ORDER K. Sadasivan, J. 1. This petition filed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeks the quashing of the proceedings pending before the Executive First Class Magistrate, Perintalmanna in M.C. 2 of 1971 under section 145 (1) of the Cr. P.C. 2. R.S. 361/5 in two taks measuring 34x15, and 13x26 (6ft. koles) is alleged to have belonged in Panayam right to deceased Thurumbath Kunhali. The 1st petitioner obtained an oral lease from kunhali and is stated to be in possession and enjoyment of this property as a cultivating tenant. The 2nd and 3rd petitioners who are the sons of the first petitioner, help him in the cultivation. After the death of Kunhali his rights devolved on Thurumbath Aliyammu and others. For reliefs under section 72 of the Land Reforms Act 1 of 1964 the 1st petitioner moved in O.A. 325 of 1970 for purchase of the landlord's rights. When Aliyammu and others came to know of it, they filed O.S. 179 of 1970 before the Munsiff's Court, Tirur, claiming that they are in possession and stating that the 1st petitioner is threatening to trespass into tak 2(13x26). Injunction was prayed for against his entry into the property. I.A. 2029 of 1970 was moved for an interim order, but the petition was not allowed. Then the 2nd respondent Syed Alavi filed O.S. 192 of 1970 with respect to the 1st tak for injunction and other reliefs. He succeeded in getting an ex parte injunction but that also was later vacated by order dated 3rd November 1970. Both the suits are now pending and appeals filed against the dismissal of the interim applications (C.M.A.Nos. 77 and 78 of 1970) are also pending in the Subordinate Judge's Court, Tirur. 3. On 7th November 1970 2nd respondent Alavi filed C.C. 1674 of 1970 against the present petitioners and two others in the Sub-Magistrate's Court, Tirur, alleging theft and mischief in respect of the crops raised in the property. That case is also now pending. In the mean time, the Sub Inspector of Police, Kattipparuthi submitted a report before the Executive First Class Magistrate stating that disputes over the possession of the property have arisen between the parties which are likely to result in a breach of the peace. That case is also now pending. In the mean time, the Sub Inspector of Police, Kattipparuthi submitted a report before the Executive First Class Magistrate stating that disputes over the possession of the property have arisen between the parties which are likely to result in a breach of the peace. Learned Magistrate called for a report of the Dy.S.P, Tirur, who also reported that a breach of the peace is imminent and recommended the taking of steps under section 145(1) of the Cr. P.C. On the 11th of March 1971 the learned Executive First Class Magistrate started proceedings by attaching the property and putting it in the charge of the Village Officer, Edayoor. It is to quash this order of the learned Magistrate that the present Criminal Miscellaneous Petition has been preferred. The case of the petitioners is that possession of the property has been adjudged in their favour in the Civil Court's order and that being the case, the present proceedings in M. C. 2 of 1971 are irnproper and are an abuse of the process of the Court, and have to be quashed. The question therefore for consideration is whether the learned Executive First Class Magistrate is justified in initiating proceedings under section 145(1) of the Cr. P.C. in the circumstances of the case. 4. Section 145 of the Cr. P.C. is attracted whenever the District Magistrate, Sub Divisional Magistrate, or Magistrate of the First Class is satisfied from a police report or other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within the local limits of his jurisdiction. The scope of the word 'dispute' in the section has come up for judicial consideration many a time and it has been held: "that the term 'dispute' means a reasonable dispute, a bona fide dispute, a dispute between parties who have each some semblance of right or supposed right." (Field, J. in Gobinda Chunder Moitra's case). The scope of the word 'dispute' in the section has come up for judicial consideration many a time and it has been held: "that the term 'dispute' means a reasonable dispute, a bona fide dispute, a dispute between parties who have each some semblance of right or supposed right." (Field, J. in Gobinda Chunder Moitra's case). Rankin, C. J. posed the query: "Where there has been a decree inter partes determining the question of right but no delivery of possession in execution thereunder, is the jurisdiction under section 145 ousted?" The learned Judge continued: "In point of logic it would seem that a decree deciding the right would be enough, and the language of the judgments in Rai Mohun Roy's case and the Raniganj Coat case is to this effect. Though in the former case there had been delivery of possession, in the latter case no such fact appears from the report. On the other hand the principle involved cannot be said on the authorities to be applicable in the absence of delivery of possession or its equivalent." 5. In the Full Bench case Agni Kumar Das v. Mantazaddin A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 610 above cited, the facts were that the petitioner took a mortgage in 1906 from one Moktar and his wife, and he sued upon it and obtained a decree on the mortgage. The decree was put in execution against Moktar and the heirs of his wife who had died by that time. The execution was allowed against Moktar's interest in the property and that was sold in court auction and purchased by the decree-holder. On the 8th of February 1926 the decree-holder-petitioner, was put in possession in pursuance of the sale. The homestead, however, was not taken possession of. The compound in scattered plots of agricultural land was alone given possession of. The Magistrate in the M. C. proceedings found that Moktar's sons were in possession. The contention of the petitioner was that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take action under section 145 and alternatively, it was contended that he did take such action he was bound in law to find that the applicant was in possession by reason of the delivery of possession given by the civil court on 8th of February 1926, some 15 months before the date of the Magistrate's proceedings. The argument proceeded upon the view that the section refers only to bona fide disputes and not to cases in which the claim on one side is without any rational ground, or is made without any real belief in its validity and that the section is intended to make interim provision until disputes are determined by the civil court and that once the civil court has determined the matter any dispute is at an end, or at all events that there is no more place for a summary order which proceeds not upon title but on mere possession. 