JUDGMENT 1. AN appointment on a vacancy consequent on an under secretary going on leave preparatory to retirement in the office of the Damodar Valley corporation is the subject-matter of challenge in the Writ petition on which the above Rule has been issued. 2. MATERIAL facts are not in dispute. The petitioner is a confirmed Assistant controller of Purchases, a Class I post under the Damodar Valley Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the said corporation). At the relevant time and even now he is at the top of the gradation List. On April 9, 1970 he was duly recommended by the Departmental promotion Committee for promotion to the next higher rank. One of the posts in the promotional rank to which the petitioner may be promoted is that of an under-secretary. One Sri k. P. Singh who was holding the post of an under-secretary went on leave preparatory to retirement on January 5, 1971. In the consequent vacancy the corporation instead of promoting anyone from the administrative branch of services and particularly the petitioner who would have been entitled to such promotion on the recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee passed the following order, "Sri S. R. Sengupta, Under Secretary, should be counted against the post of under-secretary in the Secretariat that will fall vacant consequent on Sri K. P. Singh proceeding on leave preparatory to retirement with effect from 5th january, 1971. Sri R. P. Bose, officiating executive engineer (civil) Chandrapura Thermal power Station (Construction) D. V. C., chandrapura is transferred with immediate effect and posted as officer on special duty in the Secretariat, D. V. C., calcutta on his own pay and pay scale against the post of under-secretary vice sri S. R. Sengupta counted against another post of under secretary as above. "being aggrieved by this order which resulted in denial of an immediate promotion, the petitioner moved this court with the above Writ petition and has prayed for an appropriate Writ for cancellation of the aforesaid order dated January 5, 1971. Petitioner's grievance is two fold. "being aggrieved by this order which resulted in denial of an immediate promotion, the petitioner moved this court with the above Writ petition and has prayed for an appropriate Writ for cancellation of the aforesaid order dated January 5, 1971. Petitioner's grievance is two fold. In the first place, it is claimed in paragraph 16 of the writ petition that the impugned order dated January 5, 1971 made in disregard of the recommendations of the departmental Promotion committee, is violative of the rules of procedure regarding recruitment laid down in a manual known as, "job, description and Classification List." The second grievance of the petitioner is that the impugned order has been passed arbitrarily and malafide to deprive the petitioner of his right to promotion to the post of an undersecretary by circumventing the recommendation of the Departmental promotion Committee and in disregard of Regulation 14 of the Damodar valley Corporation Service Regulations (hereinafter referred to as "service regulations". These are also the two points which have been seriously pressed at the hearing by Mr. Bagchi who is appearing in support of this rule. 3. THE Rule is being contested by all the respondents. Two affidavits have been filed one by the Respondent no. 3 for and on behalf of the respondents 1, 2 and 3 and another by respondent No. 4. Respondent No. 4 is the executive Engineer who has been appointed a Special Officer against the disputed vacancy by the order impugned in this Rule. According to the respondents there has been no violation of any of Regulations whatsoever. It is further claimed that the "job, description and Classification Last" is not a manual nor is it a regulation framed under the statute of incorporation. According to the respondents the "job, description and Classification List" is nothing but a compilation of administrative instructions issued from time to time by different authorities. It confers neither any legal right nor does it impose any statutory obligation. Further according to the respondents the provisions of this list have also not been infringed in any manner. According to the respondents the "job, description and Classification List" is nothing but a compilation of administrative instructions issued from time to time by different authorities. It confers neither any legal right nor does it impose any statutory obligation. Further according to the respondents the provisions of this list have also not been infringed in any manner. Respondents have strongly denied and disputed the suggestion that the impugned order was not passed bonafide or was passed out of any motive as suggested by the petitioner according to them as some executive Engineers (Civil) became surplus on the progress of the work of construction, it was considered necessary to absorb such surplus engineers suitably in the interest of the administration and it is only in furtherance of such a decision that respondent No. 4 was appointed a special officer in the manner set out in the order quoted hereinbefore. Mr. Mukherjee appearing for the respondents has on these pleadings contested each of the points pressed by Mr. Bagchi. 