JUDGMENT 1. IN this application under Article 286 of the Constitution, the petitioner challenges the notice issued under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Emergency Risks (Factories)Insurance Act, 1962, dated 17th february, 1966 issued by the Chief enforcement Officer and also notice dated 11th August, 1966, issued by the Chief enforcement Officer, Emergency Risks insurance Scheme. By the first notice dated 17th February, 1966, the petitioner was directed to produce certain documents for ascertaining whether the petitioner had taken out a policy of insurance as required by the aforesaid act and to investigate the insurable value of the property insured and/or required to be insured. By the second notice dated 11th August, 1966 the petitioner was informed that it appeared that the petitioner had failed to insure goods to the extent indicated in the said notice and had thereby evaded payment of insurance premium amounting to Rs. 5450/-, The petitioner was directed to show cause in writing why a final determination should not be made under sub-section (1) of section 8 and section 11 of the Emergency Risks (Factories) Insurance Act, 1962, for the aforesaid amount. The petitioner is the proprietor of Nandi and Co. The petitioner; submitted an application for insurance under Emergency Risks (Factories) Insurance Scheme in terms of paragraph 6 of the said scheme. In terms of the: form in which the application was made, according to the petitioner, the petitioner was entitled to the policy for such properties of the insurable value as the amount paid under the challan bore in the premium due to be issued and the petitioner was not asked to make a further application in respect of the balance of the insurable value of the property which might remain uncovered. Therefore, according to the petitioner no further enquiry had been made from the petitioner. No policy was however issued, and according to the petitioner as no policy had been issued no claim under the policy could be made from the petitioner in terms of the scheme it has been stated that there was further correspondence between the petitioner and the authorities concerned, which it is not necessary to set out in detail. Thereafter on 17th February, 1966 the chief Enforcement Officer issued a notice which is annexure "d" and is the subject-matter of challenge in this writ application. Thereafter on 17th February, 1966 the chief Enforcement Officer issued a notice which is annexure "d" and is the subject-matter of challenge in this writ application. The petitioner states the petitioner appeared before the authorities and thereafter on 11th August, 1966 the order or the communication which is annexure "e" and which is also under challenge was issued. Thereafter on the 26th of August, 1966 the petitioner moved this application and obtained a rule nisi and an interim order upon furnishing security, the petitioner also had obtained another rule nisi in Civil rule No. 2252 (W) of 1966 on the 22nd august, 1966, both these applications were heard together. There has not yet been any determination of any liability of any amount against the petitioner. Only one contention was urged in this application, namely, no action could be taken under the Emergency Risks (Factories) Insurance Act, 1962 in as much as said Act being a temporary statute had already expired. Upon the aggression by the Chinese Military force on the northern frontier of India, the President issued a Proclamation under Article 352 (1) of the Constitution declaring that a great emergency existed threatening the security of India. The said Emergency Proclamation continued in force until it was revoked under article 352 (2) of the Constitution by a subsequent Proclamation issued on the 10th of January, 1968. The point that was urged was that after that date no action could be taken under the said act, namely, the Emergency Risks (Factories) Insurance Act, 1962 and under the scheme framed there under. For the purpose of making provision for the insurance of certain property in India against damage by enemy action during the period of emergency Parliament enacted the Emergency Risks (Factories) Insurance Act, 1962. The said Act came into force on the 19th of december, 1962. Section 3 specified the factories insurable under the scheme to be framed under the Act. Section 8 authorised the Central Government to obtain information. The said section provides as follows : "8. The said Act came into force on the 19th of december, 1962. Section 3 specified the factories insurable under the scheme to be framed under the Act. Section 8 authorised the Central Government to obtain information. The said section provides as follows : "8. Power of Central Government to obtain information (1) Any person authorised in this behalf by the Central government may, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the owner or occupier of any property required to be insured under the Act has taken out a policy of insurance as required by this act in respect of such property, or for the purpose of investigating the insurable value of any property insured, or required to be insured, or proposed for insurance under this Act, or for the purpose of estimating the damage suffered by any property insured under this Act. (a) require the owner or occupier of the property, or any person carrying on in India, the business of fire insurance in respect of the property, to submit to him such accounts, books or other documents or to furnish to him such