JUDGMENT J.S. Trivedi, J. - The plaintiff-respondent was appointed a temporary Overseer in the Public Works Department of the U.P. State in the year 1948. In the year 1953 general rules of appointment were framed under G.O. No. 230/1 IB-953 dated 30th January 1953. After the reframing of the aforesaid rules every temporary employee including the plaintiff gave in writing an undertaking to the State Government that they were prepared to be re-employed from March 1953 on terms of employment for temporary Government servants which were in force under the aforesaid notification. The plaintiff continued to be employed as a temporary Overseer till 24th January, 1958 when he was served with a notice dated 24th January 1958 intimating him that his services shall stand terminated after the expiry of one month. An appeal against the order was filed by the plaintiff before the State Government. The State Government rejected the representation of the plaintiff by its order dated 9th April. 1958. The suit out of which this appeal arises was then filed by the plaintiff-respondents for a declaration that the termination of his service was illegal and for arrears of pay. 2. The appellant State of Uttar Pradesh contested the suit. The trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit holding that the services of the plaintiff were terminated for no fault of his and as such the termination amounted to punishment. The plaintiff was held to be entitled to claim benefit under Articles 16 and 311 of the Constitution of India. The lower appellate court confirmed the decree of the trial court, hence this second civil appeal. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh has contended that the plaintiff-respondent being temporary servant, his services were liable to be terminated by a simple order so long as the order was not mala fide order. He has further contended that the plaintiff-respondent having accepted re-employment under Rules of 1953. it was not open to him to challenge the applicability of those rules. He has further contended that the plaintiff-respondent had not in his pleadings stated that the acceptance of reemployment was under some coercion or fraud and, therefore, the lower appellate Court was not correct in holding that the acceptance of reemployment was the result of some undue influence exercised on the appellant. He has further contended that the plaintiff-respondent had not in his pleadings stated that the acceptance of reemployment was under some coercion or fraud and, therefore, the lower appellate Court was not correct in holding that the acceptance of reemployment was the result of some undue influence exercised on the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed his reliance on Union of India v. Pandurang Kashinath More, A.I.R. 1962 SC 630 for the proposition that where improper conduct is alleged it must be set out in all particulars and an arbitrary and discriminatory character must be established before the order is struck down for violating Article 16 of the Constitution. Reliance has also been placed on Ram Gopal Chaturvedi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1970 SC 158 in support of the proposition that it is impossible to define before hand all the circumstances in which the discretion for termination can be exercised. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand has contended that Article 16 of the Constitution of India was infringed so far as the persons junior to the employee were retained in service while the services of the plaintiff-respondent were terminated. He has further contended that the rules under the notification dated 30th January 1953 were not applicable to the plaintiff-respondent firstly because the signature on exhibit A-l was obtained by undue pressure and secondly the rules were applicable only to the persons who were admitted to service after the enforcement of the aforesaid rules. 5. The applicability of the rules was not challenged by the plaintiff-respondent on the ground that the writing Exhibit A. 1 was the result of some undue pressure on him. All that was stated by the plaintiff-respondent was that the rules were not applicable to the facts of the case. It is, therefore, not open to the plaintiff-respondent to contend that he was not bound by the terms of employment for temporary Government Servants promulgated under rules dated 30th January 1953. 6. The plaintiff-respondent being a temporary servant, it is immaterial whether the rules were applicable to him or not. The services of temporary servants are always terminable on a month's notice. It is only when the termination is by way of punishment that Article 311 comes in force. 6. The plaintiff-respondent being a temporary servant, it is immaterial whether the rules were applicable to him or not. The services of temporary servants are always terminable on a month's notice. It is only when the termination is by way of punishment that Article 311 comes in force. Even if misconduct, negligence or inefficiency is the motive or inducing factor, the termination of the service will not be bad so long as no stigma is cast on the employee by the termination of the employee's services. The order of termination in the instant case did not cast any stigma on the plaintiff-respondent's character or integrity nor is there anything to show that the order was to visit him any evil consequences. An order of termination, except in the cases of retrenchment, is usually passed on the ground of the unsatisfactory work of the employee. The motive and the reason for which the order of termination is passed will not make the order of termination an order of termination by punishment. It is true that the plaintiff in his plaint had stated that his work was satisfactory, but from the record it is clear that he had earned adverse entries and had not earned any increment even from 1930 to 1955 as he had failed to pass the professional examination. He had also stated that he did not cross the efficiency bar. A plea of discrimination must be based on clear pleadings and detailed particulars on the basis of which discrimination is sought to be proved. Simply because the services of a senior employee is terminated whereas the services of a junior is retained, it cannot be said that the employer discriminated in the discharge of his duties. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent placed his reliance on cases between R.K. Bhatt v. Union of India, (1970) 2 Lab LJ 587 (SC) (December issue) and (1970) 2 Lab LJ 440 : (reported in A.I.R. 1971 SC 1011) (October issue) in support of his plea of discrimination. All those cases are cases of retrenchment and do not lay down that the services of a senior employee cannot be terminated before terminating the services of a junior employee. Retrenchment presupposes the retrenchment of the junior most personnel of the same grade. Termination simpliciter not on account of retrenchment is distinct from termination on account of retrenchment. All those cases are cases of retrenchment and do not lay down that the services of a senior employee cannot be terminated before terminating the services of a junior employee. Retrenchment presupposes the retrenchment of the junior most personnel of the same grade. Termination simpliciter not on account of retrenchment is distinct from termination on account of retrenchment. Termination of services of an employee normally, as stated earlier, is effected on account of the unsatisfactory work. Doddaiah v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1967 Mys 223 on which reliance is placed by the respondent was a case of arbitrary exercise of the power of termination and it was rightly laid down that the arbitrary termination of services of the petitioner is opposed to Article 16 of the Constitution. In order, therefore, to prove that there was arbitrary discrimination, it was essential for the plaintiff to prove that those retained in service had also incurred equal number of adverse reports and their increments were also held up for failure to pass the professional examination. The Courts below were, therefore, not. right in presuming discrimination especially when the personal file of the plaintiff-respondent was made part of the record and was inspected by the Courts below. Even in the not under Section 80, Civil P.C. the plaintiff-respondent had admitted that he was the recipient of adverse remarks and the termination was challenged for violating Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Unless, therefore, the plaintiff had alleged and was successful in proving that those senior to him had incurred equal adverse remarks, it was not open to him to contend that he has been discriminated and the order of termination is bad on that account. 8. Discrimination is always the result of some mala fide action. The plaintiff has not assigned any reason why he alone was selected for termination of his service. That also goes to show that the order of termination was not based on discrimination. 9. For the reasons given above the Courts below erred in law in decreeing the plaintiff's suit. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the suit of the plaintiff is dismissed with costs throughout.