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1971 DIGILAW 226 (KAR)

G. R. GURURAJACHAR v. STATE OF MYSORE

1971-07-22

NARAYANA PAI, NESARGI

body1971
NARAYANA PAI C. J. ( 1 ) WHEN the petitioner was serving as an Assistant Master in the government High School, Channapatna, a departmental enquiry was held against him on charges of having received illegal gratification for conferring official favours on certain persons and of having mis-appropriated sale proceeds of old Government gazette, etc. He was found guilty and punishment of stoppage of five increments and recovery of rs. 22 being the misappropriated amount was imposed by an order dated 11th of February 1959. ( 2 ) ON 6-1-1960. a notice under R. 26 of the Mysore Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, was issued to him to show cause why the punishment should not be enhanced to one of dismissal. He challenged that notice in WP. No. 68 of 1960 contending that though R. 26 is set out in the notice it was in effect only a notice under r. 27 by the State Government and that under the said latter rule, the government could not act because more than six months had elapsed from the date of imposition of punishment. His contention was accepted by this Court and the notice quashed by an order made on the 14th march 1962. The judgment of the Court is reported at page 262 of 1963 (1) mysore Law Journal. ( 3 ) ON the 1st of July 1964, the Governor issued a notice to him under R. 26 of the Mysore Civil Services (Classification, Control and appeal) Rules, to show cause why the punishment mentioned above should not be enhanced to one of dismissal. The petitioner made a reply on the 8th December 1964. ( 4 ) BY an order made on the 31st March 1969 pursuant to the notice mentioned above, the Governor passed an order imposing the punishment of dismissal on the petitioner. ( 5 ) IT is the validity of the said order of dismissal that is challenged in this writ petition. ( 4 ) BY an order made on the 31st March 1969 pursuant to the notice mentioned above, the Governor passed an order imposing the punishment of dismissal on the petitioner. ( 5 ) IT is the validity of the said order of dismissal that is challenged in this writ petition. ( 6 ) THE petitioner has raised four points in support of his prayer: (1) that in the circumstances of the case the Government must be held to have abandoned the proposal to dismiss him; (2) that because he had before the impugned order was passed, suffered the punishment of stoppage of five increments imposed upon him in the first instance, the order of dismissal imposed by the Governor exposes him to double jeopardy, i. e. imposition of two punishments for the same misconduct. (3) that the Governor should have consulted the Public Service commission before proceeding to impose the Punishment of dismissal; and (4) that Rule 26 of the Mysore Civil Services (Classification, control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, is unenforceable against him for lack of previous approval of the Central Government as required by the proviso to sub-sec. (7) of S. 115 of the States' Reorganisation act. ( 7 ) THE facts depended upon in support of the first contention of alleged abandonment, are briefly these. Although the notice to show cause against the proposed dismissal was issued so long as on 1st July 1964 to which the petitioner had made a reply on 8th December 1964, the order of dismissal was passed more than five years thereafter on the 31st of March 1969. In the meanwhile, the petitioner alleges that at an interview he had with the Minister for Education he was informed that the proceedings against him would be dropped and that his case for promotion would be considered. He was in fact put in independent charge of a Class II administrative post in July 1966 and subsequently promoted thereto on an officiating basis on 29th December 1966. ( 8 ) THE petitioner, Contends that these circumstances related by him clearly point to the conclusion that the Government had given up the idea of dismissing him for misconduct. ( 9 ) THE alleged assurance said to have been given by the Minister for education is denied on behalf of the State Government. Mr. Kanti who was the then Education Minister is no more. ( 9 ) THE alleged assurance said to have been given by the Minister for education is denied on behalf of the State Government. Mr. Kanti who was the then Education Minister is no more. There is no written record of any such assurance held out by the Minister. The admitted circumstances of the ease also point to the contrary. The proceedings referred to could be no other than the proceedings initiated by the issue of notice by the Governor and not the State Government. As the power of the governor under R. 26 is quite different from and independent of any power of the State Government, it is difficult to see how any Minister of the State Government can, by assurance or otherwise, stop or withdraw the proceedings instituted by the Governor. We do not, therefore, accept the case of alleged assurance given by the Minister for Education. ( 10 ) THE same background also makes it difficult to accept the argument that the act or acts of the State Government in subsequently putting him in independent charge of a higher post and also promoting him to such a post must be read as so inconsistent with any idea of punishments to lead to the inevitable conclusion that there has been abandonment of the proposal to dismiss the petitioner. Indeed in principle the pendency of disciplinary proceedings need not necessarily prevent