( 1 ) IN all these five cases the question that arises for consideration is whether the Sub Inspector of Police, Honavar, is competent to prosecute the petitioners for not having obtained the licence for running tea shops and a biscuit shop, which is punishable under S. 16 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). ( 2 ) NARASIMHA Govind Kamath (Petitioner in Crrp. 205/1971), Ganapathi vithoba Shet (Petitioner in Crrp. 206/1971) Ramakant Anant Shanbhag (Petitioner Crrp. 207/1971) Nilabal Vasudev Shet (Petitioner in crrp. 208/1971) and Subraya Nagappa Shet (Petitioner in Crrp. 209/71} were prosecuted on the allegations that except Ramakant (Petitioner in crrp. 207/1971) the others were running tea shops keeping food articles for sale in their respective shops without obtaining a licence for the year 1969-70 as required by S. 7 (iii) of the Act read with S. 50 (1) of the Act and thereby committed an offence punishable under S. 16 (1) of the Act. Ramakant Anant Shanbhag (Petitioner in Crrp. 207/71) was prosecuted for a similar offence for running a shop in which he was selling biscuita and other foodstuffs, in the Court of the Additional Judicial Magistrate, first Class at Honavar. ( 3 ) IT was objected on behalf of the petitioners that a prosecution under S. 20 of the Act could only be instituted by the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by general or special order of the Central Government or state Government or a local authority and could not be instituted by any other person. The learned Magistrate decided in favour of the petitioners and dismissed the complaints without hearing the evidence. On revision, the learned Sessions Judge, Karwer, in all these cases came to the conclusion that the Sub Inspector of Police was competent to prosecute the petitioners and in that view he directed the learned Magistrate to dispose of the cases as if they had been filed by the competent authority and according to law. These revision petitions are filed by the petitioners against the decisions of the learned Sessions Judge at Karwar. ( 4 ) THE offence is created by S. 4 of the Act and S. 20 points out how it is to be prosecuted. Section 20 of the Act provides:"20 (1 ). These revision petitions are filed by the petitioners against the decisions of the learned Sessions Judge at Karwar. ( 4 ) THE offence is created by S. 4 of the Act and S. 20 points out how it is to be prosecuted. Section 20 of the Act provides:"20 (1 ). No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority: provided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in section 12 if he produces in court a copy of the report of the public analyst along with the complaint. " (Sub-section 2 is not necessary ). The provisions of sub-sec. (1) of S. 20 as it now stands, provides that no prosecution for an offence under this Act could be instituted by any person other than the persons or authorities specified therein. The prosecution can be instituted (1) by the Central Government or (2) by the state Government or (3) by a local authority, or (4) by a person with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority, or (5) by a person authorised in this behalf by the central Government or the State Government or a local authority. The proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 20 however provides that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may also be instituted by a purchaser referred to in S. 12 if he produces in Court a copy of the report of the public analyst along with the complaint. Therefore it is clear that a prosecution under this Act must be by one or the other person specified in S. 20 of the Act. The authorities specified in S. 20 or persons authorised by them are competent to prosecute under this Act. A person who has been authorised to prosecute under this Act must therefore necessarily be clothed with the valid sanction by one or the other authorities specified therein. Consequently, it follows that the sanction must be valid. The authorities specified in S. 20 or persons authorised by them are competent to prosecute under this Act. A person who has been authorised to prosecute under this Act must therefore necessarily be clothed with the valid sanction by one or the other authorities specified therein. Consequently, it follows that the sanction must be valid. If the sanction in favour of a person is invalid to prosecute a person under this Act, such prosecution becomes a nullity. It is not necessary that S. 20 of the Act under which prosecution is sanctioned should have been specified. The facts on which the prosecution is based should however be placed before the authority and the authority should apply its mind to them before granting sanction. In substance, it amounts that the competent authority that could prosecute a person as specified in section 20 could itself prosecute a person or authorise a person giving sanction after applying its mind to the facts of the case. If the sanction is valid and if it is in favour of a person, that person alone is competent to prosecute and no one else can prosecute. ( 5 ) IT is true that S. 20 provides that "no prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the central Government or the State Government or a local authoity"; but there are no words prohibiting other persons from taking