JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - The Petitioner is being prosecuted for an offence u/s 376, Indian Penal Code and the matter is still in the commitment stage. 2. The prosecution has alleged that on the night of 15-8-1968 the Petitioner committed rape on the victim at Netaji Hotel, Parlakemidi. The victim was an employee of the Nabajiban Mandal at the relevant time. First Information Report was lodged on 134-1969 about eight months after the occurrence at R. Udayagiri Police Station. The charge-sheet was submitted on 13-6-1970 when cognizance was taken. In the committing Court two of the prosecution witnesses were examined on 31-8-1970 and the third witness was examined on 14-9-1970 while the fourth one was examined on 21-10-1970. The victim (p.w. 1) admitted in her deposition that during the period of her service she was submitting a monthly tour diary to the Angul Office. That diary disclosed the places of her visit with reference to the period of stay. She asserted that she claimed her traveling expenses for having visited Parlakemidi on 15-8-1968 and this was asked for in the claim of T.A. for September, 1668. The stand of the accused seems to be that p.w. 1 was not at Parlakemedi on the relevant day. After the fourth prosecution witness was examined an application was made by the Petitioner for summoning some of the charge-sheet witnesses and in particular witness No. 11, one Rusi Behera who was shown in the charge-sheet as the General Secretary of the Utkal Nabajiban Mandal at Angul. The Petitioner was interested in causing production of the tour diary of p.w. 1 for the month of August, 1968. The committing Magistrate by his order dated 2-11-1970 came to hold, In the circumstances if the tour diary of p.w. 1 being produced by the witness Rusi Behera will reveal that the victim lady was present at Atarsingh on 15-8-1968 the evidence of all the witnesses examined and specially the evidence of p.w. 2 cannot be disbelieved relying only on the endorsement made in the tour diary of p.w. 1. Therefore, the evidence of Rusi Behera cannot be utilized in favour of the accused at this stage. Besides that there will be long delay in this enquiry and delay will not serve he purpose of the accused. Therefore, the evidence of Rusi Behera cannot be utilized in favour of the accused at this stage. Besides that there will be long delay in this enquiry and delay will not serve he purpose of the accused. In the conclusion I find that the witness Rusi Behera is neither a witness to the Actual commission of the offence nor a principal witness not any other witness who can be able to throw light on the prosecution case and as such the evidence of this Rusi Behera is not necessary at this stage in the interest of justice and specially in the interest of the accused. The request of the Petitioner was thus rejected. This revision is directed against the aforesaid order of the learned Magistrate refusing to summon Rusi Behera at that stage. 3. Admittedly to this enquiry Section 207-A, Code of Criminal Procedure applies. Sub-section (4) of that section provides, The Magistrate shall then proceed to take the evidence of such person, if any, as may be produced by the prosecution BS witnesses to the Actual commission of the offence alleged; and if the Magistrate is of opinion that it is necessary in the interests of justice to take the evidence of anyone or more of the other witnesses for the prosecution, he may take such evidence also. The scope of this sub-section has come for determination in a series of cases both before the High Courts as also the Supreme Court. The requirements of this sub-section have normally been divided into two parts. Firstly, the mandate given to the Magistrate to take evidence of such persons as may be produced by the prosecution as witnesses to the Actual commission of the offence alleged. In respect of this requirement the Magistrate seems to have no option and an obligation is cast by statute to receive evidence of such witnesses. The second portion of the sub-section confers discretion in the Magistrate to receive such further evidence as in his opinion appears to be in the interests of justice. Primarily and directly, the second part lays no obligation at all, but only confers a power and a discretion on the Magistrate to examine on his own account witnesses other than those examined by the prosecution if he considers it to be in the interests of justice to do so. In Kirpal Singh Vs. Primarily and directly, the second part lays no obligation at all, but only confers a power and a discretion on the Magistrate to examine on his own account witnesses other than those examined by the prosecution if he considers it to be in the interests of justice to do so. In Kirpal Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh to which the learned Magistrate has made reference their Lordships interpreted the scope of this sub-section. In clear terms they indicated that a discretion was conferred upon the Magistrate in the matter of examination of witnesses not produced by the prosecutor. Exercise of that discretion must be judicial and not to be guided by any set of rules or standards, but must be adjusted in the light of circumstances of each case. Their Lordships further said that the Magistrate was not to be guided by the attitude of the prosecutor. On the other hand, it was his duty to examine all such witnesses as may be produced by the prosector as witnesses to the Actual commission of the offence alleged, but his duty did not end with such examination. The Magistrate must, however, apply his mind to the documents referred to in Section 173, and the testimony of witnesses, if any, produced by the prosecutor and examined, and consider whether in the interest of justice it is necessary to record the evidence of other witnesses. 