Judgment :- 1. The only question in this writ appeal is whether there is excessive delegation in S.3 of the Kerala Local Authorities Entertainments Tax Act of 1961. A Single Judge of this Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant in limine holding that there was no excessive delegation; and the appeal is against that order.i S.3 reads 'Any local authority may levy a tax (hereinafter referred to as the entertainment tax) at a rate not less than ten percent and not more than twenty five per cent on each, payment for admission to any entertainment." The contention is that the fixation of a minimum of 10 per cent and a maximum of 25 per cent is excessive delegation in the absence of proper guidelines as to bow an appropriate rate is fixed within the maximum. There is already a decision of a Single Judge of this Court on the question in P. P. Kalyanasundaram v. State of Kerala (1966 KLT.17). The same question relating to the same section was considered in this case; and the learned judge repelled the contention following the decision of the Supreme Court in The Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema (AIR. 1965 S C 1107). The contention of the counsel of the appellant before us is that this decision requires reconsideration. 2. The counsel has drawn our attention to a few decisions, all of the Supreme Court. The first decision is the decision in the Liberty Cinema case; and the other decisions are M/s. Devi Das Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1967 SC. 1895), Ram Bachan Lal v. The State of Bihar ((1967) 3 S. C. R.1), Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton, Spinning & Weaving Mills, Delhi (AIR. 1968 S. C.1232) and M/ s. Jullundur Rubber Goods manufacturers' Association v. The Union of India (AIR. 1970 S. C. 1589). The principles as to what should be the nature of the guidelines have been laid down in these decisions fairly clearly. But, the contention of the counsel is that one of the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in the Liberty Cinema case has not been accepted by Subba Rao J. in Devi Das Gopal Krishnan's case. The principles as to what should be the nature of the guidelines have been laid down in these decisions fairly clearly. But, the contention of the counsel is that one of the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in the Liberty Cinema case has not been accepted by Subba Rao J. in Devi Das Gopal Krishnan's case. The counsel has pointed out that Subba Rao J. has not agreed as a general principle that guidance can always be spelt out from the limitation to fix the rate by the extent of the needs of and the expenses required by the delegate to discharge its statutory functions. After the arguments in the case closed, the very recent decision of the Supreme Court in Gulabchand Bapalal Modi v. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad (1971 (1) S. C. C. 823) has also been brought to our notice. And we find that this question has been pointedly considered in this decision in Para.19 of the judgment. Shelat J has observed: "Though he (Subba Rao I.) did not agree as a general principle that guidance can always be spelt out from the limitation to fix the rate by the extent of the needs of and the expenses required by the delegate to discharge its statutory functions, the Court did not disapprove Liberty Cinema case (supra) but confined the principle laid down there to the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act in which the majority had found the requisite guidelines. No such guidance was available in the Sales Tax statute before the Bench deciding Devi Das's case [supra]. The position which emerged from the decision 30 far, therefore, was that the power to fix rates can be delegated if the statute doing so contains a policy or principles furnishing guidance to the delegate in exercising such power." This is how the observation of Subba Rao J. in Devi Das's case has to be construed: and this is how the Supreme Court itself has construed it. That concludes the main argument in the case. 3. The next argument of the counsel is that the guidelines should be found in the statute itself which delegates the power to the local authority. That concludes the main argument in the case. 3. The next argument of the counsel is that the guidelines should be found in the statute itself which delegates the power to the local authority. Though, none of the cases cited before us has had occasion to consider this question, we do not find any substance in this contention; because, as in the case before us, the statute which contains the impugned section confers a power of taxation on local authorities. Evidently, the guidelines as indicated by the Supreme Court in the several decisions cited have to be found in the powers of the particular local authority as constituted by the particular statute. The Kerala Local Authorities Entertainments Tax Act, after providing in S.3 for the levy of the tax and the rates of the tax, goes on to provide for subjects like composition and consolidated payment of tax, admission of persons to entertainments subject to tax, manner of payment of tax, exemptions of certain entertainments from payment of tax, manner of recovery of tax, etc. The guidelines for fixing the rates of the levy under S.3 are not provided for in the Act. But that is no ground for holding that for that reason the section involves excessive delegation of taxing power. If we just look into the provisions of the Kerala Panchayats Act, we get sufficient guidelines in the provisions of the Act (almost all the guidelines mentioned in the Supreme Court decisions are present in the Act). The Government has power to appoint Executive Officers who are controlled by the Deputy Director and the Director; and the Government has power to appoint a Director, a Deputy Director, etc., who are again controlled by the Government. In the language of the Supreme Court, the Government is acting as a watch-dog watching the activities of the Panchayats. Then there is provision in the Panchayats Act for the constitution of a Panchayat Fund; there is provision for the preparation and sanction of budgets; there is provision for the appointment of auditors; and to cap, the local authorities are elected bodies, the members of which have to go back to the electorate once in five years. In effect and in short, all these provisions reveal effective checks on the activities of the Panchayats; and these are all guidelines mentioned in the several Supreme Court decisions. 4. In effect and in short, all these provisions reveal effective checks on the activities of the Panchayats; and these are all guidelines mentioned in the several Supreme Court decisions. 4. Thus, the contention urged in appeal has no substance; and the dismissal of the writ petition in limine by the Single Judge was quite justified. The writ appeal is dismissed, at any rate, without costs.