the process of promotion, although the nature of the mis-conduct and the responsibilities of the higher post may reasonably be taken into account in deciding whether the officer concerned is fit for promotion at that moment. Hence the mere act of promoting the petitioner when the proposal to dismiss him was pending consideration by the Governor cannot, in our opinion, be taken as sufficient basis for a firm inference that there has been an abandonment of any idea of proceeding with the Governor's notice. ( 11 ) THERE is also one clinching circumstance which make it impossible to draw the inference of any abandonment. The misconduct with which the petitioner was charged was so serious a matter as receiving illegal gratification for conferring official favours and actual misappropriation of Government money. ( 11 ) THERE is also one clinching circumstance which make it impossible to draw the inference of any abandonment. The misconduct with which the petitioner was charged was so serious a matter as receiving illegal gratification for conferring official favours and actual misappropriation of Government money. ( 12 ) IN view of these circumstances mentioned above, particularly the last one, we do not think that the delay of five years in making the order of dismissal can add any strength to the petitioner's case. ( 13 ) THE first contention of abandonment, therefore fails. ( 14 ) THE argument ol double Jeopardy is also without substance because the clear legal effect of the Governor's order of dismissal is that the said punishment of dismissal geta substituted for the original lesser punishment of stoppage of five increments. The enhancement in punishment, which means the imposition of a higher punishment than the one originally imposed, means and can mean only that in lieu or in the place of the earlier lesser punishment the higher punishment is imposed. The contention that he has already suffered the punishment in the sense that five increments are actually withheld from him cannot make any difference to the principle because when he suffers the punishment of dismissal the increments withheld from him will have to be given to him in the same way as fine is refunded in a criminal prosecution when in lieu of it a sbstantive sentence of imprisonment is imposed by way of enhancement. ( 15 ) THE necessity for consultation with the Public Service Commission is sought to be inferred from the clause "after consultation with the commission where such consultation is necessary" which occurs in R. 26 of the C. C A. Rules. The language itself makes it clear that the Governor should consult the Commission only where such consultation is necessary. Whether such consultation is necessary has to he ascertained by a reference to the Mysore Public Service Commission (Consultation) Regulations, 1958. ( 16 ) THE said Regulations are made in exercise of the power conferred by the proviso to Clause (3) of Art. 320 of the Constitution of India. Clause (3) of Art. 320 requires that the Public Service Commission should be consulted in certain service matters including disciplinary matters which are mentioned in Clause (c) thereof ). ( 16 ) THE said Regulations are made in exercise of the power conferred by the proviso to Clause (3) of Art. 320 of the Constitution of India. Clause (3) of Art. 320 requires that the Public Service Commission should be consulted in certain service matters including disciplinary matters which are mentioned in Clause (c) thereof ). But the proviso empowers the Governor as respects services and posts in connection with the affairs of a State (other than All India services) to make regulations specifying the matters in which either generally or in any particular class of cases or in any particular cicumstances it shall not be necessary to consult the Commission. ( 17 ) REGLN. 3 of the Mysore Public Service Commission (Consultation) regulations states that generally it shall not be necessary for the commission to be consulted in the case of posts specified in Annexure 1 to the Regulation and in certain other matters. It is pointed out that the petitioner's post is not one of the posts set out in the annexure. But then regln. 3 does not stand by itself. It must be read along with Regln. 5 which deals specially with disciplinary matters. Clause (1) of Regln. 5 state; that it shall not be necessary for the Commission to be consulted on any disciplinary matter affecting a person serving in connection with the affairs of the State except in certain cases set out therein. Those are cases of imposition of punishment by the State Government including removal or dismissal from service either by an original order or upon appeal or by way of modification in revision or review. It would mean that the effect of the said sub-sec. is to make it totally unnecessary to consult the Public Service Commission in any other case. Therefore, imposition of any punishment by the Governor under Rule 26 does not require any consultation at all. ( 18 ) BUT some argument is constructed on Clause (2) of Regln. 5, part of which relevant for the argument, reads :"nothing contained in clause (1) shall be deemed to make it necessary for the State Government to consult the Commission in any case * * * * (f) in respect of a Government servant where the Governor has passed an order under proviso (c) to sub-sec. 5, part of which relevant for the argument, reads :"nothing contained in clause (1) shall be deemed to make it necessary for the State Government to consult the Commission in any case * * * * (f) in respect of a Government servant where the Governor has passed an order under proviso (c) to sub-sec. (2) of Art. 311 of the constitution; * * * *"the argument is that clause (2) seems to suggest that consultation may be necessary where Governor acts otherwise than under proviso (c) to sub-sec. (2) of Art. 311 of the Constitution. The argument in our opinion, is pointless. Even clause (2) of Regln. 