JUDGMENT R.S. Pathak, J. - By this and the connected petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioners challenge the validity of a Government Order dated July 13, 1970 providing a wage structure for engineering industries in the State of Uttar Pradesh. 2. In pursuance of the recommendations made in paragraph 25 of Chapter XXVII of the Second Five Year Plan and in paragraph 20 of Chapter XV of the Third Five Year plan Government of India in the Ministry of Labour and Employment decided by a Resolution dated December 12, 1964 to set up a Wage Board-'for the Engineering Industries, excluding the Steel plants for which a Wage Board was already in operation. Those engineering industries would include foundries except Those to which the recommendations of any other Wage Board had already 'been applied. 3. The Wage Board so set up consisted of a Chairman, two independent members, and the employers and workmen were represented by three members each. The terms of reference of the Board included the determination of the categories of employees who should be brought within the scope of the proposed wage fixation and the working out of a wage structure based on the principles of fair wages as set forth in the Report of the Committee on Fair Wages. In evolving the wage structure the Board was required to take into account, in addition to the considerations relating to fair wages, the needs of the industries in a developing economy, the special features of the engineering industries including aspects relating to exports, the requirements of social justice, the need for adjusting wage differentials in such a manner as to provide an incentive to workers for advancing their skill and the desirability of extending the system of payment by results. From the purview of the wage Board were excluded public sector undertakings which were run departmentally, establishments employing less than 50 workers and workshops attached to non-engineering establishments. 4. The Central Wage Board entered upon its deliberations and after completing its proceedings published its report in December 1968. Among its prominent features, the Report recommended higher wages for the workers which were to be phased out over a period of five years. The report was not unanimous. 4. The Central Wage Board entered upon its deliberations and after completing its proceedings published its report in December 1968. Among its prominent features, the Report recommended higher wages for the workers which were to be phased out over a period of five years. The report was not unanimous. A dissenting note entered by the workmen's representatives indicated that the recommendations fell disappointingly short of their expectations, while the dissenting note entered by the employers representatives expressed concern over recommendations which they regarded as extravagant and unreasonable. On March 21, 1970 the Government of India in the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Rehabilitation noted the recommendations contained in the Report and accepted them. The Government also welcomed the talks in progress between the parties in different States for the purpose of arriving at mutually acceptable terms. State-wise or under-taking wise, in the light of recommendations made in Chapter VII of the Report. The Government commended to the parties the desirability of making such settlements valid for a sufficiently long period, preferably for five years. It seems that in the State of Bihar the parties arrived at a bi-partite settlement at the State level which was registered as an agreement under the Industrial Disputes Act. 5. In Uttar Pradesh, a tri-partite conference was held between the representatives of the employers, the workers and the State Govt, on February 9, 1970 and again on May 14, 1970 for considering the implementation of the recommendations of the Central Wage Board in the State, No agreement between the parties seems to have been reached. The State Government then made the Order No. 4032 (TD) 36-A/64 (TD)/1969 dated July 13, 1970, with which we are concerned. It purports to be under Section 3 (b) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. The State Government then made the Order No. 4032 (TD) 36-A/64 (TD)/1969 dated July 13, 1970, with which we are concerned. It purports to be under Section 3 (b) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. The preamble in the Order refers to the Resolution dated March 21, 1970 of the Government of India and the tri-partite conferences, and then recites that:- "In the opinion of the State Government, It is necessary for the maintenance of Public order or supply of services essential to the life of the community and for maintaining employment, to implement the almost unanimous recommendations of the Board in respect of coverage of the engineering establishments and their employees and the majority recommendations in respect of the wage structure, keeping in view the recommendations of the Government of India in this regard and after making suitable modifications in view of the conditions prevailing in the engineering industries in the State." The Order applies to all factories employing 50 persons or more as on December 31, 1967 or subsequently, and specifically excludes public sector undertakings run by a department of the Government. It extends to all employees falling within the definition of "workmen" as defined under Section -2 (z) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act but excludes apprentice. It sets up a wage structure, classifies the workmen entitled thereto, details the pay scales and dearness allowance, provides for an area allowance and specifies the method of calculating the wages for daily rates workmen and piece rate workmen and provides for weightage for length of service. It sets out how the higher wages should be phased and distributed, prescribes how the workmen are to be fitted into their respective categories and makes provision for adjustments against fringe benefits. Finally, it provides how payments are to be made. The Order came into force with immediate effect, and remains in force for a period of one year in the first instance. 