4. I shall deal with the points raised by Mr. Bagchi in the same order they have been raised but in dealing with the first point I shall also deal with the question as to whether the impugned order violates Regulation 14 or any other regulation of the said service Regulations. According to Mr. Bagchi the "job, Description and Classification list" broadly classifies services under the Corporation into three heads viz., (1) general administrative services, (2) engineering services and (3) scientific services. Both the posts of an assistant Controller of Purchases as also of an under-secretary are posts in general and administrative services. On the other hand, the posts of executive and other engineers belong to the engineering services. This would be evident by the classifications made in the "job, Description and Classification List". Chapter 3 of the Job, Description and Classification list provides that recruitment to the post of an undersecretary is to be made: "(1) By transfer of officers of parallel level in general services, (2) By promotion from Assistant secretaries on selection basis. (3) By borrowing from Government." Mr. Chapter 3 of the Job, Description and Classification list provides that recruitment to the post of an undersecretary is to be made: "(1) By transfer of officers of parallel level in general services, (2) By promotion from Assistant secretaries on selection basis. (3) By borrowing from Government." Mr. Bagchi by way of a contradistinction has drawn my attention to the provisions in this very list for recruitment to the post of a Deputy controller of Purchases which is same in rank as that of an under secretary to show that recruitment to the post of a Deputy Controller can be made by transfer of an Executive Engineer which is not permitted in the case of an under secretary. Mr. Bagchi at the same time relies on Regulations 9 and 14 of the said Service Regulations framed under section 60 of the Damodar Valley corporation Act, 1948. Regulation 9 provides that recruitment to the services of the Corporation shall be made by (a) direct appointment or (b) promotion of persons already in the service of the Corporation or (c) borrowing from Government. Regulation 14 provides that promotion shall be made on merits and in case of promotion to class I it shall be made ordinarily after considering the recommendations of the departmental Promotion Committee. Relying on these regulations Mr. Bagchi contends that the corporation could not have appointed respondent No. 4, an Executive Engineer, to the post of an under secretary and that too in violation of the aforesaid regulations. Mr. Mukherjee appearing for the respondents has however raised a very fundamental objection that neither the rules incorporated in the "job, Description and classification List" nor the said Service Regulations are statutory in force and as such even if there had been any violation of such rules or regulations there can be no writ issued by this court either for setting aside the order so passed or for enforcement of any obligation thereunder. According to mr. Mukherjee neither the Rules nor the Regulations impose any statutory obligation nor do they create any legal right in favour of the petitioner. 5. IN considering this objection the two sets of regulations viz. "job, Description and classification List" and the said Service Regulations have to be considered separately as they stand entirely on different footing. According to mr. Mukherjee neither the Rules nor the Regulations impose any statutory obligation nor do they create any legal right in favour of the petitioner. 5. IN considering this objection the two sets of regulations viz. "job, Description and classification List" and the said Service Regulations have to be considered separately as they stand entirely on different footing. The "job, description and Classification List is not a regulation framed by the Corporation in exercise of its regulation making powers. There is very doubt as to whether all the rules incorporated herein were framed by the Corporation itself. It is a compilation of administrative decisions or instructions issued either by the Corporation or its subordinate authorities for guiding the usual and routine administration particularly in reference to recruitment to various posts under the Corporation. As a matter of fact Mr. Bagchi himself has fairly conceded that rules incorporated herein cannot be strictly said to be statutory or having any statutory force. In my view it would not be beyond the powers of the Corporation in an appropriate case to deviate from the requirements of this "job, Description and classification List" inasmuch as every administrative decision or instruction can be varied in its application to a particular case so long as the authority making the decision or issuing the instruction bonafide and reasonably considers such deviation to be necessary. This being the position, even if it be conceded for a moment that the disputed appointment of respondent No. 4 is in deviation of the provisions of this "job, description and Classification List" still the petitioner would not be entitled to any relief as prayed for of having an appropriate writ from this court setting aside the said order This is my conclusion on an assumption that the impugned order is in deviation of the provisions of the "job, Description and classification List" but on my finding recorded hereinafter I am unable to accept this position either. 