JUDGMENT : S.K. Ray, J. - This appeal is by the tenants of a house against whom execution proceedings have been levied by the landlord for their eviction by executing the order of eviction passed by the House Rent Controller. The sole question for determination in this appeal is whether Sub-section (6) of Section 7 of the Orissa House-Rent Control Act, 1967, (Orissa Act 4 of 1968) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is retrospective in operation, and if so, the extent of its retrospectively. 2. The necessary facts in connection with which the aforesaid question arises may now be stated: The late father of the Appellants took house on rent for the purposes of running a hotel from the Respondent. This was on 15-12-1944. In 1961 the Respondents filed a house-rent control case (Misc. Case No. 14/61) against the tenant u/s 7 of the Rouse Rent Control Act, 1958, for his eviction on three grounds, viz., (1) that the tenant was a willful defaulter; (ii) that he had altered the building impairing its value, and (iii) that he challenged the title of the Respondents to the house. Admittedly no prior notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had been given by the landlord before instituting this evicting proceedings. Rasing on a decision of this Court Prafulla Kumar Das v. House Rent Controller Cuttack, which held that notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not necessary in the House Rent Control Act cases which was delivered on 24-1-1962 eviction order was passed on 3-4-1963. The tenant went up in appeal (Misc. Appeal No. 7 of 1963) which was dismissed, and the order of eviction was confirmed on 31-12-1963. The tenant filed O.J.C. No. 28 of 1964, but eventually withdrew it. The landlord thereafter levied execution of the order of eviction in execution case No. 74 of 1966 in the Court of Munsif, Puri. On 6-1-1967, subsequent to the levying of the aforesaid execution, this Court reversed its earlier decision in Prafulla Kumar Das v. House Rent Controller 1962 C.L.T. 173, and held that prior notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary before any eviction order could be obtained. This late decision was delivered on 6-1-1967 and is reported in Abani Kumar v. Rajgopal 33 C.L.T. 148. This late decision was delivered on 6-1-1967 and is reported in Abani Kumar v. Rajgopal 33 C.L.T. 148. Thereafter the tenant filed an application in the executing Court stating that the order of eviction is a nullity in view of the later decision of this Court. This application was numbered as Misc. Case No. 245/66. This Misc. Case was allowed on 24-7-1967, and consequently an order in the execution case was passed on 1-5-1967 dismissing the same as not maintainable. The Orissa House-Rent Control Act, 1967, received the assent of the President on the 17th February, 1968, and was published in the Orissa Gazette on 4th March, 1968. This Act was numbered as Orissa Act 4 of 1968. Sub-section (3) of Section 1 provided that this Act shall be deemed to have come into force on the 4th day of May, 1967 in those local areas of the State in which the Orissa House-Rent Control Act, 1958, was in force immediately prior to its expiry. On 13-5-1967 Misc. Appeal No. 42 of 1966 of 1967 Was filed by the landlord-decree-holder challenging the order of the executing Court dated 1-5-1967 by which the execution case was dismissed as not maintainable. This appeal was allowed on 19-9-1970 and the original Misc. Case No. 14/61 was restored to file. This was obviously allowed on the ground of application of Sub-section (6) of Section 7 of the House-Rent Control Act, 1967. This appeal is against this order of the lower Appellate Court dated 19-9-1970. 3. It is contended by Mr. Mohanty that by 4-5-1967 when the new House. Rent Control Act was deemed to have come into force, no proceeding for eviction of a tenant or for execution of an order of eviction was pending, because the execution case bad been dismissed earlier on 1-5-1967 as not maintainable, and Election 7(6) of the Act will not be applicable. Mr. Pal, for the other side replies that though in fact no proceeding was on the anvil of any Court, nevertheless, the right of appeal had not been extinguished and when in exercise of that right, such appeal was filed on 13-5-1957, the eviction proceeding must be deemed to have revived, and must be deemed therefore to be pending on the date when the new House-Rent Control Act was deemed to have come into force. 4. Mr. Mohanty for his contention relied strongly on three decisions. 4. Mr. Mohanty for his contention relied strongly on three decisions. The first one is the case of United Provinces v. Mst. Atiga Begum 1940 F.C.R. 110. The second is the case reported in Chandrasingh Manibhai and Others Vs. Surjit Lal Ladhamal Chhabda and Others and the third case relied upon is the case of Smt. Kusum Kumari Devi v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Bihar AIR 1954 Pat. 238 . The relevant passage from the Federal Court decision may be quoted: Undoubtedly, an Act may in its operation be retrospective, and yet the extent of its retrospective character need not extend so far as to affect pending suits. Courts have undoubtedly leaned very strongly against applying a new Act to a pending action, when the language of the statute does not compel them to do so. It is well recognised rule that statutes should, as far as possible be so interpreted, as not to affect vested rights adversely, particularly when they are being litigated. When a statute deprives a person of his right to sue or affects the power or jurisdiction of (sic) Court in enforcing the law as it stands, its retrospective character must be clearly expressed. Ambiguities in it should not be removed by Courts, nor gaps filled up in order to widen its applicability. It is a well established principle that such statutes must be construed strictly, and not given a liberal interpretation. The Supreme Court in the case referred to above Chandrasingh Manibhai and Others Vs. Surjit Lal