6. At this stage, we may point out that during the pendency of the proceedings before the Central Wage Board, the Wage Board, recommended to the Government of India for the grant of interim relief to the workmen and the recommendations were accepted by the Government of India. Thereafter on February 8, 1967 the U.P. Government made an order under Section 3 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act directing the payment of interim relief. 7. Thereafter on February 8, 1967 the U.P. Government made an order under Section 3 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act directing the payment of interim relief. 7. The writ petitions have been heard together, and the contentions raised by learned counsel for the different petitioners before us are set out below:- 1. The impugned Order operates retrospectively and, therefore, beyond the terms of Section 3 (b) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. 2. The Order is vitiated by an inherent contradiction because while its fundamental feature is the phasing of the higher wages over a period of five years it has been declared to be in force for a period of one year only. 3. The State Government when making the Order did not apply its mind to the considerations set out in Section 3 (b) of the Act, and there was no emergency to warrant the making of the Order. 4. The Order does not take into account the paying capacity of the industry and. therefore, the wage structure provided by it is contrary to law. 5 The order proceeds upon an invidious discrimination between private sector undertakings and public sector undertakings, between the Kanpur region and other comparable regions such as Ghaziabad and Meerut, and between undertakings within the Mahapalika limits of Kanpur and those immediately outside those limits; consequently Article 14 of the Constitution has been violated. 6. The classification attempted in the Order between different regions was too vague and should have been broken down still further so as to produce clearly defined regions. 7. In respect of the foundry industry an order under the Minimum Wages Act already existed and there was no need for making the Order under consideration. 8. The Order is self-defeating inasmuch as its stringent provisions if implemented would result in the closure of a number of undertakings belonging to the Industry. 9. The order is not in accord with Articles 38 and 43 of the Directive principles of State Policy set out in the Constition. 10. Before the Order was made the Government was bound to consult the industry. 11. Section 3 (b) of the Act delegates legislative power. 12. In writ petition No. 4353 of 1970, It is urged that the petitioner's undertaking is not covered by the Order because the undertaking manufactures musical instruments, and that a musical instrument is not an engineering product. 8. 11. Section 3 (b) of the Act delegates legislative power. 12. In writ petition No. 4353 of 1970, It is urged that the petitioner's undertaking is not covered by the Order because the undertaking manufactures musical instruments, and that a musical instrument is not an engineering product. 8. The first contention is that the Order falls outside the scope of Section 3 (b) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act inasmuch as it has retrospective operation. Section 3 (b) provides for an order by the State Government making provision "3 (b) for requiring employers and workmen or both to observe for such period as may be specified in the order, such terms and conditions of employment as may be determined in accordance with the order." Section 3 (b) was considered in Basti Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 Allahabad 538 (FB) by a Full Bench of this Court and it was held that it could not be given any retrospective effect. The case was taken in appeal to the Supreme Court, and in State of U.P. v. Basti Sugar Mills, A.I.R. 1961 SC 420 the Supreme Court ex- pressed its entire agreement with that view. That, then, is the state of the law. 9. The question next is whether upon a proper construction of its terms the impugned Order can be said to operate retrospectively. 10. We are referred by the petitioners to some provisions in the Order which they say indicates that the Order is retrospective. Clause 36 of paragraph IX prescribes how the initial basic wages shall be reached. From the table, taking Area 1 as an example, 75 per cent of it is specified with reference to January 1, 1969, 82 per cent, as on January 1, 1970 and it goes on increasing accordingly until it reaches 100 per cent on January 1, 1973 Clause 37 details how the difference between the existing total emoluments as on December 31, 1968 and the basic Wages etc. payable under the Order from January 1, 1970 shall be calculated. Clause 38 (ii) declares that the wages shall be fixed, as from January 1, 1969 by adding Rs. payable under the Order from January 1, 1970 shall be calculated. Clause 38 (ii) declares that the wages shall be fixed, as from January 1, 1969 by adding Rs. 20/- out of the difference shown in column No. 3 of the table set out there to the workmen's emoluments as on December 31 1968, and the balance of the amount in column No. 3 is to be distributed in equal instalments spread over a period of four years from January 1, 1969 to January 1. 