled to 20/45 the share in each property. A declaration has been further sought that the will executed by Umrao Singh in favour of Mst. Pathashi is illegal and void because none of the properties was his self-acquired property. They have also sought an injunction restraining Mst. Pathshi from disposing of the family property. 3. Mst. Patashi contested the suit and stated that partition had already been effected between the plaintiffs and Umrao Singh before the execution of the will. It was also stated that the properties mentioned in the will were the self-acquired properties of Umrao Singh and he had a right to bequeath them to her. 4. 3. Mst. Patashi contested the suit and stated that partition had already been effected between the plaintiffs and Umrao Singh before the execution of the will. It was also stated that the properties mentioned in the will were the self-acquired properties of Umrao Singh and he had a right to bequeath them to her. 4. The lower court framed the following issues on the pleadings of the parties: ^^1- D;k tk;nkn iSnk&dnkZ vtuke mejkoflag fgUnw eqrdkZ dh tk;nkn gS o dkfcys rdlhe gS\ 2- D;k eqnk;yk ua- 1 fgUnw [kkunku dh tk;nkkn eudwyk oks xSj eudwyk dks QjksDr djus dh ps"Vk esa gS ftlls eqnb;ku dks uqdlku gksrk gS vkSj blfy;s eqnbZ;ku gqDe bErukbZ nokeh ikus ds eqLrgd gS\ 3- D;k olh;rukek rk- 10-5-61 cgd eqnk;yk ua- 1 Jh mejkoflag ds vukf/kdkj o vuqfpr :i esa fd;k gS ftldh eUlw[kh ds eqnbZ;ku eqLrgd gS\ 4- D;k eqnbZ;ku tk;nkn eqUntkZ QgfjLr ua- d ykxk;r o rdlhe djkus ds eqLrgd gS\ 5- nknjlh\ In support of these issues, the plaintiffs gave their own statements as P. W. 10 and P. W. 11 and also examined Biharilal P. W. 1, Saraswati Narain P. W. 2. Jagan Prasad P. W. 3, Vishambar Prasad P. W. 4. Onkarnath P. W. 5, Prabhudayal P. W. 6 Parshadilal P. W. 7, Ghodiram P. W. 8 and Mahesh Chandra P. W. 9. In rebuttal Mst. Patashi gave her statement as D. W. 1 and examined Harnarain D. W. 2, Mamraj D. W. 3 Rampratap D. W. 4 and Ganeshilal D.W. 5. Plaintiffs also produced receipts issued by the Mining Department Exs.1 to 5. On behalf of the defendants, copy of the will, copies of Khasra of Smt.2013, 2019 and 2020 and sale-certificate were also produced. The document Exs.1 to 5 are not traceable on the record; but learned counsel for the appellants is in possession of the certified copies of these documents and he has placed them before the court for its perusal. 5. The learned District Judge on a consideration of the evidence came to the finding that properties mentioned at items Nos. 1, 2, 4. 5 and 6 were the self-acquired properties of Umrao Singh and they had been rightly bequeathed to Mst. 5. The learned District Judge on a consideration of the evidence came to the finding that properties mentioned at items Nos. 1, 2, 4. 5 and 6 were the self-acquired properties of Umrao Singh and they had been rightly bequeathed to Mst. Patashi under the will which is valid to that extent He further held that property at item No. 3 of Schedule Ka was the joint family property and Umrao Singh had no right to will away that property to his wife. The learned Judge further held that the properties mentioned at items Nos. 3, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 were the joint family properties and liable to partition. He accordingly passed a preliminary decree for partition of items Nos. 3, 7, 8, 9, l0 and 11 of Schedule Ka, and declared the shares of the parties as below: (1) Plaintiff Banwarilal 5/27 (2) Plaintiff Vishnu Avtar 5/27 (3) Defendant No. 1 Mst. Patashi 5/27 (4) Defendant 2 Premnarain 5/27 (5) Defendant 3 Durga Prasad 5/27 (6) Defendant 4 Mst. Ratidevi 1/54 (7) Defendant 5 Mst. Angooridevi 1/54 (8) Defendant 6 Mst. Mayadevi 1/54 (9) Defendant 7 Mst. Santi Devi 1/54 6. In this appeal, learned counsel contends that the lower court has erroneously held properties Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 as the self-acquired properties of Umaro Singh. It is contended that the said properties were the joint acquisition of the plaintiffs and their father Umrao Singh. In this connection it is pointed out that the plaintiffs were also carrying on mining business in the life-time of Umarao Singh and had made contribution out of these earnings for the acquisition of the aforesaid properties. It was also contended that Umrao Singh was only a Patwari drawing a salary of Rs. 7 pm. and he had no other source of income so as to acquire the aforesaid properties and in such circumstances it should be presumed that the aforesaid properties were the joint family properties. It was also contended that Umrao Singh was only a Patwari drawing a salary of Rs. 7 pm. and he had no other source of income so as to acquire the aforesaid properties and in such circumstances it should be presumed that the aforesaid properties were the joint family properties. Reliance is placed on Haridas vs. Devkuvarbai (1) where it was held that the property acquired jointly by father and son living together becomes joint family property, even in the absence of family nucleus for its acquisition, and on Bhagwant Kishore vs. Bishambhar Nath (2) where the court held that: "where a purchase is made by the Karta of the manager of the joint Hindu family and it is proved that he was in receipt of an income on behalf of the joint Hindu family, and it is not proved that he had any separate source of income, the presumption to be made is that the purchase was made by the Karta on behalf of the family from family funds, unless the contrary is proved. When no other source of income is disclosed from which the property could be purchased and all that is known is that the family possessed some ancestral nucleus, the presumption to be made is that the nucleus was sufficient to enable the purchase of the property to be made. The nature of property so purchased is joint family property." 