Ladhamal Chhabda and Others, held, while construing Sections 12 and 50 of the Bombay Rente, Hotel and Lodging House Rents Control Act (Act 57 of 1947), that those provisions are restrictive in their retrospective operation and pending execution proceedings and appeals are excluded from such operation. The Patna High Court in the case referred to above Sm. Kusum Kumari Devi v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Bihar AIR 1954 Pat. 238 , held: It is a familiar rule that no statute shall be construed to be of restrospective operation unless the terms of the statute expressly state that it is retrospective or such a construction arises by necessary implication. The rule is based on the presumption that legislature does not intend what is unjust or that transaction which have already vested title to property should be reopened or thrown into doubt. The rule is based on the presumption that legislature does not intend what is unjust or that transaction which have already vested title to property should be reopened or thrown into doubt. It will be seen from all these oases that, though generally a statue should not be so construed to include within its retrospective operation pending actions which were commenced prior to such enactment and by which certain rights had vested, but if on a construction of the statute and from the express provision in the statute it is clear that the retrospective operation would extend so 88 to govern also pending actions, then the statute must be given that operation. It is appropriate at this stage to refer to a passage from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sukhram Singh v. Smt. Harbheji AIR 1969 S.O. 1114. The passage runs thus: A law is undoubtedly restrospective if the law says so expressly but it is not always necessary to say so expressly to make the law retrospective. There are occasions when a law may be held to be retrospective in operation. Retrospection is not to be presumed for the presumption is the other way but many statutes have been regarded as restrospective without a declaration. Thus it is that remedial statutes are always regarded as prospective but declaratory statutes are considered retrospective. Similarly same times statutes have a retrospective effect when the declared intention is clearly and unequivocally manifest from the language employed in the' particular law or in the context of connected provisions. It is always a question whether the legislature has sufficiently expressed itself. To find this one must look at the general scope and purview of the Act and the remedy the legislature intends to apply in the former state of the law and then determine what the legislature intended to do. This line of investigation is, of course only open if it is necessary. In other words it can be said that there might be something in the context of an Act or be collected from its language, which might give towards prima facie prospective a larger operation. More retrospectively is not to be given than what can be gathered from expressed or clearly implied intention of the legislature. In other words it can be said that there might be something in the context of an Act or be collected from its language, which might give towards prima facie prospective a larger operation. More retrospectively is not to be given than what can be gathered from expressed or clearly implied intention of the legislature. The whole matter boils down to this : To decide whether a particular statute or a provision of statute is retrospective, and if so, the extent of its retrospectivity, one has to construe the particular provision in its entire context, and having regard to the general scope and purview of the Act and the remedies the Legislature intended to apply in order to determine the intention of the Legislature. It is unnecessary to resort to these principles of construction in the present case as the concerned provision is unambiguously retrospective. 6. Sub-section 5(5) of Section 7 of the Act runs thus: (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, it shall not be necessary for the landlord to serve a notice for termination of the tenancy on the tenant for the purpose of proceedings under this section. Sub-section (6) of Section 7 of the Act runs thus: (6) No proceedings, whether for eviction of the tenant or for execution of an Order of eviction, instituted under the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1958, shall be challenged merely on the ground that no such notice as aforesaid had been served on the tenant before institution of such proceeding. Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act runs as follows: (3) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 4th day of May, 1967, in those local areas of the State in which the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1958, was in force immediately prior to its expiry and it shall come into force in such other local area or areas on such date as the State Government may, by notification, appoint in that behalf. 6. It is clear that Sub-section (6) of Section 7 of the Act is made expressly retrospective with effect from 4-5-1967, and all proceedings for eviction of the tenant or for execution of an order of eviction which had been instituted under the Orissa. 6. It is clear that Sub-section (6) of Section 7 of the Act is made expressly retrospective with effect from 4-5-1967, and all proceedings for eviction of the tenant or for execution of an order of eviction which had been instituted under the Orissa. House Rent Control Act, 1958, which were pending or deemed to be pending on 4-5-1967 or thereafter cannot be challenged merely on the ground that notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act has not been served. In two cases decided by this Court Section 7(6) of the Act has been held to be retrospective. Those cases are Nityananda Khuntia v. Ramemdranarayan Brahmchari, and Anr. O.J.C. No. 1539 of 1968-D/16-9-71, and Janardan Sharma v. Kishori Mohan Tripathy M.A. No. 113 of 1967-D/25-7-68. 