information as he may reasonably think necessary, or (b) at any reasonable time, enter any premises comprising or containing the property, inspect such premises of property, and require any person found on such premises who is for the time being in charge thereof, or in control thereof, or whom he believes to be in possession of information relevant to his investigation, to produce to him and allow him to examine such accounts, books or other documents as he may think necessary or to furnish to him such other information as he may reasonably think necessary. (2) Whoever willfully obstructs any person in the exercise of his powers under this section or fails without reasonable excuse to comply with any demand made there under shall, in respect of each occasion on which any such obstruction or failure takes place, be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. (3) Whoever, in purporting to comply with his obligations under this section, knowingly or recklessly makes a statement false in a material particular shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. (3) Whoever, in purporting to comply with his obligations under this section, knowingly or recklessly makes a statement false in a material particular shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. (4) Where in any proceedings in respect of a contravention of section 5 in relation to any factory, it is proved, in relation to that factory- (a) that a demand for the production of a policy of insurance issued in accordance with the Scheme insuring the owner or occupier of the factory was duly made under this section and was not complied with, and (b) that the person making the demand was nut satisfied that there was such a policy in existence it shall be presumed, except in so far as the contrary is proved, that the said section 5 was being contravened in relation to that factory at the time when the demand was made and continued to be contravened in relation to that factory at all times thereafter." 2. SECTION 11 provides for recovery of premiums unpaid. Sub-section (3) of section 1 is material and it is necessary to set out the same : "(3) It shall remain in force during the period of operation of the Proclamation of Emergency issued on the 26th october, 1962, and for such further period as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be the period of emergency far the purposes of this Act, but its expiry shall not affect anything done or omitted to be done before such expiry and section 6 of the General Clauses act, 1897 (10 of 1897), shall apply up on the expiry of this Act as if it had been repealed by a Central Act". Pursuant to this Act a scheme was framed, it is not necessary in view of the fact that only one point was urged in this case, though several points were taken in the petition, to refer in detail to the said scheme. In clarification of the point urged in support of this application Mr. Pursuant to this Act a scheme was framed, it is not necessary in view of the fact that only one point was urged in this case, though several points were taken in the petition, to refer in detail to the said scheme. In clarification of the point urged in support of this application Mr. Dutt formulated four points as additional grounds to the petition and I allowed his client to agitate these joints, which are as follows : "I. For that in view of the constitutional provision in Article 358, leading to automatic lapse of emergency legislation, the standard saving clause of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 cannot be construed to save a temporary statute enacted for the period of emergency II. For that the cloak of immunity embodied in words of Article 358 "except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the laws so ceases to have effect" makes section 6 of the General clauses Act of doubtful validity with regard to Emergency legislation. III. For that in view of the well accepted principle that the effect of expiration of the temporary statutes is a matter of construction, the principle of repeal embodied in the Section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application to the expiry of a temporary statute. IV. For that the Emergency Risks (Factories) Insurance Act, 1962, Emergency risks (Goods) Insurance Act, 1962 being a temporary Act expired on the withdrawal of the Proclamation of emergency by the President on 10th january, 1968, and as such there is no person authorised by the Central Government to determine the evaded premium and to collect the Same as an arrear of land revenue". 3. AS mentioned hereinbefore in the application I am concerned with the contention that after the emergency was over, the temporary statute expired and the prosecution cannot continue under the temporary statute any further. It. was, therefore, urged that no action could be taken any further by the Chief enforcement Officer under the scheme. Indeed Mr. Dutt urged there was no chief Enforcement Officer and the scheme had become inoperative and there could not be any determination as contemplated by section 8 of the Emergency Risks (Factories) Insurance Act, 1962. The Emergency Risks (Factories)Insurance Act, 1962 is a temporary Act. The rule of construction applicable in cases of actions under temporary statutes are well settled. Dutt urged there was no chief Enforcement Officer and the scheme had become inoperative and there could not be any determination as contemplated by section 8 of the Emergency Risks (Factories) Insurance Act, 