1973. Then follows a table indicating how the distribution of the total phased payment is to be effected. 11. It seems to us that the provisions upon which the petitioners rely merely lay down the scheme for phasing out the higher wages. They do not necessarily imply that the Order is retrospective. For that, we must turn to the operative provisions of the order which create the liability to pay. These provisions are set out in paragraph XIII. Paragraph XIII reads:- "XIII. Payment how to be made : (52) All payments in terms of this order shall commence from the wage period commencing from June 1, 1970, payable in July 1970. (53) The arrears calculated at revised rates shall be payable from January 1970 only. These payments will be made in such a manner that one month's arrears are paid along with the current wages of each month till they are liquidated. The payment of arrears also shall commence from the wage period beginning with June 1, 1970. payable in July 1970. (54) In case of fortnightly paid workmen, the instalments of monthly arrears shall be paid along with wages of second fortnight of each month. The payment of these arrears in their case shall also be made from the wage period commencing from 1st of July. 1970, payable in the second fortnight of the same month." 12. Upon a fair construction of those provisions, they appear to require :-- (1) The employers will make payment to .their employees in terms of the Order from the "wage period commencing June 1, 1970 payable in July 1970." (2) Although the scheme embodied in the Order refers to a revised wage structure phased out from January 1, 1969, the workmen will be entitled to payment on the revised rates only from January 1, 1970. The payment of that amount will be made from July 1970 along with the current wages, so that the arrears for one month are paid along with the current wages of each month until the arrears have been paid off. (3) The same principle has been substantially adopted in the provision made in the case of fortnightly paid workmen. 13. Now, an order operates retrospectively when it brings into existence a situation or a state of affaris positioned in the past. An order operating retrospectively may be imagined as travelling back into time until it reaches the point from which it is intended to have effect. As from that point of time or date, the consequences of its operation began to flow. And as soon as the circumstances and conditions prescribed by it meet together the right or liability contemplated by it takes birth. Where originally there was in fact no right or liability, the order, although passed today operates to create that right or liability in the past. 14. One of the tests which, it seems to us, should be decisive of the question in the present case is whether the benefit of the new wage structure has been confined to workmen continuing in employment on the date of the order or has been extended also to workmen who were no longer in employment on that date. If the right to wages at the revised rates from January 1. 1970 accrues retrospectively an employer would have to pay to every workman employed from that date wages at the revised rates, regardless of whether the workman continues in employment on the date of the order. A workman employed in January and February 1970 only would be entitled to claim wages at the revised rates for those months. But if the right is confined to such workmen as are continuing in employment on the date of the Order, then the payment of arrears for the period from January 1970 must be understood as constituting in substance a term of employment operative from the date of the Order. It is a term introduced or implied by the law .in every contract of employment which existed before the date of the order and continues to subsist thereafter. Every workman employed since January 1970 and continuing in employment on the date of the Order will be entitled to say from July 13, 1970. It is a term introduced or implied by the law .in every contract of employment which existed before the date of the order and continues to subsist thereafter. Every workman employed since January 1970 and continuing in employment on the date of the Order will be entitled to say from July 13, 1970. "By the operation of the Order, my present terms of employment stipulate that in addition to my current Wages must be paid an additional amount calculated by reference to the revised rates specified as from January 1970". The claim is a measure of his present and future entitlement to wages. The payment of the additional amount is a term governing the workmen's present and future employment; it does not represent a right governing his past employment, if it could have been construed as governing his past employment then as we have already pointed out, a workman who was employed for a period from January 1970, but had ceased to be in employment before the date of the order could legitimately come forward to claim arrears at the revised rates. That, we think, would be contrary to the entire scheme prescribed by the Order. 