6. MR. Mukherjee's objection that the said Service Regulations are not statutory in character however raises a very delicate issue. Obviously, Mr. Mukherjee relies on the two recent decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of (1) Indian Air Lines Corporation v. Sukdeo Rai 1971 (1) L. L. J. 496 and (2) U. P. State Warehousing Corporation ltd. v. Tyagi 1970 (2) S. C. R. 250. Obviously, Mr. Mukherjee relies on the two recent decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of (1) Indian Air Lines Corporation v. Sukdeo Rai 1971 (1) L. L. J. 496 and (2) U. P. State Warehousing Corporation ltd. v. Tyagi 1970 (2) S. C. R. 250. In both the aforesaid cases no doubt the Supreme Court held that regulations framed under the relevant provisions of the statute of incorporation had not the force of law. Those regulations only provide for terms and conditions which would govern true relationship between the Corporation and its employees. It was held that though made under the powers conferred by the statute such regulations do not constitute any statutory restriction on the powers of the Corporation. Strongly relying on these decisions Mr. Mukherjee contends that the Service regulations now under consideration similarly framed should not be interpreted to impose any statutory restriction on the powers of the Corporation or cast any statutory obligation on it. Mr. Bagchi on the other hand, strongly relies on the provisions of section 60 of the Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948 where under these service regulations were framed. According to Mr. Bagchi on the decision of the Supreme court in the case of (3) Rajasthan state Electricity Board v. Mohanlal (1967) 3 S. C. R. 377 the Damodar valley Corporation cannot but be considered to be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution as a part of the sovereign powers of the State is vested in the Corporation. Then again section 60 of the statute of incorporation unmistakably invests a part of legislative powers in the Corporation that the regulations framed thereunder would supplement the law. The relevant provisions of the statute of incorporation in the present case are in this respect materially different from those under consideration by the Supreme court in the cases above referred to. In my view though there may be such force in the contention of Mr. Bagchi, still the question may have to be considered from a different aspect. Powers of subordinate legislation may have been invested in the Corporation by section 60 but the question is as to whether each and every regulation framed in exercise of such powers irrespective of their character would have statutory force, or, that issue would be dependent on the nature and character of the regulations framed under such powers. Powers of subordinate legislation may have been invested in the Corporation by section 60 but the question is as to whether each and every regulation framed in exercise of such powers irrespective of their character would have statutory force, or, that issue would be dependent on the nature and character of the regulations framed under such powers. Such an issue is of vital importance but on the facts of the present case it would not be necessary for me to decide the issue inasmuch as even if it be assumed that such regulations have statutory force there has been no infringement thereof. As pointed out hereinbefore Regulation 9 relied on by Mr. Bagchi only lays down the method of recruitment and such regulation in no manner restricts the Corporation from appointing an executive Engineer even to the post of an undersecretary. Such restriction may have been on the provisions of "job, Description and classification List" but not on the service regulations. That apart there has been no appointment of an engineer to a post of under secretary. On the facts of the present case it appears that in substance the Corporation has for the time being temporarily abolished the post of an under secretary and has created the post of a Special officer to be manned by the respondent no. 4 to be counted against the post of an under secretary so abolished. There is no dispute that respondent No. 4 as an Executive Engineer held a post same in rank as that of an undersecretary there was really no promotion given to respondent No. 4 but he has been transferred to the post of a special Officer so created. In that way there has been no infringement either of the provisions of Regulation 9 of the service Regulations nor of the provisions regarding recruitment to the post of an under secretary as in the "job, description and Classification List. " the post of the under secretary for the time being stands temporarily abolished in