1962. The Emergency Risks (Factories)Insurance Act, 1962 is a temporary Act. The rule of construction applicable in cases of actions under temporary statutes are well settled. As a general rule, unless it contains some special provision to the contrary, after a temporary Act has expired no proceeding can be taken upon it, and it ceases to have any further effect. It is important, therefore, to bear in mind the distinction between a temporary Act and a perpetual Act. Every statute for which no time is limited is called a perpetual statute and continue in force until it is repealed, while a temporary Act is of limited duration and lapses automatically after the specified period. The difference between the effect of the expiration of a temporary Act and the repeal of a perpetual Act was pointed out by parke B. in (1) Steavenson v. Oliver 151 E. R. p. 1024. It was observed, "there is a difference between temporary statutes and statutes which were repeal ed; the latter (except so far as they relate to transactions already completed under them) became as if they had never existed; but with respect to the former the extent of the restrictions imposed, and the duration of the provisions, are matters of construction. " reference may also be made for this proposition to Craies on Statute Law, sixth Edition, page 408. The point was again considered in the case of (2) R. v. Wicks, 1946 2 All E. R. 529. The last mentioned case was approved in appeal by the House of Lords and the said decision is reported in (3) (1947)1 A. E. R., p. 205. The position was again considered in the case of (4) Director of Public Works and another v. HO Po Sang and others, (1961) A. C. 901 = (1961) 2 A. E. R. 721. In the case of (5) Rayala Corporation v. Director of enforcement, S. C. p. 494, the Supreme court of India had occasion to decide the question whether the prosecution started after 1st of April, 1965 when rule 132-A (2) had been omitted by defence of India Amendment Rules 1965, was invalid or not. In the case of (5) Rayala Corporation v. Director of enforcement, S. C. p. 494, the Supreme court of India had occasion to decide the question whether the prosecution started after 1st of April, 1965 when rule 132-A (2) had been omitted by defence of India Amendment Rules 1965, was invalid or not. There the supreme Court held that the language contained in clause (2) of the Defence of India (Amendment) Rules, 1965 whereby Rule 132-A (2) was omitted could only afford protection to action already taken while Rule 132-A (2) was in force, but could not justify initiation of a new proceeding which would not be a thing done or omitted to be done under the rule but a new act of initiating a proceeding after Rule 132-A (2)had ceased to exist. There clause (2)of the Amendment Rules by which Rule 132-A ceased to have effect was to the following effect "in the Defence of India Rule, 1962, rule 132-A (relating to prohibitions of holdings of foreign exchange) shall be omitted, except as regards things done or omitted to be done under that rule". The Supreme Court was of the opinion, that the language contained in clause (2) of the Amendment Rules only afforded protection to action already taken while Rule 132-A was in force, but could not justify initiation of a new proceeding which would not be a thing done or omitted to be done under the rule: but a new act of initiating a proceeding after the rule had ceased to exist. The Supreme Court came to this view because the Supreme Court reiterated its earlier view expressed in the case of (6) S. Krishnan v. State of Madras a. I. R. 1951 S. C. p. 301, where relating to the temporary statutes the Supreme court had observed "the general rule with regard to temporary statute is that in the absence of special provision to the contrary proceedings which are taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires". In this connection it is necessary to refer to Article 358 of the Constitution. Which is in the following terms : "358. In this connection it is necessary to refer to Article 358 of the Constitution. Which is in the following terms : "358. While a Proclamation of emergency is in operation, nothing in article 19 shall restrict the power of the state as defined in Part III to make any law or to take any executive action which the State would but for the provisions contained in that Part be competent to make or to take, but any law so made shall, to the extent of the in-competency, cease to have effect as soon as the Proclamation ceases to operate, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the law so cease to have effect". It is also necessary to refer to Article 352 of the Constitution which is in the following terms: "352 (1) If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance, he may by Proclamation, make a declaration to that affect. (2) A Proclamation issued under clause (1) - (a) may be revoked by a subsequent proclamation; (b) shall be laid before each House of Parliament; (c) shall cease to operate at the expiration of two months unless before the expiration of that period it has been approved by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament; provided if any such Proclamation is issued at a time when the House of the people has been dissolved or the dissolution of the House of the People takes place during two months referred to in sub-clause (c) and if a resolution approving the Proclamation has been passed by the Council of States, but no resolution with respect to such Proclamation has