15. To our mind, the Order is intended to apply only to such workmen as are in employment on the date when it comes into force. Clause 13 provides for an option by employees in head offices each offices liaison offices registered offices etc. of engineering units to elect whether they prefer wage scales and service conditions applicable to them prior to the Order or those enforced by the Order. Such a provision can obviously be utilised only by employees who are continuing in employment. Paragraphs II to IX refer to the wage structure, the different categories of workmen and the phasing and manner of implementation. From the fact that the higher wages are intended to be phased out into the future, there can be no escape from the conclusion that workmen in present employment alone are contemplated. Paragraph X provides for the fitment of workmen in their respective categories in terms of the Order within a period of two months from the date of order. That again necessarily points to workmen presently employed. It is significant that there is no provision in the order which confers any benefit under it to workmen who ceased to be in employment before it came into force. That again necessarily points to workmen presently employed. It is significant that there is no provision in the order which confers any benefit under it to workmen who ceased to be in employment before it came into force. 16. In our opinion, the scheme embodied in the order is governed by Paragraph XIII of the Order, Paragraph XIII creates a liability on the employers which operates in the present and endures into the future, and the quantitative aspect of which is measured by the sum of the current wages and an additional amount described as arrears. The order is prospective in its operation its restrospectivity is an illusion. 17. In Basti Sugar Mills, A.I.R. 1961 SC 420 (supra) the Supreme Court was called upon to consider a somewhat similar case. There an Order dated July 5, 1950 under Section 3 (b) required the employers to pay bonus for the year 1947-48 to those persons who had worked during that year and the payment was to be made to workmen in employment on the date oi the order. The Supreme Court observed "This payment was directed to be made within six weeks of the making of the order. By giving this direction the State Government did no more than attach a condition to the employment of workmen in the year 1950-51 in Sugar factories affected by the order. That is all that it has done." The Supreme Court held that even though the effect was to augment past wages of the workmen thereby, nevertheless the payment was a condition of their employment in future. It was pointed out on behalf of the employers that the effect of the order was to add a new term or condition with regard to employment for a period which was already over. But the Supreme Court repelled this contention and added :- "The effect of that order is merely to require the employer to pay an additional sum of money to his employees as a term of condition of work in future." Those observations completely cover the case before us. 18. The second contention is that the impugned order suffers from an inherent contradiction because while purporting to prescribe a wage structure ultimately realised through a process of successive phasing over a period of five years the order itself has been brought into force for a period of one year only. 18. The second contention is that the impugned order suffers from an inherent contradiction because while purporting to prescribe a wage structure ultimately realised through a process of successive phasing over a period of five years the order itself has been brought into force for a period of one year only. It is urged that an attribute of a wage structure is that it should endure for an appreciable period. Now. the order has been made under Section 3 (b), and, therefore, has to be limited in duration for a definite period. As we shall presently show, the order has been made to meet a state of emergency. It may have been possible for the State Government to make the order operative for a period of five years but as the petitioners themselves assert, it is bound to have a profound effect upon the industry and the workmen, and in the circumstances the State Government can be said to have acted reasonably in providing a shorter period for its operation in the first instance. It is always open to the State Government to extend the period of the operation of the order, and that it has that possibility in mind is clear from paragraph XIV of the Order which declares that "the State Government may extend the period of applicability of this order from time to time". Therefore we do not see any contradiction in the terms of the Order, and reject the contention of the petitioners to the contrary. 19. The third contention is that the State Government did not apply its mind to the considerations set out in Section 3 (b) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act when making the order. It is also said that there was no emergency to warrant invoking the powers under Section 3 (b). The submission is that the State Government mechanically passed order to give effect to the recommendations contained in the Central Wage Board Report. The contention is plainly without substance. That the State Government applied its mind before making the order is evident from perusal of the preamble of the order. Compared with the preamble of Section 3 (b), it will be found that only some of the conditions set out in that preamble have been considered as the basis for making the order. The contention is plainly without substance. That the State Government applied its mind before making the order is evident from perusal of the preamble of the order. Compared with the preamble of Section 3 (b), it will be found that only some of the conditions set out in that preamble have been considered as the basis for making the order. The considerations set out in section 3 are:- (1) securing the public safety or convenience; (2) maintenance of public order; (3) maintenance of supplies essential to the life of the community, and (4) maintaining employment. Of these, securing the public safety or convenience has not been made the basis of the order. Apparently, in the opinion of the Government that was not a relevant factor when making the order. Then, when the State Government decided to implement the recommendations of the Central Wage Board by making the Order, it did not incorporate all the recommendations of the Board. It selected only those (Sic) the situation obtaining in the State. Moreover, although the phasing of the wage structure has been drawn largely from the proposals made in the Central Wage Board Report, the increased wages have not been computed by reference to January 1, 1969 as the Report recommends, but clearly as paragraph 53 of the order indicates, "by reference to January 1, 1970. 