lieu thereof an ex-cadre post of a special officer is created. In my view, it is within the powers of the corporation to do so in carrying on its administration and as such it is also within the powers of the Secretary-cum-General Manager who exercises powers of the Corporation on appropriate delegation to him. In my view, it is within the powers of the corporation to do so in carrying on its administration and as such it is also within the powers of the Secretary-cum-General Manager who exercises powers of the Corporation on appropriate delegation to him. It should be noted that although the impugned order is purported to be one made by the director of Personnel it is really based on an order of the General Manager which had the approval of the Chairman of the Corporation. So far as the petitioner's objection goes to the effect that the impugned order violates Regulation 14 of the Service Regulations i find no merit therein. As pointed out hereinbefore no promotion is being effected to the post of an under secretary in the Class I. One Class I officer of the same rank is being deputed to hold a Special post created against the vacancy as a result of temporary abolishing of the post of an under secretary. Even if it be treated to be an appointment to the post of an under secretary still it would be a transfer of an officer of the same rank and not a promotion which could invoke regulation 14 as aforesaid. The second point raised by Mr. Bagchi is to the effect that the impugned order was not passed bonafide but as passed only to deprive the petitioner of his right to promotion by circumventing the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion committee and the statutory regulations. It is no doubt true that if the petitioner can satisfy the court that he has been maliciously singled out for the purpose of denying him the promotion a writ would lie against the Corporation on the authority of the Supreme court decision in the case of (3) Rajasthan State Electricity Board (supra)but on the facts I find no such case substantiated before met The petitioner has not alleged any particular malice as against him by any particular officer or officers or any particular reason therefore. It may be true that by the impugned order he has been denied the immediate opportunity for a promotion but if that be the result of a bonafide administrative decision there is no scope for this court to intervene. It may be true that by the impugned order he has been denied the immediate opportunity for a promotion but if that be the result of a bonafide administrative decision there is no scope for this court to intervene. Here on the facts I have no manner of doubt that the respondent corporation adopted the procedure disputed in this case only to accommodate a surplus civil engineer and in furtherance of a policy, bonafide adopted, of accommodating surplus civil engineers of the Corporation. That civil engineers have become surplus on gradual progress of the construction work has not been denied. What has however been contended by bagchi is that if the respondent No. 4 was really surplus he being only an officiating executive engineer should have been reverted to the substantive lower rank and there can be no justification for accommodating him on the same rank by creating a special post. Further Mr. Bagchi has referred me to the statements made in affidavit-in-reply to the effect that the vacancy consequent on the transfer of Mr. R. P. Basu, the respondent No. 4 had been filled up by promoting an assistant engineer. Therefore, he submits there is no bonafides in adopting the procedure done in the present case and thereby denying opportunity for promotion to the petitioner, So far as the promotion of an assistant engineer is concerned which is referred to for the first time in affidavit-in-reply Mr. Mukherjee has contended that had the relevant document been disclosed by the petitioner it would have been clearly established that a surplus civil engineer who was accommodated so long in a post of an electrical engineer at the Chandrapura-Thermal Power station, has been replaced by an electrical engineer. As for Mr. Bagchi's contention that if surplus, the respondent No. 4 should have been reverted and should not have been transferred to a special post counted against the post of an under-secretary, I am afraid this court has not the jurisdiction to sit over the propriety or otherwise of administrative decisions taken by tie corporation. There might have bean many factors which led the authorities to decide that though officiating, the respondent No. 4 should not be re-vested. There might have bean many factors which led the authorities to decide that though officiating, the respondent No. 4 should not be re-vested. I have no manner of doubt that the decision was taken bonafide and once i come to this conclusion I have no jurisdiction to question the wisdom of the authorities in coming to such a decision. In this view I find no substance in the second point raised by Mr. Bagchi. As both the points raised by Mr. Bagchi fail the application fails. The Rule is discharged. There will be no order for costs.