4. The object of the committal proceeding is mainly two fold: (i) that the accused may have ample notice of the matter for which he is going to be tried and of the main evidence by which the prosecutor would go to prove his case so that the accused may be fully prepared for his defence at the trial; and (ii) that the Court of sessions may not be unnecessarily burdened with the task of conducting trials for serious offences where there may be really no reasonable grounds for conviction of the accused. This being the real basis for providing the procedure of commitment, Courts have taken the view that the committing Magistrate is not a post Office. While it is true that he is not to try the offence it is equally true that he is not 8 mere machine who is to dispatch the accused persons for trial by commitment for any charge placed before him. While it is true that he is not to try the offence it is equally true that he is not 8 mere machine who is to dispatch the accused persons for trial by commitment for any charge placed before him. Therefore, it certainly becomes necessary for forming a judicial impression as to whether there would be reasonable grounds for conviction of the accused if he is committed, to take into account the material aspects of the prosecution case. 5. The second part of Sub-section (4) of Section 207A, Code of Criminal Procedure obviously confers discretion upon the Magistrate even to examine witnesses giving circumstantial evidence. As I have already indicated, the order of commitment without examining witnesses giving circumstantial evidence may not be allowed to be assailed as bad in law; but it is a very different matter to say that The committing Magistrate would not be acting with impropriety if in a given case he excludes such evidence from being placed before him in order to give him a fair assessment of the prosecution case in order to reach the conclusion as to whether if be commits There would be reasonable chance for conviction of The accused in the trial Court. In Abdul Aiz v. State 1963 (1) Cri.L.J. 513, the Allahabad High Court was of the view that the Magistrate should exercise his discretion under Sub-section (4) in favour of summoning and examining a witness whose production even at the commitment stage would go to show that the prosecution case was wholly frivolous and There would be no scope for conviction if any commitment is made. 6. In the present case the place of rape is indicated to be inside a hotel located at Parlakemedi. The date of occurrence is available. It has been admitted by the prosecutrix that she has submitted T.A. particulars showing her presence at Parlakemidi on that date. The stand of the accused is that if the T.A. particulars are produced they would show that p.w. 1 was not at Parlakemidi on that date. Production of such document has certainly a considerable bearing on the point with reference to the stand of the defence. After that evidence is produced what would be its effect in the matter of a total assessment of the evidence particularly in the setting of the evidence of p.w. 2 is a matter for the learned Magistrate to assess. Production of such document has certainly a considerable bearing on the point with reference to the stand of the defence. After that evidence is produced what would be its effect in the matter of a total assessment of the evidence particularly in the setting of the evidence of p.w. 2 is a matter for the learned Magistrate to assess. But it would indeed be an Act of impropriety to say without knowing what that evidence would be that on the basis of such evidence which may be received through Rusi Behera the evidence of p.w. 2 cannot be disbelieved. 7. The learned Standing Counsel contended that in the scheme of enquiry u/s 207-A, Code of Criminal Procedure there is no room for any defence to be taken into account. That is why the schemes u/s 208 and under this section have been made different by the Parliament. Sub-section (1) of Section 208, Code of Criminal Procedure casts an obligation on the committing Magistrate to receive the evidence of the accused while Section 207-A, Code of Criminal Procedure does not speak of any defence evidence. The difference in the two sections is clear. Yet as a proposition of law that the Magistrate in seisin of a proceeding u/s 207-A, Code of Criminal Procedure cannot look into the defence of the accused to come to the conclusion which he has to reach when he is about to commit cannot be laid down. 8. Keeping in view the facts of the present case I think it was proper for the learned Magistrate to summon Rusi Behera to produce the document in question. It is true that process might have taken some more time. But it is difficult for me to appreciate that production of the document was not found to be in the interests of The Petitioner. There was absolutely no material on record for the learned Magistrate to come to that conclusion. The Petitioner was pressing for the production of the document through the witness obviously on the footing that if the document came before the learned Magistrate there was possibility of his not being committed. Therefore, the learned Magistrate was not right when he said that production of the document which involved some more time would not be in the interest of the accused. To that extent Mr. Therefore, the learned Magistrate was not right when he said that production of the document which involved some more time would not be in the interest of the accused. To that extent Mr. Mohanty for the Petitioner is certainly right in his criticism of the stand adopted by the learned Magistrate. 9. The learned Magistrate is absolutely correct in his approach that the commitment proceeding should not be delayed. That in fact is the clear intention of the Parliament in making the amendment. But it cannot be overlooked that when there is a competition between quick disposal and interest of justice the latter must prevail. It would be the duty of a Court to keep in view the ultimate purpose of the existence of the judicial system which is dispensation of justice and keeping the goal in view expedition must always be attempted. There should not be any instance where the cause of justice would be sacrificed in order that the legislative intention of expediting the disposal of the proceeding should be given effect to Justice is the ultimate aim and early disposal is the mandate of the procedure. 10. In view of what I have, said above I think it appropriate to vacate the order of the learned Magistrate dated 2-11-1970 and call upon him to require production of the document in question by summoning the witness. He shall be alive to his responsibility of quick disposal of the proceeding and take due care to see that the matter is not further delayed. The revision is allowed.