20. The petitioners also point out that there was no question of public order involved when the order was made, and that again shows that the mind of the State Government was not applied. The expression "public order", it is pointed out, has a well accepted meaning, and we are referred to Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1966 SC 740 Where the expression "maintenance of public order" was held by the Supreme Court to mean "the prevention of disorder of a grave nature." It is contended that the conditions precedent mentioned in section 3 did not exist when the Order was passed, and the burden lay upon the State Government to show that they did. Now, in Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. State Industrial Tribunal, A.I.R. 1961 SC 1381 the Supreme Court examined this question of the burden of proof in regard to an order under Section 3 (b), and it observed :- "The difference between a case where an order contains a recital on the face of it and one where it does not contain such a recital is that in the latter case the burden is thrown on the authority making the order to satisfy the Court by other means that the conditions precedent were fulfilled. In the former case the Court will presume the regularity of the order including the fulfilment of the condition precedent, and then it will be for the party challenging the legality of the order to show that the recital was not correct and that the conditions precedent were not in fact complied with by the authority." 21. In the present case, the conditions precedent have been recited in the Order itself, and the burden is upon the petitioners to show that the recital of those conditions is not correct and that there has been no compliance with those conditions. In some of the petitions before us there is an averment that the conditions precedent recited in the Order did not exist in fact. In order to clear the position, we sent for the original records of the State Government on the basis of which the order was made. We find from the several reports and other notes contained in those records that the agitation of the workmen belonging to the industry had reached serious proportions and strikes were threatened in case the recommendations of the Central wage Report were not implemented. In the circumstances, it appeared necessary to make an order granting immediate relief to maintain public order and avoid disturbances and to ensure the continued supply of services essential to the life of the community and the maintenance of employment Therefore, we are satisfied that the State Government did apply its mind deciding to make the order and that it did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in passing the Order. The State Government considered that an emergency had arisen calling for the making of the order, and the material shows that it could have reasonably come to such a conclusions 22. The State Government considered that an emergency had arisen calling for the making of the order, and the material shows that it could have reasonably come to such a conclusions 22. It is also urged that the State Government has omitted to consider, when giving effect to the recommendations of the Central Wage Board that its Report was signed by three members only and that the remaining members dissented from it. and that, therefore it could not be considered as a Report by the entire Board. It seems to us that it was for the State Government to decide whether or not the recommendations contained in the Report should be adopted and enforced. This Court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of that decision so long as the well accepted principles of industrial law are not shown to have been violated. 23. The third contention is also rejected. 24. The fourth contention is that when making the Order, the State Government did not take into account the paying capacity of the industry. It is urged that having regard to the principles now well settled, by the Supreme Court in Express Newspaper Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 SC 578. Lipton Ltd. v. Their Employees, A.I.R. 1959 SC 676 and Standard Vacuum Refining Co. v. Its Workmen, A.I.R. 1961 SC 895 this basic requirement of a Wage structure prescribing a fair wage is wanting in the present case. There was considerable debate before us on this contention. We are of opinion that this requirement has infact been considered. The impugned order has been made on the basis of the Central Wages Report, and that Report appears to have taken into account the paying capacity of the industry. Chapter VI of the Report is devoted to that consideration. From the outset, the Board set about ascertaining from employers and their organisations particulars relating to this aspect of the matter. As appears from Paragraph 1.11 of the Report, nearly 4,000 copies of a questionnaire were issued. Out of them only 217 undertakings sent replies. The response of the industry to the questionnaire was poor. From the outset, the Board set about ascertaining from employers and their organisations particulars relating to this aspect of the matter. As appears from Paragraph 1.11 of the Report, nearly 4,000 copies of a questionnaire were