6. The principle underlying the argument is that the Magistrate is not to interfere with the execution of a decree in the civil court: "That he is bound to maintain the party in possession who has obtained a decree and recovered possession in execution of that decree. That there would never be an end to litigation if the Magistrate"" will not keep in force the decision of a Civil Court regarding lands." The learned Chief Justice continued to observe: "These expressions will all be found in the judgment in Rai Mohun Roy v. Wise which is the leading case among those relied on by the applicant. In some of the cases, particularly when the decree in question has been passed or affirmed by the High Court, there is a certain amount of embroidery upon this theme which may well be ignored. But there is a reference to Indian condition in the Raniganj Coal Association v. Hem Lall, which may usefully be recalled: If the law were otherwise it would be worth no one's while to go to the trouble and expense of proving title in a regular suit, for the effect of a decree might be to a great extent nullified by parties contriving to get into some kind of possession (which they could easily do in forest lands like those now in question) and then demanding to be retained in possession till a second suit was brought and decided." The learned Chief Justice has held that even in such situations there is scope for dispute of possession. He would observe: "I dissent altogether from the doctrine that the words 'dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace' refer only to bona fide disputes or only to reasonable disputes. He would observe: "I dissent altogether from the doctrine that the words 'dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace' refer only to bona fide disputes or only to reasonable disputes. The first sub-section is concerned with the maintenance of the public peace and with the reality of disputes, the danger of disputes. It matters little to a broken head whether it be broken in good faith or in bad and the Magistrate can have no preference. When he finds from a police report that he must take action, he can hardly be in a position to enter into such question. The section requires him to call for written statements and to enquire only as to the fact of actual possession. The nature of the claim to title may affect the question of fact as to possession, but he is expressly debarred from enquiring into the merits of the claims.. The section is based upon the notion that whether a man has the best or the worst claim in the world he must not take the law into his own hand and so disturb the public peace" Nor, on the other hand, is it clear to me that disputants with mala fide or unreasonable claims are specially amenable to orders for security under section 107. The Magistrate's discretion in such matters must be determined by the facts as a whole . The same considerations seem to me to afford an answer to the contention that once the Civil Court has pronounced upon the right of one party as against another there is no place for an order under section 145 which proceeds upon mere possession. If the party is out of possession and is attempting to retake possession at his own hand forcibly so as to disturb the public peace, I am at a loss to know why the Magistrate should not require him to assert his right in the proper way. " Suhrawardy, J. in concurrence with the Chief Justice observed: "Now it cannot be doubted that a decree of the Civil Court must have its due force and it is not desirable that one arm of the law should fight the other. But this is a concern of the legislature and not of Courts, however just and expedient it may seem to avoid such a conflict. But this is a concern of the legislature and not of Courts, however just and expedient it may seem to avoid such a conflict. It is argued that once the difference between the parties on the question of title to the land has been settled by a Civil Court there is no further dispute that remains to be decided under Clause 6 of section 145 and therefore the Magistrate cannot regard such a dispute as one within the section. The logical conclusion from this view is that if a person obtains a decree for recovery of possession in the Civil Court he need only go to the land with some lathials and create a disturbance there and the Magistrate is bound to put in possession, thus acting as the Court of execution of the Civil Court decree. In my opinion the word 'dispute is used in its ordinary sense meaning a disagreement, struggle, scramble or quarrel for possession of land, etc., which is likely to cause a breach of the peace, without reference to the respective claims of the disputants. It is possible that the legislature has not entirely overlooked cases like the present. If the decree-holder or auction-purchaser obtains actual possession through the civil Court or such possession as in the eye of law is equivalent to actual possession and is subsequently dispossessed by the judgment-debtor he can come to the Magistrate within two months under clause (4) and the Magistrate will reinstate him in possession..." 7. In substance, the Full Bench held that the Magistrate has jurisdiction even in cases where the Civil Court has entered, a decision regarding possession, provided there is a dispute of possession between the parties which is likely to result in a breach of peace. It is enough if the Magistrate is subjectively satisfied by police report or otherwise. In the present case, no decree has yet been passed by the Civil Court. The matter is only pending before the Civil Court. The ad interim injunction issued by the Civil Court, was later on vacated and it is against that order that the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal was filed. No order of injunction of course, has been issued from the appellate court. But that does not mean that the opposite party (present petitioners) can walk into the property as if the Civil Court has passed a decree in their favour. No order of injunction of course, has been issued from the appellate court. But that does not mean that the opposite party (present petitioners) can walk into the property as if the Civil Court has passed a decree in their favour. All that the Magistrate is to get satisfied in initiating proceedings under section 145 is that a dispute exists between the parties over possession of the property. "The likelihood of the breach of the peace is sufficient to give the Magistrate jurisdiction and the weight to be attached to a previous order of a civil or criminal Court or of Revenue Officer