been passed by the House of the People before the expiration of that period, the Proclamation shall cease to operate at the expiration of thirty days from the date on which the House of the People first sits after its reconstitution unless before the expiration of the said period of thirty days a resolution approving the Proclamation has been also passed by the House of the People. (3) A Proclamation of Emergency declaring that the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened by war or by external aggression or by internal disturbance may be made before the actual occurrence of war or of any such aggression or disturbance if the President is satisfied that there is imminent danger thereof. " 4. MR. Dutt also drew my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States of America in the case of (7) Young Stown Sheet and Tube company v. Charles, Sawyer, United states Supreme Court Reports, 96 Law ed. page 1153. This decision was refer red to by Mr. Dutt for the proposition that the declaration of emergency pro vided an occasion for use of certain power, but did not enlarge the scope or ambit of that power. This proposition cannot be disputed. In my opinion, however, the question in the present case will have to be determined in the con text of the language of the present. statute and in the background of the constitutional provision, the language of the statute in specific terms provide that the expiry of the temporary statute shall not affect anything done or omitted to be done before such expiry and it also provides that section 6 of the General clauses Act, 1897 shall apply upon the expiry of the said Act as if it had been repealed by a Central Act. In the instant case before me the omission or default with which the petitioner has been charged is alleged to have bean committed when the emergency was in force. Furthermore in the instant case the proceedings were taken against the petitioner at a time when the emergency was in force. The statute in question not only in its terms keeps alive proceedings for anything done or omitted to be done while the statute is in operation, but by reference brings into effect section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which deals with the effect of repeal. The statute in question not only in its terms keeps alive proceedings for anything done or omitted to be done while the statute is in operation, but by reference brings into effect section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which deals with the effect of repeal. Generally in a temporary statute there is no scope of repeal but there is nothing in principle of statutory enactment which prevents incorporation of the principles of section 6 of the General clauses Act in a temporary statute If either the principle of section 6 of the general Clauses Act or the specific term of the statute which save proceedings in respect of anything done or omitted to be done is given effect to, the contention urged in support of this petition cannot be accepted. Counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that this provision in the statute which saved pending proceedings was illegal and ultra vires It was contended that such a provision violated provisions of articles 352 and 358 of the Constitution of India. It was urged that a temporary statute during the emergency could not be so framed that its provisions would be operative beyond the period of emergency. I am unable to agree with this contention. The emergency may be the occasion for the use of the power by the parliament in a particular manner but emergency neither creates, nor abridges or enlarges the content of that power to be used by Parliament. If the Parliament has the authority to legislate in such a manner that in case even of a temporary statute the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act would apply, then emergency does not curtail or abridge that power. It has been well recognised both in England as well in India that a temporary statute could provide for its effectiveness beyond the stipulated period. In the case of (5) Rayala Corporation v. Director of enforcement (supra) the Supreme Court has also expressed that view. I am therefore unable to accept the contention that such a provision was illegal or ultra vires. In the case of (5) Rayala Corporation v. Director of enforcement (supra) the Supreme Court has also expressed that view. I am therefore unable to accept the contention that such a provision was illegal or ultra vires. It is necessary here to observe that my attention was drawn to two judgments, one being the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of (8) Union of India v. Thamanna sitaraman Janeyalu and the other of the A1lahabad High Court in the case of (9) Rajaram Om Prakash v. Union of India. I am in respectful agreement with the views of the learned Judges expressed in the said two decisions. In view of the fact that only one contention was urged and in the view I have taken this application must fail. There will be no order as to costs. Interim order, if any, is vacated. The rule nisi is discharged. Let the operation of this order be stayed for a period of four weeks from today. C. R. 2252 (W) 66 5. IN view of the judgment in the other case, this application must also fail and the same is accordingly dismissed. The Rule nisi is discharged. There will be no order for costs. Interim order, if any, is vacated. Let the operation of this order be also stayed for a period of four weeks from today.