issued. Out of them only 217 undertakings sent replies. The response of the industry to the questionnaire was poor. In paragraph 6.9 of the Report the Board states "Even out of the small number very few furnished the financial data in the shape of balance sheet etc., specially, ; though the Board had requested for such data." The Board found it difficult to draw any definite conclusion from the financial data so received, which was also hardly representative, and, therefore, it came to the opinion that no analysis of the financial position of the industry could be attempted on the basis of the replies received. In the circumstances, the Board turned to other material before it, including the studies made by the Reserve Bank of India and by the Association of Indian Trade and Industry, Bombay and upon the data afforded by that material it examined the capacity of the industry to pay. 25. Apart from this, in case the petitioners are of the view that the paying capacity of the Industry has not been considered, it is open to them to raise an industrial dispute and have the matter referred to a Labour Court or Tribunal for, adjudication. The impugned order does not preclude this. It is true that the original proviso to Section 3 has been deleted, but that, in our opinion, makes no difference. 26. The fifth contention is that the Order violates Article 14 of the Constitution:. Public sector undertakings have been excluded from its operation and it is confined to the private sector only. There can be little dispute that the pattern of the wage structure of public sector undertaking should be substantially similar to that of a private sector undertaking, as was pointed out by the Supreme Court in Hindustan Antibiotics v. Workmen, A.I.R. 1967 SC 948. But the question before us is whether in point of fact the position as regards wages prevailing in engineering undertakings of the public sector is substantially the same as that in similar undertakings in the private sector. But the question before us is whether in point of fact the position as regards wages prevailing in engineering undertakings of the public sector is substantially the same as that in similar undertakings in the private sector. If the public sector undertakings have already provided a wage structure guaranteeing a fair wage, there can be no question of extending the order under section 3 (b) to them. The contention is that Article 14 has been violated, but in order to sustain that contention it is necessary that an adequate foundation should be laid in the writ petitions. In our opinion, no such foundation is to be found in the petitions before us. 27-28. The next ground upon which it is said that Article 14 has been infringed proceeds on the distinction maintained between the Kanpur region and the remaining regions of the State. It is urged that Ghaziabad and Meerut are two regions which compare with the Kanpur region as regards engineering undertakings, and there was no reason for prescribing a heavier burden in the case of the Kanpur region. Here again, the data contained in the writ petitions is insufficient for inferring that the conditions obtaining in the Ghaziabad and Meerut regions substantially compare with those existing in the Kanpur region. Indeed, the Central Wage Board specifically considered Kanpur as an engineering centre of such significance as to merit special consideration. That is clear from paragraph 7.47 and the paragraphs which follow in its Report. 29. It is further urged that there is no basis for discriminating between undertakings situated within the Mahapalika limits of Kanpur and those situated immediately outside those limits. Again, it is not possible to say that the petitioners have shown that the conditions prevailing between the two classes of undertakings are substantially the same. Prima facie, it seems obvious that the conditions operating within the limits of the Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika call for higher wages than outside it. Further, it was necessary to demarcate the extent of the Kanpur region for the purpose of clearly indicating the application of the wage structure relating to it. and in adopting the limits of the Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika for that purpose it cannot be said that an unreasonable norm has been adopted. We are unable to hold that upon the grounds on which the petitioners rely Article 14 has been contravened. 30. and in adopting the limits of the Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika for that purpose it cannot be said that an unreasonable norm has been adopted. We are unable to hold that upon the grounds on which the petitioners rely Article 14 has been contravened. 30. The sixth contention is that the order should have attempted a more detailed classification between different regions in the State. In our opinion, the degree of classification is a matter to be determined by the State Government upon considerations which appear to it practical. and expedient, and no valid complaint in that regard can be made to a court; of law unless it can be shown that Article 14 has been infringed. Moreover, the petitioners should have shown from positive data that such a classification was possible. In that, we are of opinion, they have failed. 