in land registration case may be a question for the consideration of the Magistrate. There can be no interference with his discretion even if the matter might have been more suitably dealt with under section 107. In such a case however the case ought not to be kept pending for the decision of the application for revision against the previous orders of the land registration case. The Magistrate is bound to receive all such evidence as may be produced." (Gaya Prasad v. Ram Sarober A.I.R. 1934 Patna 471.) In R. H. Bhutani v. Mani J. Desai A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1444 Supreme Court observed: "The object of section 145, no doubt is to prevent breach of peace and for that end to provide a speedy remedy by bringing the parties before the court and ascertaining who of them was in actual possession and to maintain status quo until their rights are determined by a competent court. The section requires that the Magistrate must be satisfied before initiating proceedings that a dispute regarding an immovable property exists and that such dispute is likely to cause breach of peace. But once he is satisfied of these two conditions, the section requires him to pass a preliminary order under sub-section (1) and thereafter to make an enquiry under sub-section (4) and pass a final order under sub-section (6). It is not necessary that at the time of passing the final order the apprehension of breach of peace should continue or exist. The enquiry under section 145 is limited to the question as to who was in actual possession on the date of the preliminary order irrespective of the rights of the parties." In the case on hand the civil dispute of course, is pending decision before the civil court. The enquiry under section 145 is limited to the question as to who was in actual possession on the date of the preliminary order irrespective of the rights of the parties." In the case on hand the civil dispute of course, is pending decision before the civil court. But on that ground it cannot be said that the Magistrate's jurisdiction is ousted. "If a dispute about a certain immovable property is pending before a revenue or a civil court and if one of the parties to that suit moves a Magistrate to take proceedings under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code about the same immovable property which is involved in the suit, the Magistrate should not lightly proceed in the matter. He should weigh and consider whether there is a real apprehension of the breach of peace and even if there is such an apprehension whether the same cannot be averted by proceedings under section 107, Criminal Procedure Code. The jurisdiction of the Magistrate to proceed under section 145 Cr. P.C. is not ousted simply because a suit about the same immovable property is already pending in a revenue or civil court. In such cases the Magistrate must proceed with care and caution, after ascertaining full facts from the party which moves the application." Tikuda v. State (F.B.)” (A.I.R.1961 Rajasthan 216). The Travancore-Cochin High Court observed in J. Sankaran v. V. Jacob A.I.R. 1955 T.C. 190 that: "If the Civil Court has itself appointed a Receiver and taken possession of the property or has issued any order restraining the defendant from disturbing plaintiff's possession, after finding that the latter's case of possession is prima facie true, the Magistrate should stay his hands. But where no Receiver has been appointed by the Civil Court and the plaintiff's case of possession is only pending investigation and decision by that Court, the Magistrate cannot keep quiet if he is satisfied that the dispute about possession is likely to result in a breach of the peace. To prevent anything like that happening, he could attach the property and place it in the hands of a receiver." 8. In the present case, the Magistrate has, as is seen from the records, proceeded with caution and only after getting himself satisfied that a dispute was pending that he proceeded to act under the section. To prevent anything like that happening, he could attach the property and place it in the hands of a receiver." 8. In the present case, the Magistrate has, as is seen from the records, proceeded with caution and only after getting himself satisfied that a dispute was pending that he proceeded to act under the section. Doubts of course, lingered in his mind when the report of the Sub-Inspector of Police was received, and he was hesitant to act under the section, as proceedings in the Civil Court were pending in respect of possession of the property. He, therefore, called for a report from a superior police officer, Deputy Superintendent of Police and it was after that, that action was initiated by him. It cannot therefore be said that the Magistrate has acted without jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the respondents stated that in view of the fact that the Civil Court is now seized of the matter the Magistrate should abstain from proceeding further under section 145 and if at all he thinks that for prevention of the breach of the peace he should intervene, the proper course to be adopted is to initiate proceedings under section 107 of the code. This is a matter falling squarely within the discretion of the Magistrate and from the materials before me I do not think, there is any scope for the contention that the discretion has improperly been exercised. There can be no interference with his discretion even if the matter might have been more suitably dealt with under section 107. 9. This Court will ordinarily be reluctant to interfere under section 561-A of the Code in criminal proceedings properly instituted and the court in which it is instituted has jurisdiction to deal with it. 10. The Supreme Court has observed in R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 866. "The inherent power of High Court under section 561-A, Criminal P.C. cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.. Some of the categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings can and should be exercised are: (i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of the offence alleged (ii) Where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged and (iii) Where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge." In the light of the above pronouncement I do not think, there is a case made out for this Court to interfere under section 561-A of the Code. The proceedings have properly been instituted and the Magistrate has rightly taken cognizance of the matter. In the circumstances, this petition has only to be dismissed, but I would direct that the learned Magistrate would give an expeditious disposal of the petition. Petition is dismissed.