7. The question, therefore, to be determined is whether the properties Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 were acquired with the aid of some ancestral nucleus or were acquired jointly by the father and the sons. The law regarding the burden of proof of the existence of joint family property was laid down in Appalaswami vs. Surya-narayanamurti (3) and was thus stated — "The Hindu law upon this aspect of the case is well settled. Proof of the existence of a joint family does not lead to the presumption that property held by any member of the family is joint and the burden rests upon any one asserting that any item of property was joint to establish the fact. Proof of the existence of a joint family does not lead to the presumption that property held by any member of the family is joint and the burden rests upon any one asserting that any item of property was joint to establish the fact. But where it is established that the family possessed some joint property which from its nature and relative value may have formed the nucleus from which the property in question may have been acquired the burden shifts to the partv alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired without the aid of the joint family property." These observations were quoted with approval in Shrinivas vs. Narayan (1). 8. In M. Nagendriah vs. M. Ramchandraiah (5), the Supreme Court held that— "It is not denied that all these properties were purchased in the name of Ramachandriah. Now if that is so, then the onus of proving that these purchases were benami was on the appellant and it was for him to show by convincing evidence that the source of money for these acquisitions was traceable to the joint funds from the business. We are not unmindful of the fact that in this country benami transactions are not uncommon and they are certainly not forwarded upon. We are equally conscious of the fact that the appellant and respondent Ramchandraish are real brothers and not utter strangers. But at the same time onus must as a matter of law be on the party asserting benami nature of title. The amount and nature of evidence required to discharge the onus would of course depend upon he facts and circumstances of each case. In the case in hand the evidence to which our attention has been drawn does not seem to be strong enough to displace the concurrent conclusions of the courts below that the appellant is not joint owner of the properties in dispute along with the respondent." 9............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 10. The lower court decreed the plaintiffs suit in regard to items Nos. 3,7,8,9,10 and 11 of schedule Ka. It has determined the plaintiffs share as 5/27th each. Similarly, the share of the other two sons and of the widow Mst. Patashi has been determined as 5/27. Each of the four daughters has been given 1/54 share in the properties. 10. The lower court decreed the plaintiffs suit in regard to items Nos. 3,7,8,9,10 and 11 of schedule Ka. It has determined the plaintiffs share as 5/27th each. Similarly, the share of the other two sons and of the widow Mst. Patashi has been determined as 5/27. Each of the four daughters has been given 1/54 share in the properties. Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the shares of the widow and the plaintiffs have not been correctly determined. According to him. the widow and the daughters have only J/54 share in the property and in this 5/6th share left by the deceased, only the sons are equally entitled. Learned counsel relies upon sec. 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Learned counsel also relies upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in Shiramabai vs. Kalgonda (6). The argument is that by virtue of the proviso to sec. 6 of the Act read with explanation 1, the deceased shall be entitled to l/6th share in the coparcenary property because of the notional partition and as such his interest shall devolve upon his heirs according to the provisions of this Act, that is to say the four sons, widow and the four daughters shall get equal share, that is, 1/54 in that l/6th share. The argument pro-ceeds further that the widow after having got 1/54 share as an heir will not get any more share in the coparcenary property on a suit for partition by he sons. It is argued that the right of the widowed mother to get a share equal to her son on a partition of the coparcenary property stands abrogated by virtue of sec. 4 of the Act. To me, the contention does not seem to be correct. 11. It is argued that the right of the widowed mother to get a share equal to her son on a partition of the coparcenary property stands abrogated by virtue of sec. 4 of the Act. To me, the contention does not seem to be correct. 11. Amongst others, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, has made the following changes in the old law— "(1) The limited ownership of a widow and other female heirs, known as widows estate or limited estate is abolished and converted into full ownership, and (2) an undivided interest of a coparcener in a Mitakashara joint family property or of a Member of a marumakkattayam, Aliyasantana or Namboodri family property is not only made heritable but also capable of being disposed of by a testamentary document." Before the enforecement of the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act (Act 18/1937) the widow mother was entitled to a share equal to that of the son in the coparcenary property if a partition took place between the sons. After the coming into force of Act No. 18 of 1937, on the death intestate of a Hindu governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law, leaving separate property, his widow became entitled to the same share, in respect of the property in respect of which the husband died intestate as a son. In regard to the husbands interest in the joint family property, the widow acquired in that property the same interest which her husband had at the time of his death. In Pratapmull Aggarwala vs. Dhanbati Bibi (7) it was made clear that— "In accordance to the Mitakshara