31. It is said that one of the anomalies which arises as a result of the group classification attempted by the order is that smaller units will be deprived of skilled workmen as they will be attracted to large units paying higher wages. In our opinion, that is not a necessary result. Whether workmen prefer employment in one unit or another is a matter governed by several considerations, a higher salary being only one of them. 32. The seventh contention is that as an order under the Minimum Wages Act already exists in respect of the foundry industry there was no need to provide another wage structure for that industry by the impugned order. Now, the Central Wages Board was charged with the task of working out a wage structure based on the principles of fair wages. Those principles were set out in the Report of the Committee on Fair Wages. From that Report it is clear that a fair wage was not considered as identical with a minimum wage. While the lower limit of the fair wage had to be the minimum wage, the upper limit was set by what was broadly described as the capacity of the industry to pay. Therefore, although a minimum wage may have been prescribed for the foundry industry, that did not preclude the working out of a-wage structure providing for a fair wage. In Express Newspapers Ltd., A.I.R. 1958 SC 578 (supra) the Supreme Court explained that a fair wage was a mean between a living wage and a minimum wage. Therefore, although a minimum wage may have been prescribed for the foundry industry, that did not preclude the working out of a-wage structure providing for a fair wage. In Express Newspapers Ltd., A.I.R. 1958 SC 578 (supra) the Supreme Court explained that a fair wage was a mean between a living wage and a minimum wage. Consequently, the order made under Section 3(b). inasmuch as it makes provision for a fair wage, does not cover the same area as an order prescribing a minimum wage under the Minimum Wages Act. The seventh contention is rejected. 33. The eighth contention is that the Order defeats itself inasmuch as its provisions are so burdensome that their implementation would result in the closure of a number of undertakings belonging to the industry. The averments contained in the writ petitions in regard to this &contention provide insufficient material for coming to that conclusion. The burden lay upon the petitioners to show that the enforcement of the recommendations of the Central Wages Board was beyond the capacity of the undertakings to pay and would result in their closure. 34. The petitioners urge also that the dearness allowance provided under the impugned Order is not in conformity with the principles laid down in Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Its Workmen, A.I.R. 1969 SC 360. This contention is not supported by the material on the record. There is nothing before us to establish that the dearness allowance exceeds the amount necessary to neutralise a reasonable portion of the rise in the cost of living, that it has no relation to the industry-cum-region principle and that the additional financial burden on the employer resulting from the Order would be unreasonable. 35. Apart from this as we have already said, it is still open to the petitioners to raise an industrial dispute in the matter and have the dispute agitated before an industrial tribunal of labour which by its very nature provides a more appropriate forum than the extrodinary jurisdiction of this Court conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution. 36. The ninth contention is that the order is in conflict with Articles 38 and 43 of the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in Part IV of the Constitution. We have no jurisdiction to enforce those Directive Principles. Article 37 clearly states that the provisions contained in Part IV shall not be enforceable by any Court. 36. The ninth contention is that the order is in conflict with Articles 38 and 43 of the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in Part IV of the Constitution. We have no jurisdiction to enforce those Directive Principles. Article 37 clearly states that the provisions contained in Part IV shall not be enforceable by any Court. 37. The tenth contention is that the State Government was bound to consult the industry before making the Order. As we have already shown, the Order itself proceeds on the recommendations made by the Central Wage Board. The Board issued a questionnaire to a large number of undertakings. Apparently, there was no lack of attempt on the part of the Board to secure the co-operation of the industry in the task before it. The industry is in no position to complain, specially when its response was extremely poor, only about 5.4% of its units having replied to the questionnaire. Apart from this, nowhere does law require that the State Government should consult the employers before making an order under I Section 3 (b). It is very natural, the I power is of an emergent character and the Legislature could never have contemplated that before an order is made under Section 3 (b) for meeting an emergency ail the interests affected by it must be consulted, The tenth contention is rejected. 38. The eleventh contention is that Section 3 (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act delegates legislative power. The point is concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in Swadeshi Cotton Mills, A.I.R. 1961 SC 1381 (supra) against the petitioners. 39. Finally, it is urged in Writ petition No. 4353 of 1970 that the petitioner's undertaking does not fall within the scope of the impugned order because the undertaking manufactures musical instruments and, it is said a musical instrument is not an engineering product. It is difficult to appreciate how that submission is competent at this stage. Nowhere does the order declare that it applies to an undertaking manufacturing musical instruments. If any steps are taken to enforce the order against the petitioner, it will be open to it to raise this objection and, then if the situation so warrants to apply to this Court for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. 40. In the result, the petitions fail and, are dismissed with costs.