Judgment :- 1. A co-operative society registered under the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1932 is the petitioner in this Original Petition and it is represented by the President. The 1st respondent, while working as the Secretary of the petitioner co-operative bank, was proceeded against for certain irregularities noticed in the performance of his duties as Secretary. A sub-committee of the Board of Directors served on the petitioner a memorandum of charges and after considering his explanation found him guilty of the charges framed against him and issued a notice to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. The charges levelled against the 1st respondent were that he had been lending money privately to one C.P.C. Hydrue while refusing to give him loan from the bank, that he had given excess amounts in granting gold loans, that he had divulged the bank secrets to one C. Kunjumuhammed, that he had misappropriated the movables belonging to the bank and used them at his own residence and that he had not maintained the service register as required by the rules. The explanation submitted by the 1st respondent was found not satisfactory and he was dismissed from service. The 1st respondent filed an appeal before the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Trivandrum, against the order of dismissal; but the Registrar directed him to file an appeal before the Board of Directors. He did so, and while the appeal was pending before the Board, the 3rd respondent, which is the workers' union, the Kerala State Co-operative Employees' Association, obtained a reference to the Labour Court, Quilon on the question of the 1st respondent's dismissal. The Labour Court after an enquiry held that the order of dismissal passed against the 1st respondent was illegal since no domestic enquiry in keeping with the principles of natural justice had been held against the 1st respondent before his dismissal. The Labour Court, which is the 2nd respondent in this original petition, as a result, ordered that the 1st respondent should be reinstated in service with full back wages. The petitioner-co-operative Bank now prays for the issuance of a writ in the nature of a certiorari, mandamus or other appropriate writ quashing Ext. P1 award passed by the 2nd respondent Labour Court. 2. The petitioner-co-operative Bank now prays for the issuance of a writ in the nature of a certiorari, mandamus or other appropriate writ quashing Ext. P1 award passed by the 2nd respondent Labour Court. 2. The main contention raised by the petitioner's counsel is that the finding of the Labour Court that the 1st respondent is a workman within the meaning of S.2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act is wrong in law, that the provisions of the by-laws of the bank conclusively show that the 1st respondent was in charge of the administration of the bank and was, therefore, not a 'workman' within the meaning of S.2(s) of the Act. According to the petitioner's learned counsel, the reference to the Labour Court was therefore incompetent ;and there was no industrial dispute within the meaning of S.2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act. On this ground it was argued that the 2nd respondent had no jurisdiction to pass the award Ext. P-1 and it was therefore void and inoperative being without jurisdiction. 3. The only question that arises for consideration in this petition is whether the 1st respondent is a 'workman' within the meaning of S.2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). It was practically conceded that if the 1st respondent was ultimately held to be a workman, then the order passed by the 2nd respondent was valid and binding on the petitioner and his award has to be effective. Under S.2(s) of the Act a workman is defined as 'any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute'. There are four exceptions to the above definiton, but we are only concerned with two of them which run as follows:-"but does not include any such person (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding five hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature." 4. To understand the nature of the duties which the 1st respondent had to discharge in his capacity as Secretary we have to go through the by-laws of the co-operative bank. Clause.19 of the by-laws down, inter alia, that the executive management of the affairs of the bank shall vest in a Board of Directors and that the Board of Directors shall consist of not more than 9 members elected by the members. Clause.20 indicates that the Board of Directors shall appoint a paid Secretary who shall have no seat on the Board, and Clause.23 stipulates that the President shall have a general control over all the affairs of the bank and that the Secretary shall be responsible for the executive administration of the bank subject to the control of the President. The Secretary has to exercise such powers as may be delegated to him by the Board of Directors from time to time and he shall also have power to operate on the accounts of the bank with the other banks within the limits prescribed by the Board. The Secretary's powers include that of representing the society to sue or be sued on its behalf, but all bonds in favour of the bank is to be in the name of the President. The Secretary has power to sign, endorse and negotiate cheques and other negotiable instruments within the limits prescribed by the Board and certain loans may be sanctioned by the President on the recommendation of the Secretary subject to the ratification of the Board of Directors at its next meeting. While the Secretary is the authority competent to sanction casual leave to other employees of the bank, he has no authority or power to take disciplinary action against the members of the establishment and for this purpose a sub-committee elected from the Board of Directors has to function as the disciplinary authority. While the Secretary is the authority competent to sanction casual leave to other employees of the bank, he has no authority or power to take disciplinary action against the members of the establishment and for this purpose a sub-committee elected from the Board of Directors has to function as the disciplinary authority. The Secretary has the power to inflict the punishment of censure or fine, but all the other punishments can be inflicted only by the President or the sub-committee. The point for decision is whether the above powers and duties of the Secretary can be considered to make him employed in a managerial or administrative capacity. In AIR. 1966 S. C. 305 (Reserve Bank Employees' Association v. Reserve Bank) it has been held that the question whether a particular workman is supervisor within the definition of workman is ultimately one of fact, at best one of mixed fact and law. The question will really depend upon the nature of the industry, the type of work in which he is engaged, the organizational set up of the particular unit of industry and like factor. It was urged on behalf of the petitioner in this case that the work of the 1st respondent was supervisory in character though his salary is only Rs. 225 and that, therefore, he squarely came within the definition of 'workman'as defined in S.2 (s) of the Act. It is now well settled that before considering the question whether one of the four exceptions to S.2 (s) applies to a case it has to be ascertained whether the employee comes within the scope of the main clause of S.2(s). The decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1970) 2 L. L. J. 590 (Burman Shell Co, v. Burmah Shell Management Staff Association) has held that for an employee in an industry to be workman under S.2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is manifest that he must be employed to do skilled or unskilled manual work, supervisory work, technical work, or clerical work. If the work done by an employee is not of such a nature, he would not be a workman. The following observations make the position clear. If the work done by an employee is not of such a nature, he would not be a workman. The following observations make the position clear. " If every employee of an industry was to be a workman except those mentioned in the four exceptions, those four classifications need not have been mentioned in the definition and a workman could have been defined as a person employed in an industry except in cases where he was covered by one of the exceptions The specification of the four types of work obviously is intended to lay down that an employee is to become a workman only if he is employed to do work of one of those types, while there may be employees who, not doing any such work, would be out of the scope of the word 'workman' without having to resort to the exceptions. An example, which appears to be very clear, will be that of a person employed in canvassing sales for an industry. He may not be required to do ? paper work, nor may be required to have any technical knowledge. Hi may not supervising the work of any other emplopees, nor would be doing any skilled or un manual work. He would still be an employee of the industry and, obviously employee would not be a workman, because the work for which he is emplocovered by the four types mentioned in the definition and not because he was out of the definition under one of the exceptions." The duties assigned to the 1st respondent which have been enumerated earlier clearly indicate that his work is mostly clerical and to some extent supervisory. He is, therefore, a'workman' coming with in the category mentioned in the main part of the definition. 5. The next question to be considered is whether he has to be excluded by reason of belonging to one of the categories which have been specifically excluded. The argument is that he is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity and therefore he is taken out of the definition of the word 'workman'. A fairly large number of decisions have been cited before me to show what categories of employment would come within the words 'managerial' or 'administrative' as contemplated in S.2(s). The argument is that he is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity and therefore he is taken out of the definition of the word 'workman'. A fairly large number of decisions have been cited before me to show what categories of employment would come within the words 'managerial' or 'administrative' as contemplated in S.2(s). I think it unnecessary to refer to those decisions as in this case it is quite clear that the 1st respondent has neither managerial nor administrative capacity while he functions as the Secretary of the bank. The crux of the matter is that a person employed in a managerial or administrative capacity should be capable of real initiative, control and command and that he must have independent powers to take a policy decision, initiate disciplinary action against the employees and have power of appointment in respect of subordinates. The duties which have been assigned to the 1st respondent are mostly of a routine nature and his work is mainly clerical. He has to function within the direct control of the managing Board and be has no initiative in action. All the policy decisions have to be taken by the Board of Management. In (1967) 1 L.L.J. 270 it has been held by the Rajasthan High Court that a Manager and Chief Accounts Officer of a co-operative society is a 'workman' under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Madras High Court in (1967) 1 L.L.J. 252 has held that an assistant (administration) working in the Madras Electricity Board on a pay scale of Rs. 370-20-475 is a 'workman' within the definition of S.2(s) notwithstanding bis designation. 6. It may also be mentioned that the 1st respondent, over and above his capacity as Secretary, is also working as an appraiser in the bank for which he is paid a monthly salary of Rs. 20/-. That also indicates the nature of his duties and functions and is a pointer to the fact that he has no independent administrative or managerial capacity. The 1st respondent Secretary has no place among the Board of Directors and his work is wholly under the control and supervision of the Managing Board. He has no power of taking disciplinary action against other employees and his work mainly consists in carrying out the direction of the Managing Board. To some extent his duties involve the supervision of the subordinate employess. He has no power of taking disciplinary action against other employees and his work mainly consists in carrying out the direction of the Managing Board. To some extent his duties involve the supervision of the subordinate employess. But his salary being only Rs. 225/- per month, this will not take him out of the definition of an employee. On a consideration of the entire circumstances I am of the view that the Labour Court was right in holding that the 1st respondent is an employee within the meaning of that term in S.2 (s). It follows that the award passed by the 2nd respondent is valid and binding on the petitioner. 7. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dissmissed. In the circumstancesof the case, however, there will be no order regarding costs.