5 deals with the possibility or necessity for consultation by the State Government and not the Governor. The wide amplitude of the general provision of clause (1) which states that it shall not be necessary for the Commission to be consulted on any disciplinary matter affecting a person serving in connection with the affairs of the State except in cases mentioned therein, leaves no room for doubt that the Governor need not consult the Commission in any disciplinary matter. ( 19 ) IT was, however, pointed out that under the Mysore Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, the Governor is not different from the State Government because Rule 2 (e) defines the governor as meaning the Governor of Mvsore acting on the advice of the counsel of Ministers. But what is overlooked in this argument is that the definitions in Rule 2 apply unless the context otherwise requires. There can be no doubt that the context of Rule 26 of the C. C. A. Rules makes the said definition inapplicable. So far as the nower of review is concerned, such power is conferred upon the State Government under R/27 when it functions as the appellate authority. We have pointed out in our order dated the 15th of June 1971 made in V. M. Kularrni v. State of mysore, (1972)1 Mys. L. J. 115 that the power of review conferred on the Governor under Rule 26 is distinct and different from the nower of review under rule 27. There is no doubt in our mind that the Governor referred to in rule 26 is not the Governor as defined in Rule 2 (a) of the C. C. A. Rules. L. J. 115 that the power of review conferred on the Governor under Rule 26 is distinct and different from the nower of review under rule 27. There is no doubt in our mind that the Governor referred to in rule 26 is not the Governor as defined in Rule 2 (a) of the C. C. A. Rules. ( 20 ) FINALLY there is the argument that the reference to 'after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary' in rule 26 of the C. C. A. Rules would be reduced to surplusage by the view taken above. All that we need say is that as the Consultation Regulations now stand, there is no necessity for the Governor to consult the Commission. ( 21 ) ON the last contention that Rule 26 is unenforceable against the petitioner who is an allottee from the erstwhile State of Mysore to the new State of Mysore for lack of previous approval of the Central Government under the proviso appended to sub-sec. (7) of S. 115 of the States reorganisation Act, the point for investigation is whether it varies to the petitioner's disadvantage any condition of service applicable to him on the 31st of October 1956, because the absence of approval is admitted. ( 22 ) NOW it is not and cannot be disputed that even in the erstwhile state of Mysore misconduct on the part of a Government servant was punishable after a disciplinary enquiry and that such punishment might include dismissal depending upon the circumstances of the case. It is not and cannot be denied that misconduct by way of receiving illegal gratification and misappropriation of Government money, if proved, may be visited with the punishment of dismissal. Rule 26 of the Mysore Civil service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, does not make any difference to this position. Another matter which may be regarded as fundamental and as amounting to a condition of service is that the disciplinary enquiry resulting in punishment must be subject to the rules of natural justice. Rule 26 does not involve any disobedience of the rule of natural justice because a proviso appended thereto requires in express terms that an order imposing or enhancing a penalty shall not be passed unless the person concerned has been given an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against such enhanced punishment. Rule 26 does not involve any disobedience of the rule of natural justice because a proviso appended thereto requires in express terms that an order imposing or enhancing a penalty shall not be passed unless the person concerned has been given an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against such enhanced punishment. ( 23 ) IT is not, therefore, possible for the petitioner to suggest that any matter which can be regarded as a condition of service has been at all varied to his disadvantage. ( 24 ) THE argument, however, is that the rules prevalent in the erstwhile state of Mysore did not confer any power of review on the Governor and that the conferment of such power for the first time by Rule 26 of the Rules of 1957 promulgated in the new State of Mysore amounts to variation of a condition of service to the disadvantage of the petitioner. The simple answer to the contention is that it is only a matter of procedure in which nobody, not even a Government servant has or can claim any vested right and that so long as the principles of natural justice governing the enquiry into misconduct and imposition of punishment therefor are not violated, no complaint can be made by any Government servant of any variation of a condition of service to his disadvantage. ( 25 ) THUS all the contentions raised by the petitioner fail. ( 26 ) THE writ petition is dismissed. --- *** --- .