law, the mother or the grand mother is entitled to a share when the sons divide the family estate among themselves; but she cannot be recognised as the owner of such share until the division is actually made, as she has no pre-existing right in the estate except a right of maintenance. The mother, it was held, does not become owner of the share allotted to her by a preliminary decree in a partition suit of her son, until the preliminary decree was carried out and actual division of the joint family was made. The mother, it was held, does not become owner of the share allotted to her by a preliminary decree in a partition suit of her son, until the preliminary decree was carried out and actual division of the joint family was made. The widow mother of course could not compel a partition so long as the sons remained joint." The Supreme Court in Munnalal vs. Rajkumar (8) after referring to the above deci-sion of the Judicial Committee held with reference to secs. 4 & 14 of the Succession Act that by declaration of heirs rights in a preliminary decree, the great grand-mother Khilona Bai became entitled to the absolute rights in the property. It was held that having regard to sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, it cannot be assumed that the Legislature merely intended to declare the rule enunciated by the Privy Council in Pratapmull Aggarwala vs. Dhanbati Bibi (supra). It, therefore, follows that the right of a wife or mother to a share on partition is not a mere personal right meant to assure her of her maintenance but is a right in property. The Hindu Succession Act is principally a mere law of inheritance containing rules of devolution of property on the death of a person and has not affected the rights of a mother to a share equal to that of a son in the coparcenary property when actual partition takes place between the sons. 11. Sec. 6 recognises the Hindu Law of survivorship but by the proviso creates an exception and provides for devolution of the interest of the deceased coparcener if he dies intestate and leaves any of the female heirs specified in cl. 1 or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such female relative. Explanation (1) defines the expression "the interest of the deceased in the Mitak-shara coparcenary property" and incorporates into the subject the concept of notional partition. For the purpose of enabling succession to and computation of an interest which was otherwise liable to devolve by survivorship and for the ascertainment of the shares in that interest of the relatives mentioned in Glass I of the Schedule. 13. I am unable to agree that sec. For the purpose of enabling succession to and computation of an interest which was otherwise liable to devolve by survivorship and for the ascertainment of the shares in that interest of the relatives mentioned in Glass I of the Schedule. 13. I am unable to agree that sec. 4 of the Succession Act has abrogated the old rule of Hindu Law under which the widow mother was entitled to a share equal to that of the son at the time of actual partition among the sons. The over-riding effect of sec. 4 is only in regard to such matters "for which provision is made in the Succession Act", The Succession Act does not contain any provision in regard to the rights or the share of the wife or the mother in the coparcenary property at the time of the partition. Therefore the rights of the widow mother under the old rule of Hindu Law cannot be said to have been curtailed by sec. 6 of the Act. 14. The correctness of the decision in Shiramabai vs. Kalgonda(6) was doubted by the same learned Judge of the Bombay High Court in a later Bench decision reported as Rangbhai vs. Laxman(9), and the learned Judge did not refer the matter to a larger Bench for re-consideration and observed that as he was a party to the decision in the earlier case, he could state that the matter was not fully argued then and the Bench was not in a position to consider all the pros and cons of the matter. 15. In Gopal Narain vs. D.P. Goenka (10), P.N. Khanna J. also dissented from the view taken in Shiramabai vs. Kalgonda (supra) and observed: "The overriding effect of the Hindu Succession Act, created by sec. 4 is only in respect of such matters for which provision is made in this Act. In the absence of any provision in the said Act, the question of the said Act overriding any text, rule of interpretation of Hindu Law in force immediately before the commencement of the Act in respect of such matter does not arise. The fact that the right of the mother to maintenance has been recognised and codified under the Hindu Adoptions & Maintenance Act, 1956, is not at all indicative of the fact that she was not intended to be given a share at partition of the joint family property." 16. The fact that the right of the mother to maintenance has been recognised and codified under the Hindu Adoptions & Maintenance Act, 1956, is not at all indicative of the fact that she was not intended to be given a share at partition of the joint family property." 16. I am, therefore, of the view that according to the proviso to sec. 6 read with Explanation (1) on a notional partition, the interest of Umrao Singh in the property was 1 /6th as he had four sons and his wife. That 1/6 share would now devolve upon all the four sons, the four daughters and the widow that is each one of them will have 1 /54th share. Besides this, on partition of the property the remaining 5/6 share in the property shall be equally divided between the four sons and the mother each getting 1/6 share. The lower court has, therefore, rightly declared the shares of the parties in the joint family properties Nos. 3, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of Schedule ka. The plaintiffs and the other two sons and the widow will have 5/27th share each while the four daughters l/54th share each in the property. 17. This appeal has, therefore, no force and is according dismissed with costs.