7. The form of the present contention of Mr. Mohanty was neither raised nor noticed in there two decisions. In the present case the execution proceeding for eviction of the tenant had been instituted under the Orissa House-Rent Control Act, 1958, but that proceeding had terminated on 1-5-1967, and no appeal had been filed when the new Act came into force on 4-5-1967, though the appeal period had not expired. The real question, therefore, is whether those execution proceedings for eviction instituted under 1958 Act could be said to be pending on 4-5-1967. It is contended by Mr. Mohanty that the extent of its retrospectivity conferred under Sub-section (6) of Section 7 must not be widened so as to include proceedings which had terminated factually before the commencement of the new House Rent Control Act, and were merely restored by filing of the appeal after commencement of that Act. In my opinion, this contention does not appear to be sound. It is clear that if the execution proceedings can be said to be pending on 4-5-1967, Section 7(6) of the Act would be attracted not because of any widening the extent of retrospectively, but by reason of the conclusion that the proceedings are held to be pending of the date of commencement of the Act. It will be seen that the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1967 (Act 4 of the 1968) received the assent of the President on the 17th February, 68, and must commence into operation from that date; but for certain purposes it was retrospective in operation from and since the 4th day of May, 1967. It will be seen that the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1967 (Act 4 of the 1968) received the assent of the President on the 17th February, 68, and must commence into operation from that date; but for certain purposes it was retrospective in operation from and since the 4th day of May, 1967. By the date when the Act received the President's assent, Misc. Appeal No. 42/66 was pending. It is well-known that an appeal is a continuation of the suit out of which it arises, and is in the nature of rehearing : Chandrasingh Manibhai and Others Vs. Surjit Lal Ladhamal Chhabda and Others, and Subodh Gopal Bose Vs. Ajit Kumar Haldar and Others. The effect of this principle is that the Misc. Appeal No. 42/66 is a continuation of the proceeding for eviction instituted under Orissa House-Rent Control Act, 1958, in 1961. Any change in the law regarding the subject-matter of the appeal, either by way of amendment or by enactment of a new statue affecting the rights of the parties, should be taken notice of by the Appellate Court. For this proposition, authorities are to be found in Krushna Chandra Sahu v. Khetrabasi Panda and Ors. 1971 C.L.T. 929; Rafiquennessa Vs. Lal Bahadur Chetri (Dead) through his Representatives and Others, ; Subodh Gopal Bose Vs. Ajit Kumar Haldar and Others, ; Provas Chandra Poddar Vs. Visyaraju Kasi Viswanatham Raju and Another. It is true that the order dated 1-5-1967 dismissing the execution case does not become suspended, nor its operation interrupted by presentation of an appeal, but the eviction proceedings which were dismissed by order dated 1-5-1967 must be deemed to be pending and undergoing rehearing on filing of the appeal on 13-5-1967. There is, nothing in the Act to indicate that the Legislature wanted to exclude the applicability of the general principle that an original proceeding is deemed to continue until all proceedings in connection with it, by way of appeal or revision, when such appeal or revision has been provided therefore, have been determined finally. If the Legislature had so intended it would have explicitly said so. It will be seen that on 17-2-1968, when this Act received the President's assent, Misc. Appeal No. 42/66 was pending, which means that the proceedings for eviction instituted under the Orissa House-Rent Control Act, 1958, was continuing and thus pending. If the Legislature had so intended it would have explicitly said so. It will be seen that on 17-2-1968, when this Act received the President's assent, Misc. Appeal No. 42/66 was pending, which means that the proceedings for eviction instituted under the Orissa House-Rent Control Act, 1958, was continuing and thus pending. This continuance and pendency must be envisaged in an unbroken continuity from the time when the eviction proceedings were instituted under the 1958 Act and till the final disposal of the appeal on 19-9-1970. Thus, Sub-section (6) of Section 7 of the new Orissa House-Rent Control Act (Act 4 of 1968) directly and prospectively applies, therefore, the question of retrospective operation does not arise in the present case. Even if it be assumed that the execution proceeding for eviction had been finally terminated when the new Act was deemed to come into force on 4-5-1967, filing of the appeal subsequently has the effect of reviving the eviction proceedings, and making the whole process from its institution in the year 1961, till the filing of the appeal on 13-5-1967, a continuous pending process, because until the period of limitation for filing of the appeal from the date of the order, 1-5-1967, expires the eviction proceedings cannot be deemed to have been finally terminated. Thus, even enough the Act is deemed to have come into force on 4-5-1967, and even though the appeal had not been filed, but since the appeal time had not expired the eviction proceedings must be taken to be continuing. In this view also Sub-section (6) of Section 7 is attracted. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the opinion that Sub-section (6) of Section 7 of the Orissa House-Rent Control Act, 1967, fully applies to this case and the order dated 19-9-1970 passed in Misc. Appeal No. 42/66 restoring the execution case No. 14/61 to file was a natural and correct order to be passed in view of Sub-section (6) of Section 7 of the new Act, and must, therefore, be upheld. In the result, therefore, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.