proceedings. This S. 20 is one of the group of sections headed "enforcement of Act'. It shows that S. 20 provides specifically for prosecution of persons by persons specified therein. I am clearly of the opinion that in cases arising under the Act, persons specified therein only can enforce the provisions of the Act. Certain offences are created by the Act and the Act provides that as to who shall enforce its provisions. If any one can enforce the provisions of the Act, S. 20 becomes useless. I do not think that negative words are required to exclude proceedings by persons other than the persons specified in the section. Certain offences are created by the Act and the Act provides that as to who shall enforce its provisions. If any one can enforce the provisions of the Act, S. 20 becomes useless. I do not think that negative words are required to exclude proceedings by persons other than the persons specified in the section. For instance, if an Act provided that a particular person was to enforce a penalty, no one else could sue for it; it is obvious that if every one could sue for, then the statutory clause enabling him to sue, would be unnecessary and useless. It is made abundantly clear by the proviso to S. 20 wherein an exception is provided for. The exception is only in respect of a purchaser referred to in S. 12 of the Act and under that section he could prosecute a person for any offence under this Act. provided he produces in Court a copy of the report of the public analyst along with the complaint. That proviso abundantly makes it clear that the Legislature intended that persons specified or person authorised by them alone, are competent to enforce the provisions of this Act and no one else The provisions of S. 20 are direct and clear. It seems to me therefore that the words are intelligible and they mean that prosecution could only be instituted by the proper authorities and if any one enforces the provisions of this Act, that would not be competence. It seems to me therefore, that the words of the statute are reasonable and intelligible and whereas if the other meaning is given to them, they would be used in a strange sense and would be superfluous. The only safeguard provided IF. as I could understand, that nobody except the authorities mentioned and the persons empowered by them alone can launch the prosecution. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in K. M. Kanavi v. State of mysore, AIR 1968 SC 1339 , wherein the facts of the case were that one K. M. Kanavi was the President of the Municipal Borough of Gadag-Betgeri from 11th january 1960 to 15th March 1963. He was removed from the Presidenship on 15th March 1963 by an order passed by the Government of Mysore for neglect of duty and incapacity. He was removed from the Presidenship on 15th March 1963 by an order passed by the Government of Mysore for neglect of duty and incapacity. On the next day, i. e. , on 10th March, 1963, the Government passed an order superseding the Borough. K. M. Kanavi filed two writ petitions challenging these two orders of his removal and supersession of the Borough. The order of supersession was quashed by this Court. Thereafter, elections were held for the office of the President, because the appellant (K. M. Kanavi) had ceased to be the president under the order of removal One other person was elected as the President of the Borough on 22nd April, 1963. On 25th April, 1963 the new President asked K. M. Kanavi to hand over all the papers, documents and property belonging to the Municipal Administration. On 2nd May 1963 K. M. Kanavi sent three keys and two files of papers by registered parcel to the new President. The new President returned it on the ground that those articles had not been delivered to him in person by K. M. Kanavi. When sending the parcel, K. M. Kanavi had written to the new President stating that he was retaining certain papers as they were needed by him for his writ petition. Thereafter, the Slate Government made an order under sub-sec. (2) of 23a of the Bombay Municipal boroughs Act, 1925 directing K. M. Kanavi to hand over charge of all the papers and properties which were in his possession. He was also asked to hand over an iron cup-board with its keys and contents which were with him. K. M. Kanavi did not comply with this order. Therefore, the Government of Mysore sent an order to the Divisional Commissioner directing him to take necessary action under S. 23a of the Bombay Municipal boroughs Act to prosecute K. M. Kanavi. The Divisional Commissioner in turn, wrote to the Deputy Commissioner requesting him to take immediate action to prosecute K. M. Kanavi. The Deputy Commissioner then passed an order authorising the newly decided President of the Borough to be the formal complainant in reject of this prosecution and to file a criminal complaint against K. M. Kanavi. Therefore the new President filed a complaint against K. M. Kanavi for an offence punishable under s. 23a (3) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act. The Deputy Commissioner then passed an order authorising the newly decided President of the Borough to be the formal complainant in reject of this prosecution and to file a criminal complaint against K. M. Kanavi. Therefore the new President filed a complaint against K. M. Kanavi for an offence punishable under s. 23a (3) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act. On the basis of this complaint, K. M. Kanavi was convicted. One of the grounds urged was that the new President was incompetent to file a complaint as it was not filed in accordance with the procedure laid down and so the proceedings taken by the Magistrate were without jurisdiction. Dealing with this question, this is what the Supreme Court observed:"it is true that there is no specific provision in the Act laying down that cognizance of an offence under the Act is not to be taken except on a complaint filed in accordance with a direction made under s. 200 (1) but the scheme of the Act and purpose of this provision in s. 200 (1) makes it clear that the legislature intended that such proceedings s should only be instituted In the manner laid down in that sub-section. The word 'may' was used only because the legislature could not have enacted a mandatory provision requiring the Standing committee or the Chief Officer to make a direction for institution of proceedings in all cases. This word" was intended to give a discretion to the Standing Committee or the Chief Officer to make directions for taking proceedings only when they considered it appropriate that such a direction should be made and to avoid compelling the Standing Committe or the Chief Officer to make such directions in all cases. The use of this word 'may' cannot be interpreted as laying down that, if a proceeding for punishment of any person for contravention of any of the provisions of the Act is to be instituted, it can be instituted in any manner without complying with the requirements of S. 200 (1) of the Act. "in those circumstances the Supreme Court held that the complaint filed not by a Standing Committee but by the President was illegal. Earlier the Supreme Court in Ballabhadas Agarwala v. J. C. Chakravarthy, AIR 1960 SC 576 had to interpret a similar provision i. e. S. 537 of the Calcutta Municipal act, 1923. "in those circumstances the Supreme Court held that the complaint filed not by a Standing Committee but by the President was illegal. Earlier the Supreme Court in Ballabhadas Agarwala v. J. C. Chakravarthy, AIR 1960 SC 576 had to interpret a similar provision i. e. S. 537 of the Calcutta Municipal act, 1923. It laid down that the Commissioner may institute defend or withdraw from legal procedings under that Act or under any rule or bye-law made thereunder. The Court held that, though the word used was 'may', this provision must be read as requiring that the institution or withdrawal from legal proceedings under that Act must be by the Commissioner and no other authority. ( 6 ) IT seems to me therefore, that the authorities mentioned in S. 20 can only launch proceedings against persons charged with an offence under the Act. The principle laid down in the above cases clearly applies to the interpretation of S. 20 of the Act with which I am concerned. On this view, it must be held that the complaint, in the present case, which was instituted by the Sub Inspector of Police of Honavar, without any order or direction from the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority as the case may be or a person authorised in this behalf by a general or special order by the three agencies mentioned in that section, was not competent as it did not comply with the requirements of S. 20 (1) of the Act. ( 7 ) IT was contended by Shri Lakshmeshwar learned Counsel on behalf of the State that the offence being cognizable by the police, the sub Inspector of Police was competent to prosecute the petitioners in question on the complaint of the Food Inspector who had been authorised by the Municipal Authorities, to prosecute them. The person who had been authorised to prosecute the petitioners in this case was the Food inspector and not the Sub Inspector of Police. The question is not whether the offence committed under the Act is cognizable or not. The question is whether who could prosecute any person under the Act for violating any of the provisions therein. To prosecute is to set the law in motion and the law is only set in motion by an appeal to some person clothed with judicial authority in regard to the matter in question. The question is whether who could prosecute any person under the Act for violating any of the provisions therein. To prosecute is to set the law in motion and the law is only set in motion by an appeal to some person clothed with judicial authority in regard to the matter in question. The food Inspector was competent in this case to prosecute the petitioners as he had been authorised generally or specifically to prosecute the petitioners under the Act. He has no authority to delegate his powers in favour of another person to prosecute the petitioners. The Municipal council in the instant case, having not authorised the Sub Inspector of police of Honavar to prosecute the petitioners, the Sub Inspector of Police was not competent to prosecute them under the Act and in this view the complaint filed by him was liable to be dismissed. The learned Magistrate has taken the correct view of the law. ( 8 ) FOR the reasons stated above, disagreeing with the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge, Karwar, I set aside the judgment passed by him and confirm the order passed by the learned Magistrate, Honavar. --- *** --- .